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During the 1980s and 1990s, the autonomy and capacity of the state has been under 
considerable stress in regards to the reduction of public policy choice. External' forces of 
globalisation and technical innovations have led to a loss of economic 'boundary control', 
initiating cross-national policy change and a convergence of public policies on a neo- 
liberally-led paradigm.
This development has been reflected in the processes of policy change experienced 
by the British Labour Party and the German Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(SPD), in particular in the ideologically charged area of 'social democratic' labour market 
policy (LMP) choices.
This study argues, that although political systems and institutional cultures of 
'social democratic' parties and agents differ substantially between the UK and Germany, 
'social democratic' parties economic policy approaches are increasingly developing along 
similar lines. Both parties1 responses to the changing contextual 'internal' domestic as well 
as 'external' socio-economic factors are cross-nationally compared and their constrains 
encountered by path dependencies and a historically institutionalised economic policy 
paradigm are investigated.
Faced with a general shift in paradigm from 'Keynesian' to 'neo-liberal', party 
actors - guided by prescriptive social democratic policy templates - were initially inhibited 
from aligning policy approaches. This contributed significantly to a 'delayed' shift in both 
parties' economic policy paradigm, electoral failure, and a lack of the parties' public 
economic policy credibility.
Several strata of information have been used to combine analytical and empirical 
evidence - utilising both quantitative (statistical) data as well as the historical analysis of 
both parties’ policy development processes. Qualitative sources have been backed up by 
quantitative evidence of the parties’ programmatic changes in labour market polices that 
were gathered with a labour market policy coding frame for the statistical multi-lingual 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: The development of labour market policies. 
Comparing long-term policy change in the British Labour Party and 




1.4. The quantitative and qualitative approach to programme analysis
1.5. Social Democracy and labour market policy
1.5.1. The quantitative and qualitative approach to policy analysis
1.5.2. Parties' operating in opposition
1.5.3. Differences in political systems, domestic challenges and policy traditions
1.6. The Historical Institutionalist approach
1.6.1. Linking the neo-institutionalist approach to the decline of the Keynesian paradigm
1.1. Introduction
This thesis deals with the ongoing policy change and organisational 
transformation brought about by the British Labour Party (1979-97) and the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - SPD (1982-98) in a period of long-term 
opposition. During this period the autonomy of the state came under considerable stress 
and the capacity of the parties in government to make effective public policy choices was 
significantly reduced. Forces of economic globalisation and innovations in information 
technology have led to the loss of economic 'boundary control', initiating cross-national 
policy change with convergence of public policies between parties of differing ideological 
persuasion on the basis of a neo-liberal paradigm. In response, the state and within it 
(governing) parties have increasingly responded to these challenges by changing their 
policies, mainly by reducing state interventionist measures or ceasing to advocate such 
solutions.
The processes of party policy change are to be investigated by analysing the 
manner in which party political elites have gradually altered their 'belief systems' over 
time, taking into account the specific conditions and restraints political parties (as mass 
membership organisations) are under.1 In other words, how did both 'northern' European 
social democratic parties - in opposition - solve their problem of achieving a functional 
alignment of goals and structure, while engaging in an ongoing learning process in the
1 The notion of ‘belief systems’ rather than ‘interests’ is chosen for this study. While interest models 
presuppose the definition o f a set o f means and performance indicators necessary for goal attainment 
(interests/goals), ‘beliefs’ are more inclusive and more verifiable. ‘Belief systems’ models can incorporate 
self-/organisational interests allowing actors to establish goals in different ways (e.g. perceptions due to
12
presence of persistent uncertainty? Furthermore, can we draw wider conclusions from the 
experiences of those two parties?
This thesis uses the example of both the development of labour market policies 
(LMPs) in both parties to assess comparatively the institutional learning and processes of 
policy change both 'social democratic' parties engaged in during their long period in 
opposition. We than draw conclusions from the processes of transformation by looking at 
how party actors have analysed and incorporated different 'influence-components' into 
programmatic and organisational responses. The eventual aim is to understand how both 
'social democratic' parties (in opposition) have been subject to differing 'external' national 
and international as well as 'internal' influences (such as different intra-party challenges, 
traditions, and party policy making processes) and how - in response - processes of policy 
change have occurred.
In Chapter 2 we assess the exogenous shocks in social and political conditions in 
the form of increasing state budgetary problems; the rising challenge of high 
unemployment; changing economic conditions (Europeanisation, globalisation, the rise of 
the multinationals and NIC's; oil crisis; the decline in economic growth and 
unsustainability of the previous expansion of welfare states) that altered dramatically the 
socio-economic landscape and deprived social democratic parties of their Keynesian- 
inspired economic policy foundations. As a result, their traditional programmes had been 
deprived of a substantial set of (nation-based) policy solutions.
In Chapter 3 we investigate the 'internal context' (national operational conditions, 
agenda's, strategies and choices) in which both parties had to place their LMP 
development. Here, we assess, if the Labour Party and the SPD also suffered under the 
structural disadvantage of being in opposition, i.e. if it can be claimed that they were 
deprived of substantial governmental (civil service) resources, up-to-date data and the 
pressures of having to adopt pragmatic and financially sound policy positions that the 
public would view as realistically implementable once in office. At the same time, we 
focus on the changing role of policy presentation, policy communication and the use of
socialisation), making it more inclusive. (Sabatier, Paul A. - ‘An advocacy coalition framework of policy 
change and the role of policy-orientated learning’, Policy Sciences. 21, 1988, p 142)
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the media. Furthermore, both parties encountered differing national political systems, and 
to their electoral disadvantage - changes in the social composition of the electorate.
In Chapter 4, we look at the experience in both parties of substantial degrees of 
institutional path dependency in their policy development outlooks that inevitably 
hindered a swift switch of economic paradigm by party actors. Furthermore, we discuss, if 
this led in turn to a situation in which the parties felt unable to modernise traditional 
Keynesian-led economic policy approaches that remained initially a fundamental part of 
their ideological framework. In other words, did actors encounter severe problems when 
considering a shift in the party's economic paradigm, and hence continued to develop - in 
an incremental and rational manner - policies that were based on traditional institutional 
rules and operating procedures.
Chapters 5 and 6 deal specifically with the parallel search for credible new labour 
market policies and considers traditional pathways; their eventual amendment; and the 
agenda setting by conservative governments as well as both parties' responses and policy 
review processes. Both parties' organisational and policy transformation is, furthermore, 
compared and conclusions are drawn from the SPD's and Labour Party policy actors' 
evaluation of their parties' policy changes. These chapters deal, furthermore, with the 
reform of Labour's and the SPD's internal procedures and policy-making processes.
In Chapters 7 and 8 we develop and use the tool of a labour market policy 
framework for the content analysis of the parties programmatic developments in order to 
assess both parties paradigmatic development of economic policies during the period of 
investigation. We then apply qualitative data to analyse and explain the policy 
developments that have taken place in this area. Here, the aim is to show the role 
paradigms played within the process of parties' making policy choices and deciding upon 
their political strategy.2
Paradigms are used in this study as frameworks containing explicit statements on perceived concepts of 
thought and theories. They entail a multitude o f commitments to preferred types o f instrumentation and to the 
ways in which accepted instruments may legitimately be employed. Often institutional rules derive from 
paradigms, but paradigms can guide (research) even in the absence o f mles. (Kuhn, Thomas S. - The structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, The University o f Chicago Press, London 1962 [1968], p 40). Paradigms set the 
limits o f action, the boundaries o f acceptable inquiry and maintain criteria for the finding o f problem 
solutions. Inevitably, policy-makers may face the problem of being unable to perceive and consider possible
14
Overall, this thesis focuses on the question, if the continued application of a party 
paradigm offers part of the explanation why both parties faced long-term electoral failure, 
and if the eventual overall shift in economic paradigm - leading to a substantial degree of 
policy convergence in both parties LMPs - can be held responsible for both parties 
eventual revival in electoral fortunes?
Research approach
A. Investigate the environmental context and challenges for social democratic parties.
B. The assessment of the programmatic change with quantitative and qualitative research tools 
(using the example of LMPs).
C. The coding of party policy documents allows their quantitative content analysis, which can be 
added to the evidence drawn from the used common and grey literatures as well as the 
interviews, conducted with party actors.
D. The investigation of institutional constraints on rational party actors in order to enhance the 
understanding of social democratic party policy choices.
E. The assessment of the question if the crises of the Keynesian paradigm led to exceptional 
difficulties for social democratic party actors as they tried to adapt to a changed environment 
and amend traditional policy paths.
F. Is it possible to generalise about the development and changes of LMP-making over time by 
both social democratic parties?
G. The comparative analysis of programmatic choices and organisational changes, and the 
significance of their role played in the revival of the Labour Party’s and SPD’s electoral 
fortunes.
1.2. Hypotheses
This thesis tests the convergence hypothesis that, although the political and 
institutional cultures of "social democratic' parties and agents differ(ed) substantially 
between the UK and Germany, the experience of similar 'outside' factors (such as the 
internationalisation of the economy) as well as specific differing 'inside' factors (such as 
operational difference in the domestic political systems) led to the British Labour Party
problems or solutions, which lie beyond their own paradigm defined horizon. (Chilcote, Ronald H. - Theories 
o f Comparative Politics. Westview Press, (2nd ed), Oxford, 1994, p 58) In regards to policies makes, Fritz 
Scharpf has described paradigm rightly as “are operating within institutional settings in which they are much 
less free in their actions than autonomous individuals might be. They are themselves likely to be constituted 
by institutional norms that not only define their competencies and other action resources but that also specify 
particular purposes and shape the associated cognitive orientations.” (Scharpf, Fritz - Games actors play - 
Actor Centred Institutionalism, Westview Press, Oxford, 1997, p 12).
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and the SPD's increasing development of economic policies along similar lines (during 
their long-term spell in opposition) in the 1980s and 90s. In fact, the parties' strategic 
decisions and their policy-making processes enable us to establish similar overall patterns 
of 'social democratic' (opposition) party response behaviour. The formulation of changing 
labour market policies (LMPs) proposed by both parties can be used to illustrate the 
impact this behaviour has had over both parties' processes of policy change.
Even more significant is the fact that both social democratic parties moved at a 
similar moment in time towards the adoption of an increasingly neo-liberal (labour 
market) policy prescriptive economic policy paradigm. This development process was 
already clearly indicated by both parties incremental expression of LMP changes since the 
mid-1980s, but gained momentum that led to an overall change of paradigm and hence 
overall policy approach by the mid-1990s. In fact, a similarly (ten year) delayed shift in 
economic policy paradigm (compared to their Conservative party rivals) from a 
Keynesian-led to neo-liberal dominated policy paradigm can be detected among both 
parties that can be explained by actors' similarly 'path-dependent' application of a 
'strongly institutionalised' (social democratic) Keynesian-led policy paradigm that 
prescribed the parties' labour market policy choices. (Chapter 4)
Furthermore, the remaining substantial traditional differences between party 
institutions and policy making processes, which could have been expected to have led to a 
consistently larger range of varying party policy approaches were significantly 
overwritten by the greater picture of social democratic parties having to re-orientate their 
common policy approaches (and paradigms) according to the requirements of the 
substantial change experienced in political and economic circumstances. In fact, the effects 
of the policy reviews undertaken by both parties since 1979/1982 point towards a dilution 
of the traditional social democratic model and are an adjustment to constrained 
circumstances rather than a renewal of the model.3
3 Until their general election victories in 1997/98, the British and German Social Democrats continued to 
perform weak during elections, even when they diluted their traditional policy model. Only when they 
regained the ability to deliver strong and credible policy visions (even if  predominantly neo-liberal and 
increasingly similar to their political party opponents) did their electoral fortunes change. This was even more 
so the case when they were able to offer policies that addressed the question o f unemployment. In fact, as 
soon as the electorate believed that specific policies were the best possible attempt to cut unemployment, both 
parties were electorally successful, which also shows that election commitments and programmes of political
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1.3. Research Aims
The comparative component of the study and the time period under investigation 
will document the degree of the possible emergence of cross-national policy formation 
patterns independently of party rules, procedures and institutional design.
Transnational differences in work and welfare arrangements range from minor 
variations in official definitions to deep-seated and long-lasting contrasts of historical 
formation, social philosophy, and institutional design. The comparative character of the 
study offers a useful insight into the degree to which 'intemaT and "external' factors 
determined the most recent development of 'social democratic' thought and policy 
positions.
Furthermore, this research adds to the 'party systems' literature by attempting to 
distinguish more clearly between the institutional and rational factors that determine 
party policy-making outcomes. Some useful insights into the nature of 'social democratic' 
party policy development in pre-govemmental 1997/98 opposition can be drawn in 
particular in response to the re-emerging challenge of unemployment. Furthermore, 
processes of policy convergence are identified, which show that the growing dominance 
of the external environmental conditions takes place at the expense of historical 
institutional 'centrifugal' tendencies.
Finally, parties and their changing political appeals are best studied on a 
comparative cross-national scale, as the basis for judgement must be relative rather than 
absolute. A cross-national research approach is far better able to shed tight on questions 
such as have parties made use of the entire range of strategies available and have they 
utilised appeals used by their social democratic sister parties? Which are the significant 
policy areas and what is the degree of cross-national congruity? What are the national 
factors influencing parties' choices? Is the search for new policy approaches such as the 
'Third Way' and 'Neue Mitte' an attempt by parties to re-define an ideological base for 
policy making which offers a framework that can be fitted around their increasingly 
pragmatically orientated policy outlook?
parties are more significant than many observers believe. In other words, only when social democratic parties 
were able to portray themselves as confident and competent were they able to dominate the programmatic 
policy agenda and be electorally successful. Additional aspects, such as policy presentation, communication 
and the use of the media will also be looked at in greater debts in the Chapters 3 and 6.
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1.4. The quantitative and qualitative approach to policy analysis
The general strategy of investigation is based on an 'embedded' (multiple units of 
analysis) as well as 'multiple-case design' approach as specified by Robert K. Yin.4 Hence, 
the study of the programmatic developments in the area of labour market policy involves 
more than one unit of analysis. Within the single (although wide) policy area chosen for 
the case study, attention is given to a substantial range of sub-units.
It is necessary to focus on the parties' organisations as a whole, while recognising 
the importance of several intermediary units. At each level of analysis, different data 
collection techniques will be used, namely programmatic content analysis,5 statistical data 
analysis and elite interviewing.6
This 'embedded' design has the advantage of allowing the investigation of sub­
units, while also dealing with the larger institutional unit. This allows us to remain 
focused on the phenomenon of party actors' changes in beliefs and interests (party policy­
making behaviour) while not neglecting the case (LMPs) and context (historical 
dimension) of the study.7
Several strata of information have been used to combine analytical and empirical 
evidence - using both quantitative (statistical) data8 (Chapters 7 and 8) as well as the 
historical analysis of the Labour Party and SPD's policy development processes 
throughout their period in opposition (Chapters 2 ,3 ,5  and 6).
4 Yin, Robert K. - Case Study Research. Sage Publications, London, 1984, p 46
5 Based on party manifestos or platforms, defined as the recognisable statement o f policy, which has the 
backing o f the leadership as the authoritative definition o f party policy (see: Chapters 7 and 8 on programme 
and manifesto analysis).
6 The study of institutional party behaviour includes interviews with individual party actors/functionaries as a 
sub-unit o f study.
In order to evaluate actors perceptions of change, interviews with both parties past and present actors were 
held which focused on seven areas. First, actors were asked about their evaluation o f newly applied LMPs 
and the way they perceived the process o f policy change; secondly about the impact o f party institutional 
specific developments over time; and thirdly how and if  they (personally) experienced changes in believes 
and opinions. A fourth area of inquiry was concerned with their own role and specific events which took 
place during their tenure in (influential or observant) party positions; a fifth set o f  questions inquired about 
what they believed to have been the main factors that led to policy change within their parties; following on 
from this they were then asked about their evaluation o f the changes within party programmes and their 
causes; and finally actors were invited to express what future LMP trends they expected from their parties.
7 As suggested by Yin, Robert K. - Case Study Research. Sage Publications, London, 1984, p 50
8 Quantitative (statistical) evidence has been collected with the help o f a especially developed labour market 
policy framework to enable the statistical multi-lingual comparison of parties policy pledges expressed in 
party manifesto’s and major mid-term statements over time.
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While looking at a single policy area, it is important that the research design 
enables the assessment of multiple sub-cases of policy that fall within the LMP area. This 
makes this approach unusual, as it is assumed - for the comparative component - that 
policy preferences of both parties may overlap, i.e. the aggregation of policy approaches 
are viewed as a whole in order to deal with the labour market and tackle unemployment. 
However, as much as assessing the single policy outcomes and explanations behind it, 
multiple-sub cases of policy-making can only be compared loosely when considering 
actors' intentions and policy contents, as their contextual circumstances are of similar 
significance.
This thesis will consider agency, institutions and structure. Competing narratives 
are assessed and drawn from several theoretical approaches while evaluating which one is 
most helpful and least instructive. Policy decisions of political parties are bound by certain 
organisational rules. Party rules that were introduced by actors to guide and safeguard 
decision-making and recognise contextual factors (e.g. environmental change) beyond the 
control of single actors short-term considerations. However the role of individual 
(rational) actors cannot be ignored.
In order to simplify the research focus, a variety of factors influencing the policy 
formation process of political parties in opposition must first of all be identified and 
grouped. As shown in table (1.1), it is the intend to go beyond the stage of analysing 
policy change as a function of political parties consisting of input, black box, output and 
feedback factors. Instead, to gain useful results, different factors and theoretical 
approaches are identified to explain and evaluate outcomes of party policy-making.
The number of factors listed in the generalised model of the 'policy change 
function of political parties' are not fixed and their significance and role varies depending 
on the individual party structures, the distinctive political environment and above all the 
specific policy area under investigation (1). For the purpose of this study, the factors of 
motivation (2) and policy making (3) are chosen to be at the heart of the research focus 
when explaining the process of LMP change. From this follows the choice of theory 
applied in the analysis in order to gain an improved understanding of the programmatic 
policy outcome (4) over time. At the same time, the eventual policy outcome (4) produces 
feedbacks on motivation (2) as well as policy-making process (3) for the next 'round' of
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policy change in a continuous process of parties' re-balancing the various and constantly 
changing interests, factions and influence components within their institutions while 
responding to the continuously changing 'external' and 'internal' environmental and 
policy contexts (1).
For this thesis, an approach that contains the quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of policy programme content has been chosen to document and assess the development of 
LMPs by the Labour Party and the SPD.
(1) The quantitative approach: Quantitative (statistical) evidence has been collected with 
the help of an especially developed labour market policy framework to enable the 
statistical multi-lingual comparison and analysis of parties policy pledges expressed in 
party manifesto's and major mid-term statements over time.
(2) The qualitative component in form of commonly used empirical research tools: 
Programme analysis, literature, party documents and interviews with policy actors have 
been used to assess the processes involved in the LMP-formation of the Labour Party and 
the SPD and supplement quantitative findings. This means, that LMP-making will be 
brought into a greater overall context, recognising the overall party behaviour patterns 
and policy development as well as changing inner-party structures and contextual 
environmental economic and political conditions.
The policy change function of political parties in opposition
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While the content analysis process is impartial and direct (quantitative), the 
inferences drawn from the results may be quite subtle and indirect. Often, an important 
part of the inference process consists of the recognition and collection of external 
information aiding the interpretation of the content analysis of the text (qualitative). 
Quantitative content analysis alone does not necessarily lead to reliable research results 
(as the frequency of an assertion may not necessarily reveal its importance), hence 
qualitative research must be utilised to validate the quantitative results.
1.5. Social Democracy and labour market policy
Since the experience of the great depression with its severely high levels of 
unemployment in the 1920s, there is possibly no single aspiration with which Social 
Democratic parties in Europe have identified themselves more closely than the 
achievement or maintenance of full employment.
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During the thirty post-war years of economic growth (1945-1975) the problem of 
unemployment seemed to have been diminished and contained with the help of 
Keynesian economic policy, a policy approach that is often understood as the embodiment 
of the post-war "social democratic" model of managed capitalism.9 Keynesianism unified 
social democratic revisionist theory and practice creating the conditions that enabled the 
parties to enact their principal policy ideas of freedom, social justice and equality more 
effectively than ever.
Therefore a "strong link" can be established between LMPs advocated by social 
democratic parties and Keynesianism (even if the actual degree of Keynesian-led policies 
applied varied substantially between different countries). Furthermore, the evaluation of 
the responses of policy-makers to the challenges to established welfare states and labour 
market policies is critical for evaluating the currently widely held thesis that rapid and 
inexorable social, economic and political strategic change is undermining the viability of 
distinctive welfare regimes. (Martin 1996, Pierson 1997) Here, comparative policy analysis 
is essential, as the extent to which "similar" parties remain capable of adopting distinctive 
policies or show tendencies towards convergence reveal an insight on how causal 
mechanisms generate continuity of change in party policy choices over time.
Here, the development and changes in labour market policy positions offer an 
insight to the validity of arguments about the effects of globalisation on policy-makers' as 
the pressures for convergence in this area can be expected to have been particularly 
intense.
1.5.1. The quantitative and qualitative approach to policy analysis
For this thesis, the analysis of policy programme content has been chosen to assess 
the development of LMPs by the Labour Party and the SPD.
9 Keynesianism and Keynesian-style policies are notions used in this thesis as a generalising concept that 
combines the substantial intervention o f the state into economic processes, with the Keynesian paradigm 
being based on the main aspects o f John Maynard Keynes 'General Theory o f employment, interest and 
money' (1936). In short, at the heart o f the Keynesianism paradigm lies the concept o f balancing aggregate 
demand and supply as a concept o f macroeconomic analysis. Furthermore, it entails the provision o f an 
alternative rationale for active government management of the economy to the ‘classical’ neo-liberal view  
that the market economy functions best when free from state intervention. Furthermore, the Keynesian 
paradigm includes a particular set o f policy prescription often referred to as ‘counter-cyclical demand 
management’. This means, for example, that during recession Keynesianism advocates active fiscal state 
policies such as increasing public spending, tax reductions or public works financed by budgetary deficit in 
order to revive the economy with extra investment and demand. See also 4.1.1. and 4.5.1.
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Since the party archives for the period analysed remained inaccessible (20 year 
rule), the research relied on semi-archival sources such as published and unpublished 
party documents, "grey" literature (e.g. internal party working papers), the analysis of 
party events in the academic literature, newspaper reports, speeches and public 
statements of political actors as well as numerous interviews with leading party actors 
and observers during the period of investigation.
Political actors' perceptions of events and their explanations of policy changes, 
actors' stated beliefs, intentions, and motives have been taken seriously in this study as 
party functionaries are not just expected to have acted within their party position, but also 
(and probably more importantly) as 'representatives' of their own perceptions. Interviews 
have also been a very useful source of information as - in the nature of parties - many 
discussions among actors take place informally or without any written trace to constitute 
evidence.
Limitations governed by the official requirements of the size and structure of the 
thesis have meant that only excerpts from various interviews and documents collected 
have been used. In fact, most of the interviews have been used as evidence for, or 
illustration of an argument, recognising the pitfalls of actors occasionally distorted 
perceptions, opinions and memories of past events and motivations. Hence, every attempt 
has been made to cross-check actors1 memories and statements with other documentation 
and literature.10
Most importantly, however, a coding frame has been designed to cover (although 
not exclusively) the most common micro-economic LMP initiatives and measures 
intended (directly or indirectly) to improve the functioning of the labour market. The 
frame divides, standardises and refines various LMPs advocated by the SPD and Labour 
Party since 1979/1980. It expands on previous work undertaken by the European 
Consortium for Political Research - Manifesto Research Group (MRG) (Budge et al 1987) 
to design instruments to facilitate the comparative use of party manifestos and/or 
platforms to gain an authoritative definition of party policy.
10 Interviews with SPD party actors' were conducted in German (see Appendix II). Quotations from 
interviews as well as citations from written German sources have been translated into English by the author.
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The advantage of a standardisation of the party programme texts lies in the fact 
that it offers a reduction in content detail while increasing the focus of analysis. In fact, 
policy details are unified under the roof of one LMP framework that has been developed 
exclusively for this study and focuses intensively on the various policies developed to deal 
with labour market inefficiencies. An economic perspective has been taken on the choice 
of coding categories recognising the analytical and sectoral breakdown of LMPs devised 
by various economists and studies (OECD 1990, Calmfors 1994, Employment Policy 
Institute 1994, Jackman 1994, Robinson 1996).
In addition, the scheme includes the politically focused categories of "external 
relations" and "ideology and institutions" as they are expected to also carry direct 
relevance to party policies aimed at improving the overall employment situation.
Domains of the Labour market doIicv framework
1. External Relations
2. General Policy Outlook and Labour Market Regulation
A. Supply Side Measures
3. Skills and Competitiveness
4. Benefit System and Labour Market Agencies
B. Demand Side Measures
5. Public Sector activity, ‘social employment’ and employment taxes
6. Macro-economic policies for Economy / Labour Market
C. Ideology and Institutions
7. Ideology and Institutions o f the Economy / Labour Market
The term "policy" has been defined broadly as a designated (pledged) action 
concerning a specific policy area envisaged, advocated and promoted by a political party. 
The frames consist of various coding- and sub-categories, which have been developed in 
order to filter precise single LMPs out of the programme text.11 The growing or declining 
significance given to specific policies by parties can then be comparatively assessed and 
conclusions can be drawn from the collected data. In addition to the assessment and 
coding of parties major basic programmes and election manifestos, "major" party
11 See: Appendix III and IV
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statements/policy documents dealing specifically with LMPs developed and published by 
the parties during mid-term are also assessed with the same procedure. Following the 
ideas of Ole R. Holsti, the 'ideal' content analysis "should use qualitative and quantitative 
methods to supplement each other. It is by moving back and forth between these 
approaches that the investigator is most likely to gain insight into the meaning of his 
data."12
1.5.2. Parties' operating in opposition
The fact that the Labour Party and the SPD have been in opposition during the 
period under investigation has been recognised as a substantial factor in the parties' policy 
development processes (See Chapter 3). The party political constellation of 'opposition' 
versus 'government' is a prime motivation for party political activity and programmatic 
outcome. In fact, a variety of factors have been identified which account for distinctive 
differences in opposition party behaviour patterns.
In fact, parties in opposition may be 'structurally disadvantaged' when attempting to 
gather information to develop detailed and coherent policies.13 Furthermore, opposition 
parties are usually not in a position to react directly - unlike government parties - with 
actions to (often only anticipated) changing situations, as they are not in a position to 
implement policies. Instead, they have to decide and voice policy concerns, positions and 
future policy plans to confirm the credibility of their role as opposition party and display 
their ability to deal with (governmental) responsibilities.
Just to give some examples, opposition parties adopt policy positions they may decide 
to advocate not only because they may be popular with the electorate and maximise their 
vote, but also as they may be perceived as damaging the government parties' preference- 
shaping strategies. Furthermore, opposition parties may decide to vigorously oppose and 
contest government legislation to encourage lobby groups to engage the government in 
time-consuming discussions and protests in order to frustrate the implementation of 
government legislation and change voters' perceptions of government policies and its 
degree of competence. In addition, opposition parties can attempt to outbid government
12 Holsti, Ole R. - Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Addison-Westley, London, 1969, 
P 11
13 Ware, Alan - Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p 118
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policies by demanding and promising policies that boost the expectations of the electorate 
(although they may not be sustainable once in government).
Overall, the sample of possible 'opposition specific' factors listed above shows that the 
factor of having to act out from a position of opposition must be taken into account when 
considering the policy-making behaviour and processes of the Labour Party and SPD and 
their attempts to shape the preferences of voters and outbid their opponents policy 
appeals.
1.5.3. Differences in political systems, domestic challenges and policy traditions
The different policy agendas in Germany and Britain have also been influenced by 
each country's constitutional framework, which also strongly influences and 
preconditions Labour and the SPD labour market policy responses.
The fact that British Conservative governments were able to opt for far more 
radical labour market policy choices than the German CDU/FDP government can be 
attributed to long-standing differences in traditional labour market policy approaches in 
Germany and the UK. Furthermore, differences between both countries' political systems 
with political power centralised in the Westminster Model in Britain, and the federal 
model in Germany, which offers much greater institutional stumbling blocks, and veto 
points to substantial short-term policy reform are of substantial importance. Finally, the 
varying traditional industrial relations systems and the far more consensual relationship 
between employers and trade unions (German social partnership vs. negative trade union 
feedback in Britain) conditioned party political labour market policy development in 
Britain and Germany decisively between the 1970s and 80s.
1.6. The Historical Institutionalist approach
Having looked at contextual, country and party specific factors, this study offers a 
theoretical framework to understand party policy choices. In contemporary political 
science, the focus has been laid on statistical aggregation models of choice and exchange. 
The two dominant explanations applied to political events are based on either 'rational' 
exchange or 'institutional' approaches. The 'rational' exchange approach is based on 
actors behaving rationally by choosing among 'ranked' choices. In contrast, the 
institutional approach incorporates aspects of organisational theory as well as sociology to
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emphasise how institutions structure political life and how institutional choices are 
shaping actors ideas, attitudes, and even their preferences.14
This thesis argues that in order to analyse and explain the development of LMP- 
making by social democratic parties in long-term opposition, a solely theoretical rational 
choice approach is insufficient. Although recognising the predominant rational behaviour 
of actors to increase utility, a new institutionalist approach must be added to the analysis 
of actors to account for them being 'embedded' in institutions.
Institutional constraints to the rational actor include institutional formal rules, 
compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure relationships 
between individuals in various units of the polity and economy. Historical 
institutionalists define institutions as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and 
conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political economy. 
Institutions' activities range from setting standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy 
to conventions regulating the behaviour of corporatist players.
A historical institutional approach has been chosen for this study as it contains a 
necessary distinctive view of historical development. 'Social causation' is perceived as 
'path dependent' in the way that the idea that the same pressures and forces will generate 
and lead to the same outcomes everywhere is rejected. Instead, it is recognised that similar 
inputs (conditions and forces) can lead to differing results as outcomes depend 
predominantly on the contextual features of a given situation. Hence, institutions are 
viewed as a major factor premeditating the 'path' of historical development, with policy 
and party institutional change being understood as 'embedded' in contextual features and 
behavioural outcomes.
Furthermore, the historical institutionalist approach distinguishes between 'historical 
events of continuity' and 'critical junctures' that arise when historical developments move 
onto a new path (e.g. due to economic crises, fundamental economic and political change). 
As a consequence, at these 'branching points' institutions engage in substantial changes.
Finally, this approach is promising for the purpose of this study, as it tends to locate 
institutions in a causal chain that accommodates a role for other factors, notably socio­
14 Steinmo, S., K. Thelen and F. Longstreth - Structuring Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992, p 27
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economic developments and the diffusion of ideas and rational actors. Therefore it 
provides a highly inclusive theoretical framework that helps to explain - not exclusively 
but most realistically - the interaction among a variety of factors responsible for the 
behaviour of social democratic parties and allows comparisons during the period of 
investigation chosen for this study.
Here, Steinmo et al (1992) have argued convincingly that institutions shape the 
goals of political actors "influencing an actor's definition of his own interest, by 
establishing his institutional responsibilities and relationship to other actors" as well as 
structuring power relations among actors and therefore policy outcomes.15 However, 
while recognising that long-term institutional pathways may constrain policy choices, 
they cannot be treated as being the sole "cause of outcomes."16
However, while path-dependence can offer insights into the policy continuity of 
parties, the real challenge, however, is to use this theoretical approach to account for both, 
continuity and change, within parties' policy choices. Although the approach may lack in 
elegance, it accounts for an important historical perspective in the overall attempt to 
understand institutional development and programmatic change as investigated in the 
case of the SPD and the Labour Party throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
1.6.1. Linking the neo-Institutionalist approach to the decline of the Keynesian 
paradigm
Finally, this study applies the use of policy guiding overall paradigms to 
understand Social Democratic party behaviour. Paradigms contain explicit statements on 
perceived concepts and theories. They may entail a multitude of commitments to 
preferred types of instrumentation and to the ways in which accepted instruments may 
legitimately be employed. Often, (institutional) rules may be derived from paradigms, but 
paradigms can also guide actors1 perceptions of problems and solutions even in the 
absence of specific prescriptive rules.17 This means, that paradigms guide, for instance, the
15 Hall, Peter A. - Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, p 19
16 Steinmo, S., K. Thelen and F. Longstreth - Structuring Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992, p 3
17 Kuhn, Thomas S. -  The structure o f Scientific Revolutions. The University o f Chicago Press, London 1962 
(1968), p 40
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policy-makers selection of problems, his or her evaluation of data, and often the advocacy 
of an attached theory. A paradigm may set the limits of action, the boundaries of 
acceptable inquiry and maintain criteria for the finding of problem solutions. Inevitably, 
policy-makers may face the problem of being unable to perceive and consider possible 
problems or solutions, which He beyond their own paradigm defined horizon.18 In fact, as 
pointed out by Fritz Scharpf, institutional norms not only define actors' competencies and 
resources for action, but "also specify particular purposes and shape the associated 
cognitive orientations."19 Hence, a once institutionally internalised and applied paradigm 
may in fact substantially influence the development and adoption of formal rules, 
compliance procedures as well as standard operating practices.20 Here, we attempt to 
operationalise the concept of institutionalised paradigms to political parties.
Quentin Skinner has convincingly argued that analysts also run the real risk of 
'applying unconsciously' current paradigmatic beliefs when assessing and trying to 
interpret texts, something that he feared could 'contaminate' the analysts understanding 
of historical writings. This problem obviously occurs when attempting to understand 
policy programmes that were developed during the 1980s and early 1990s. However, 
drawing from the same assumption, we can presuppose that the writer or political actor of 
an historical document (during the time of writing) was also unconsciously embedded in 
his own paradigm, but was most unlikely to have been aware of that.21 Hence, with 
hindsight, it is becoming possible to identify the paradigm that was predominant at the 
time of the formation of a (policy) document. This works however to the advantage of 
today's analyst of historical texts as 'past' paradigms can be re-assembled, something that 
greatly enhances today's understanding of 'historic' writings and choices even if current 
paradigms differ substantially.
Now, if a party's economic paradigm, such as the Keynesian, has grown to become 
a substantial part of a party's ideological foundation, we raise the question if party policy 
makers as well as rank and file members could be heavily discouraged from re-shaping
18 Chilcote, Ronald H. - Theories o f Comparative Politics Westview Press, (2nd ed), Oxford, 1994, p 58
19 Scharpf, Fritz -  Games actors play -Actor Centred Institutionalism. Westview Press, Oxford, 1997, p 12
20 Hall, Peter A. - Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1986, p 19
21 Skinner, Quentin and James Tully (ed) - Meaning and context, Quentin Skinner and his Critics, Policy 
Press, Cambridge, 1988, p 32
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their preferences and allowing a shift in the party's paradigm to take place? In fact, the 
continuous change of the political economic environment; the increasing desperation of 
party actors as well as rank and file members the persisting electoral failure; and finally 
the unequivocal will to re-gain political power and forge new electoral coalitions may 
have precipitated both parties shift towards considering the adoption of a neo-liberally- 
led paradigm, something which may have been a precondition for both parties ability to 
eventually re-gain government office.
The dilemma of the Labour Party and the SPD throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 
early 1990s has been the need to combine - at the same time -  the reform of their 
Keynesian paradigm, embrace neo-liberal ideas, and the development of 'new' distinctive 
policy alternatives. Here, the dilemma lay in the need to assuage the diversity of the three 
requirements.
Finally, the electoral successes of the Labour Party and the SPD experienced in the 
late 1990s indicate that both parties have not only undergone programmatic and 
institutional transformation, but that they seem to have been able to find a new sense of 
purpose and closed some of their ideological and policy gaps that appeared with the 
decline of the Keynesian paradigm. This thesis documents, accounts and explains 
comparatively in the following chapters both parties attempts to re-develop and redirect 
their policy direction in the area of labour market policies at a time of dramatic 'external' 
and 'internal1 contextual change.
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Chapter 2. The development of post-war Social Democracy in 
Western Europe (A general overview)
2.1. The development of Western European post-war Social Democracy
2.1.1. A Brief history of post-WW2 European Social Democracy
2.1.1.1. Pillars of corporatism and the role of trade unions
2.1.1.2. Social Democratic policy agenda setting
2.1.1.3. Demographic change and electoral strategy
2.1.1.4. Party families
2.2. The 1970s and the challenges to European Social Democracy
2.2.1. The crises of Keynesianism and state interventionism
2.2.2. Intellectual attack from the left, new social movements and free marketeers
2.2.2.I. The left challenge
2.2.2.2. New Social Movements
2.2.2.3. The challenge of the right
2.2.2.4. Social democratic partisan voters, issues of power and strategic dilemmas
2.2.2.5. The moral dimension
2.3. The Europeanisation and increasing convergence of Social Democratic parties
2.3.1. Social Democratic parties taking on a pro-European integrationist agenda
2.3.2. Globalisation and Europeanisation and Co-operation
2.4. 'Modernisation': The response of Social Democracy
2.4.1. 'Modernisation' and 'Innovation'
2.4.2. The 'Third Way' and a bit of 'Neue Mitte'
2.4.2.I. What's different? - 'Third Way' and 'Neue Mitte'
This chapter considers the development and problems encountered by European 
social democracy in order to give a frame of reference to the development process of 
labour market policy (LMP) making since the early 1980s. It also attempts to set the 
'external' historical party context in which the Labour Party's and the SPD's institutional 
and LMP development activities must be viewed.
Briefly, since the experience of the great economic depression with its severely 
high levels of unemployment in the 1920s, there is possibly no single aspiration with 
which Social Democratic parties in Europe have identified themselves more closely than 
the achievement or maintenance of full employment. In fact, social democratic theory has 
been primarily concerned with searching and applying for a strategy which viewed the 
welfare state and full employment policies (i.e. social and economic citizenship) as 
necessary preconditions for a socialist transformation of society that was envisaged to be 
based on a modified efficient capitalist economy.22
During the thirty 'golden' years of economic growth (1945-1975) the problem of 
unemployment seemed to have been contained with the help of Keynesian-led economic
22 Esping-Andersen, G0sta and Kees van Kersbergen - ‘Contemporary Research on Social Democracy’, 
Annual Review o f Sociology. 18, 1992, p 188
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policy, a policy approach that is often understood as the embodiment of the post-war 
'social democratic' model of managed capitalism. Keynesian policies (not exclusively, but 
in various forms) were adopted throughout Western Europe and became a synonym for 
what 'traditional' social democracy is widely imagined to stand for today. Keynesianism 
unified social democratic revisionist theory and practice, creating the conditions that 
enabled the parties to enact their principal policy ideas of freedom, social justice and 
equality more effectively than ever.
However, the renewed occurrence of high levels of unemployment during the 
1970s began to question the widely held belief that social democratic labour market 
policies and Keynesian economics were sustainable. The policy model that had previously 
grown to be a consensual part of the economic policy tool kit of Western European states 
was increasingly undermined. In fact, it became clear that the previous economic growth 
rates encountered by Western Europe were an unsustainable precondition for the success 
of social democratic economic and public policy and that new challenges, such as rising 
inflation, could not be dealt with effectively under the old economic policy regime.
The fact that Keynesian policy was so closely associated with social democracy, 
and that social democratic parties all over Western Europe had incorporated a high degree 
of state interventionism in the economy into their ideology created eventually enormous 
problems for those parties in the longer term. As significant changes in the socio-economic 
environment began to undermine 'traditional' social democratic policy prescriptions, and 
while parties of different ideology moved away from formerly widely consensually held 
state interventionist policy prescriptions, most social democratic parties faced an 
enormous problem in adjusting and modifying their policy approach in response to newly 
evolving circumstances. The general challenges social democratic parties faced from the 
mid-1970s onwards and their attempts do deal with them, is dealt with in this chapter in 
order to provide a broad understanding of the parties' specific responses in the area of 
labour market policy.
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2.1. Development of European Social Democracy
Herbert Kitschelt has underlined that "names do not directly reveal differences 
and similarities in the parties' appeals and strategies."23 Therefore, during the course of 
this study, centre-left labour, socialist and social democratic parties will be referred to as 
'social democratic' as they are generally from the same generic group of parties.
A definition of what precisely makes up social democratic party policy is a little 
trickier. The concept of social democracy includes many facets and has evolved as well as 
changed over the years. In fact, social democracy has been a mixture of many different 
influences, with different national parties drawing on a melange of ideological and policy 
traditions. For this study, W. E. Paterson's and A. H. Thomas definition of social 
democracy consisting of five parameters (revalidating Anthony Crosland's 1956 theses)24 
that describe parties as social democratic, if they "advocate political liberalism, the belief 
in a mixed economy, the welfare state, Keynesian economics, and the belief in equality", 
appears to be most helpful.25
However, the choice of Paterson's and Thomas five parameters is not entirely 
unproblematic, as they describe again the features of what social democracy was 
perceived to entail between the post-war period and the mid-1970s. Since then, two 
decades of sustained pressure on Keynesianism and public ownership have raised the 
question of whether it is still appropriate to build conceptually on the Paterson and 
Thomas model. The answer, however, must still be yes, and although social democratic 
policies have had to move on since, the parties and policies are still based upon those 
traditions. Even the recent modernisation of their programmes - according to more recent 
strategic and socio-economic requirements - relate to those parameters.
2.1.1. A Brief history of post-WW2 European Social Democracy
After the Second World War, in the context of the experience of the depression, the 
defeat of fascism, and above all with the onset of the greatest boom period in the world 
economy, the conditions were established for the successful expansion of Social 
Democracy. With Keynesianism and the welfare state providing a substantive content to
23 Kitschelt, Herbert - The Transformation o f European Social Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1994, p 1
24 Crosland, C. A. R. - The Future of Socialism. Cape, London, 1956
25 Paterson, W. E. and A. H. Thomas - The Future o f Social Democracy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, p 3
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'state interventionism', it seemed no longer necessary for Social Democratic parties to 
emphasise public ownership as the centrepiece of planning or control over the economy. 
Instead, emphasis was placed on the idea that a sufficiently state controlled capitalist 
economy could deliver adequate levels of social justice, equality and wealth.
By the early 1950s, the large majority of European Social Democratic parties had 
dropped the idea of abolishing capitalism and replaced it with a strategy of state 
interventionism to counteract uneven development of the capitalist economy. This 
strategy owed its real inspiration to Keynesianism, which popularised the idea of the state 
using steering mechanisms to aim at economic growth, high wages and full employment. 
In accepting a role for both, the market and the state, social democracy accepted 
capitalism under the condition that limited state interventionism would be acceptable to 
capital in the overall management of the economy. Furthermore, an essential part of social 
democratic policy became the idea of the state redistributing the economic surplus in 
progressive ways with the help of social insurance, welfare programmes and tax laws.
Finally, the post-war years brought a period of Social Democratic governments to 
large parts of Western Europe. Parties like the Austrian, Scandinavian or German Social 
Democrats, who had abandoned the aim to create a socialist economy and instead 
advocated the idea of a mixed economy, were most successful. Some socialist party 
leaders and members (including significant elements within the socialist parties of France, 
Italy, Britain and Greece) criticised their contemporaries for managing the capitalist 
system rather then making the transition to 'socialism'. However, much of this criticism 
was rhetorical. For instance - in the case of the British Labour Party - socialist principles on 
ownership (such as stated in Clause IV) were not officially abandoned until the 1990s, but 
played no major role and were never attempted to be implemented by a moderate and 
highly pragmatic Labour Party whenever in government.26
Overall, describing the post-war decades as 'social democratic' is of course a 
generalisation that relates to the role of social democratic parties during that period as 
much as to the overall policy consensus that existed within many Western European 
countries. A consensus that often cut through various political party lines and which was
26 Taylor, Gerald. R. -  Labour’s Renewal. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 168 + 174
34
based on principles that can predominantly be accredited to social democratic policy ideas 
and principles rather than those of any other ideological tendency.27
2.I.I.I. Pillars of corporatism and the role of trade unions
The 'traditional' social democratic state consisted of working towards the 
collaboration between labour and capital (often referred to as 'revisionism') based on the 
idea that the state intervenes when the balance of power seems to be shifting too strongly 
towards one side. This kind of 'state appeasement policy' grew - during the 1950s - into an 
all-encompassing party policy consensus in most of Europe's political systems. Social 
Democrats also derived prestige from some nationalisation and the establishment of social 
insurance systems, which were introduced as a cornerstone for the desired 'welfare state'. 
In addition, the most unacceptable feature of capitalism, namely unemployment, seemed 
to be dealt with successfully through Keynesian demand management techniques.
Economic growth was the underlying central assumption of the social democratic 
approach, an assumption, which led eventually to the crisis of the model. Growth was 
essential in order to accommodate for a continuous increase in state spending. The period 
of economic boom encountered during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s was therefore a 
precondition for the successful implementation of social democracy throughout Western 
Europe.
As previously mentioned, this system worked best in countries where powerful 
and centralised trade union movements where able to organise the working class 
enforcing a strong degree of discipline on their members in order to support wage 
restraint and hence keep inflationary pressures low. However, the degree of corporatist 
structures has varied substantially among northern Europe's countries. In addition, the 
role of trade unions and their influence on social democratic parties has undergone 
substantial changes during the last 25 years. An important component of the activities of 
social democratic parties in their domestic policy systems have been the roles played by
27 Hence, with the clear exception of the ‘social democratic’ countries o f Scandinavia, most o f Western 
Europe witnessed a compromise between social democracy and - social democratic influenced - moderate 
conservatism. Admittedly, many of the key characteristics of labour market policies in Britain and Germany 
were built on a compromise and were not purely social democratic in character - for instance the reliance on 
predominantly passive LMPs as opposed to active Scandinavian type policies. There were even exceptions 
such as the structure o f the German pensions system which was rather o f a non social-democratic character.
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the national trade union organisations and the degree to which corporatist structures had 
been established.28
In the case of the Labour Party, the role of the trade unions had been very distinct, 
not only because of traditional links, common interests, personnel and membership base, 
but also because the unions helped to found and finance the party, and played a vital part 
in Labour's overall (policy) decision-making procedures. Until the mid-1970s, the unions 
had played a predominantly supportive role whenever a Labour government had been in 
office. However, the lack of a traditionally strong corporatist arrangement in Britain; 
decentralised and pluralistic union structures; and a strong shop steward movement led 
to a sectionalised union movement and a localised collective bargaining structure. This 
meant, that the degree of centralisation and union discipline had been far less developed 
than that of the powerful centralised trade union movements on the continent, something 
that had grave consequences. In contrast, in Germany, the state as well as industry and 
employers accepted the 'centralised' role of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) in 
participating in corporate decision-making.29
Gosta Esping-Andersen and Kees van Kersbergen have been arguing convincingly 
that social democratic parties have been more capable of altering the distribution system 
and maintaining growth with full employment when having been linked to powerful and 
centralised trade unions movements. Even though social democratic parties have not 
necessarily escaped trade-offs between equality and efficiency, they have succeeded in 
shifting distributional pressures from the market to the state. Hence, the labour movement 
has often successfully traded market wages for a social wage, and, by doing so, reaped the 
benefits of full employment and strong social citizenship.30
(Schmahl, Winfried - ‘The public-private Mix in Pension Provision in Germany’, in Rein, M. and E. 
Waadensjo (ed) - Enterprise and the Welfare State. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1997, pp 99-111)
28 We use Philippe C. Schmitter’s definition o f corporatism, which refers to it as a concept in which interest 
groups (such as trade unions or employers federations) do not only attempt to influence governmental 
decision-making, but instead become themselves - preconditioned by their ability to enforce a significant 
degree o f discipline on their members - part o f a countries decision-making and policy implementation 
system. This in turn, contributes to a countries policy-making process becoming less confrontational and 
more consensual. (Schmitter, Philippe C. and Gerhard Lehmbruch [ed] -  Trends toward corporatist 
intermediation. Sage, London, 1979, p 14-16)
29 Koelble, Thomas A. - ‘Challenges to the Trade Unions: The British and West German Cases’, West 
European Politics. July 1988. Vol. 11, No. 3, p 102
30 Esping-Andersen, Gosta and Kees van Kersbergen - ‘Contemporary Research on Social Democracy’, 
Annual Review o f Sociology. 18, 1992, p 202
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Nevertheless, in Britain the unions played an important role during Labours spell 
in government in the 1970s as the party required union support to fight inflationary 
pressures by initiating a social contract to keep wage increases low. Folklore has it, that in 
1978 union leaders failed increasingly to moderate their members demands and that the 
powerful and highly influential trade unions brought not only the country to a grinding 
series of strikes ("winter of discontent") but also ensured - as a consequence - Labour's 
defeat at the following 1979 general election. In other words, trade unions played - in 
particular during the 1970s - a undisciplined and destructive role right until the anti-union 
legislation initiated by the new Conservative government undermined their ability to hold 
the country at ransom.
This version, however, of the union role has been strongly questioned in recent 
literature on the 1970s and 1980s, with Eric Shaw arguing that the description of ""brute 
union power"" is a clear misrepresentation of the fact that the unions actual influence on 
Labour's economic decision-making as well as their failure to avoid the ""benefiting no- 
one and harming many" strikes were rather a consequences of Labour's deflationary 
economic strategy applied from 1976 onwards.31 Similarly, Gourevitch and Bomstein have 
argued that the "social contract" (1973) negotiated between the trade unions and the 
Labour Party meant, that for the union's co-operation on incomes policy, Labour 
committed itself to a programme of public investment and stimulation of domestic 
demand, industrial restructuring through nationalisation and economic planning. 
However, as soon as the conditions for a loan from the International Monetary Fund in 
1976 became clear, Labour abandoned its part of the bargain.32
What is clear, is the fact that in Britain the unions lost much of their influence 
throughout the 1980s (as a consequence of anti-union legislation and overall changes in 
employment patterns) while their influence on the Labour Party's decision-making also 
began to ebb away with party institutional reforms and Labour's search for new sources 
of finance. By now, the unions have become one of many organisations that the Labour 
Party may consult during its policy-making process. However, the continuous lack of 
corporate structures and "New Labour's' failure to develop any enthusiasm towards
31 Shaw, Eric - The Labour Party since 1945, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1996, p 210
32 Gourevitch, Peter and Stephen Bomstein - ‘Unions in a Declining Economy: The Case o f the British TUC’, 
in Gourevitch, P.A. et al - Unions in Crises, Allen and Unwin, London, 1984, p 48-60
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engaging in a more continental style industrial relations approach means, that Labour's 
link with the British trade union movement is still evolving, if not even cooling further.
In Germany, the relationship between the SPD and German trade union 
confederation (DGB, which consists of eleven individual unions) has been one of mutual 
recognition. Although the trade unions have neither (in comparison to the Labour Party) 
been as directly involved in the institutional decision-making processes of the SPD nor 
have they held a similar financial clout within the party, the overwhelming majority of the 
SPD's party executive has traditionally consisted of trade union members.33 It is also clear 
that both organisations have been strongly dependent on each other, with the SPD having 
traditionally been the party most sympathetic towards demands from the DGB. However, 
the SPD has always been aware that in order to be an inclusive 'peoples party', it could 
not and did not want to become a "prisoner of the trade unions" - a notion which had 
been frequently used by the CDU and FDP when attacking the SPD during election 
campaigns.34
The relationship between political parties and the trade union movement differs 
dramatically in Britain and Germany. In Germany, the DGB is by law 'party neutral'. 
Although more SPD functionaries may belong to the trade unions than those of the CDU, 
the number of CDU functionaries is still substantial and the party - as a classic 'catch all' 
party that attempts to attract a following among most social groups in society - relies not 
only on the votes of union members but also contains trade-union orientated 
'Sozialausschusse' that have traditionally been highly influential on the CDU's labour 
relations policy choices. Hence, the CDU views the unions as potential allies for their 
policies as well as a crucial part of the electorate for which it competes.35 In contrast, the 
British Conservative Party has treated the trade unions as Labour allies and therefore 
traditionally as political opponents.
Even though the DGB has played an indispensable role in Germany's post-war 
corporatist structure and industrial relations system, its power - similar to that of the TUC
33 For instance, by 1994 - 95 per cent o f MPs and 100 per cent of the Parteivorstand (similar to Labour’s 
NEC) were trade union members according to Langkau, J. et al (ed) - SPD und Gewerkschaften. Verlag 
J.H.W. Dietz, Bonn, 1994, p 69
34 Langkau, J. et al (Hg.) - SPD und Gewerkschaften. Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, Bonn, 1994, p 68
35 Koelble, Thomas A. - ‘Challenges to the Trade Unions: The British and West German Cases’, West 
European Politics. July 1988, Vol. 11, No. 3, p 105
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- has been threatened by the effects of economic modernisation. Innovations in 
information technology as well as an increase in deregulated and flexibilised employment 
patterns have led to a steady decline in union membership which - in addition to 
employers increasing rejection of static corporatist structures - has begun to undermine 
the traditional role and strength of the trade unions, with some analysts foreseeing the 
further decline of the movement.36 Similar to Labour, trade union activists and members 
inside the SPD have often been allied to the more traditional wing of their party. 
However, when Helmut Schmidt during his final years as Bundeskanzler in 1981/82 - 
advocated an increasingly neo-liberal economic policy programme, the trade unions 
began to withdraw their support from the Schmidt government, something that 
substantially undermined his power base within the party.37 In fact, Schmidt's policies of 
cutting back on welfare expenditure marked a significant turning point in German 
politics, as this new trend was actually started during the final years of the SPD 
government and only continued (from 1982 onwards) by the new Christian Democratic 
administration under the notion of 'Wende'.38
Interestingly, while the CDU/CSU certainly used anti-state interventionist and 
trade union 'Wende' rhetoric in its 1980s, 1983 and 1987 election campaigns, serious 
conflicts with the German trade union movement remained rare. In contrast, the Tories 
followed up their anti-union rhetoric with actions - the most important being the 1980 and 
1982 Employment Acts and the 1984 Trade Union Act that seriously attacked the strength 
of trade union organisations by making unions liable for secondary picketing (picketing 
industrial sites that were not directly involved in strikes); undermining closed shop 
arrangements by requiring unions to hold secret ballots; and enforcing changes to the way 
the unions were funded and the way their resources were used to fund the Labour Party.39
Overall, it is fair to say that the relationship between social democratic parties and 
the trade unions in Britain as well as Germany are still undergoing a process of transition 
in response to the changing role not only of trade unions in society, but also as a result of
36 Windolf, P - ‘Vom Korporatismus zur Deregulierung. Thesen zum Strukturwandel der Gewerkschaften’, 
Journal fur Sozialforschung. 1989, p 367-87
37 Losche, P. and F. Walter - Die SPD. Wissenschaftliche Biichergesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1992, p 158
38 Gotz, Christian - Fur eine neue Wende zur sozialen Demokratie, Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, Koln, 1984, p 11
39 Mitchell, Neil J. - ‘Where traditional Tories fear to tread: Mrs Thatcher’s Trade Union Policy’, West 
European Politics, Vol. 10, No 1, January 1987, p 33
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the institutional as well as policy modernisation processes that both social democratic 
parties engaged in.
2.I.I.2. Social Democratic policy agenda setting
Intellectually, Social Democracy dominated the political agenda during the 1950s 
and 1960s, while other ideologies faced great problems. Marxism was discredited because 
it was identified with Soviet Union style communism that had been shown to provide 
lower living standards than in the West while at the same time being highly repressive as 
a system.
Conservatism (ideological, not party political) found less intellectual support in a 
period that was dominated by very rapid social and demographic change. This change 
appeared to be moving in the Social Democratic direction of managed capitalism, while 
retaining a certain idealistic appeal in its commitment to redistribution and equality. This 
made some observers believe, that the role of ideology had been pushed aside by a 
common pragmatism and a high degree of consensus in society that had diminished the 
role of ideology in Western society, i.e. hence leading increasingly to the claim of an "end 
of ideology".40 Overall, it is fair to say that a general, often cross-political party "traditional 
social democratic policy consensus" had developed between the years of the 1950s and 
early 70s. Even when Social Democratic parties themselves were not in government, Social 
Democratic values, ideas and policies were often put into practice by their Christian 
Democratic or Conservative opponents.
In addition, a newly found mass appeal was formally expressed, for example, in 
the "Bad Godesberg Programme" of the German SPD in 1959 that was paralleled by 
similar developments in other European Social Democratic parties. Social Democrats 
realised that in order to gain an "electoral" majority and in response to a reduction in the 
size of the manual working class, the traditional core clientele of the social democratic 
parties, it had to appeal to a greater variety of groups in society. The manual worker's 
image of social democratic parties seemed electorally disadvantageous and socially 
inappropriate and in the case of the Labour Party, the influential party reformer Anthony 
Crosland argued during the 1950s that the party would have to seek to build a new
40 Dahrendorf, Ralf - 'Das Ende der Ideologic', Die Zeit. No.44, 11/11/1963
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identity as a peoples' party7.41 In fact, the Labour Party - far from being a reflection of its 
own constitution (and in particular Clause IV7s call for public ownership) - was strongly 
linked with the actual programme of its 1945 Attlee government that had been essentially 
liberal, making Labour a fundamentally pragmatic party.42
Until the world-wide economic problems of the early 1970's, the Social Democrats 
could fairly claim to be at least the agenda setting party - if not the "natural" party of 
government - over wide stretches of Western Europe. In Sweden, for example, forty years 
of being in office only ended temporarily during the mid-1970s. In Austria, Social 
Democrats enjoyed a permanent status of government until the early 1980's. In West 
Germany, after several years during which their power had been limited to the country's 
Lander and regional parliaments, Social Democrats entered coalition governments under 
Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt in 1966 that lasted until 1982. And in smaller countries, 
such as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, Social 
Democratic parties played - if not directly in power - often a formative part in government 
coalitions.
However, there were exceptions from extensive electoral success. For example, the 
French Socialist Party and the British Labour Party managed only short spells in 
government. Both parties policies used highly 'socialist7 rhetoric, were more strongly 
committed to the expansion of nationalisation, increases in public spending as well as 
economic planning than their sister parties, a fact that is often used to explain their lack of 
electoral success.43
2.I.I.3. Demographic change and electoral strategy
Another major factor influencing the policy formation and electoral strategy of 
parties has been the change of their electoral profile due to factors of demographic change. 
Already in the late 1950s the Labour Party and the SPD were faced with the transition in 
the social composition of the electorate. Although social democratic parties' electoral
41 Paterson, W. E. and A.H. Thomas (ed) - The Future of Social Democracy, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986, 
P 5
42 Taylor, Gerald. R. -  Labour’s Renewal. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 168 and 174
43 Morgan, Roger - ‘Social Democracy in Europe: A Comparative examination’, Government and Opposition. 
Winter, 1982, Vol 17, pp 21-34
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support had never been entirely based on the manual working class electorate, this had 
been their traditional core clientele. Both parties recognised the fact that they had to 
widen their electoral appeal in order to be able to gain an electoral majority, which led to 
their re-invention in the late-1950s. This process of broadening the parties appeal to 
become 'catch-all' or 'people's parties' led to two major consequences. Parties were "no 
longer obliged to listen almost exclusively to their own distinct clienteles", and were in 
addition less burdened with the particularistic demands of their core clienteles, something 
which enabled the parties to become more responsive to changing circumstances and 
develop a greater degree of policy flexibility.44
The stability of parties also depends on their capacity to draw voters into their 
organisational nets. By widening their appeal and loosening links with core clientele 
voters, parties became "more remote from the every day lives of the citizenry" hence 
weakening the organisational preconditions for stability as well as voter loyalty.45
Changes in the nature of work over time, the rise of new social groups and the 
continuous fragmentation of the existing class structures as well as the 'individualisation' 
of society and with it of voters meant that both parties had to strategically adjust to the 
changing and increasingly more and more fluid electoral profiles of the voters. In fact, the 
Labour Party and the SPD have tried over the years to expand their appeal to attract 
greater parts of the middle classes, civil servants, skilled employees and those employed 
in the growing service sector.46 From this follows, that elections could only be won by 
Social Democratic parties if they were able to attract the vote of this 'highly fragmented' 
target audience.
However, members of these groups are less loyal to a single political party and 
often vote according to rational considerations, which in turn means that they are more 
easily prepared to change their electoral party allegiances if they perceive greater 
individual gains from another parties' advocated policies. However, these voters are 
considered to be of extreme importance as elections are decided by groups of the 
electorate that consider switching their vote. As parties compete for the votes of this group 
of the electorate, they have to take account of the specific policies favoured by those target
44 Mair, Peter - Party System Change - Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, p 10
45 Mair, Peter - Party System Change - Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, p 36
46 Padgett, Stephen and William Paterson - A History of Social Democracy in Post-war Europe. Longman, 
London, 1991, p 125
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groups and align their electoral strategy accordingly if they want to win elections. In 
respect to party's political choices, this situation has automatically meant the 
enhancement of the interests of the target audiences. In other words, in order to gain an 
electoral majority, parties have had to overrate the interests and policy expectations of a 
minority target group and respond specifically to their political demands, which do not 
necessarily reflect the wishes of the majority of the electorate.
For social democratic parties, this situation has created additional problems. 
Members of the electoral target groups command usually above average incomes and are 
not prepared to support parties which promote policies of substantial wealth 
redistribution by means of high tax levels. Bearing this in mind, social democratic policy­
makers are - strategically - well advised to remove or play down the (traditional social 
democratic policy) issue of redistribution from their party programmes and agendas. For 
Labour as well as the SPD, this has meant that strategic electoral considerations have 
ruled out policies of large-scale egalitarian redistribution.
In fact, the 'traditional' social democratic conviction that economic growth would 
allow a positive sum socialism in which difficult re-distributive choices were no longer 
necessary has been replaced with a situation in which social democratic parties are forced 
to justify to their electorate distributive decisions, such as, to provide more resources for 
schools means inevitably less for something else.47 This process has naturally been 
reflected by social democratic parties' electoral strategies and their programme formation 
decisions.
2.I.I.4. Party families
Overall, the fortunes and conditions encountered by Europe's social democratic 
parties since the end of the Second World War have been quite diverse. In fact, until 1989, 
Western Europe's social democratic parties could be roughly divided into two major 
families acting under quite different conditions.48 One group consisted of the 'traditional' 
'northern' social democratic parties, with those of the Scandinavian countries commonly 
being referred to as the most conventional models, although the German and Austrian
47 Gray, John - Is equality a lost cause?. New Statesman, 28/02/1997b, p 45
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German social democratic parties, the labour parties of the Netherlands and Britain as 
well as the socialist party of Belgium can also be broadly based in the 'northern' category. 
All of these parties operated in advanced capitalist countries. Instead of reforming 
capitalism, they perceived their role as managing it by distributing the wealth 
accumulated by the system; hence they were able to declare as their major political aims 
the achievement of full employment and the establishment of a full-fledged welfare state.
In contrast, a second family of even greater variety of southern European 
'modernising' social democratic parties can be identified, which include those of Spain, 
Portugal and Greece that operated in economies, which can be described as rather 
backward. In the case of France and Italy, both the economic development of both 
countries been of a rather mixed nature with certain backwards areas contrasting with 
highly developed ones. On the one hand were the socialist or left of centre, parties of 
France and Italy, which over long periods faced strong competition from Communist 
parties. This meant that they were only able to gain majorities and government office after 
Communist competition had substantially declined or lost its radical edge. On the other 
hand were the social democratic parties of Spain, Portugal and Greece, which were able to 
establish themselves only after periods of quasi-democracies and dictatorships (that lasted 
until the mid 1970s). Furthermore, southern European social democratic parties had to 
operate in countries with restrained overall economic conditions, which meant that they 
often played the role of being the major modernising political force.
Therefore, the difference between the two party groups was quite significant until 
the 1980s, and the historic late-development in the case of the southern European parties 
as well as their disadvantageous economic circumstances - compared to those faced by 
their 'classic' "northern" European sister parties - mean that both party famities have to be 
treated 'historically' separately.49 Similarly, the British Labour Party and the German SPD 
had far more factors in common with each other than with most of their southern 
European sister parties.
48 Sassoon, Donald -  Fin-de-Siecle Socialism: The United. Modest Left. New Left Review, No. 227, Jan./Feb. 
1998, p 91
49 Thomson, Stuart - The Social Democratic Dilemma: Ideology, Governance and Globalisation. MacMillan, 
Basingstoke, 2000
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2.2. The 1970s and the challenges to European Social Democracy
For a variety of reasons, social democratic parties in Europe were faced with 
growing crises since the mid-1970. After the world-wide recession of 1973, social 
democratic governments were increasingly on the defensive, trying to maintain the 
modest gains from earlier decades.50 Parties experienced a loss in electoral support and 
with it the loss of government office a diminished agenda setting capacity together with 
an increasingly defensive party behaviour in regards to Keynesian-type state 
interventionist policies. There was also a growing acceptance of the neo-liberal paradigm 
in economic and political sciences as well as in public discourse; the decline in party 
membership; increasing internal party conflicts; internal doubts about aim and identity; 
and the realisation and recognition that the 'traditional' Keynesian principles underlying 
the social democratic approach towards economic and social policy were not sufficient 
any longer to safeguard traditional social democratic policy responses.51
The degree to which the encountered problems weakened the appeal of Social 
Democracy in Europe varied from country to country and will be analysed in greater 
detail in the case of the British Labour Party and the SPD later. However, apart from 
nationally specific circumstances and developments it is possible to identify a set of 
common factors that impacted on all of Western Europe's Social Democratic parties. 
Overall, social democratic parties suffered under the crises of Keynesianism and state 
interventionism; changing international/historical circumstances; an increasingly fierce 
intellectual attack from the right as well as left, besides the rise of the new social 
movements. All these factors contributed to the parties' loss of identity and general crisis 
of socialist ideology and post war approaches to social democracy.52
2.2.1. The crises of Keynesianism and state interventionism
The drawing to a close of the post-war boom in the early 1970s revealed the 
fragility of the Keynesian welfare state. It became clear that not just Social Democratic 
policies, but a combination of special conditions had produced the high investment ratios 
of the 1950-1973 period. These included the cleansing of unproductive and less dynamic
50 Braunthal, Gerard - The West German Social Democrats. 1969 - 1982 - Profile o f a Party in Power. 
Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p 290
51 Meyer, Thomas - Die Transformation der Sozialdemokratie. J. H. W Dietz Nachf., Bonn, 1998, p 11
52 Taylor, Gerald. R. -  Labour’s Renewal. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 193
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capital during the depression and the war; vast post-war pools of skilled cheap labour; 
clusters of technological innovations favouring productivity growth and mass consumer 
demand; the weakening of trade union militancy during the cold war and the abundance 
of cheap raw materials and the availability of new markets and relatively open trade 
under US economic leadership.53
With the oil crisis and a dramatic change in the international economic 
environment, conditions for social democracy changed unfavourably and irrevocably. The 
end of economic growth meant a decisive decrease in the ability of governments to put 
forward Keynesian-inspired demand expanding policies due to budgetary constrains. 
Therefore, the idea of centrally placed state institutions being able to actively intervene in 
the market had been met by a crisis.
Furthermore, previous economic policies had ensured coherent intensive regimes 
of accumulation that provided a co-evolution of non-inflationary growth and increased 
standards of living. Even though a catalyst for the economic "stagflation crises" of the West 
was the OPEC "oil crises' that signalled the end to this "Fordist" form of accumulation, far 
more fundamentally was it an expression of Taylorist production norms reaching their 
socio-technological frontiers. In fact, by the 1970s productivity growth had already begun 
to decline and could no longer underwrite aggregate demand expansion.54
Furthermore, even though the reasons behind the increasing unemployment rates 
were initially due to the various factors that had pushed the world economy into 
recession, by the 1980s unemployment was hardly "cyclical" anymore (i.e. caused by the 
end of a business cycle). In fact, governments, such as the Conservatives in Britain, had 
begun to de-prioritise the unemployment question or adopted at least the view that 
aiming for a 'natural1 rate of unemployment would be more sensible then increasing the 
use of further state resources and interventionist measures to halt the increase in 
unemployment. Furthermore, unemployment grew increasingly "structural", with the 
rationalisation and globalisation of economic competition playing an increasingly greater 
part in this. Hence, a vital pre-condition for the successful application and implementation
53 Ryner, J. Magnus - ‘Neoliberal Globalisation and the Crisis o f Swedish Social Democracy’, EUI Working 
Papers, European University Institute, SPS No. 98, 4, 1998, pp 6
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of traditional Keynesian-led labour market policy approaches had been lost.55 As 
convincingly argued by Gosta Esping-Andersen, the "welfare state and labour market 
regulations have their origins in, and mirror, a society that no longer obtains: an economy 
dominated by industrial production with strong demand for low-skilled labour; a 
relatively homogenous and undifferentiated, predominantly male labour force," meaning 
that policy ideas responding to conditions, egalitarian ideas and risk profiles that were 
dominant during the 1950s and 60s had undergone dramatic change since.56 This view has 
been supported in the case of Germany - by observers such as Claus Offe, who has been 
pointing for some time to institutionalised 'Fehlkonstruktionen' (faulty constructions) 
within the German welfare system. Apart from 'benefit traps' that discourage people to 
seek low paid employment - which are also common within the British system - Offe has 
been pointing at traditional welfare state and institutionalised 'faulty' procedures within 
them.57 These include, for instance, in the case of Germany, local authorities that are 
strongly tempted to offer (nonessential) short-term employment to 'Sozialhilfeempfanger' 
(income support claimants, usually long-term unemployed) in order to make sure that 
they can claim ' Arbeitslosen Hilfe' (employment benefits) after six month, which are paid 
by the federal government, hence saving the regional community expenditure on the 
locally financed 'Sozialhilfe'. This procedure may make sense for local administrations as 
it saves them money in the medium-term, but it exaggerates financial inefficiencies within 
the welfare system. Federal money could have, for instance, been spent far more 
effectively on measures to reduce unemployment, while the local jobs on offer were 
usually not helping those unemployed to improve their medium-term career prospects, 
nor were they of any use in tackling structural unemployment. Although these kinds of 
developments cannot be blamed necessarily on the social democratic welfare state, they 
are nevertheless symptoms of a welfare system that has grown increasingly unsustainable 
and requires active state attempts to reform it. The fact that 'New Labour' and the SPD 
promised to deal with them clearly indicates that both parties had changed their 
perceptions of the welfare state before regaining office in 1997/98.
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For a long time, however, Social Democratic parties and admittedly to some extent 
their political opponents encountered severe problems in responding programmatically to 
the change of economic conditions and appeared to be unable to develop or alter their key 
state interventionist concepts successfully. The revival of neo-liberal policy solutions and 
the loss of the ability to dominate political and economic agenda setting has been 
mirrored - in the case of the Labour Party and the SPD -  during the late 1970s and early 
1980s by an apparent problem to develop coherent alternative long-term policy strategies.
2.2.2. Intellectual attack from the left, new  social movements and free marketeers
The described changes that began to take place in the political and economic 
environment since the 1970s were not the only factors that led to a decline of social 
democratic 'hegemony'. In addition, social democratic ideology came increasingly under 
fierce intellectual attack from multiple sides of the political spectrum, with challenges 
being launched from the left and right as well as the new social/ green movements.
2.2.2.I. The left challenge
Left-wing critics, partly inside the Social Democratic parties, began to argue, that 
their parties were only able to retain popular support and programmatic direction when it 
appeared that the system could support it, but that it had lost a good deal of both when 
economic conditions and right wing pressure against previous reformist gains (under the 
new more difficult economic conditions) proved that Social Democracy had depended 
only on the goodwill of industry.58
As a result, the left tried to increase its influence inside the Social Democratic 
parties by attempting to revitalise an ideological discussion focusing on the limits and 
contradictions of Social Democratic ideology. In general, mass unemployment starting in 
the 1970s, cuts in social expenditure and tax concessions for the better off were seen by 
them as proof that the welfare state was only tolerable as long as it did not interfere with 
the logic of production. This then resulted in an assault from the left on "the 'we are all 
socialists now' strategy", leading to the revitalisation of the left in many European Social
58 Benn, Tony - The Benn Diaries, (ed by Ruth Winstone), Arrow Books, London, 1995
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Democratic parties, which demanded that a greater emphasis should be placed on 
'socialist' ideas.59
This 'left challenge', however, hit the Labour Party much more severely and had a 
far more existential effect on the party than it had on the SPD. In fact, Labour's 
consequential weakness resulting from the 'left challenge' strongly influenced the 
domestic political situation in 1980s Britain by aiding the structural weakness of 
opposition towards Thatcherism. Hence, the strength of the left challenge and its role 
within the Labour Party during the late 1970s and early 1980s as well as its following 
impact on the party should by no means be underestimated.
Labour faced the fiercest leftist challenge of any western political social democratic 
party at that time, a challenge that led - in 1981 - to the first formal split within the party 
since 1931.60 This split, together with the temporary political and electorally rather 
successful rise of the so-called splinter Social Democratic Party (SDP) had enormous 
implications on the political forces within the UK that opposed the Conservatives. In fact, 
it must be strongly emphasised that the split furthered the fragmentation and decisively 
weakened the anti-Conservative parliamentary opposition throughout the decade of the 
1980s.61
Although partially successful in the short term (in particular in Britain) and on 
single issues - however with a highly destructive impact in the UK in electoral terms - the 
left was never really able to radicalise and succeed in turning Social Democratic parties in 
a more socialist direction. This was due to the fact that any incorporation of 'far-left' 
socialist policies in Social Democratic party programmes proved to be predominantly 
unpopular with the electorate.
Furthermore, socialism as the underlying theory and goal on which Social 
Democracy was originally based upon was increasingly neglected and pushed aside by 
the majority of the parties' elites. Socialism defined as the aim of far reaching reforms in 
society providing its followers with a long historic tradition and distinctive collective
59 Panitch, Leo - Socialist Register 1985/86, Merlin Press Ltd, 1986, p 51
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61 Hobsbawm, Eric -  Politics for a Rational Left - Political Writing 1987-1988. Verso, London, 1989, p 65 + 
240
49
identity began to lose its importance in the self-conception of most Social Democratic 
parties. For example, the German SPD did not see the need to use the word socialism in 
any of its main 1990s policy programmes. In fact, the partial divorce from its ideological 
socialist roots became a general tendency, which could be witnessed in all of Europe's 
Social Democratic parties.
It follows from this, that although parties have been attempting since the mid- 
1970s to develop alternatives to Keynesian policies, the revival of traditional 'socialist' 
policies was perceived by the parties1 leaderships as a political and strategic threat instead 
of being treated as a viable alternative policy option. This explains, at least partly, the 
limited long-term success of the 'left' inside social democratic parties to achieve a lasting 
change of party policy preferences.
The 'left' challenge increasingly faded further with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc 
states which re-emphasised decisively the shortcomings of the 'communist' state planned 
economies and further undermined the intellectual credibility of Marxist ideology. 
Secondly, the Western European party political landscape was been transformed 
irreversibly. Former far-left radical or Communist parties (with the exception of France) 
were either disbanded, underwent fundamental transformation, abandoned their socialist 
credentials or have been rendered electorally irrelevant. Thirdly, the influence and size of 
the 'socialist left wings' inside Europe's major Social Democratic parties have declined 
substantially. This has taken place often as a consequence of continuous electoral defeats, 
the general unpopularity of far-left policies with the public as well as the realisation that 
'socialist' policies of economic planning, nationalisation and demand management were 
increasingly unsustainable in the international economic marketplace. Finally, the left had 
to face up to the diminishing ability of national governments to implement distinctively 
state interventionist policies. For example, the failure of the French socialist government 
to introduce 'Keynesian-led' social democratic state interventionist demand-stimulating 
policies {programme commun) and the adoption (after two years in government) in 1983 of 
an economic policy approach labelled disinflation competitive (competitiveness through 
disinflation) based on the three main mechanisms of the franc fort (the pegging of the franc
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to the Deutsche Mark; wage discipline; and public-deficit reduction) underlined the 
increasing failure of nationally based policy instruments available to governments.62
2.2.2.2. New Social Movements
A second challenge to social democratic ideology came from growing 
environmental groups, and on a parliamentary level from Green parties, which 
questioned the self-proclaimed 'reformist-agenda' of social democratic parties. Central to 
their challenge was the questioning of the very idea of economic growth - as one of the 
core pillars of Social Democracy - which came under sustained intellectual attack. Various 
influential publications and studies - such as the Club of Rome's 'The Limits of Growth' 
(1972) - published in the early 1970s began to increasingly question the sustainability of 
economic growth in the view of its environmental and physical impacts.63 Environmental 
and Green movements, also present inside the social democratic parties, focused attention 
onto the nature of the earth's resources and the implications of further environmental 
destruction (caused by continuous growth). Apart from the environmental concerns, 
political groups campaigning on a wide variety of post-materialist issues such as the 
emancipation of women, nuclear power and disarmament that operated outside the 
parliamentary framework began to grow.
When social democratic parties realised they had to deal with the concerns raised 
by the new social movements, they found themselves in a difficult and defensive position. 
In fact, social democratic parties were most of the time only able to react and respond to 
the 'new' concerns raised, as their policy makers were not themselves in a position to set 
the political and programmatic 'reform' agenda in those policy areas. Inevitably, the new 
social movements became the building blocks constituting the formation of Green parties 
in most Western European countries which 'not only competed for the traditionally 
centre-left electorate of social democratic parties, but more significantly challenged the 
claims of social democrats to embody a state reformist agenda.
As a result, Green Parties have been able to attract a substantial amount of votes 
and changed many national party political systems. Currently, in countries such as the
62 Lordon, Frederic - ‘The logic and limits o f disinflation competitive’, Oxford Review o f Economic Policy, 
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Netherlands, Germany and France the importance of Green Parties has become so 
significant, that an electoral majority of the centre-left seems unthinkable without their 
support.
However, after more than fifteen years of Green Party existence, Green Party 
politics have become increasingly institutionalised and part of the political establishment 
in many European parliaments. Although the parties have raised environmental 
awareness and introduced notions such as post-materialism to Europe's political systems, 
Social Democrats have been able to argue quite successfully that the threat of 
environmental destruction effects everybody, and to deal with it in a purely party political 
context is a contradiction in itself.
Hence, green policies have been incorporated to a considerable extent into social 
democratic party programmes throughout Europe. In fact it has been argued - in the case 
of the SPD - that the sole appearance of a Green party within the political system 
strengthened the inner-party position of those groups inside the SPD whose policy 
demands in this area had previously been ignored.64 The following two examples express 
clearly the growing importance of environmental issues to both Labour and the SPD. It is 
clear that the SPD has been influenced by the strong electoral challenge from the Green 
Party in Germany, which has led to the development and adaptation of very detailed 
environmental policies. Policy proposals include the adoption of policies for "an ecological 
tax reform' as well as the promotion of ecologically friendly and 'energy saving products 
and production processes' to protect the environment.65 In addition, the SPD has 
increasingly emphasised the economic growth and job creation potential that the 
successful opening up of future markets with German environmentally friendly products 
and technology could carry.
Although to a much lesser extent (due to decisive differences in national party 
systems), the mid-90s Labour Party's programmes have had a stronger emphasis on 
environmentalism than any previous Labour policy documents. In Labour's 1994 main 
environmental policy statement it is argued that there is a 'need to place the environment
64 Leinemann, Jurgen - ‘Am Ende des langen Marsches’, Per Spiegel. Nr 25, 1997, p 117
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52
at the heart of all areas of policy' expressing the belief that 'a green industrial strategy' 
will be 'leading to a higher GDP and higher (levels of) employment'.66
Overall, ecological concerns, at least rhetorically, are increasingly adopted by 
social democratic parties and have found their way into their programmes and 
manifestos. As with the variety of policy issues raised by the new social movements, 
social democratic parties have adopted those policy issues on a case-to-case basis. The 
incorporation of those concerns may be part of an up-dating and constant renewal process 
of the social democratic agenda, but cannot be claimed as a replacement for 'traditional 
socialist' policies. One reason for this is the fact that the concerns of 'the new social 
movements' are not 'totalising' in the way socialism is (or was), promising a new 'stage' of 
social development beyond the existing order.'67
Nevertheless, Social Democratic parties had originally been rather hesitant when 
adopting and incorporating new post-materialistic concerns into their traditional 
economic growth based ideology, a fact that in particularly in countries with proportional 
electoral systems, cost them a considerable amount of voters and agenda setting influence 
during the 1980s.
2.2.2.3. The challenge of the right
The development of the 'social democratic state' with its economic, education, and 
social welfare goals led to the creation of large state bureaucracies, which became 
increasingly a target for attack from the 'right' of the political spectrum. Once questions 
were raised about the sustainability of taxation and state expenditure levels, the right 
demanded the restoration of the authority of the market and the breaking up of those 
bureaucracies.
From the early 1980s onwards, a growing number of free market advocates argued 
that social welfare and high levels of state expenditure blocked the way to economic 
recovery and a prosperous market economy.68 The rise of free market believers during the 
1980s - in Europe represented most radically by Thatcherism - constituted a major
66 Labour Party - In trust for tomorrow. London 1994, p 11
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challenge to Social Democratic values. In the UK, consecutive Conservative governments 
began to break up state monopolies, deregulate markets, privatise national companies, 
break trade union power and expose public services (including the health service) to 
competition. In fact, the growing condemnation of state interventionism by the right 
constituted a major intellectual attack on the core of the 'traditional' social democratic 
state.
In addition, the end of the planned economies in the East and the dynamics of 
globalisation of the world economies led to an enormous increase in neo-liberal and 
conservative policy popularity within public opinion as well as among political parties. 
The American Edward Luttwak has suitably described the new economic policy trends 
and beliefs that have been breaking their way since the mid-1980s and which are 
increasingly adopted and accepted by most governments of the industrialised world 
within the formula of "technological change + privatisation + deregulation + globalisation 
= Turbo-Capitalism = Wealth".69
The intellectual attack from the right and the new social movements questioned 
the core pillar of the social democratic state i.e. the central role of the state institutions as a 
directing force. However, while believers of monetarism favoured the role and capabilities 
of the market as a more efficient alternative to a strong state, new social movements' 
advocates objected to the idea of a central state in favour of more regional and local policy 
approaches.
When considering the overall impact of the 'left', 'right' and 'green' challenges 
social democracy has been faced with since the 1970s, it becomes clear that their influence 
on social democratic parties has differed considerably. Many policy ideas and convictions 
of the 'right' have been recognised and partly incorporated into 1990s European Social 
Democratic ideology. Thus it can be argued that on the one hand, social democratic 
parties have moved 'voluntarily' to the right under the auspices of engaging in a new 
'realism', joining the general move to the right of the European political agenda as well as 
for strategic electoral considerations. On the other hand, parties had to recognise the
69 Luttwak, Edward - Turbo Capitalism - Winners and losers in the global economy, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
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changes taking place in the economic environment, which increasingly forced social 
democratic parties to abandon their 'traditional' interventionist policy solutions and 
beliefs. Overall, 'green' and 'right' challenges to social democratic ideology since the 70s 
have left their deep marks on European social democracy at the beginning of the 21th 
century. While the left challenge seems to have faded, both, 'green' and 'right' ideas have 
been increasingly recognised and included in the programmes of 1990s social democratic 
parties, hence playing a vital role in the ongoing transformation process of social 
democratic ideology.
Overall, it is fair to say that the fundamental questioning of the former seemingly 
consensual ideas of social democracy produced a major crisis of confidence and lack of 
political direction for Western Europe's social democratic parties throughout the late 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s. National Social Democratic parties, their strategists and policy 
makers were drawn in three different directions, which produced a great variety of 
programmatic policy responses over time, ranging from advocating neo-liberal economic 
policies and notions of sustainable growth to ideas of a strengthening of socialist state 
interventionism. From this it follows that social democratic ideology appeared to be 
strongly incoherent and in desperate need of a consistent attempt of reform. This apparent 
lack of coherent or even credible policy solutions led to a loss by social democratic parties 
of political agenda setting power. Furthermore, in the case of Britain and Germany, the 
Labour Party and the SPD appeared disunited and their policies unconvincing to the 
electorate, which explains at least partly their continuous electoral defeats and subsequent 
long spells in opposition.
2.2.2.4. Social democratic partisan voters, issues of power and strategic dilemmas
The unprecedented difficulties of social democratic parties to choose and 
implement economic policies during the 1980s and 1990s must also be linked to their 
difficulties in framing electoral appeals within an increasingly complex environment of 
party competition. In fact, the pressures to engage in party reform and develop new 
innovative policy generated substantial strains on the social democratic party 
organisations among members, activists and supporters.
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While the global capitalism emerging during the 1980s and 1990s favoured neo­
liberal approaches, it is important not to forget that these approaches had also negative 
effects on certain sections of the population. This explains why new policy approaches 
were more easily embraced by some parties -  shifting rapidly from previous Keynesian 
path dependencies towards neo-liberalism and were electorally successful (such as the 
British Conservatives and the German Christian Democrats) - and why social democratic 
parties - such as the Labour Party and the SPD - initially refused to follow this trend.
In fact, the parties that depended traditionally most strongly on those groups of 
voters that were increasingly hurt by the application of neo-liberal policy approaches 
faced clearly the greatest difficulties in accepting the need to follow those 'new' policy 
approaches themselves. In fact, its voters and indeed members had a strong interest in 
discouraging "their parties" from shifting their policies towards a greater application of 
neo-liberally influenced policy prescriptions.
For example, Herbert Kitschelt has been rightly identifying various strategic 
dilemmas European social democratic parties were confronted with during the 1980s and 
1990s, of which the "political-economic" and "electoral" are of particular relevance.70 As 
already described by Horst Kern and Michael Schumann in the mid-1980s, the changing 
face of contemporary capitalism required increasingly well educated, highly skilled 
employees that could operate within an increasingly flexible working environment, while 
the demand for unskilled industrial or "Fordist" employment was declining. This 
development inevitably created a "new" polarisation among labour along the lines of 
increasing wage differentials with a substantial amount of employees finding themselves 
worse off in financial terms as well as in regards to their job security as a direct 
consequence of the newly emerging labour market conditions.71 As described in the words 
of Kern and Schumann, ""in major industrial sectors a fundamental change in the 
utilisation of labour is taking place"" that means a ""re-evaluation of work organisation, 
training and personnel policies and the allocation of work".72 In addition to this, trade and
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finance deregulation allowed an increasingly free flow of international capital that 
enabled companies to locate production processes to less industrially advanced countries 
in which costs were significantly lower, a process that amplified the above described 
trends.
Furthermore, with the additional wide spread abandonment of capital controls 
during the 1980s, Europe's national governments could no longer engage in expansionary 
demand-side policies to boost employment levels and economic growth. This left social 
democratic policy-makers unable to avoid any longer the adoption of economic policies 
that would accommodate market liberalisation and account for the increasing importance 
to encourage international competitiveness of domestic economic sectors by reducing 
costs in order to boost economic performance levels.
Hence, as pointed out by Kitschelt, social democratic parties that rejected the need 
for liberalisation often witnessed, as a consequence, long spells in opposition no matter 
how high domestic unemployment levels had grown and how the actual general 
performance of the economies under the sitting conservative governments had been.73 In 
fact, using the example of the Labour Party's electoral defeats during the 1983 general 
election (even though the unemployment rate had doubled since 1979)74 and 1992 (with 
elections taking place during a severe economic recession) it becomes clear that the 
Conservative Party had been able to win both times as they had succeeded in decoupling 
the governments economic performance record from the voter's perception of policy 
competence of the Conservative governments.75
Furthermore, Herbert Kitschelt has pointed out convincingly that social 
democratic parties - such as Labour and the SPD - faced during the 1980s and 1990s the 
dilemma of failing to gain electoral majorities when signalling their aversion to economic 
policies of liberalisation as voters, in turn, began to doubt the parties' economic policy
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credibility. In addition, potential coalition partners were lost when centrist parties 
demanded greater degrees of market liberalisation than social democrats were prepared to 
accept. However, social democrats that were prepared to embrace substantial 
liberalisation policies - once in office -  often experienced rapid and substantial electoral 
decline.76 In this case, the traditional social democratic core constituency voters who were 
losing out in status, income and security under the increasingly economic 
internationalisation and deregulation abandoned 'their7 social democratic parties as their 
expectations of the defence of the traditional welfare state provisions as well as use of 
active state interventionist policies were not met. Hence, social democratic parties in 
government found themselves often in a no win situation as they were not able - under 
the newly encountered conditions - to sufficiently serve the interests of this clientele and 
hence often began to alienate their voters who then turned away to the left or right. 
However, the refusal to embrace a greater degree of liberalisation deterred other crucial 
electoral groups -  at the opposite end of the political spectrum - from voting social 
democratic, leaving social democratic parties significantly short of an electoral majority.
The fact that conservative-led governments (most explicitly in Britain) also began 
to fight trade union power and successfully reduced their influence weakened the overall 
position of social democratic parties even further, as unions had 'naturally' been the 
traditional allies of social democrats. In fact, here conservative governmental policies 
constituted a systematic shift in labour relations, with the cost of deregulative measures 
being carried predominantly by those groups of voters who - in most cases -  had been 
most likely to vote Labour or SPD in the first place.
Overall, the fact that Labour's as well as the SPD's political principles and values 
had been traditionally connected to the interests of groups whose societal power base was 
losing 'influence' and who had lost 'power' under the changing socio-economic 
conditions, policies of liberalisation and the reduction of welfare state provisions meant - 
in addition to causing problems of party strategy - that party actors were understandably
76 Kitschelt, Herbert - ‘European Social Democracy between political economy and electoral competition’; in 
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hesitant to weaken their parties link with these traditional groups and institutionalised 
interests and abandon their parties long-established policy approaches and beliefs.
2.2.2.5. The moral dimension
Finally, the moral dimension behind social democratic polices focusing on the 
redistribution of resources and high public expenditure appeared not only increasingly 
unsustainable by the mid-1970s, but it became questionable as a tool to promote 
egalitarianism. In fact, the belief that state directed social democratic social engineering 
assumed that state resources spent on 'appropriate' courses would automatically result in 
the implementation of policies dealing effectively with an identified problem lost its 
persuasiveness. Instead, what followed was often the realisation that 'social engineers' in 
the form of civil servants may have their own agendas, which do not necessarily match 
actual policy requirements. An ever expanding civil service and state sector was 
economically not sustainable and could possibly not deliver the required goods most 
effectively, hence questioning one of the main assumption of the social democratic state.
In fact, while social democracy at the time was largely identified with equality, 
fairness, freedom, public ownership and human rights, intellectually ideas such as 
community, solidarity and responsibility had been increasingly marginalised and largely 
deleted from the modernised and revisionist social democracy of the 1950s and 1960s.77 
The arising misconception of the true nature of the state by social democracy as well as the 
growing public perception of the state as a (hand-out) resource provider meant that 
traditional social democracy increasingly lost the 'moral' element of its heritage.78 
Therefore, Social Democracy as a governing philosophy of post-war Western Europe 
began to break down when changes in economic conditions during the 1970s exposed its 
fundamental weaknesses.
As a philosophy predominantly based on state interventionism with an emphasis 
on public responsibility, there was a clear imbalance between the give and take in society, 
which was displayed by a lack of emphasis on the public good and individual 
responsibility. Therefore, in times of crises the social democratic state encountered great 
difficulties in providing the moral basis for the hard choices, which had to be made when
77 Boswell, Jonathan - Community and Economy: The Theory of Public Co-operation, Routledge, London, 
1994
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the economic climate changed. David Marquand has been arguing, that as a direct result - 
in the UK [and not just there] - the public sector became the battleground for predatory 
private interests throughout the 1970s, instead of being a state instrument for a coherent 
public response to the worsening economic situation.79
Most social democratic parties throughout Europe were faced with a similar set of 
problems which provided the base for the argument that a Modernised' social democracy 
would have to revive its ability to state a moral dimension that would contain notions of 
solidarity and communitarian philosophy in its model in order to increase its ability to 
make social choices.
2.3. The Europeanisation and increasing convergence of Social Democratic parties
The increasing Europeanisation and convergence of social democratic economic 
party policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s in Western Europe can be derived from the 
changing socio-economic environment as well as the search for alternatives to meet social 
democratic aims. A movement towards the growing convergence of social democratic 
parties strategy, political options and policy direction can be expected to further accelerate 
with the 'deepening' of European integration continuing.
2.3.1. Social Democratic parties taking on a pro-European integrationist agenda
The recognition of an increasing loss of nationally based economic policy options 
and the lessons learned from this are an experience that has been shared by all of Western 
Europe's social democratic parties. It has led to a revaluation of policies and strategies 
towards European integration based on the admission: 'If you can't beat them, join them1. 
From this follows, that social democratic parties in general changed over time their 
attitude towards European integration. Instead of hoping to implement wide ranging 
nationally based demand management policies, parties turned pro-European integration, 
hoping that the benefits of the process would outweigh the unsustainable 'traditionally' 
favoured social democratic policy options. Furthermore, integration was perceived to 
increase economic growth rates while a re-focusing of attention on European integration 
was seen to offer benefits by increasing the influence on the very agenda of integration,
78 Marquand, David - The New Reckoning - Capitalism. States and Citizens, Polity Press, Oxford, p 25
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e.g. by being able to campaign more effectively for the social dimension of the European 
integration process. A prime example personifying the change in policy and strategy has 
been the former head of the Commission and French socialist Jacques Delors, who has 
played an instrumental role in promoting a positive pro-active position of Europe's social 
democratic parties towards integration.
From this it follows, and it is no surprise, that Social Democratic parties have been 
supporting the strict implementation of the convergence criteria laid down in the 
Maastricht Treaty to qualify for Economic and Monetary Union. Even when Lionel Jospin 
shortly after winning government office in France in 1997 attempted to find allies for 
loosening the convergence criteria for EMU in order to free up badly needed resources to 
tackle unemployment (one of his central election pledges), he was made to realise his 
isolation among his fellow European social democratic sister parties. In fact, even in a 
traditionally high state spending and deficit country such as Italy, the centre-left 
government under Romano Prodi remained totally committed to meet the convergence 
criteria and did not support Jospin's suggestion.
2.3.2. Globalisation, Europeanisation and Co-operation
The differences in policies as well as the conditions under which social democratic 
parties in Western Europe have to operate, has decreased. This has inevitably led to a 
narrowing of economic policy positions advocated by the various parties on the centre- 
left.
The gap between the families of 'modernising southern' and 'classic northern' 
social democratic parties has lost much of its relevance. Respectively, in Portugal, Spain 
and Greece, modern political systems have developed while their economies have made 
great strides towards cohesion and European integration.
The 'northern' European social democratic parties moved away from their 
'traditional' Keynesian interventionist policy agenda towards more market led policies. 
Furthermore, the 'classic' Western European social democratic parties of Sweden, Finland 
and Austria, which had traditionally been opposed to their countries joining the European 
integration process changed their policies in favour, hence playing a significant role in
79 Marquand, David - The Unprincipled Society: New Demands and Old Politics, Jonathan Cape, London 
1988
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their countries decision to apply for full EU membership. It is significant to notice that 
these parties, by committing themselves to full EU integration - within an EU institutional 
framework that had been dominated by attempts to promote neo-liberal policies - were 
indicating their willingness to abandon remaining 'national' Keynesian interventionist 
policies from their policy agendas. In addition, the 'northern' social democratic parties of 
EU member states that had already supported the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
had beforehand accepted that the struggle against inflation was the fundamental task of 
governments, while that of direct policy initiatives against unemployment were 
unsustainable and of secondary importance.80
Overall, 'northern' social democratic parties (including the British Labour Party),81 
which had in the past remained at best lukewarm, if not at times hostile towards 
European integration, slowly repositioned themselves on the issue and adopted pro- 
integrationist policies accepting the inevitable consequences arising from such a change in 
party policy. In fact, the Labour Party has (at no time) ever been more mainstream 
European social democratic (than at any previous point during her history). Like her 
continental sister parties, commitments to wide-ranging nationalisation, to neutralism and 
the aim for a state of 'socialist' collective ownership have been abandoned as well as the 
more traditional social democratic commitments to full employment and state 
interventionism. In Chapter 8, quantitative and qualitative comparisons between Labour's 
and the SPD development of their LMPs strongly confirm this trend.
A crucial factor for the internationalisation of the socio-economic conditions of 
parties economic policy-making been trends of globalisation. These trends refer to a 
process, which is marked by the attempt to overcome the historically developed national 
borders and their organisational and projectionist functions. This process has not only 
been motivated by inevitable developments of world economic forces, but has been 
predominantly the product of conscious political interventions by national governments, 
for example, in form of further integration on the EU level (e.g. EMU) and the negotiation
80 Sassoon, Donald - One Hundred Years of Socialism. I.B. Tauris Publishers, London 1996, p 448
81 See: Statements on European integration from ‘Prosperity through co-operation: a new European Future’ 
(Labour Party, 1993) onwards, a statement which was developed in response to the invitation o f (at the time) 
Commission President Jacques Delors to submit proposals for economic renewal in the European 
Community.
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for the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Hence, the abolishment of 
barriers to the free movement of capital, goods and services and (to a limited extent) 
labour has been expressed in three ways.
Firstly, an increased movement of global financial capital has exposed a 'hierarchy 
of markets'. The rates of return on capital investment in goods- and services industries 
depends substantially on a countries exchange rate and interest rate, which in turn 
influences strongly the levels of employment and wages in national economies.
Secondly, globalisation is strongly expressed in the competition of currencies. 
Under conditions of flexible exchange rates, global financial markets predetermine the 
margins in which national/European monetary policy can set to influence a 
countries/ member states interest rates. This leads to a situation in which governments are 
forced to make the stability of their currency the predominantly aim of their economic 
policies. In fact, governments can be engaged in an international contest on currency 
stability, in which countries attempt to attract capital by offering conditions of the highest 
rates of interest and lowest levels of inflation.
Finally, the cross-border reorganisation of production and work patterns via 
transnationally operating firms as well as the free movement of capital undermined the 
regulatory and wealth-redistributional capacity of the nation state. However, in response, 
new but weaker regulatory frameworks based on a macro-regional level of economic 
blocks such as the EU are emerging, which set out new protectionist and regulatory rules.
Through increasing transnational mobility, capital began to be increasingly able to 
counter attempts at regulation by states, which began to find themselves in the context of 
competing among each other far more directly for investment resources. This new  
structural power of business has been taking the form of governments increasingly and 
voluntarily prioritising the provision of the best possible conditions for capital and 
business in their countries. In fact, factors such as 'business confidence' have never before 
determined to such an extent the direction of capital flows, the availability of finance, and 
investments, upon which future production, tax revenues and ultimately employment 
levels depend on.
Overall, the national state's capacity to pursue non-economic goals - such as 
welfare, ecology or even cultural objectives - has decreased. As all countries have had to
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join the race of providing an internationally competitive national environment for 
companies and by giving priority to meet the monetary standards of global financial 
markets, it is possible to observe a substantial convergence of economic policy responses 
to the constraints of the world market. This has been clearly demonstrated by the 
adoption of policies of deregulation (in particular of labour markets), the liberalisation of 
price and exchange rates, the privatisation (of public service sectors), the stabilisation of 
national currencies, a restrictive national budgetary policy as well as the political support 
provided for the creation of an environment which aims at offering the greatest possible 
returns on productive investment.82 In the words of Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, 
"the demise of national state capacity under globalisation is likely...to destroy a range of 
governance mechanisms in institutional economies...reducing the overall diversity of 
available governance arrangements."83
However, Paul Hirst, asking the question if globalisation has killed Social 
Democracy, has argued that the European welfare state has not necessarily been 
threatened by the abstract process of globalisation, but by the successful creation of the 
Single Market and the advent of Monetary Union within the European Union that reduces 
national state capacities to act on economic policies. Highly critical, Hirst believes that 
globalisation has become a key term in a "rhetoric aimed at silencing voices that are in 
favour of regulating markets rather than regulating for greater market freedom."84 There is 
no doubt, that if countries overspend their budgets these days by financing generous 
social programmes, international bond markets impose an immediate punishment on 
those states in the form of higher interest rates. This new golden straight-jacket on 
countries spending operates on a political level as well as through a process that Thomas 
Friedman has labelled 'global-ution' (revolution via the global economy).85
It is clear that 'traditional' social democratic regimes required and presupposed a 
far more closed economy than possible and desirable at the turn of this century. Hence, 
the 'traditional' social democratic state has been undermined by the downward spiral of
82 Mahnkopf, Birgit - ‘Soziale Demokratie in Zeiten der Globalisierung’, Blatter fiir deutsche und 
intemationale Politik, 43 Jahrgang, November 1998, pp 1318
83 Crouch, Colin and Wolfgang Streeck - The Political Economy o f Modem Capitalism, Sage, London, 1997, 
p 13
84 Hirst, Paul -  ‘Has Globalisation Killed Social Democracy?’, in Gamble, Andrew and Tony Wright - The 
New Social Democracy, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1999, p 93-5
85 Friedman, Thomas - The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Harper Collins, London, 1999
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harmonisation as governments progressively dismantle themselves in order to compete 
on social and labour costs.86
Globalisation - real or perceived - has been an important force in the policy 
convergence process of Europe's social democratic parties as it has led to a realignment of 
their policies away from the traditional orientation towards 'national' social democratic 
policies. In fact, the perception of globalisation has not only brought a convergence among 
the parties of the left, but also among parties of the left and right, although largely on the 
post-Keynesian neo-liberal terms of the right. Here, the strong degree of convergence 
among parties on the left and right can be compared with the situation of the 1950 and 
1960 when they shared the belief in full employment and an all encompassing welfare 
state (although that time the political terms were set by the left).87 Overall, the perceived 
need by social democratic parties to accept the dominance of the markets, the adaptation 
of neo-liberal policies and the abandonment of 'socialist' policies have meant that the 
economic policy gap among the social democratic parties of Europe has never been 
smaller.88
In fact, most national parties' have adopted policy strategies that minimise the 
degree of state interventionism according to the requirements of the markets, while 
attempts to move regulatory issues onto the European stage have predominantly led to 
the reinforcement of the neo-liberal policy paradigm and hence further reduced parties' 
economic policy options (in a feedback loop). Here, critical observers such as Stephen Gill 
have described the process of EU integration as the creation of a "new constitutionalism", 
which overall strengthens disciplinary neo-liberalism while reducing in turn the amount 
of pragmatically and nationally viable policy choices available to national parties.89 
According to this school of thought, the developing 'new constitutionalism' reshapes 
state-market boundaries in order to maximise the exposure of states to international
86 Gray, John - False dawn, Granta Books, London, 1998, p 88 + 92
87 Marquand, David - The New Reckoning - Capitalism. States, and Citizens, Polity Press, Oxford, 1997, p 55
88 Sassoon, Donald - ‘Fin-de-Siecle Socialism: The United, Modest Left’, in New Left Review, No 227, 
January/February 1998, p 92
89 Gill, Stephen - ‘The Emerging World Order and European Change’, in Miliband, Ralph and Leo Panitch 
(ed) - The Socialist Register 1992, Merlin Press, London, 1992, p 157-96
65
capital markets, which in turn reduces the capacity of states to manage aggregate demand 
or to even out market generated social disruptions.
Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck agreed with this thesis when they argued - 
with respect to the decline of the governing capacity of the nation-state and its impact on 
capitalist diversity - that a diminished role of state interventionism will mean that 
"instead of being imposed on markets and hierarchies by public power, with a capacity to 
redistribute resources and decision rights for the purpose of protecting social cohesion, 
regulation will increasingly be private and market accommodating".90 This was, in fact, 
learned by many social democratic parties in Western Europe throughout the 1980s and 
1990s when they experienced severe problems in regards to the implementation of their 
Keynesian inspired policy model.91
Following from this, "globalisation7 constrains substantial demands by policy 
makers for the public protection against market effects, and to discipline social actors to 
conform to market constraints and criteria. Seen from this perspective, globalisation is not 
only about a shift in the structural power of capital constraining states, but also about 
policy makers and state-actors deliberately engaging in a neo-liberal strategy in order to 
mobilise the structural power of global capital in their favour.92 Hence, parties are not 
necessarily forced to abandon Keynesian style policies, but they end up voluntarily 
adopting and advocating neo-liberal policy approaches of orthodoxy and deregulation, if 
their policy strategy is aimed at attracting capital, ensuring national competitiveness and 
to avoid the contraction of the economy. As a result, "the capacity of the nation state to 
pursue market inhibiting regulation has decreased, and the social forces that stand to
90 Crouch, Colin and Wolfgang Streeck - ‘The future of capitalist diversity’, in C. Crouch and W. Streeck 
(ed) - Political economy o f modem capitalism - Mapping convergence and diversity. Thousand Oaks, 
London, 1997, p 15
91 Examples for this include the continuous erosion and structural crisis o f the Swedish model; the aborted 
French attempt to adopt a Keynesian-style demand-management strategy in 1981; as well as the policy 
constrains enforced on national governments by the Maastricht Treaty to promote a fast track to real 
convergence via monetary integration which made the implementation o f demand management techniques 
merely impossible. These experiences brought social democratic parties’ policy choices eventually more into 
line with their Conservative and Christian Democratic counterparts. (Boyer, Robert - ‘The convergence 
hypothesis revisited’, in Berger, S. and R. Dore (ed) - National diversity and global capitalism, Cornell 
University, London, 1996, p 57)
92 Panitch, Leo - ‘Globalisation and the State’, in Miliband Ralph and Leo Panitch (ed) - Socialist Register 
1994. Merlin Press, London, 1994, p 60-93
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benefit from such regulation find it increasingly difficult to organise the relational power 
necessary to make politically effective demands/'93
This was realised by the SPD and Labour and expressed by their influential 
strategists, in the case of the SPD for instance by Fritz Scharpf, who began to argue - in 
respect to the abandonment of Keynesian style policies by social democratic policy makers 
- that "...there is now no economically plausible Keynesian strategy that would permit the 
full realisation of social democratic goals within a national context without violating the 
functional imperatives of a capitalist economy".94
Therefore, we can conclude that 'globalisation' has strongly affected party policy 
options as it pushes parties' of various ideologies towards the eventual adoption of similar 
neo-liberal economic policy approaches. Secondly, as argued by various authors (though 
often rather pessimistically), the capacity of the nation state to act effectively under the 
constraints identified can only be recovered when, in the case of Europe, states and parties 
move towards a higher European Union policy level strategy, and aim to pool their 
resources and sovereignty. By doing so, they can attempt to re-gain some ability to re- 
regulate the economic sphere if they so wish.95 However, most observers rule this out as 
unrealistic and expect instead that the nation states of the future will predominantly 
accept the role of provider for the infrastructure and public goods that business requires at 
the lowest possible cost, in order to safeguard international competitiveness.
Hence, the practical advantages of an increasingly more European level policy 
outlook and strategy of national political parties cannot be ignored and is reinforced 
further by the fact, that the European Parliament (EP) has been able to increase its powers 
over time and that it carries further potential for the extension of its role and status in the 
future.
European level co-operation of Europe's Social Democratic parties may still be 
insignificant, but it will be argued throughout this thesis that in particular economic 
factors (such as the growth of multi-nationals, more interdependent national economies
93 Ryner, J. Magnus - ‘Neo-liberal Globalisation and the Crisis o f Swedish Social Democracy’, EUI Working 
Paper, European University Institute, SPS, No. 94:4, 1998, p 13
94 Scharpf, Fritz - Crises and Choice in European Social Democracy, Cornell University Press, NY, 1991, p 
272
95 Hirst, Paul and Grahame Thompson - Globalisation in question - The international economy and the 
possibilities o f governance. Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996; and Drache, Daniel - ‘From Keynes to
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and trade patterns, further 'Europeanisation' etc.) will inevitably lead to the further 
cohesion of national social democratic economic policy agendas. However, so far the 
process of convergence is still at an early stage while distinctive national programmatic 
differences will remain due to differing national political interests, traditions, histories 
and cultures.
2.4. 'Modernisation': The response of Social Democracy
As described earlier, throughout the 1980s Social Democratic parties seemed to 
have lost the policy initiative and ability to set the political agenda. In fact, parties that 
gained government office quickly adopted policies of fiscal prudence and neo-liberal 
influenced policies, while others such as the Labour Party and the SPD - less inclined to 
follow this path - spend long periods in opposition. Parties out of office during the early 
1980s found themselves in a situation of uncertainty over what policies to adopt. In the 
case of the Labour Party, this led to severe political infighting and a radical move to the 
left with the adoption of socialist state interventionist policies. In the case of the SPD, a 
substantial variety of policies were adopted, while a clear and consistent approach was 
missing.96 In both cases, the parties ended up losing consecutive elections and remained 
firmly in opposition.
The attempt of social democratic parties to fill the gaps left by a new agenda of 
fiscal prudence and the abandonment of Keynesian policies led to the search for new  
programmatic orientation and policy responses. This search for a way to modernise social 
democratic policies and ideology gained momentum in the early 1990s when neo-liberal 
policies were failing to provide social cohesion as well as employment. In fact, the 
ongoing search for new ideas led to an increasing degree of pragmatism applied in policy 
choices, the acceptance of more fiscal prudence, an end to tax increases and even the re­
emphasis of the role of communities and (in the case of Labour) stakeholding as options 
for the renewal of social democratic policy orientation.
K-Mart: Competitiveness in a corporate age’, in Boyer, Robert and Daniel Drache - The state against markets: 
The limits of globalisation. (Chapter 1), Routledge, London, 1996
96 Borchert, Jens, Golsch, Lutz und Uwe Jun - Das sozialdemokratische Modell - Organisationsstrukturen und 
Politikinhalte im Wandel, Leske und Budrich, Opladen, 1996, p 18
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2.4.1. 'Modernisation' and 'innovation'
One of the core terms of 'New' Labour and 'Neue Mitte' rhetoric has been the 
notion of 'modernisation'. In fact, it appears that the Labour Party's use of this notion 
suggested that policies could be identified that had been modernised or attuned to reform, 
something that seemed always the right thing, even if this meant that so called 'hard 
choices' were required. Anything else could be labelled, by definition, as being out of 
touch with changing requirements or opposed to modernisation. In a nutshell, any 
institution or practice that had been identified as not working sufficiently seemed to 
require some kind of 're-new-al' or 'modernisation' action.
In the case of the Labour Party, this went so far that even its very own advisers 
and Millbank insiders - such as Derek Draper - made fun of Labour's obsession with 
'presentation' and 'soundbites' by mocking the party's constant emphasis of the term 
'new' as "New Labour, New Europe, New Everything."97 Whether Gerhard Schroder's 
notion of 'Neue Mitte' as a new policy approach that combines modern pragmatism with 
a strong sense of fairness has been a convincing formula or not,98 it is clear that the use of 
terms such as 'new', 'neu' and 'modernisation' were based on the idea that there had been 
some sort of identifiable and irreversible historical shift within both parties, emphasising 
that the public acceptance of processes such as globalisation, technologisation and alleged 
realignments in social and class structures that had to be dealt with. Hence, these 
processes - treated as given facts - required a policy 'modernisation' process in order to 
respond effectively to the changing circumstances.
It then appeared, that the idea of 'modernisation' as defined above, created a 
distinctive line that encircles and identifies everything to the left of "the modernising 
left"99 as 'old' and therefore in need of 'modernisation'. In the case of the SPD, it was not 
so much the notion of 'modernisation' that expressed the party's 'newly' found and 
reformed self-definition. Instead the SPD used the term 'innovation' - a term that had 
been used in the party's 'Fortschritt '90' programme as well as in the party's 1994 general 
election programme. It was, however, not until the run up to the 1998 election programme
97 Draper, Derek - Blair’s 100 Days. Faber and Faber, London, 1997, p 77
98 ‘Schroder beschwort den Geist der ‘Neuen Mitte” - Neue Ziiricher Zeitung, 11 November 1998
99 One o f the preferred terms used by the influential ‘Third Way’ author Anthony Giddens, Lecture at the 
London School o f Economics, London, 03 February 1999
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that the term's meaning went beyond business economics.100 By the time the SPD had 
developed its 'Innovationen fiir Deutschland' economic policy outline in 1997, the term 
'innovation' had been adopted as a synonym for the traditionally used notion of 'reform', 
as the word 'reform' - pointed out later by the first minister for work and social affairs 
(Arbeit und Soziales) in the Schroder cabinet Walter Riester - had been discredited by the 
previous Kohl-led government as something negative which meant reductions and/or 
cuts.101 Hence, the SPD chose the notion of 'innovation' as an expression for its 
'modernised' institution - while the emphasis on 'innovation' was also sought to portray 
the SPD and its policies as new, innovative and pragmatic in approach, in order to solve 
the economic and political ills of Germany.
Inevitably, this understanding of 'modernisation/innovation' must be set against 
Labour and SPD governments that had to begin to act in practice, while those actions did 
not seem to be based on a clearly prescriptive all-encompassing 'new' political theory. 
Hence, two approaches to (re)gain a guiding political theory to 'modernise/innovate' 
social democracy are comprehensible.
First, one could purely measure the 'new' Labour /  SPD governments by 
attempting to identify an underlying consistency to their actions that could then be turned 
into an implicit policy pattern that would perhaps reveal an established new form of 
social democratic theory. Alternatively, the Labour Party and social democratic parties in 
general may attempt to develop and redefine their value system and their aims in 
response to the new circumstances in order to establish a set of guiding principles for 
future policy developments. In fact, this is the context under which the term 
'modernisation' and the search for a wider ideological frame of reference have to be 
understood.
Naturally, the readjustment of social democratic parties to changing policy options 
would have to affect their overall strategic behaviour. Anthony Giddens, as an academic 
with strong "New Labour" credentials, has argued that social democratic ideology must be 
redefined by replacing orthodox beliefs with pragmatism. While social democrats - or as
100 Unger, Frank, Andreas Wehr and Karen Schonwalder - New Democrats. New Labour, Neue 
Sozialdemokraten, Elefanten Press, Berlin, 1998, p 177
101 Riester, Walter - ‘Soziale Innovationen vor dem Wandel der Arbeitsgesellschaft’, in Lafontaine, O. and G. 
Schroder et al - Innovationen fiir Deutschland, Steidl Verlag, Gottingen, 1998, p 199
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he calls and widens them to all parties on the "centre left" - should continue to draw 
inspiration from traditional "left" values, such as equality and democracy, Giddens 
believes that they must also accept that "socialism is dead as a theory of economic 
management".102 However, according to this view, the left could continue to act upon the 
principal belief that the state and its institutions are of major importance and must be 
used to act upon the above-mentioned values. The modernisation process of social 
democracy envisaged by Giddens would neither require the need nor the ability of social 
democratic parties to reinvent or develop a new overall economic theory, hence freeing 
social democracy from the need to develop a replacement for its lost Keynesian paradigm. 
Instead, Giddens prefers to subscribe to the idea - popular with "New Labour" - that in an 
increasingly complex world, governments must positively accept the uncertainties of the 
modern high-risk economy, which are increasingly the basis of successful global economic 
competition.103 This idea applied to party ideology means that "allowed is what works", 
with the previous problem for many social democratic parties - namely the lack and 
search for a clear policy prescriptive ideological vision - having been abandoned by 
making a virtue out of something that had been made out of a necessity. From this follows 
the conclusion that instead of searching for an all-encompassing new theory of social 
democracy, policies should be pragmatically based and gain consistency from a general 
set of principles. This means in practice, that a social democratic government could reform 
the welfare state by introducing more flexible arrangements to meet peoples needs and 
circumstances (such as new employment patterns) without requiring an overall theory on 
which those policy choices are based on.
This view is however strongly contested, with Giddens being criticised for 
insisting with his "third way" ideas that the world has changed so dramatically that 
textbook macroeconomic analysis and state steering has become irrelevant, while ignoring 
at the same time - as pointed out by Frank Vandenbroucke - the fact that neo-corporatist 
industrial relations have remained a highly formative and positive part within those 
countries in which these arrangements have been traditionally and successfully applied.104 
In fact, some argue that the historical strength of the German economic model may - with
102 Giddens, Anthony - ‘Centre left at centre stage’, New Statesman, May 1997, Special Edition, p 37
103 Giddens, Anthony - ‘Centre left at centre stage’, New Statesman, May 1997, Special Edition, p 38
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the help of its economic institutionalised networks - will prove to be far more resilient to 
the apparent inefficiencies uncovered and not be threatened by trends of globalisation as 
it continues to provide indigenous companies with competitive advantages through 
providing stable and innovative factor conditions; meaning that it will require far less 
system change than advocated by the proponents of the third way.105
In fact, the 'five principles of the centre left' envisaged by Tony Blair in February 
1998 reveal that the envisaged modernisation of social democracy is predominantly a 
continuation of the policies envisaged by Conservative and Christian Democratic parties 
alike and nothing substantially new. The vision to build the 'centre left' on a diet of (a) 
stable economic management; (b) steering state interventionism away from issues like 
industrial intervention or tax and spend; (c) reforming the welfare state as well as being 
(d) internationalist in outlook are not necessarily aims which are any different from the 
policies envisaged by parties on the right.106 In fact, even the final point of Blair's 'centre 
left' principles for the modernisation of social democracy that envisages a distinctive and 
core role for (e) limited state interventionism in form of state provisions for infrastructure, 
social security, education, training and health matters is shared by the centre right too. 
Here, only extreme neo-liberals of a kind not really found in Europe would reject the idea 
of infrastructure spending -  especially on education and training. Certainly neither the 
CDU nor the British Conservatives would reject this.
What we find, however, in the 'five principles of the centre left' is the perceived 
need by Blair and his allies to move the 'centre left' beyond the rather defensive social 
democratic pragmatism of the mid-1990s - with its often incoherent policy ideas -  and to 
establish a set of more or less coherent policy principles that would enable a more 
consistent policy outlook. Only the successful filling of the previous gaps will offer the 
policy guidance and future vision necessary for Europe's social democracy to offer a 
distinctive challenge to the neo-liberal paradigm.
However, arguments over the available paths of social democratic modernisation 
are bound to continue. On the one side, numerous authors such as Jens Borchert et al have
105 Harding, Rebecca - ‘Germany’s Third Way’ in Funk, L. (ed) - The Economics and the politics of the Third 
Wav, Transaction, London, 1999, p 71-77
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consistently been arguing that what has been labelled as 'modernisation' or 'opening 
towards the middle' has in fact been the bringing into line of social democracy with 
conservative labour market policy prescriptions.107 On the other side, New Labour as well 
as the SPD leadership have begun to set out more positively and distinctively pro-active 
visions of state responses to the new socio-economic challenges of the post-Keynesian 
area.108 In fact, the definition and understanding of the 'Third Way' and 'Neue Mitte' 
concepts as well as the attempt to use communitarian ideas for a moral renewal indicate 
the state of discussions -  in particular in Britain and Germany - and hence shows current 
trends for developments and future contents of social democracy that can be currently 
expected to evolve.
2.4.2. The 'Third Way' and a bit of 'New Mitte'
"Let the politics of the Third Way and the Neue Mitte be Europe's new hope."
Blair/Schroder Paper, June 1999109
The use of the terminology 'third way' has previously been associated with 
revisionist reform of the left and the search for a compromise between two established 
'extremes'. In fact, when communism was still perceived viable, democratic socialism was 
referred to as a third way between communism and capitalism. Then in post-war Europe, 
social democracy was often seen as a third way between Anglo-Saxon capitalism and 
socialism. However, with the growing crises of traditional social democracy and electoral 
defeats throughout the 1980s, academics such as Anthony Giddens claimed by the late 
1990s a (new) third way between traditional social democracy and neo-liberal capitalism.
Discussions surrounding the ideas of ideological realignment of social democracy 
in this form were predominantly started in Britain even before the Labour Party's general
106 ‘The next step’ - Blair interview, The Guardian. 07/02/1998, p 3
107 Borchert, Jens, Golsch, Lutz und Uwe Jun - Das sozialdemokratische Modell - Organisationsstrukturen 
und Politikinhalte im Wandel. Leske und Budrich, Opladen, 1996, p 8
108 For instance, Oskar Lafontaine declared in a speech at the conference ‘Innovationen fiir Deutschland’, 
Bonn, 21/05/1997 (p 1): ‘The Conservatives perceive the globalisation o f markets as a threat. In fact, they 
have used the fear from globalisation to justify the re-distribution o f wealth at the cost o f the majority of the 
population. Instead, for us globalisation is an opportunity. We want to make the most o f this opportunity, to 
increase wealth and secure old and create new employment opportunities’. Cited in Unger et al -  New  
Democrats. Elefanten Press, Berlin, 1998, p 151
109 The official titles of the Blair/Schroder Paper were ‘The Way Forward for Europe’s Social Democrats’ and 
'Der Weg nach vome fur Europa's Sozialdemokraten', 09 June 1999, (p 15)
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election victory in May 1997. The need to embed a newly defined role and political 
philosophy for social democracy that would set out a political strategy fitting the new  
socio-economic realities has been popularised by the Labour Party itself. Its aim was to 
search, revise and modernise a social democratic policy outlook and develop ideas to 
redefine the role and political philosophy of the 'centre' and fill its theoretical and 
ideological vacuum.
The overall aim of third way politics - in the words of one of its founding fathers - 
should be to help citizens pilot their way through the major challenges of our time. 
Namely, "globalisation, transformations in personal life and our relationship to nature. 
Third way politics should take a positive attitude towards globalisation, preserve, 
however, a core concern with social justice....look[ing] for a new relationship between the 
individual and the community, a redefinition of rights and obligations (no rights without 
responsibilities)."110 As listed by Anthony Giddens, the values of the 'third way' include 
"equality, protection of the vulnerable, freedom and autonomy, no rights without 
responsibilities; no authority without democracy; cosmopolitan pluralism; and 
philosophic conservatism."111
Finally, common features of 'third way' inspired economic policies include "a 
more narrow distribution of income than in a mainly free market economy, placing public 
finance on a healthier footing, more flexible labour markets, increasing educational and 
training opportunities, reduced social costs, welfare-to-work programmes and a macro- 
economic free market orthodoxy."112 In other words, 'third way' supporters have 
emphasised the necessity to adopt efficiency-increasing and sustainable employment- 
enhancing domestic economic policies.
Not surprisingly, the search for a 'third way' has been strongly associated with 
attempts to provide Blair's 'New Labour' project with a more theoretical grounding. 
However, while some observers understand the search for a 'third way' as looking for an 
alternative path to a socially cohesive capitalism, others believe that the 'third way' term 
'has moved from obscurity to universality without passage through a phase of
1,0 Giddens, Anthony - The Third Way - The Renewal of Social Democracy, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 
1998, p 64-5
111 Giddens, Anthony - The Third Wav - The Renewal of Social Democracy, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford,
1998,p 66
1,2 Funk, Lothar (ed) - The Economics and the politics of the Third Wav, Transaction Publishers, London,
1999, p 5-6
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definition' ,113 while the rhetoric surrounding the term has mainly served to recycle the 
'neo-liberal consensus' and marginalises opponents of that hegemony by suggesting that 
they are somehow out-of date with reality.114 Fierce critics such as Marquand have 
therefore expressed his fear, that this new notion enables the Labour Party to exclude 'old' 
social democratic concerns like redistribution from serious discussion, while recycling and 
representing the neo-liberal consensus with some talk of equality and communitarian 
perspective bolted on to it.115 This fear has at least been partly confirmed by Labour's 
Trade and Industry Secretary Steven Byers who declared that Labour's ideas of the 'Third 
Way' demonstrate the realisation that "wealth creation is now more important than the 
redistribution of wealth" and herewith burying one of the central traditional tenets of the 
Labour movement.116
However, what makes the 'third way' discussion so interesting is the fact that it is 
a clear attempt to devise a cohesive strategy for parties on the 'centre-left' aimed at 
redefining social democracy in order to regain the policy initiative. The 'third way' clearly 
takes account of the changing circumstances in which centre left parties have to operate in 
and attempts to refine how traditional centre-left values should be applied in the future. 
Naturally, academics and politicians closely associated with New Labour claim that the 
'third way' is not the search for a new strategy in an old game, but it is the path ahead in a 
totally new game which takes into account the dramatically changing political and 
economic environment and goes inevitably beyond the old notions of left and right. In the 
words of Gerald Holtham (at the time director of the Labour friendly think-tank the 
IPPR), 'New' Labour's aim is to develop policies that apply "traditional social-democratic 
values to contemporary circumstances, recognising the inevitable dominance of capitalism 
and the market economy and the need to work with, not against it."117 This however 
sounds like nothing particularly new, as it has traditionally been social democratic 
common sense to work with the market as a functioning economy with high growth rates
113 Kaser, Michael - ‘Post-Communist transitions as ‘muddling through” , in Funk, Lothar (ed) - The 
Economics and the politics o f the Third Wav. Transaction Publishers, London, 1999, p 56
114 Plender, John - ‘A New Third Way’, Prospect Magazine. February 1998
115 Marquand, David on NEXUS ‘UK-Policy Forum on the Third Way’, 28/01/1998, NEXUS-Archive, 
London
116 ‘Wealth creation is the priority, insists minister’ -  The Guardian, 02/03/1999, p 9
117 Holtham, Gerald - ‘Confessions of a clocking-off think-tanker’, in progress. IPPR, Autumn 1998
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has always been the precondition for its policy approach. However, what the above 
definition indicates is, that the centre-left does not seem to be able to develop a simple 
policy prescriptive formula similar to what the right had been able to come up with 
during the 1980s.
It is, however, possible to identify a new 'third way' rhetoric coupled with a 
different approach to the understanding of the causalities in society. The strong emphasis 
on individualism found in neo-liberalism has been given a more equal status to the role of 
communal responsibilities. Also new about the rhetoric is the fact that policy ideas are not 
based on egalitarianism as was common in 'traditional' social democracy. Instead, the 
means envisaged by the Labour government to achieve social justice have been shifted 
from the traditional social democratic idea of redistribution and equality to the 'narrower' 
notions of the state ensuring 'minimum standards' and 'equality of opportunity'.
Hence, the question remains, how can political actors on the centre left characterise 
in simple terms their prescriptive policy principles? In fact, in the absence of a strong 
'narrative', a story-line that plays up continuities and gives the inattentive voters 
something to identify with is what the SPD and the Labour Party continue to search for, 
with Labour advisors - such as Philip Gould - admitting that what is needed are 
"...uncompromising and single-minded positions in all of the policy and issue areas rather 
than a whole raft of often confusing and abstract 'third way1 messages."118
However, academics taking part in the search for a 'third way', such as LSE's 
Professor Julian LeGrand belief that the Labour Party's increasing emphasis on 
community and accountability as well as on responsibility and opportunity represents a 
distinctive 'third way' that is different from neo-liberalism and traditional social 
democracy. This may, however, be an over-interpretation of the capacities of the notion in 
practical politics.119 In fact, the distinctive pragmatism displayed by the Labour Party 
policies put forward since May 1997 confirms that there is still a lack of an all- 
encompassing 'grand idea'.
Although most policies put forward by governments entail compromises, the 
question remains, if it is possible to gain clear guidance for policy decisions from a 
seemingly vague, rather non-visionary and highly pragmatic set of principles which
118 ’Gould's dire warning to Labour1, The Guardian. 20/07/2000
119 Le Grand, Julian -  ‘The Third way begins with Cora’, New Statesman, 06 March 1998, p 27
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borrow from a variety of ideas and theories? So far, the main emerging ideas of a third 
way for the 'centre left' contain libertarian and individualistic notions as well as an 
emphasis on community responsibilities. Furthermore, a missing automatic belief in the 
virtues of the free market is complemented by a seeming lack of commitment in favour of 
the public sector or the belief in a mixed economy.
What remains is the acknowledgement of a state role, but one, which is decisively 
weaker than what it used to be under traditional social democratic policies. While the 
notion of the third way appears to be highly pragmatic, it is difficult to envisage it being 
instructive for policy planning. This then raises overall doubts whether a 'what counts is 
what works' approach to policy making is able to replace the lost economic policy 
paradigm under which social democratic parties have been suffering in recent decades.120
Finally, the discussions and search for a 'third way' have only just begun. While 
the foundations and direction of the search for a new ideological and policy outlook have 
been marked out and ideas such as 'stakeholding' and communitarianism been 
introduced into the search, the final outcome of the attempt to redefine social democratic 
identity is far from certain. However, it can be stated that the 'third way' - in contrast to 
the usual way of ideological development - is something currently developed in order to 
fit, justify and give coherence to policy approaches that have already been applied under 
the banner of 'New Labour' or 'Neue Mitte' without having been inspired by pre-existing 
guiding principles. Now, this approach can certainly be called 'new'.
2.4.2.I. What's different? - 'Third Way' and 'Neue Mitte'
It is fair to say, that there has been a marked difference between Tony Blair's and 
Gerhard Schroder's intellectual and political ambition to develop and modernise - 
possibly together with party friendly think-tanks and academics - their parties' ideology 
and programmatic policy visions.
Beginning with his assumption of the party leadership and long before his party's 
accession to government office, Tony Blair portrayed himself as a reformer who perceived 
it to be necessary not only to reconstruct Labour's institutions but also social democratic 
theoretical principles by adopting more market-orientated and liberal doctrines.
120 Blair, Tony - ‘Tough on red tape’, Financial Times. 09/03/1998
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Furthermore, Blair used and encouraged during the 1990s the growth of more or 
less labour friendly informal networks of think tanks (IPPR, Demos, Centre for European 
Reform etc.) and the country's academic community to feed successfully the party's 
ideological modernisation and programmatic reform as well as development of 'third 
way' thinking.121
In contrast, Gerhard Schroder never displayed the same ambition or even 
perceived the need for a similar degree of party policy modernisation. His legendary 
distance to the SPD's party institution, official policy positions and formal policy making 
processes may have contributed substantially to the fact that he would have met - and 
indeed met in the case of the Blair/Schroder paper - substantial resistance within his party 
when pushing for the redefinition of its policy outlook and ideology. Hence, the more 
traditional and less flexible think-tanks close to the SPD such as the Friedrich-Ebert 
Stiftung, Max Plank Institute or Hans-Bockler Stiftung have not been used and 
encouraged to engage as actively - in comparison to UK institutes - in a policy and party 
ideology development drive.
Finally, the 'third way' as well as the 'Neue Mitte' discussions have divided social 
democrats right through the middle of their parties with the eventual acceptance by 
Labour's and SPD's activists as well as rank and file members only being understandable, 
if one recognises the strong will of the parties to regain government power after an 
exceptional long period in opposition. The unease of large groups within the parties about 
the adoption of these 'new' ideas is also clearly shown by the strong need of the parties 
leaderships to use 'spin doctors', new 'modern' policy rhetoric and professionalised 
communications to sell those policy institutional and policy reforms - not only to the 
electorate, but to highly critical party members.122 This selling of the 'third way' and 'Neue 
Mitte' appears to have been an important part and another aspect of both parties' 
leadership's strategies to overcome the resistance to policy change among their own party 
ranks.
121 Michel, F. and L. Bouvet - ‘Paris, Bonn, Rome: A Continental Way’, in Hargreaves et al - Tomorrow’s 
Politics, Demos, London, 1998, p 144
122 Wallis, Joe and Brian Dollery - Market failure, government failure, leadership and public policy, 
MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1999, p 138-90
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Overall, after having assessed the 'external' context for the crises of the social 
democratic welfare state; the parties ideological and electoral challenges as well as the 
other exogenous factors that played a crucial part in this equation, it is clear that although 
problems varied and impacts differed for the Labour Party and the SPD, some general 
underlying problem patterns and trends that both parties had to similarly deal with can 
be identified that will help us to understand better both parties shifts in policies during 
the period under investigation. Having furthermore identified the most recent theoretical 
and programmatic responses by the Labour Party and the SPD to deal with the issues, we 
can now assess the 'internal' factors that have determined and conditioned both political 
parties strategies and their programmatic choices in order to see if the direction of policy 
change was inevitable and reveals common response patterns between the parties.
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Chapter 3. The 'internal' context: National differences, changing 
operational conditions, strategies and choices of parties in
opposition
3.1. Factors of party policy-making
3.1.1. Reasons for party policy change
3.2. The increasing role of marketing and the media
3.2.1. The media, party and leadership behaviour
3.2.2. The emergence of a new type of media effective party leadership
3.2.3. The changing role of the party leadership
3.3. Domestic policy systems as conditioning factors for Labour's and the SPD's policy formation processes
3.3.1. Features of party political opponents - The CDU and Conservative Party
3.3.2. National roles of opposition (Britain and Germany)
3.4. The Labour Party and the SPD: Parties acting within the constraints of being in opposition
3.4.1. Opposition parties preference shaping strategies
3.4.2. Social democratic parties in 'opposition'
3.4.3. Comparing parties in differing electoral systems
3.4.4. Developing and pledging policies in opposition: A structured disadvantage
3.5. Differing experiences of the Labour Party and SPD in early opposition (Labour Party and SPD)
As described in the previous chapter, 7 external' problems such as the emerging 
economic crises of the post-war system, an emerging ideological crises, and the change of 
environmental conditions that diminished the capacity of party leaders and policy-makers 
to offer successful policy alternatives to party members and the electorate were one of the 
problem areas that can be partly blamed for Labour's and SPD's electoral and party 
problems between the 1980s and mid-1990s. However, the parties' loss of influence over 
domestic policy agenda setting and the ability to influence government policy was not 
solely caused by those 'external' factors, but also by various 'internal' factors that were 
due to the German and British political systems, traditions, changes in their use of the 
media and parties' ability to influence preference formation.
While Chapter 2 dealt with the specific historical context in which the analysis of 
party LMP making takes place, this chapter looks at the changing conditions for social 
democratic party actors within the historical period under investigation in order to enable 
a more holistic comparative analysis of both parties behaviour that includes the 
recognition of variations in national influence components as well as general changes in 
factors conditioning party policy communication in order to be able to help us identify 
cross-national social democratic party policy change patterns and a possible common 
redirection of public policy choices on a neo-liberal paradigm.
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In fact, only after having taken into account aspects of 'internal' conditioning will it 
be possible to draw wider conclusions and understand both parties undertakings to 
achieve a functional alignment of their goals and structures.
3.1. Factors of party policy-making
In order to gain an insight into the policy development process of both political 
parties and to assess the significance of their programmes /  statements it is helpful to 
sketch out country 'internal' features of parties that are relevant for this study.
Political parties can be understood as bodies in which a group of like-minded 
members attempt to pursue the aim of promoting a particular set of ideas as well as to 
canvass for the acceptance of an ideology. Furthermore, the foundation of political parties 
is an attempt to facilitate and encourage members and supporters alike to increase their 
involvement and participation in political life.
Traditionally, the membership of parties is perceived as an important factor as 
parties require a large number of people to fulfil tasks such as campaigning for votes 
during election campaigns; to generate party resources such as money; to legitimise a 
party's ideas as well as the 'democratically' selected 'party candidates' which run for 
public office.
Differences among parties can often be traced back to social cleavages that were 
present at the time of foundation. In fact, cleavages provide parties with the role of 
building alliances for conflicts over policies, resources and value commitments within the 
larger body of the state.123 Furthermore, parties do not only integrate various cleavages in 
society, but also have to function as agents of conflict management among their 
leadership, members and electorate. This circumstance explains why policy-making 
within party institutions is not a simple evolutionary process but instead represents a 
process of mediation among various political conflicts and interests. An intra-party 
process of negotiations and coalition building is facilitated by developed intra-party 
institutional procedures, something that lies at the heart of most democratic political party 
organisations policy formation and formulation process. Hence, party policy development 
must be understood as the facilitation of a variety of interests and conflicts to internal
123 Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan (ed) - Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Free Press, New York, 1967, p 5
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pressures as much as a response to external constrains. Aptly, Samuel Eldersveld 
appropriately described parties as 'miniature political systems' with authority structures, a 
representative process, and an electoral system that provides for inner-party processes 
such as decision-making, choices of leaders, the definition of goals and programmes, and 
the means to resolve internal party system conflict.124
In order to facilitate the analysis of decision-making processes taking place inside 
parties, a scheme is needed to map out and differentiate among the structure and strength 
of party sub-unit groups (i.e. wings, fractions, Richtungen or Flxigel). Giovanni Sartori has 
developed a helpful scheme for analysis by devising three types of sub-unit groups 
consisting of (a) "fractions' as a general, unspecified category; (b) "factions" which can be 
defined as specific power groups; and (c) "tendencies" which are representing merely a 
patterned set of attitudes.125 As policy-making inside parties takes place in a "miniature 
political system", the behaviour, strategic choices and interaction among different sub­
party groups/players is of great interest to this investigation. According to Sartori's 
classification, parties that are composed of strong factions are highly factionalised, with 
inner divisions being highly visible and highly salient. In contrast, a party composed 
primarily of tendencies would be a party whose inner division were of lower visibility 
and low salience, and therefore according to Sartori's definition, a party with little 
fractionalisation.126 Overall, the inclusion of this definition scheme of sub-groups of parties 
is useful when attempting to assess the "group" interactions that have taken place during 
parties" policy-making processes as sub-unit level groups that consists usually of a fluid 
mixture and combination of differing proportions of factions, tendencies as well as 
individuals and independent actors try to promote their policy positions, beliefs and 
interests within parties institutions.
Summing up, we can establish that electoral motivations that facilitate party policy 
change, the domestic environment as well as intra-party factors must be considered when 
investigating parties policy choices as changes in the domestic/national political and
124 Eldersveld, S. J. -  Political Parties: A behavioural Analysis. Rand McNelly, 1964, p 1
125 Sartori, Giovanni -  Parties and party systems -  A framework for analysis. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1976, p 75
126 Sartori, Giovanni -  Parties and party systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, p 75
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institutional environment (microfoundations)127 have a substantial effect on party 
behaviour, strategy and organisations. This also includes changes in the party political 
system, such as the emergence of new parties, changes in coalitions, party structure, 
electoral system, the overall corporatist structure of the state as well as exceptional events 
of significance (e.g. war, unification).
3.1.1. Reasons for party policy change
In order to understand the different interests and conflicts that may lead to 
changes in parties programmatic policy direction or emphasis, it is important to establish 
that processes can set off or require the change of programme contents. Kenneth Janda et 
al (1995) - in a study on party behaviour after elections - identified four major factors that 
lie at the heart of political parties' motivation to engage in the processes of changing 
policies and identity. Namely, parties may initiate a policy facelift by changing or 
repackaging their policies in order to shift their identity (image that citizens have in mind) 
of the party. Secondly, parties' display different identities to voters over time. Thirdly, 
parties may be driven to (re)formulate their policy statements prior to an election 
campaign in form of election manifestos in an attempt to correspond to the (strategic) 
requirements of the specific electoral situation. In fact, party policy and ideological 
principles on which leaders and supporters were once united, inevitably change and 
evolve over time.128 In addition, one could add that shifts in the influence of sub-party 
groups could lead to a re-orientation in parties' policy priorities or strategic goals.
3.2. The increasing role of marketing and the media
An increasing reduction in social democratic parties' public policy options - as 
indicated in the previous chapter and discussed later - has inevitably affected areas such 
as the political culture of party competition. Peter J. Grafe has fittingly described (for the 
case of Germany) the impact the increasing adoption of similar policy options and the 
cohesion of parties' programmes may hold for the political contest within our political 
systems. Here, Grafe warned as early as 1986 that one effect of this development would be
127 Budge, Ian et al (ed) - Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change: Spatial analysis o f Post-war election 
programmes in 19 democracies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987
128 Janda, K., Harmel, R., Edens, S. and P. Goff - ‘Changes in Party Identity - Evidence from Party 
Manifestos’, Party Politics, Vol 1, No 2, 1995, p 172
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an increasing (over-) emphasise of parties on programmatic differences even though they 
were clearly shrinking in substance. In fact, he foresaw that parties' activities would have 
to meet increasingly the need for offering entertainment value to supporters in order to 
cater for a growing leisure character of politics that would partly replace parties' 
competition on policy ideas.129 Furthermore, since the late 1970s trends of policy 
convergence among party organisations have been facilitated by the increasing 
homogeneity of communication systems, and above all, by the role of the mass media 
(print, radio and television) which has strongly influenced the development of parties' 
policy presentation and communication between party leadership and members as well as 
parties and the electorate.130
3.2.1. The media, party and leadership behaviour
'Traditionally' parties have relied heavily on their organisations to carry and 
spread policy beliefs and messages. This has been of particular importance during 
electoral campaigns when party leaders had to rally for their policy ideas directly by 
addressing large meetings of party members and the electorate. Here, the growing 
importance of the media and mass communications is increasingly changing the political 
cultures and communication structures of political parties. In fact, there is an increasing 
belief that in order to reach the widest possible electoral audience, parties have to create 
campaign strategies that contain a proper up-to-date mix of an appealing charismatic 
candidate, forceful slogans, and key non-ideological issues confirming Richard Rose's 
view that a "general election is about a choice between organisations, not ideas."131
In fact, today political messages are increasingly filtered through to the electorate 
via a complex top-to-bottom communication system, with party attention focusing and
129 “Wenn sich SPD and CDU in ihrem politischen Spektrum immer weiter annahem, dann miissen zur 
Motivierung der Anhanger und Wahler Unterschiede inszeniert werden, dann werden auch Unterhaltungswert 
und Freizeitcharakter von Politik immer bedeutsamer.” In Grafe, Peter J. - Schwarze Visionen, Rowolt 
Taschenbuch Verlag, Reinbek, 1986, p 31
130 ‘Media Momentum’ - Media Monitor. Vol. VI, Nr 6, Juni/Juli 1992, p 6
However, the technique to combine content analysis with opinion polls and the prove of a strong relationship 
between both variables can be traced back to the early 1970s and a study o f McCombs, Maxwell and Donald 
Shaw - ‘Agenda Setting Function o f Mass Media’ - Public Opinion Quarterly. 36, 1972, pp 176-87; Petersen, 
Thomas - ‘Das Ende des Blindflugs. Weitere Belege fur den Einflufl der Berichterstattung auf die 
Bevolkerungsmeinung’, Medien Tenor, Nr 35, Februar 1996, p 8
131 Rose, Richard - Do parties make a difference?. MacMillan, London, 1984, p 44
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resources increasingly allocated to party "media7 centres (such as the SPD's 1998 Campa132 
and Labour's 1997 Millbank election centres)133 which have had the task to 'sell' policies 
and candidates as well as provide the means for effective 'permanent' campaigning by 
providing systems for rapid policy responses and rebuttal units. In addition, it can be 
detected that the range of policy areas covered by parties electoral communications has 
increasingly been converging on a limited range of issues focusing on low inflation, low 
taxation and value for money public services, and welfare issues.
It is fair to say that the increasing need to meet media requirements when 
communicating with the wider public facilitates the attempt by parties to present their 
policies in an increasingly media friendly package. In order for politicians to reach voters 
and get policy messages transmitted by the media, messages have to be very brief, simple 
and catchy, something that has recently often been referred to as a 'sound bite' culture of 
politics. Here, complex policy proposals are increasingly giving way to a 'policy 
presentation' that fits media friendly three-minute television policy presentation slots, 
short slogans on advertising boards and 'pledge cards'. The growth of 'sound bite' politics 
-  possibly epitomised most pointingly by Labour's 1997 ambiguous but brilliant election 
commitment to be 'tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime' -  are a good example 
for a short policy message that is easy to remember, holds a wide appeal and means a 
variety of things.
Overall, parties are increasingly reliant for their electoral success on notions of 
image in the form of attempts to emphasise to the electorate party policy competence, 
unity, credibility, moderation and the quality of the leadership. In fact, it can be observed 
that party leaders are increasingly chosen by their parties on merits such as their ability to 
perform adequately and convincingly on television than predominantly on policy 
competence.
While some observers have been extremely critical of the 'marketisation' of party 
politics - criticising the replacement of rational debate with 'soundbites' or the
132 Ruzas, Stefan - ‘Marketingkommunikation -  Im Wechselfieber’, W&V, No 16, 17 April 1998, p 70-1
133 At the cost o f two million pounds, the Labour Party had set up a new media centre and rebuttal unit at 
Millbank Tower close to Westminster. At the heart o f the ‘Rapid Rebuttal Unit’ was a computerised database 
called ‘Excalibur EFS’ (Electronic Filing Software) that enabled the party to respond quickly (during one 24 
hour news-cycle) to the attacks o f competing party opponents. (Butler, D. and D. Kavanagh - The British 
General Election o f 1997. St. Martin’s Press, London, 1997, p 57-8)
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substitution of party political stature with business like marketing and sales techniques134 - 
others have argued that the parties' use of marketing and market research enhances the 
ability of parties to deal with the real concerns of the people as 'focus group' research and 
the opinion polling of the electorate makes parties more democratic and responsive to the 
wishes of the electorate.135 Furthermore, parties have increasingly recruited experts in 
modern media techniques who professionally employ modern means of communication 
(facilitating 'spin doctoring') to enhance their cause. Hence, increasing resources have 
been allocated by parties on advertising and campaigning budgets; new technologies have 
been employed to aim at target electoral groups and to help make strategic programmatic 
policy decisions that offer the widest electoral appeal.136 As convincingly described by 
Margaret Scammell in her book on 'designer politics', parties' increasing application of 
'new' marketing techniques and attempts to improve their responsiveness to the changing 
wants of the electorate ultimately affect party policy goals, priorities, policies, candidates 
choice, party organisation and behaviour.137
In fact, 'modem' political marketing is all about attempting to make the product 
(party appearance and programme) suitable to the consumer (voters) demands. In a 
nutshell, the increasing political marketing of political parties does not only influence the 
way party policy content is communicated to the electorate, but it also influences the 
actual content of policies advocated.
The behaviour of the Labour Party in preparation for the 1997 British General 
Election offers a revealing insight into what has been described as the 'professionalisation' 
or 'Americanisation' of parties' election campaigns. In fact, the Labour Party compiled an 
internal document that recommended a list of areas in which Labour could learn from the 
US presidential election campaign of Bill Clinton in 1992. This list stressed among other 
points the need to improve the handling of the media during the election campaign by 
increasing the flexibility of press briefings and the candidate's schedule as well as the 
setting up of a rebuttal unit in order to deal as quickly as possible with attacks from other
134 Franklin, Bob - Packaging Politics. Edward Arnold, London, 1994
135 Scammell, Margaret - Designer Politics - How Elections are Won, MacMillan, London, 1995, p 298
136 Newman, Bruce I. (ed) - Handbook o f political marketing. Sage, London, 1999
137 Scammell, Margaret - Designer Politics - How Elections are Won. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1995, p 8
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parties.138 Furthermore, the document stressed the important role brief, clear, consistent 
policy themes and campaign pledges had played in Bill Clinton's successful bid for the 
White House.
Asked later about the significance of the report, one of its authors, the Labour 
Party's veteran organiser John Braggins, argued that the most important thing Labour had 
learned from Clinton's 1992 presidential campaign had been the need for the party's 25 
top politicians to be disciplined and remain 'on message' when talking to the media and 
voters. Furthermore, Braggins emphasised that Labour had learned - in comparison to 
previous elections - the importance to focus its campaign on the key issue of the economy, 
rather than on "160 different policies to be found within huge manifestos that were 
comparable to policy shopping lists."139
A leaked electoral strategy document of the Labour Party called the 'War Book: 
Version 3' revealed the degree of 'professionalisation' of the 1997 election campaign, 
which consisted of the precise pre-planning of Labour's election strategy, laying out the 
electoral battleground, identifying strong and weak points of Labour's appeal as well as 
stressing the party's policy themes and campaign pledges.140 A Guardian journalist 
described the 'War Book' fittingly as "a cross between post-modern 'list journalism' and 
present day marketing vogue for visual presentation....(with) hardly a traditional sentence 
in it. No verbs. Just bullet points."141 The Labour Party's approach towards the 1997 
election campaign included, furthermore, the pre-testing of themes, slogans and phrases 
in so-called 'focus groups' as well as the extensive use of public opinion polling to check 
'performance levels' i.e. the electorates (and in particular target groups) perception of the 
party was continuously monitored. Hence, policy priorities reflected the need to appeal to 
Labour's target voters, i.e. those groups of swing voters that had to be won over if the 
Labour Party would want to secure a parliamentary majority. For this, the profile of
138 Braggins, J., M. McDonagh and Barnard, A. - The American Presidential Election 1992 - What Can 
Labour Learn?, Internal Labour Party Document, (unpublished), 1992
139 Interview with John Braggins, London, 08/02/2000
140 Labour Party - War book: Version 3. Two Futures, leaked internal party document (approx.) Nov. 1996, 
pp 4-19
141 Kettle, Martin - ‘Leaked War Book highlights main strength and weaknesses in candid detail’, The 
Guardian. 24 April 1997
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Labour's "target audience" was identified as consisting of voters that were "mortgage 
holders; younger; and on higher incomes".142
Not surprisingly, the Labour Party's election manifesto was aimed at the electoral 
centre and focused on 'neo-liberal' policy approaches in form of pledges for low marginal 
rates of interest and low inflation as well as low levels of spending and borrowing (with 
Labour even adopting the spending commitments of the Conservative government), 
hence underlining the significant impact of modern market research techniques on the 
party's electoral and policy strategy.
Many of the above described campaign ideas and techniques were later adopted 
by the SPD during its 1998 election campaign. This included the party's establishment of a 
war room and rebuttal unit, the printing of programme pledge cards; a highly leadership 
focused election campaign and even the declaration of electoral target seats which were 
published on the SPD's election campaign internet site.
3.2.2. The emergence of a new  type of media effective party leadership?
Much has been written in recent years about a new style of leadership that has 
been increasingly successful with the media and above all the electorate. Prime example 
for this new type of party politics in Europe has been the electoral revival of the British 
Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair. His leadership style, relatively new for 
Europe's political systems, seems to have been at least partly inspired by the Democrats in 
the USA. Here, the increasing use of the media to focus on a party leader, spread ideas, 
sell politics, symbols and images has certainly played a part in the revival of the Labour 
Party in Britain.143 Also, the combination of the increasing role of the media and 
professionalised use of party policy presentation has played an important role in pushing 
personalised party politics to new heights.144 In fact, the former SPD party leader Bjorn 
Engholm stressed the importance for today's politicians to win over and co-operate with 
an all important media as there is no alternative to transport messages, with politicians 
"who do not use this, who do not smile and bite with pleasure into every microphone,
142 Labour Party - War book: Version 3, Two futures, (approx.) Nov. 1996, p 21
143 Meyer, Thomas - ‘Der Blair-Effect’, p 226-234, in: Thierse, Wolfgang (ed) - 1st die Politik noch zu retten? 
Standpunkte am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Aufbau Verlag, Berlin, 1996
144 This is in comparison to previous party leaders such as Harold MacMillan (Conservatives), Harold Wilson 
(Labour) as well as Konrad Adenauer (CDU) who also used successfully the media to stress the role o f their 
personalities.
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leaving the biting to the neighbour from the CDU" i.e. political opponent.145 Similarly, 
Labour's former spin-doctor David Hill expressed his belief that modern politics are all 
about a "constant sense that you have to keep communicating" with, for instance, "Blair 
going to take any opportunity to communicate what he is going to achieve [and]... giving 
the same message."146 Politicians such as Blair or Schroder have gained in effectiveness 
and stature from their ability to exhibit individual charisma with the help of the media as 
they carry the human face of often unfamiliar party organisations, unknown policy 
making structures and programmes. Hence, they offer a personalised policy orientation in 
political systems that lack increasingly clear conflict lines, transparency and contain - for 
the individual voter - incomprehensibly complicated social and political realities. Here, 
media accelerated party leadership personalities increasingly replace the role of ideologies 
which in the past enabled voters to a greater extent to identify party policy concepts, 
policy frameworks and bench marks that provided orientation for the evaluation of party 
political choices.
Not surprisingly, Gerhard Schroder and Tony Blair are examples of party leaders 
that have gained in leadership status in parallel to their ability to show to the electorate a 
degree of independence from their party organisations. In fact, both have been able to 
enhance their individual public charisma by portraying themselves as standing partly 
aside of their party organisation and interests of their parties' clientele.
3.2.3. The changing role of the party leadership
The increasing media focus centred on a few politicians representing their parties 
in the public eye leads inevitably to a decrease in the democratic accountability of party 
leaderships. Decisions and instant responses to the actions of political opponents' actions 
are expected to be given by party leaders on the spot in the media. This means that party 
'position' statements must be delivered instantaneously by leaderships, a circumstance, 
which reduces their ability to consult their parties.
The increasing importance of mass communication can, however, also be used by 
party leaders to their advantage and strengthen their position, as it enables them to appeal 
directly to party members when proposing policies. This means, that party leaders are
145 Interview with Bjorn Engholm, Liibeck, 15/06/1999
146 Interview with David Hill, London, 26/08/1999
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increasingly able to cut out traditionally influential party layers of consultative party 
functionaries that in the past would have been decisive for influencing and channelling 
party opinion between the leadership and party members. This has led to an enormous 
increase of decision-making power in the hands of fewer party functionaries and leaders 
with party leaders being increasingly able to coerce their parties into accepting policies 
advocated by them. In fact, those within the party openly disagreeing with the party 
leadership are open to the accusation that they risk undermining the public's perception 
of the party's unity, hence damaging the party's optimal electoral performance capacity. 
In addition, party elites have increased their potential in influencing rank and file 
members precisely because of their ability to employ the media for their appeals and 
because of their advantage in terms of information.147
All this must be seen in the context of both, the Labour Party and the SPD, 
engaging in a substantial processes of reform of inner-party procedures during the late 
1980s and 1990s that although upgrading individual membership (with the introduction 
of plebiscitary elements in the party structures such as membership ballots and internal 
votes) led at the same time to a weakening of the power of the parties1 body of 'delegates' 
(activists and associated members) while providing the parties elite's and leadership with 
extra room for manoeuvre and autonomy of actions.148
Thomas Meyer et al have fittingly explained parties increasing prioritisation and 
professionalisation of their media communication operations in the age of television by 
the fact that parties1 policy agenda's have become increasingly dominated by the 
perspectives of professional party strategists and communicators.149 In fact, Meyer et al see 
party functionaries as well as rank and file members increasingly relegated to the status of 
consumers who have delegated their policy and decision making capacities to the 
professional politicians, making political action increasingly the exclusive domain of office 
holders and heads of the party executives.
The above described general observations on the role of the mass media and its 
effects on the role of party leaderships is easily confirmed by developments in the Labour
147 Jun, Uwe - ‘Inner-Party reforms: The SPD and Labour Party in Comparative Perspective’, German 
Politics, Vol 5, No 1 (April 1996), p 64
148 Jun, Uwe - ‘Inner-Party reforms: The SPD and Labour Party in Comparative Perspective’, German 
Politics, Vol 5, No 1 (April 1996), p 71-3
149 Meyer, Thomas et al - Parteien in der Defensive?, Bund Verlag, Koln, 1994, p 126
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Party and SPD. Here, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroder - as party leaders - represent the 
image conscious examples of youngish, effective media friendly party representatives. 
Once chosen to challenge their conservative opponents, both politicians gained substantial 
personal authority over party policy direction and strategy, a situation which underlines 
that trends of convergence do not only exist in the area of policy choices, but also in areas 
such as party policy presentation and inevitably formulation as well.
The changing media environment and its impact on democracy and legitimacy has 
already led to calls to reform Europe's political system. For example, Peter Mandelson 
(influential architect of 'New Labour' and in 1998 Minister without Portfolio) envisaged a 
growing importance for plebiscites, referenda, focus groups, lobbies, and 'citizens' 
movements as ways to complement representative democracy with more direct forms of 
involvement.150 This shows that current party convergence in behaviour due to changes in 
the role of the mass media may only be the beginning of a much greater process of 
political system transition which may not only alter dramatically the content of party 
policies and ideology, but also the future role of political parties and politicians in general.
Finally, the issues raised above, although highly visible and of increasing 
importance, and indeed their precise impact on party policy formation and actor 
behaviour cannot be easily measured. In fact, a study conducted by Robert Worcester 
(MORI) and Roger Mortimer on Labour's 1997 landslide victory confirmed the old saying 
that 'opposition parties do not win elections - governments lose them'. Both authors 
argued in their book that the Labour Party as the opposition party only had to portray "a 
renewed image of electability" as the unpopularity of John Major's Conservative 
government, the "Tory image of economic incompetence" (Black Wednesday), "hopeless 
divisions" within the party and sleaze allegations "laid the foundations of Labour's 
victory" four years before the general election took actually place.151 Hence, Worcester and 
Mortimer - using extensively public opinion surveys - have shown that even without 
Labour's 'professionalisation' of campaigning and message communication and the 'Blair- 
factor', the Labour Party would still have been most likely to win the 1997 election.
150 Traynor, Ian - ‘Peter’s passions - Blair’s spinmeister startles Germans’, The Guardian, 16/03/1998
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Overall, a large number of factors play a role in determining the electoral success 
of parties. And while the 'professionalisation' of parties election campaigning, the 
growing importance of policy communications via the media with the electorate as well as 
a more leadership focused campaigning style may influence and significantly contribute 
to the success or electoral failure of a party, contextual issues such as the overall state of 
the economy at the time of election or the appearance of the party/parties in government 
office are equally of significant importance within regard to electoral outcomes.
3.3. Dom estic policy systems as conditioning factors for Labour's and the SPD's policy  
formation processes (The W estminster M odel vs. German federalism)
Before looking in greater debts at the Labour Party and the SPD as actors in 
opposition, it is important to point out the policy prescriptive role institutional stumbling 
blocks, veto points to policy reform and country specific electoral mechanics 
(constitutional constraints and differences in co-operative systems) have played in both 
parties responses to policy challenges. In fact, the differences in the actions and degree of 
policy radicalism of both parties domestic political opponents - the Conservatives and 
CDU - can be expected of having played a substantial role in determining both parties 
actors policy choices and strongly influencing national policy agenda's.152
3.3.1. Features of party political opponents: The CDU and the Conservative Party
The German Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU)
If we look at the features of the CDU/CSU in government and the Kohl 
administration, various points that conditioned the government's actions and attitudes are 
worth pointing out, as they - in turn - conditioned the SPD's strategy in opposition as well
151 Worcester, Robert and Roger Mortimer - Explaining Labour’s Landslide, Politico’s Publishing, London,. 
1999
152 Klingemann, H.-D. et al are right in their observation that “parties are effective articulators o f a policy 
agenda to the extent that the profiles enacted by governments reflect the profiles of programs that parties 
have presented to the electorate. Collectively and over time, the parties that compete in a country present a 
changing set o f programmatic concerns, which provide evidence o f the shifting boundaries o f policy 
discourse. If these also correspond with the boundaries o f changing government action, then we can claim 
that the parties have portrayed the effective agenda from which the policy process has proceeded.” Hence, 
they argue that “policy-making has been structured by the process o f competition through which the agenda 
has been publicly forged.” Therefore, the agenda setting does not necessarily depend on a party holding a 
mandate in form o f government office, but “rather upon their holding a legitimate and effective place in the 
public forum”. Klingemann, H.-D. et al - Parties, Policies, and Democracy, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994, p 
241
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as the policy agenda put forward by the CDU/CSU. Furthermore, the SPD could also 
attempt significant ways to obstruct the CDU-led governments policy setting.
There were the failing attempts of the Kohl government during the 1990s to engage 
in a thorough programme of policy reform and labour market policy modernisation, often 
referred to in Germany as 'Reformstau' (reform-log-jam), which were due to the 
CDU/FDP's governments inability to push through any major economic or tax-policy 
reforms and were largely a consequence of the German constitutional and political 
system.
A fundamental difference of the German political system in contrast to the British 
is the fact that it is based on federalism. This means that executive power is divided 
between the national level and the federal Bundeslander level, each with its own 
Bundesland government and parliament, something that stands in stark contrast to the 
traditional centralisation of power in the British system. This circumstance creates 
decisively different conditions for (opposition) party behaviour in Germany, making it, 
for example possible, that the same party/parties which is/are in federal government 
office may find her/themselves at the same time in opposition in certain Bundeslander 
governments. It also reflects on the institutional set up of parties and party political veto 
points within the German political system.
Constitutionally conditioned, the second legislative chamber (Bundesrat) proved to be 
a major obstacle to policy reform attempts by the CDU/FDP government from 1991 
onwards, when the SPD gained the status of - Lander vote - majority party that enabled 
the SPD to veto virtually all major governmental economic and welfare policy reform 
attempts. For instance, major parts of the Action Programme for Investment and 
Employment' put forward by the Kohl administration in 1997 - notably 'the tax reform of 
the century' - were blocked i.e. vetoed outright by the SPD dominated Bundesrat.
Unlike the British Conservative Party, the CDU/CSU has always had close 
organisational ties with the German trade union movement. Although unthinkable for the 
British Conservatives, the longest serving minister in the Helmut Kohl government 
cabinet was the popular trade unionist Norbert Blum (Minister fur Arbeit und
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Sozialordnung) who was Minister for Employment between 1982-1998. This link has been 
built up since the party's foundation after the war and the CDU still contains the 
influential Christlich Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft (CDA - 'Christian Democratic 
employees') grouping which during the 1980's and 90s remained an important player in 
the party's welfare and labour market policy choices. The CDA counterbalanced 
campaigns within the government parties for more extensive deregulation efforts and the 
neo-liberal demands of the CDU's business wing (Wirtschaftsfliigel) as well as the FDP.153
In addition, the German trade unions have been relatively independent from the SPD - 
in contrast to the Labour Party and the unions -  something that has meant that the DGB 
has been able to influence CDU governments much more effectively than British unions. 
In contrast, British Conservative governments have traditionally regarded their national 
trade union movement as the backbone of their political opponent.154 Hence, this 
difference explains why the CDU-led governments shared far more restraint when 
planning to introduce extensive labour market 'flexibilisation' measures, even when the 
CDU leadership had repeatedly promised a more drastic approach.
Finally, as the relationship between the trade unions and CDU has been traditionally 
far more consensual than in the UK, the CDU has been able to attract and also relied to a 
greater extent on votes from trade union members in order to win elections. This has 
meant that the CDU has been attracting votes from trade unionists whose interests - in 
turn - had to be dealt with sympathetically by the CDU (offering these groups substantial 
veto-points over policy changes) when choosing and developing labour market policies.
The British Conservative Party
In the highly centralised Westminster political system, the British Conservative 
Party and its government had been allocated an exceptional degree of power. The first- 
past-the-post electoral system, in addition providing single-party governments, ensured 
that once in power, the Conservative government was not constrained by major
153 The CDA has originally been a descendent from the German pre-war Christian trade union movement. It 
has been successfully lobbying for the interests of workers and employees inside the CDU/CSU and 
whenever in government, the CDU’s government Minister for Arbeit and Sozialordnung has been appointed 
from the ranks o f the CDA (such as Hans Katzer etc.). It is, however, fair to say that the influence of the CDA 
inside the CDU has been declining since the late 1980s.
154 Koelble, Thomas A. - ‘Challenges to the Trade Unions: The British and West Germany Cases’, West 
European Politics. July 1988, Vol 11, No 3, p 106
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constitutional policy veto points (since the Conservative controlled House of Lords holds 
only powers to delay legislation). In addition, the Conservatives did not need to worry 
about the House of Lords as the party held a permanent and large majority. Furthermore, 
the 'winner takes-alT electoral system has meant that the opposition party's ability to 
influence government policies is reduced to a minimum. In addition, the fact, that during 
the period of investigation the Labour Party and the Liberal/SDP/Lib-Dem opposition 
parties were splitting the opposition vote did only guarantee unrivalled Conservative 
Party dominance over the House of Commons, but also enabled the governments to push 
through its legislative plans while being able to widely ignore its opponents.
Hence, during the 1980s the Conservative Party was able to use these powers to 
introduce extensive labour market policy reforms. In fact, the Conservatives did not suffer 
defeat once or had to compromise reforms in order to gain a parliamentary majority for 
policies that often benefited the Conservatives southern clientele of rising wage earners, 
often at the expense of the traditional urbanised Labour voter in the north of the country. 
Furthermore, from 1981 onwards the parliamentary opposition to the Conservatives had 
been decisively weakened as intra-party quarrels within the Labour Party had finally led 
to a formal split with an influential amount of MPs on the right leaving the party to set up 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Finally, the effect of Conservative governments 
successful defeat of the miners during the miners' strike (1984-85)155 - confirming the 
substantial weakening of the trade union movement and with it the Labour Party's 
traditional natural ally - should not be underestimated as an indicator for the shift of 
power within British society in favour of the Conservative Party.
Overall, for the Conservatives it was far easier to decide upon and pass radical 
deregulative labour market policy reform through parliament than for the constitutionally 
and inner-party constrained CDU and its coalition government.
In fact, the Conservative Party - unlike the CDU - never developed strong 
organisational ties with outside interest groups. This stands in stark contrast to the Labour 
Party which - until the late-1980s - was institutionally linked with the country's trade 
union movement; relying not only financially on the unions, but a party constitution that 
guaranteed decisive decision-making power to the trade unions via their 'block votes', the
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Labour Party's policy choices were strongly reliant upon and constrained by trade union 
interests.
In the case of the Conservative Party, the parliamentary party had been at the very 
centre of the party's organisational structure, a structure that does not depend -  as in the 
case of the CDU - on local, regional, federal as well as Lander party organisations. Hence, 
the Conservative Party's apparatus and leadership personnel as well as decision-making 
machinery had traditionally been highly centralised. As rightly observed by Thomas 
Koelble, "the dominant faction in the British Conservative Party...enjoys a great deal more 
decision-making freedom than their counterparts in the West Germany Christian- 
Democratic Union (CDU). The organisation of the British Conservative Party allows its 
leaders greater autonomy from interest group pressure than in the CDU."156 Hence, this 
difference in political culture (centralism vs. federalism) between Britain and Germany is 
mirrored by the parties in government as well as parties in opposition.
David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh have correctly pointed out that the federal 
structure of the SPD has meant that it is far less centralised than the Labour Party. For 
instance, when in opposition, the central (now) Berlin based parliamentary party was 
weakened as it could not make use of the government bureaucracy and civil servants to 
develop policies. Furthermore, regional SPD Lander governors hold the resources and 
power base to decisively influence the policy making of the national party organisation 
especially if the federal party is in opposition. This circumstance explains, why the SPD in 
opposition was not tempted to choose more radical policy approaches, as Lander 
'Ministerprasidenten' in power had a moderating influence with their interest being, that 
the central party organisation would adopt pragmatic unorthodox policy positions that 
could easily be supported by the Lander governments. In contrast, the Labour Party 
experienced policy formation patterns -  as pointed out by Butler and Kavanagh - under 
which "in opposition, influence shifts to the extra-parliamentary party, particularly the
155 The Labour Party leadership complained later, that during "a cmcial 15-18 month period" o f the miner 
strike and in its aftermath, it was prevented from concentrating on re-developing policy issues and improving 
the party's public appeal. (Interview with Neil Kinnock, Brussels, 24/07/2000)
156 Koelble, Thomas A. - ‘Challenges to the Trade Unions: The British and West German Cases’, West 
European Politics, July 1988, Vol 11, No 3, p 93
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Conference and National Executive, which reflect the views of the large trades unions and 
party activists, many of whom are left wing."157
In fact, after Labour had lost the 1992 election, the party leadership, first under 
John Smith and even more fiercely under Tony Blair, moved the party's economic policies 
further towards the adoption of neo-liberal ideas -  a move that had been made easier by 
the organisational evolution the party had undergone. Here, Labour was able to move 
away from the traditionally strong trade union influence on its policy making machinery, 
while at the same time changing officially the party's constitutional aims - as in the 
amendment of the Clause IV - and abandoning its fundamental commitment to public 
ownership.
Overall, it is clear that the development of Germany's and Britain's social 
democratic policy agendas during the period of investigation were significantly dissimilar 
due to differing political systems, policy traditions and actions of political opponents. The 
different conditions under which the SPD and the Labour Party had to take up their role 
and develop policies in opposition therefore contrasted substantially and hence affected 
both parties institutional and policy responses.
In fact, even though both parties were affected in a similar way by the same socio­
economic constraints when formulating their policies, New Labour eventually took the 
neo-liberal cause far further than the SPD.
Hence, the legacy and impact of the Conservative Party's policies (1979-1997) with 
its public utility sell offs and extensive labour market deregulations had pushed the 
domestic policy agenda far further towards neo-liberalism than had been the case in any 
other European country. That is why the political context in which the Labour Party had 
to win elections and formulate policies had been much further to the right of the political 
spectrum.
Secondly, there had been no electoral competitor to the left of the Labour Party 
(even, if only due to the electoral system) that could have threatened the Labour Party in 
terms of losing votes to the left when the party moved its policy approaches further to the
157 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh - The British General Election of 1983. MacMillan, London, 1984, p 
47
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centre of the political spectrum in order to attract and win over the median voter and 
'middle England/
Thirdly, the centralised nature of the Labour Party's structure (and moves to 
strengthen it) made it easier for the party to centrally enforce its policy agenda on the 
entire party organisation.
Finally, the public sector trade unions had remained far stronger in most other 
European countries than in the UK. Here, the emasculation of the public sector trade 
unions had meant that the Labour Party had not had to face the same pressures as other 
centre/left social democratic parties in opposition or government when deciding upon 
labour market policies. Clearly, the differing conditions and differences in opponents 
affected the Labour Party and the SPD when acting and developing policies in opposition. 
We can now proceed and look at the general conditions that constrained and conditioned 
the ability of both parties to develop policies and act in opposition.
3.3.2. National roles of opposition (Britain and Germany)
The institutional roles and duties of opposition parties differ historically and 
substantially between the British and German political systems with their different 
electoral systems and the resulting parliamentary majorities setting very different 
conditions for the operational scope of opposition parties.
The traditional view of the nature of opposition in Britain is based on the existence 
of a competitive two-party system. This has meant historically, that the opposition has 
held the role of being a standing alternative government, which institutionally has been 
most clearly displayed by the 'Her Majesty's Loyal' opposition party's appointment of 
'shadow ministers' acting within a 'shadow cabinet'. However, particularly since the 
1980s, this perception has been threatened and questioned by the fact that both major 
parties lost a substantial share of their vote to third parties, reflecting an overall trend that 
clear cut class and party identification seemed to be on the decline.158 However, with the 
British first past the post electoral system remaining in tact, the system continued to
158 Nevil Johnson has argued that the overall institutionalisation of the opposition party as being a standing 
alternative to the government o f the day broke down during the 1980s, as the Labour Party was not perceived 
by the overwhelming majority o f the electorate as a viable alternative government. (Johnson, Nevil -  
‘Opposition in the British Political system’, Government and Opposition, Vol 32, No 4, 1997, p 487
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deliver clear parliamentary majorities. This resulted in the continuation of the electorally 
winning party 'takes all' situation, which meant that the ability of opposition parties to 
influence governmental policy decisions has been kept to a minimum. Traditionally, once 
an election had taken place, parliament was seen primarily as a forum of open debate and 
consensual bargaining among government and opposition MPs, but instead has been 
treated by opposition parties more as a forum to influence their party's public perception 
and to improve future electoral potential.159
In contrast to the British political system, general elections in Germany are not as 
decisive in respect to cutting a clear line between the 'in' and 'out' parties, although 
elections are usually decisive in respect of deciding who forms the next executive. The use 
of proportional representation in the German electoral system encourages clearly the 
access of multiple parties to parliamentary seats, hence encouraging and necessitating the 
formation of party coalitions to gain a majority of seats to form a government. This 
circumstance influences the entire electoral outlook of parties in opposition, as a general 
election does not decide over the 'in' or 'out' status of a party, but instead decides over a 
party's ability to enter a coalition.160 However, a party's success of attracting more votes 
may not enable it necessarily to become part of a majority coalition. Overall, opposition 
parties fundamental aim is to gain public support as well as to win votes in elections and 
although both aims are important, they are neither always necessary nor always sufficient, 
since any one of a great variety of factors may prove decisive in one specific case but not 
in another.161
After having established the domestic institutional and political system differences 
that may substantially alter the SPD's and Labour's Policy choices, we can now move on 
to look in some more debt at the specific conditions under which parties have to develop 
policies when in opposition.
159 Dahl, Robert A. (ed) -  Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1966, p 339
160 There are exceptions to the rule, in fact, the German system  has produced the phenom enon of a 
party trying to m axim ise her vote w hile not aim ing at coalition building or a role in governm ent as 
happened in the case of the Green Party in the early eighties.
161 Dahl, Robert A. (ed) -  Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, Yale University Press, New Haven 
and London, 1966, p 345
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3.4. The Labour Party and the SPD: Parties acting within the constraints of being in 
opposition
Parties' choices of electoral strategy and on what policies to adopt are not only 
determined by ideology and the political system they operate within, but also by a party's 
electoral situation. Hence, a party in opposition is faced with a different set of challenges, 
aims and possibly preference shaping strategies.
In fact, it is interesting to look at the behaviour of opposition parties (in particular 
those with the potential of winning government office) under the consideration of the 
constraints they are facing as opposition parties and their possibly reduced ability to 
shape and adopt preference shaping party strategies for the electorate. By these strategies, 
we mean, for instance, the ability of parties to attempt to redirect public attention to issues 
they feel strongly about or their ability to polarise social tensions between groups of the 
electorate in order to encourage voters to reconsider formerly held beliefs and switch 
party allegiances.
3.4.1. Opposition parties preference shaping strategies
It seems conceivable, that major parties in opposition may attempt to reshape 
voters' preferences as they attempt to influence the political agenda. There are two major 
ways for opposition parties to engage in this process. When opposition party actors adopt 
party policy positions, they may not necessarily advocate certain policies because they are 
deemed popular with the electorate and are expected to maximise a party's vote. Instead, 
opposition parties may have chosen to adopt a specific policy in order to damage the 
preference-shaping strategies of parties in government. For example, an opposition party 
may decide to vigorously oppose and contest government legislation through all of the 
state's decision-making bodies and institutions in order to encourage protests among the 
public or lobby groups to engage the government in time consuming discussions and 
protests in order to frustrate the implementation of government legislation. With this 
strategy, opposition parties can change voters' perceptions of the competence of 
government policies. Furthermore, opposition parties can attempt to outbid government 
policies by demanding and promising policies that boost the expectations of the electorate 
as voters may be tempted to vote for the party that seems to offer the best deal. Under this 
category would fall, for example, party programme pledges on great state investment
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schemes to boost employment which are promised once a party is in government. 
However, as we will see later with regards to labour market policies proposed by the SPD 
and Labour Party, it is important to propose policies that do not only promise more than 
political opponents, but they must be credible and realistic. In fact, if the electorate begins 
to question the credibility and implementability of parties' policy pledges (e.g. if a realistic 
framework for funding is missing), than a party can be expected to damage its electoral 
chances and reduce its share of the vote rather than improve it.
Similarly, the attempt of the Labour Party to push the issue of unemployment to 
the top of the national agenda throughout the 1980s by declaring it one of Labour's main 
policy priorities did not necessarily improve Labour's electoral performances. At best, it 
may have helped the party to score some sympathy points with the electorate and 
improved the competency rating on welfare policies with the electorate acknowledging 
the importance of the unemployment issue, but its actual voting preferences were 
determined instead by other issues such as low inflation and tax rates (Butler and 
Kavanagh 1992). Therefore, the Labour Party did not succeed electorally with its strategy 
to shape voters preferences as other policy issues seemingly determined to a far greater 
extent the country's electoral campaigns and outcomes.
However, the use of party preference shaping strategies are a common means out 
of the toolbox of party strategists, party leaderships and elite's as well as election 
campaign managers and spin doctors. The attempt to set the domestic agenda and take 
over the policy initiative certainly influences programmatic policy choices to better ones 
party's electoral performance and to enable more 'professionalised' electoral campaigning.
3.4.2. Social democratic parties in 'opposition'
Following from this is the question, can we assume that the behaviour of parties' 
in opposition differs from that of parties in government office, because opposition party 
actors may differ in the way they rank policy objectives and chose their political 
strategies? In fact, the political constellation of opposition versus government parties 
maybe a crucial factor and provides leads to the programmatic positioning of the parties. 
This means, on the one hand, that during the course of this study, the fact that we are 
dealing with two social democratic parties in opposition may give possible leads to their
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specific behaviour patterns and policy responses. However, on the other hand, although 
the 'opposition' factor must be accounted for, we have to remind ourselves that we are 
first and foremost investigating the question, why both social democratic parties remained 
in opposition for exceptionally long periods of time. And to answer this, we intent to 
focus predominantly on the impact of the decline the Keynesian paradigm has had on 
social democratic party's policy positioning rather than investigating and drawing 
conclusions for the general behaviour patterns of parties in opposition. Nevertheless, the 
fact that during the period under investigation both parties were conditioned by their 
status as opposition parties has certainly influenced their behaviour and strategic 
planning, thus making the 'opposition' factor an important secondary component that has 
to be recognised for the analysis of the Labour Party's and SPD's policy development 
processes.
Eva Kolinsky, editor of one of the most important 1980s studies on opposition in 
Western Europe's political systems detected an overall neglect of political analysts dealing 
with opposition parties, which she compared to as being treated like "a loser in a cup 
final: Media attention turns to the victorious team."162 In fact, the majority of literature on 
political parties focuses predominantly on the policy-making process of parties in 
government or the translation of policy proposals into government policy. However, as 
this thesis deals exclusively with parties in opposition, we are for obvious reasons not in a 
position to view parties intended policy actions or inaction in light of later governmental 
implementation, which forces us to try to understand and evaluate parties' intentions and 
pledges as well as their likely determination and ability to transform them into 
government policy.
Maurice Duverger (1951), in his 'classic' account of the organisation and activity of 
political parties in modern society, was one of the early writers who assessed opposition 
party activity. In a special chapter at the end of his book, he concentrated on emphasising 
the differing formative influences (two or multiple) party systems held over opposition
162 Kolinsky, Eva (ed) -  Opposition in Western Europe, Croon Helm, London, 1987, p 1
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parties.163 Duverger acknowledged that factors such as the role of alliances, party strength 
and internal organisation are crucial in determining the nature of the political activity of 
parties in opposition.
In the first major comprehensive study solely focusing on political opposition in 
Western Democracies published in 1966, Robert A. Dahl gave special attention to the 
various national constitutional arrangements that conditioned and defined the precise role 
of opposition parties within the functioning of political systems. However, Dahl neglected 
to account sufficiently for the role and implications of institutions on opposition party 
activity and focused predominantly on establishing that there were a variety of differing 
opposition party activities in different political systems. This ultimately forced him to 
conclude that the establishment of comparative behaviour patterns among opposition 
parties was an impossible task.164 However, in order to overcome the problems 
encountered by Dahl, we attempt during this study to emphasise on institutional 
implications and the role they play in the policy development processes of the parties 
under investigation, in particular when dealing with the theoretical aspects of party 
behaviour.
Furthermore, it must be recognised that the institutionalised competition of 
government versus opposition plays a crucial role in the parties' policy development 
processes as it provides legitimacy to the democratic decision-making process. In 
principle, a democratic governing system should be open to opposition inputs - critical or 
co-operative - in order to produce decision-making outcomes that are acceptable to all 
actors involved. In other words, parliamentary democracy is usually built on a consensus 
among actors within the political system that accommodates competition among various
163 According to Duverger, in a two party system the parliamentary opposition parties were most likely to be 
moderate in character. He argued, that parties would remain distinct in spite o f this moderate character and 
because of their great potential to eventually take over government responsibility. In this case, he felt that the 
opposition was protected “from any exaggerated demagogy, which might react to its disadvantage.” In 
contrast, in multi-party systems Duvenger foresaw opposition parties to tend to be naturally demagogic as a 
result o f different circumstances. He believed that the electoral conflict in multi-party systems would lead to 
opposition parties fighting their nearest rival, and encourage opponents to outbid each other on electoral 
pledges. Furthermore, in multi-party systems, parties likelihood to gain sole government power would be 
quite limited, a factor that he envisaged would tempt opposition parties to “indulge in unlimited criticisms 
and promises.”
Duverger, Maurice - Political Parties. Methuen & Co., London, 3rd ed. 1964, p 415
164 Dahl, Robert A. (ed) -  Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, Yale University Press, New Haven 
and London, 1966, pp 345-47
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ideas and interests as well as government and opposition actors in a manner, that the 
different party actors perceive as more or less fair. From this follows, that a pre-condition 
for the functioning and legitimisation of the political system is the active involvement of 
opposition as well as government parties in both the policy and opinion formation 
processes within a democratic society.
In fact, two major factors can be identified in 'western' democratic political systems 
that ultimately condition activities of opposition parties and provide them with a defined 
role.
a. The political system and culture in which opposition parties are based and operate is 
significant for refining an opposition party's role and tasks.
b. Institutional factors, such as the overall system of government, the structure of parties 
and the electoral system significantly pre-determine the playing field of opposition 
parties and condition their overall strategic behaviour.
In order to apply the two major factors identified above to our analysis of both parties' 
LMP formation activities, we must look in greater detail at the factors, motivations and 
reasons that lie behind opposition party activity and distinguish them from those of 
governmental parties. Here, we have to take account of motivational factors, the structural 
disadvantage of opposition parties as well as the differing national political systems 
influence on the behaviour of opposition parties.
3.4.3. Comparing parties in differing electoral systems
As already identified, electoral systems play a crucial role in the functioning and 
structure of party systems and influence therefore strongly the conditions under which 
parties in opposition have to operate. Electoral systems are decisive in determining the 
concentration of parties represented in parliament; the relative strength of parties in 
relation to the amount of votes received and also influences the cohesion of parties. In fact, 
a change of electoral system in any country could certainly be expected to fundamentally 
alter a country's political profile.
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As most Western European countries have adopted various electoral models 
containing elements of proportionality, the British system is truly unique by any European 
standard. This has been pointed out in a study by Bernard Crick, which argued 
convincingly that the British system is often unsuitable as a basis for generalisations about 
political behaviour patterns in other European countries.165 This raises the problem that 
comparative cross-national studies, such as on party behaviour, between Britain and 
systems of continental Europe and the eventual ability to develop generalising theoretical 
models from this may be strongly impaired.
We deal with this problem by focusing on the role that increasingly similar 
'external' socio-economic factors hold on social democratic parties operating in the British 
and German political system as well as looking at different 'internal' policy making 
processes and strategic party choices that can be strongly related to the party actors 
operations within the differing institutional frameworks and political systems. In fact, the 
chosen hypotheses and research path are an attempt, if anything, to show that it is 
possible to overcome the above described obstacles when engaging in the cross-national 
study of parties operating in differing political systems and to draw overall theoretical 
conclusions from the parties policy choices.
However, the above-described problems sharpen the awareness of substantial 
differences in party systems. The overall cross-national differences that occur due to 
differing political cultures; the long-term historical developments of political systems as 
well as specific national political and parliamentary constellations found during the time 
frame of investigation inevitably lead to very individual cross-national party profiles, as 
identified by R. A. Dahl in 1966, but do not necessarily eclipse by themselves party 
decision-making patterns and actors' considerations as they remain ultimately 
comparable and cross-nationally identifiable.
3.4.4. Developing and pledging policies in opposition: A 'structural disadvantage'
Different motivating factors for opposition and government parties can be 
identified when they engage in policy reviews and organisational learning processes.
165 Crick, Bernard, ‘On Conflict and Opposition’, in Barker, Rodney S. (ed) -  Studies in Opposition, 
MacMillan, London, 1971
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Instead of having to be concerned with the implementation of proposed policies, 
opposition parties in liberal democracies play constitutionally the role of controlling the 
actions of the government party/parties by scrutinising government actions, voicing 
criticisms and suggesting alternative policies. However, opposition parties by nature can 
only draw upon policy initiatives of intent and proclaim courses of action. In contrast, 
government parties possess the ability not only to state their policy preferences in 
programmes, but also to have the capacity to enact them into actual legislation. In 
addition, government parties can even engage in courses of state action, which have not 
been part of their programme.
Overall, empirical research on party programmes faces generally the problem that 
policy pledges given by government parties and probably to an even greater extent by 
opposition parties may be unrealistic, possibly unworkable or programmes may include 
pledges that were made to the electorate partly with the knowledge that they would be 
impossible to keep.166 Although parties in opposition may be tempted to an even greater 
extent than government parties to propose unrealistic policy pledges, it must be pointed 
out in their defence that this may not be necessarily based on bad intent. While opposition 
parties in particular may be tempted to put forward unrealistic pledges to attract extra 
votes, actors face a disadvantage in resources available (compared to parties in office) for 
policy development.
Here, the SPD's former party general secretary (1981-87) Peter Glotz emphasised 
that there is not only a large temptation for policy makers in opposition to develop and 
propose 'catalogues' of policies that lack political and financial realism due to a lack of 
available up-to-date data and (outside) expertise, but that politicians in opposition are also 
in a situation in which their aim to win the next election and to criticise the government 
increases substantially the temptation of policy-makers to advocate policies that lack 
realism.167 Similarly, in the case of Labour and its policy making errors during the party's 
early years in opposition, party 'moderniser' and MP Tony Wright has argued that the 
party "promised all kinds of conflicting things and just took on board any interest group
166 Budge, Ian et al (ed) - Ideology. Strategy, and Party Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1987
167 Interview with Peter Glotz, Erfurt, 14/06/1999
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demand that was around, believing that when you put one demand on top of another that 
you would somehow find your way, something that was catastrophic."168
Clearly, opposition parties often lack the kind of resources in terms of information, 
up-to-date data and personnel - usually available to government parties - to develop 
detailed policy initiatives, a factor that clearly must effect policy making competencies 
and tempts parties to adopt possibly unrealistic pledges that may undermine the 
credibility and electoral performance of an opposition party as a trustworthy alternative to 
a party in government. Alan Ware (1996) expanded on this claim by arguing that 
opposition parties are generally in a disadvantageous position when attempting to 
develop policies. He has attempted to show this by using the historical record of Labour 
Party policy developments. Here, he has argued that the Labour having been out of power 
for most of the 20th century must be accredited to the "dismal record" the party has held 
when it came to its policy development. In fact, Ware argued that Labour's most 
successful period of policy implementation was between 1945-51 where the party 
benefited from having previously been a member of the wartime coalition government, 
something that enabled Labour to make use of government resources in form of reports 
and research studies. According to Ware, this circumstance eventually provided the basis 
for Labour's most successful policy initiatives.169 Ware thus concluded, "even the best- 
resourced parties cannot replicate in opposition the kind of policy development that 
governments can".170 In other words, opposition parties face a "structural disadvantage" 
when attempting to develop and formulate workable policy proposals.
Various policy actors during the interviews for this study have further backed up 
this argument. For example, John Braggins pointed out that on complicated policy issues 
such as health, finance and transport, vast amounts of information are required to develop 
realistic policy programmes. Here, the lack of availability of information tempts 
opposition policy makers "to make recommendation based upon your feeling of what is 
fair, right, proper, and just, but none of that is going to be able to be tested until you know
168 Interview with Tony Wright, London, 01/02/2000
169 Ware, Alan - Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p 118
170 Ware, Alan - Political Parties and Party Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p 357
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what the economics of it and the implications that they will have on other aspects of 
government" are, concluding that "any opposition party, no matter how many think tanks 
it has, is going to be inferior in its policy making than a party in government."171 The 
former SPD Minister for Employment, Helmut Rohde, described - similar to Ware's 
argument - this development when he began working (as a parliamentary state secretary) 
at the Ministry for Employment after the SPD had won the 1969 general election. The SPD 
which had already been in government office for the previous three years as part of a 
great coalition with the CDU/CSU had used the time, according to Rhode, to prepare - 
with the resources of a government party - detailed policy proposals that were drawn up 
before the election and implemented at once when the SPD-led government of 1969 
assumed office.172
Hence, since the early 1980s and until 1997/98, the Labour Party and the SPD as 
opposition parties clearly operated under two severe constraints when developing LMPs. 
Firstly, they had to develop and propose policies on increasingly more complex issues 
(with a growing cross-national dimension) in which policies could often only attempt to 
deal with the impact of problems rather than with tackling causes which lay increasingly 
outside the domestic domain. Secondly, both parties had to cope with the 'structural 
disadvantage' of being in opposition and hence lacking government information, 
resources and personnel to develop and provide precise policy alternatives.
This meant, that opposition parties had to balance, to a greater extent than 
government parties on the one hand, the temptation to outbid their political rivals with 
(over) generous/ambitious political pledges within their programme, while on the other, 
having to maintain an image of competence and trustworthiness with proposed policies 
and pledges being delivered to the electorate as credible, costed, workable policies based 
on the latest available information and data.
Here, the Conservative Party and the CDU-led governments were far better able to 
use the entire governmental and ministerial machinery to develop credible and detailed 
governmental and party policies. In fact, the German system of state party funding 
explicitly recognises the structural disadvantage of opposition parties by offering extra
171 Interview with John Braggins, London, 08/02/2000
172 Interview with Helmut Rohde, Bonn, 24/06/1999
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resources to parliamentary party organisations and MPs in the Bundestag that are not part 
of the current government.173
3.5. Differing experiences of the Labour Party and SPD in early opposition
It has to be pointed out, that in particular at the beginning of both parties' periods 
in opposition during the early 1980s conditions were strongly influenced by national 
factors arising from the differing national political systems; a greater variety of 
'acceptable' policy choices available to the parties; and in particular in Britain the 
polarisation of political party conflict and the changing role i.e. crack down on the trade 
union movement. In 1979 and 1982 respectively, both parties experienced similar 
pressures from the grass-roots as well as party activists to move to the left as the loss of 
government power was partly blamed within both parties on the leadership of the Labour 
/  SPD-led governments, which were perceived as having 'failed' to implement their 
parties reformist 'left' ideals in government. However, when confronted with this pull 
factor, party institutions as well as the national political systems clearly contributed to 
different outcomes in the parties' policy and strategy developments.
Labour Party
David Denver (1987) argued that the move of the Labour Party to the left after 
entering opposition in 1979 must be accredited to various factors that were rather unique 
in the case of the party.174
Firstly, after 1979, Labour began to move its policies towards the left as the 
traditionally more 'moderate' parliamentary party leadership was not able to retain 
control over party organisation and policy making processes as 'moderates' were not (as 
previously) backed by the majority of trade unions at the annual party conferences. In 
fact, Denver argued furthermore that some trade unions had already started to move to
173 As a rule, all parliamentary party groupings represented within the German Bundestag receive - according 
to the ‘Abgeordnetengesetz’ - monthly payments of more than £180000 in addition to the £6800 received by 
each MP (£1=DM3=€1.50). In addition, each parliamentary party organisation (Fraktion) and its MPs - when 
not playing part in the current government - receive a further 10% (PLPs) and 15% (MPs) o f bonus funds of  
their opposition ‘status’, something that is certainly intended to offset and compensate for the structural 
disadvantage experienced by parties in opposition (It must, however be pointed out that the German party 
laws distinguish clearly between financial support for PLPs and the actual party organisations). (Lolhoffel, 
Helmut - ‘Das Geld der Fraktionen’, Frankfurter Rundschau. 06/01/2000, p 4)
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the left by the end of the 1960s, which had meant that the left gained slowly but 
increasingly more and more control over Labour's NEC, while the 'hard' left was 
institutionally increasingly unchecked and therefore able to increase its influence within 
the party organisation to a considerable extent. Hence, when the Labour Party lost the 
1979 general election, the severe increases in the rate of unemployment under a Labour 
government and the overall disappointment of many party members with a lack of 
achievement by Labour governments in 1964-1970 and 1974-79 meant, that the inner-party 
left was able to re-adjust the party's political outlook and balance.175
Secondly, for the Labour Party constitutional questions became a major source of 
intra-party conflict throughout the 1980s, with the mandatory re-selection of incumbent 
MPs, the election of party leaders and the control over the development of the party 
policies and election manifestos representing a constant source for divisions within the 
party that led to consistent bitter and highly publicised battles between the left and right. 
From this it followed that the party appeared totally disunited and even extremist for long 
periods in opposition176, a situation that ensured an extremely poor party image in the 
public eye.177
Overall, the Labour Party - in particular in the early years of opposition - was for 
intra-party institutional reasons far too divided to play any effective role as an opposition 
party; to regain lost policy credibility and present itself in the eyes of the electorate as a 
government in waiting. When this weak party appearance was added to the general 
'external' challenge and social democratic agenda setting problems faced by Labour, it 
becomes clear why the Labour Party was not able to be an effective electoral opponent for 
the Conservative Party or successful player in channelling domestic opposition against the 
Conservatives and challenge successfully the government in office.
174 Denver, David - ‘Great Britain: from ‘Opposition with a Capital ”0 ”’ to Fragmented Opposition’, in 
Kolinsky, Eva -  Opposition in Western Europe, Croom Helm, London, 1987, p 75-107
175 For a more detailed account, see: Williams, Philip - ‘The Labour Party: The rise o f the left’, in Berrington, 
H. (ed) - Change in British Politics, Frank Cass, London, 1984, p 26-55
176 Neil Kinnock offered an additional reason for the polarised policy choices of the Labour Party during its 
early years in opposition. He argued that "Thatcherism produced polar responses" and as a consequence 
"there was little patience for people that said, don't let us just look for a way o f opposing this, let's look for a 
way of showing it to be destructive and then finding some way's that are practical and have more popular 
appeal." (Interview with Neil Kinnock, Brussels, 24/07/2000)
177 In October 1983, 71% of the electorate agreed in a opinion poll compiled by the Gallup Institute, that the 
Labour Party was too extreme. (Gallup Polls Ltd, Political Index (GPI), p 276 + 278)
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SPD
In contrast to the development of the Labour Party, Paterson and Webber (1987) 
identified at least five major institutional and constitutional factors that were crucial for 
the SPD's avoidance of having to face similar pressures than the Labour Party and of 
moving substantially to "left' when entering opposition.178
First of all - in contrast to the Labour Party - the SPD faced a strong continuity in 
the party's federal leadership personnel. In addition, the voluntary withdrawal of Helmut 
Schmidt and Herbert Wehner from the inner-circles of the party leadership led only to a 
modest shift in the intra-party balance of power that strengthened predominantly the 
moderate centre around the party leader Willy Brandt.
Secondly, the Social Democratic controlled Lander and local governments 
constituted a natural constituency and force for 'realism' when the party took up its 
opposition role. In fact, the weight of the leadership of the SPD-led Lander governments 
within the party increased as the Bundespartei went into opposition on the federal level. 
The fact that the SPD Lander governments controlled large administrations meant that the 
SPD Lander-Ministerprasidenten were provided with the expertise and resources to have 
an influential impact on the party's policy formulation process. Hence, the Social 
Democratic Lander-premiers were not only able to strengthen their position and play a 
central role in the formulation of the SPD policy programmes, they were in addition also 
naturally pushing for moderate party policies as they were actively holding down 
government office in their Bundeslander.
Thirdly, the constitutionally determined federal level parliamentary work that 
takes place in form of work committees meant, that the system acted against the 
radicalisation of the SPD in opposition. In fact, the system generated pressure on 
individual MPs to develop 'pragmatic' expertise in specific policy fields and to take up a 
problem-solving approach to politics and political issues. The hierarchy of the SPD's 
parliamentary party (with the right wing traditionally in a strong domineering position) 
meant, that MPs had to display their moderate credentials before they would be chosen by 
the parliamentary party for policy determining committee work.
178 Paterson, William E. and Douglas Webber - ‘The Federal Republic: The Re-emergent Opposition’, 
in Kolinsky, Eva - Opposition in Western Europe. Croom Helm, London, 1987, pp 127-52
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In addition, as described earlier, parliamentary opposition in Germany has a 
predominantly co-operative role, which means that constitutional factors also guided the 
moderate development of the SPD's policy agenda. Furthermore, the absence since 1982 of 
any major class or ideological polarisation issue facing the German political system meant 
that the SPD party leadership did not experience any significant pressure from its rank- 
and-file membership or core electoral clientele to adopt more polarised policy positions or 
engaged in a radical opposition strategy (except for anti-nuclear power and peace 
movement issues).
Finally, the close alignment of the SPD with the traditionally rather moderate 
German trade union movement and the discipline of the majority of the unions to follow 
arbitration strategies meant that pressures for programmatic radicalisation would not 
come from this part of the German labour movement. German trade unions - in order not 
to avoid alienating their mass membership - brought forward predominantly moderate 
political demands and acted rather as a conservative force whenever the SPD proposed 
more radical left policies (such as policies against the further use of nuclear power 
stations).179
Overall, in this chapter we have looked at the 'internal microfoundations' of the 
parties' policy making as well as the specific conditions faced by parties1 in opposition. 
'Internal' as well as 'external' influence components depend on a variety of different 
factors and indeed do not allow the use of precise all-country set check lists. Instead, 
conditions are fluid and change according to a constant evolution is taking place over time 
within the domestic policy systems and party organisations. Nevertheless, parties' in 
opposition are a distinctive species whose specific features are too often not recognised or 
ignored even though they are a crucial component for the understanding of party policy 
choices and strategic actor behaviour.
After having identified the relevant differences in the national party political 
systems, we can now proceed to test them within the context of the historical period and 
the parties' actual policy changes, using the example of their labour market policies. This 
assessment can now link 'external' to 'internal' contextual factors before looking at the
179 Paterson, William E. and Douglas Webber - ‘The Federal Republic: The Re-emergent Opposition’, 
in Kolinsky, Eva - Opposition in Western Europe. Croom Helm, London, 1987, pp 127-52
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specifics of party institutional reforms; the occurrence of "junctures" and changes in 
"ideational" components; as well as the development of policy ideas and consider how  
'rational' actors have engaged in the process of policy change. Let us, however, firstly 
move to the theoretical aspects of party actors' policy choices before engaging in the 
quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse the formulation of LMPs by the Labour 
Party and the SPD between 1979/97 and 1997/98.
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Chapter 4: Institutional constraints on rational party actors: The role 
of the Keynesian and Neo-liberal paradigms for the policy 
development of the Labour Party and the SPD
4.1. A theory of party paradigm shifts and policy processes
4.1.1. Neo-Institutionalist approaches and the decline of the Keynesian paradigm
4.1.2. Rational actors and party policy development
4.2. Party identities and policy space
4.2.1. The temporal dimension of party politics
4.3. A 'New Institutionalist' approach
4.3.1. Rules, Routines and Standard Operational Procedures
4.3.2. Actors, rules and procedures
4.3.3. Inefficiencies of rules and procedures
4.4. The role of ideas in the policy process
4.5. The Keynesian and Neo Liberal paradigms, institutions and impacts
4.5.1. Party policy and the Keynesian paradigm
4.5.2. Party policy and the Neo-Liberal paradigm
4.5.3. The parties shift from a Keynesian to the acceptance of a Neo-Liberal policy approach
4.5.4. Consequences of the change in paradigm for the Labour Party and the SPD
4.5.5. Path dependence and 'picking the right horse'
4.5.6. Path dependence and political parties
4.6. Labour's and the SPD's 'delayed' shift towards more neo-liberal LMPs approaches
4.6.1. Problems of party strategy
4.6.2. Policy learning
4.6.3. The role of institutionalised paradigms
4.6.4. Why did Conservatives and Christian Democrats not face the same problem?
4.6.5. The role of demographic change
4.7. The notion of institutional history
4.7.1. The application of Historical Institutionalism
4.7.2. Comparative findings: Historical Institutionalism and the decline of the Keynesian paradigm - The case of the 
Labour Party and the SPD
4.8. Conclusion
This study links institutional factors to the role of policy paradigms within political 
parties, which are shown to have played an instrumental role in the Labour Party's and 
the SPD's institutional development, strategic choices and labour market policy formation 
processes. In fact, they explain the initial long-term electoral failure of Labour and the SPD 
and the requirement for an overall paradigm shift, which led eventually to a substantial 
degree of policy convergence in the LMPs advocated by both parties.
Institutional factors such as path dependence, the adoption of paradigms by both 
parties and their inability to modernise Keynesian-led policy approaches as they had been 
a fundamental part of social democratic ideology led to both parties experiencing severe 
problems when following the general trend of a paradigmatic shift from Keynesian to 
neo-liberal policy subscriptions. In fact, responsible for this was the fact that actors 
operated 'embedded' within 'their' parties and in this case Keynesian paradigm that must 
be understood as a set of templates, which pre-determined their choices as they 
developed, incrementally and rationally, their policies.
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It is argued in this chapter that paradigms as well as specific sets of party 
institutional rules and procedures have played an important role in pre-determining the 
policy choices and outcomes of actors operating within both parties.
4.1. A theory of party paradigm shifts and policy processes
In contemporary political science, the focus has been laid on statistical aggregation 
models of choice and exchange. The two dominant explanations applied to political events 
are based on either 'rational' choice or 'institutional' approaches. The 'rational' exchange 
approach is based on actors behaving rationally by choosing among 'ranked' choices. In 
contrast, the institutional approach incorporates aspects of organisational theory as well 
as sociology to emphasise how institutions structure political life and how institutional 
choices are shaping actors ideas, attitudes, and even their preferences.180
It will be argued that in order to analyse and explain the development of LMP- 
making by social democratic parties in long-term opposition, a sole theoretical rational 
choice approach is insufficient. Although recognising the predominant rational behaviour 
of actors to increase utility, a new institutionalist approach must be added to the analysis. 
Institutional constraints to the rational actor include institutional formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure relationships between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economy. (March and Simon 1958, Heclo 
1974, March and Olsen 1979, Panebianco 1988, Hall 1989, 1993, Steinmo 1992, Scharpf 
1998) For instance, historical institutionalists define institutions as formal or informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of 
the polity or political economy. Institutional activities- in our case of party organisations - 
range from setting standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to conventions and 
paradigms regulating the behaviour of individual actors. In this thesis, institutional 
factors are linked to the ranking of policy choices by actors and are believed to have had a 
great impact on the parties' development of labour market policies.
180 Steinmo, S., K. Thelen and F. Longstreth - Structuring Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992, p 27
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4.1.1. Neo-Institutionalist approaches and the decline of the Keynesian paradigm
Social Democratic party behaviour must be understood in the context of social 
democratic "ideas' entering a major historical "branching point" (the changing of socio­
economic conditions, the decline of the Keynesian- and rise of neo-liberal policy paradigm 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s) that questioned and affected core institutional 
arrangements and beliefs in those parties.
Paradigms can be understood as frameworks of ideas and standards that specify 
not only the goals and kinds of instruments that can be used to attain them, but they also 
specify the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Paradigms - in 
contrast to single policy ideas - are guiding frameworks that 'embed' policy positions as 
well as the understanding of problems and solutions within an overall picture of 
reference.
Thomas Kuhn described paradigms - in his influential book on the structure of 
scientific revolutions (1962) - as an accumulation of achieved knowledge, an established 
point of reference, which - for a time - supplies actors with the foundation for further 
initiatives.181 The notion of paradigms applied to the world of policy-making means that a 
paradigm guides the policy-makers selection of problems, his/her evaluation of data, and 
advocacy of theory. A paradigm may set the limits of action, the boundaries of acceptable 
inquiry and maintain criteria for the finding of problem solutions. Inevitably, this means 
that policy-makers may be restricted and unable to perceive and consider possible 
problems or their solutions that lie beyond their own paradigm defined horizon.182
Once paradigms have asserted themselves within an organisation, they often tend 
to reach as far as influencing and defining institutional formal rules, compliance 
procedures and standard operating practices.183 Once adopted, paradigms can supply sets 
of behavioural templates and ideological guiding principles to actors as they offer a 
framework for collective as well as individual actions, beliefs and decision-making 
orientation within institutions.
181 Kuhn, Thomas S. - The structure of scientific revolutions, (2nd ed.), University o f Chicago Press, 1962, p 
10
182 Chilcote, Ronald H. - Theories o f Comparative Politics Westview Press, (2nd ed.), Oxford, 1994, p 58
183 Hall, Peter A. - Governing the Economy: The Politics o f State Intervention in Britain and France. Oxford 
University Press, 1986, p 19
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Hence, paradigms may entail a multitude of commitments to preferred types of 
instrumentation and to the ways in which accepted instruments may legitimately be 
employed. Often, institutional rules are derived from paradigms, but paradigms can guide 
research even in the absence of rules.184 This means, that paradigms guide, for instance, 
the policy-maker's selection of problems, his or her evaluation of data, and often the 
advocacy of an attached theory. A paradigm may set the limits of action, the boundaries of 
acceptable inquiry and maintain criteria for the finding of problem solutions. Inevitably, 
policy-makers may face the problem of being unable to perceive and consider possible 
problems or solutions, which lie beyond their own paradigm defined horizon.185
This perception has been supported by Scharpf who has been observing that actors 
within political parties, unions etc "are operating within institutional settings in which 
they are much less free in their actions than autonomous individuals might be. They are 
themselves likely to be constituted by institutional norms that not only define their 
competencies and other action resources but that also specify particular purposes and 
shape the associated cognitive orientations."186
In fact, it can be argued that paradigms which have asserted themselves on the 
political and economic system of the state tend to gain an institutionalised status. Hence, 
an applied paradigm influences the development and adoption of formal rules, 
compliance procedures as well as standard operating practices.187 The same is true about 
the institutionalised paradigms of political parties. While political parties may be 
transmission belts for the interests of the electorate, policy-makers engineer distinctive 
policies to respond to different redistributive concerns and distributional coalitions, 
politicians actively structure interests and shape preferences around broad ideological 
principles and specific economic strategies to shape the political and policy preferences of 
voters and to expand their initial electoral coalitions.188 As emphasised by Prezworski and 
Sprague in their analysis of social democratic electoral politics, political parties "forge
184 Kuhn, Thomas S. -  The structure o f Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press, London 
1962 (1968), p 40
185 Chilcote, Ronald H. - Theories o f Comparative Politics, Westview Press, (2nd ed.), Oxford, 1994, p 58
186 Scharpf, Fritz - Games actors play -Actor Centred Institutionalism, Westview Press, Oxford, 1998, p 12
187 Hall, Peter A. - Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, Oxford 
University Press, 1986, p 19
188 Boix, Carles - Political Parties. Growth and Equality - Conservative and Social Democratic Economic 
Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p 218
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collective identities, instil commitments, define the interest on behalf of which collective 
actions become possible, offer choices to individuals and deny them."189
Overall, firstly policy actors are 'embedded' in a relatively stable 'actor' 
constellation' that can even be analysed with the help of game-theoretical concepts. 
Secondly, institutional settings define the modes of interaction (negotiations, party 
hierarchy, negotiation procedures) with which actors are able to influence one another, a 
process which ultimately shapes the resulting policy choices of political parties.190
Now, if a party's economic paradigm, such as the Keynesian, has grown to become 
a substantial part of a party's ideological foundation, party policy makers as well as rank 
and file members are heavily discouraged from re-shaping their preferences and allowing 
a shift in the party's paradigm to take place. In fact, the degree to which actors' 
preferences reflect institutional goals depends on the extent to which institutions structure 
the behaviour of individual actors, on how positively or negatively the institution is 
viewed as well as on the strength of contending institutional and ideological loyalties.191
In fact, during this study it will be argued that only the continuous change of the 
political economic environment; the increasing desperation of party actors as well as rank 
and file about the persistent electoral failure and opposition role; and finally the 
unequivocal will to re-gain political power and forge new electoral coalitions led both 
parties actors to shift towards the neo-liberal paradigm, which had increasingly appeared 
to be a precondition for both parties ability to re-gain government office.
During the 1960s the study of institutions in the social sciences had been 
increasingly abandoned in favour of two theoretical approaches that were based more on 
individualistic assumptions. The 'rational' exchange approach to politics can be 
understood as an aggregation of individual preferences into collective actions by some 
procedures of negotiation and coalition formation of exchange (Downs 1957, Coleman 
1966).
189 Prezworski, Adam and John Sprague -  Paper Stones: A History o f Electoral Socialism, University o f  
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986, p 9
190 Scharpf, Fritz -  Games actors play -Actor Centred Institutionalism, 1998, p 12
191 Marks, Gary et al - ‘European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric vs. multi-level governance’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol 34, No 3, September 1996, p 348
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Overall, behaviouralism and rational choice are approaches that contain as a main 
assumption that individuals act autonomously as individuals, based on either socio- 
psychological characteristics or on rational calculation of their personal utility. In either 
theory, individuals are not constrained by either formal or informal institutions, but 
would make their own choices.
By the early 1980s, scholars such as Johan P. Olsen and James G. March, began to 
call for a return to thinking seriously about institutions and their roles in explaining 
behaviour in the area of social sciences. They coined the term "new institutionalist in 1984 
and witnessed the emergence of a counter revolution in which political scientists 
rediscovered the role of institutions.
The study of politics with an institutional approach incorporates aspects of 
organisational theory as well as sociology. It emphasises questions of how institutions 
structure political life, shape actors ideas, attitudes, preferences and 'embed' them within 
the rules and procedures of the institution. In fact, actors are assumed to organise their 
beliefs and choices in accordance with (socially constructed) rules and practices that guide 
their actions and occur within the context of institutionalised shared meanings and 
practices. (March and Olsen; 1984; 1989; North, 1990)
The way parties deal with political and economic problems and their choice of 
policy tool-kit to approach them is by no means static and changes over time according to 
policy challenges and requirements. However, all parties carry institutionalised policy 
principles which provide an 'instructing' framework to all layers of party members, 
activists and leadership. These principles often guide individual as well as collective party 
actors' beliefs on how to rank and approach political problems. A change to these 
principles -  or as we refer to them in this study 'paradigms' - can be expected to be 
generally of a slow incremental and piecemeal nature as a great variety of inner-party 
interests and factions have to permit -  if not agree - on their amendment.
From this it follows, that even though individual actors may be acting in a rational 
manner, this rationality has been formed and developed within an institutional setting 
that defines the modes of interaction among various actors within an organisation, for
119
instance, by the way it conditions - through party hierarchy, negotiation procedures and 
available resources -  policy choices.
Here, March and Olsen (1996) have pointed at the sociological aspects of the 
institution-actor relationship, arguing that institutions have considerable influence over 
actors by organising their "hopes, dreams, and fears as well as purposeful actions" which 
are then followed up by actors on the basis of "a logic of appropriateness"192 which guides 
actors when considering and identifying their individual "goals" and "interests".193 
Similarly, James Tully, writing about the context of actors7 decision-making argued, that 
"rational assessment takes place within convention-governed context, which are 
themselves always contested and modified in the course of rational assessment...in the 
piecemeal w ay.. .of ideological innovation."194
Furthermore, although it remains the overall intention of this study to ultimately 
retain a coherent model of party policy formation behaviour across multiple cases, this 
should not be done at the expense of ignoring political, economic and historical 
circumstances that have initiated party policy change and may continue to do so. 
Therefore, new institutionalism will be used as the theoretical foundation of this thesis, 
without, however, claiming to be of explanatory exclusiveness when following the policy 
processes of party institutions.
Finally, the chosen institutionally-based theoretical approach to the analysis of 
policy processes links with a further line of argument pursued in this study, namely the 
ability to observe a "shift7 in Labour's and the SPD's choice of guiding policy principles 
(paradigms), which we argue has played a significant role in both parties failure to 
respond effectively to changing political challenges and economic conditions. The 
argument continues, that this (delayed) 'shift7 in paradigm explains the restrained and 
cautious embrace of new economic policy approaches by party policy makers (even when
192 March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen - ‘Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions’, Governance: An 
Institutional Journal o f Policy and Administration. Vol. 9, July 1996, p 249
193 March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen - Rediscovering Institutions. Free Press/MacMillan, 1989, p 147
194 Skinner, Quentin and James Tully (ed) - Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics. Policy 
Press, Cambridge, 1988, p 21
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faced with long-term electoral failure) and confirms - as will be argued later - the 
substantial "path dependence7 of actors' policy choices.195
4.1.2. Rational actors and party policy development
Early rational choice theory as put forward by Anthony Downs (1957) focused on 
the rational behaviour of the electorate and political parties. His major assumptions and 
arguments can be summarised as follows: Political parties behave like rational actors 
which attempt to cater for the policy requests of the electorate as they are driven by the 
goal to maximise their share of the popular vote in order to gain control of the governing 
apparatus.196 In its purest form, this theory assumes that parties are unable to develop 
their own party agenda and sets of policy ideas. In fact, here, rational choice condemns 
parties to be solely responsive to the wishes and the demands of the electorate, which 
leaves parties with a neglible ability to set their own policy agenda and gives them only a 
minor capability for decision-making.
Not surprisingly, Downs' views have been disputed by various scholars such as 
Chappell and Keech (1986) who have argued for the existence of a dynamic spatial model 
of party competition and believe that Downs' fundamental hypothesis that 'parties 
formulate policies in order to win elections' is flawed,197 and - that instead - 'parties win 
elections in order to formulate policies'. Their model of party competition, in contrast to 
Downs, insists that parties have policy preferences of their own, which lead to persistent 
differences between parties positions and platforms, that would not exist if parties were 
simply attempting to maximise votes.198
It is, however, fair to say that it is widely accepted that parties are "office seeking 
teams" whose overwhelming aim it is to win elections in order to increase their influence 
and /  or gain government office.199 Nevertheless, this study shows that parties -  although 
not entirely free to develop and pursue their own policy agendas -  are indeed in a
195 In fact, policy-makers acting under solely rational considerations should have been expected to adopt with 
much greater pace -  in parallel with their electoral more successful national party political competitors -  neo­
liberal policy approaches which were seemingly more ‘popular’ with the electorate.
196 Downs, Anthony - An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957, p 25
197 Downs, Anthony - An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957, p 28
198 Chappell, H. W. and Keech, W. R. - ‘Policy motivation and party differences in a dynamic spatial model 
of party competition’, American Political Science Review. Vol 80, No 3, September 1986, p 881
199 Schlesinger, Joseph A. - ‘On the theory of party organisation’, Journal o f Politics, Vol 46, No 2, May 
1984, p 369-400
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position of being able to determine to a considerable degree their own policy agendas and 
choices, which are not necessarily rationally considered in the sense of vote maximisation 
and gaining the greatest possible utility from policy choices.
4.2. Party Identities and Policy Space
We can clearly detect a softening of the boundaries separating contending 
theoretical approaches to policy processes, pointing the way towards the application of a 
variety of approaches as complementary rather than competitive explanations for political 
phenomena, as none of the common theoretical approaches can fully explain the political 
actions and processes that take place in parties within the real world.
In a study on the programmatic developments of 21 parties, Ian Budge (1987) 
(while not rejecting - as he called it - Downs "speculations" on party competition), has 
shown that assumptions on the rationality of actors within parties have to be modified in 
order to come "closer to every day reality."200 Contrary to common rational choice 
wisdom, Budge et al argued that parties were under considerable 'policy expectancy 
pressure', with 'certain' policy areas 'belonging' to specific parties.201 In fact, his study 
showed that the electorate expected and pressurised parties to deal with issues in a 
'traditional' tried and tested manner, with parties interpreting problems and formulating 
policy solutions predominantly in accordance to past procedures and demands. In turn, 
parties risk losing their credibility, if they advocate significantly different sets of policies 
and beliefs from those previously advocated. Similarly, parties cannot claim easily to do 
better than their party opponents in policy areas in which the electorate 'expects' another 
specific party to be traditionally ascribing significant importance to and be more 
competent in.
In spatial terms this means that some policy areas (or segments, in the case of a 
single line) are often ('historically') more open to one party than to another. Specific policy
200 Budge, Ian - ‘The internal analysis o f election programmes’, in Budge, Robinson and Hearl - Ideology, 
Strategy and Party change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p 27
201 For example, the electorate tends to accredit more competence to Conservative or Christian Democratic 
parties when dealing with law and order issues, while expecting Social Democratic parties to be more capable 
when dealing with welfare issues.
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themes often belong' rather to one party than to another and are defined by a certain 
degree of 'party-reserved' space.
Similarly, Robertson (1976) developed the 'saliency theory' as a modification to 
Downs' traditional theory of party competition in which he argued in a similar way that 
parties compete less by taking opposite sides on the same issues, but rather attempt to 
select their own favourite issues.202 Thus parties can be expected to be substantially bound 
to the policy positions they have advocated in the past as they have to make sure that they 
maintain their 'identity' and satisfy loyal traditional voters.
In fact, the use of notions such as 'identity' - when dealing with political parties - is 
a clear recognition, that parties' choices (in addition to market exchange) are based on 
additional 'ideational' properties. As Klingemann explained, "parties sustain an identity 
anchored in...cleavages and issues...packaged by ideology, yielding a history of particular 
actions in government and enduring association with certain groups of supporters....even 
if parties wanted to repudiate their past for short-term advantage, they could not easily do 
so, and they might not be believed if they tried. Each party is expected to stand for 
something that separates it from the competition."203
Overall, parties compete among each other by emphasising and manipulating the 
salience of different issues rather than competing for votes on same set of issues, with 
different policy positions.204 For example, it has been difficult in the past for the Labour 
Party in Britain and the SPD in Germany to convince the electorate that they will do better 
at keeping personal taxation levels low than for their Conservative Party or CDU party 
rivals, as their opponents have been traditionally perceived by the electorate as 
embodying 'low' taxation and to a 'lesser' degree redistributive policies. Hence, party 
actors have a natural interest in focusing emphasis on their 'own' and 'strong' party 
issues, as one party's point of strength is likely to be another opponents party's point of 
weakness, with an emphasis on specific programmatic policy areas likely to form a unique 
party profile and parties 'competing for electoral victory by virtue of slight adjustments' 
to their own most preferred position.205
202 Robertson, David - A Theory of Party Competition, Wiley, London, 1976
203 Klingemann, H.-D. et al - Parties, Policies, and Democracy. Westview Press, Oxford, 1994, p 24
204 Sabatier, Paul A. - ‘Introduction’, in Klingemann, H.-D. et. al. - Parties, Policies, and Democracy, 
Westview Press, Oxford 1994
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The positions described above underline the view that parties' policy choices are 
strongly influenced by 'historical identities' and serve their core clienteles. At the same 
time, however, to be electorally successful, they have to aim to attract new voters to their 
established policy portfolio. Clearly, different identities encourage parties to achieve 
different policy goals as well as to win office or maximise their share of the vote.206
4.2.1. The temporal dimension of party politics
There is a far greater 'temporal dimension' within party politics in contrast to 
economics. In the economic sphere, lines of authority are clear and relevant decision 
makers are likely to share the same broad goal of profit maximisation. In addition, 
principle policy aims such as the objective of improving efficiency and promoting 
innovations make in turn institutional change of organisations easier to achieve. In 
politics, however, the temporal dimension raises specific problems as political decision 
makers are aware of the fact that long-term institutional control is uncertain. This lack of 
continuous control carries implications for the way political institutions have been 
designed, and as a consequence, for their procedures of institutional change. This means, 
that political institutions often contain structures set up by decision-makers over time that 
make it difficult to adopt new rules and procedures, but once adopted they remain in 
place for a long period. In other words, political institutions are often specifically designed 
to hinder the process of (short-term) institutional and policy reform.
In his study of the political institutions of the EU, Paul Pierson supports the above 
view by arguing that the "same requirements that make initial decision-making difficult, 
also make previously enacted reforms hard to undo, even if those reforms turn out to be 
unexpectedly costly", or in the case of parties impose a high electoral price.207 Hence, even 
if policy decisions seem irrational, they clearly carry their own internal 'logic'.
Furthermore, institutions are not necessarily the products of conscious design 
according to a masterplan. In fact, the Labour Party and the SPD are more than one
206 H. W. Chappell and W. R. Keech use a dynamic spatial model to prove - in a pluralist tradition - that 
politicians can vary in their balance o f concern for implementing policies and winning office as much as 
voters can vary in their sensitivity to party differences.
207 Pierson, Paul - ‘The path to European integration’, Comparative Political Studies. Vol 29, No 2, April 
1996, p 143
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hundred years old and their organisations have developed slowly over the decades. 
Hence, institutional rules have been evolving and developed by actors and former actors 
overtime (historical heritage) in an evolutionary manner in order to guide and safeguard 
institutional decision-making outcomes in accordance with specific institutional aims and 
goals. This way of predetermining or at least influencing the future ranking of policy 
choices and options, and to establish procedures which take account of contextual factors 
(such as technological change) that lie beyond the control of parties but must be 
recognised in order to safeguard, if not the effective functioning of the institution, at least 
its responsiveness and ultimately survival.
Finally, a further purpose served by operational procedures and the definition of 
principle institutional purposes is the task to empower an organisation's members. In fact, 
only reliable and publicly known procedures provide a check against arbitrary and 
capricious behaviour of institutional leaders. Thus, the institutionalist approach reflects a 
common commitment to the significance of institutional arrangements and a common 
criticism of atomised accounts of social processes. It seeks to explain the relationship 
between structure and democracy and the ways in which rules and procedures influence 
political behaviour. Their significance lies in their ability to influence the perceptions and 
construction of the reality within which actions take place, as they affect the flow of 
information and kinds of searches for choices undertaken; shape the definition of 
alternatives and finally influence the interpretations made of the results.208
However, institutions are never static, they change in response to their external 
environment and challenges to their standing rules, procedures and paradigms -  so that 
they are rarely born whole in the first instance and rarely stay undisturbed over long 
stretches of time.
4.3. A 'new Institutionalist' approach
What is commonly referred to as the 'new institutionalist' approach does not 
constitute a single and coherent body of theory, but represents many streams of 
arguments and debates whose core assumptions have been developed into different
208 March, J.G. and J. P. Olsen - ‘Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions’, Governance: An 
Institutional Journal of Policy and Administration. Vol 9, July 1996, p 251
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directions. However, two major aspects of this approach can be identified. Firstly, the 
'new7 institutionalist approach recognises and links the relationship between institutions 
and the individual/collective behaviour patterns of actors, and secondly, it focuses on the 
understanding of processes of institutional origin and change. There is a current debate 
about the distinctive categories within 'new7 institutionalism, namely between rational 
choice institutionalism (Cook and Levi 1990, Coleman 1990); historical institutionalism 
(Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992); and sociological/political science institutionalism 
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Granovetter and Swedberg 1992, March and Olsen 1989) 
however scholars have identified as many as six different types of this approach.209 These 
7 new7 approaches to the study of institutions represent an attempt to move beyond the 
descriptive traditions of 7 old7 institutionalism, by adding to it research tools and an 
explicit concern for theory that had previously been refined both by behaviouralism and 
rational choice analysis.210 Furthermore, attention was drawn to the question of how 
differences in behaviour and power among individuals and groups can be explained if 
their characteristics and preferences could be expected to be quite similar.211 In fact, 
scholars have increasingly recognised the importance of "intermediate-level institutional 
factors7 when analysing the behaviour of actors. These factors include corporatist 
arrangements, policy networks and party structures which play -  according to Steinmo et 
al - a crucial role when trying to understand the "incentives and constraints faced by 
political actors77 which explain "systematic differences across countries".212
4.3.1. Rules, routines and standard operating procedures
Routines are a means through which individual members during their 
participation in an institution can minimise their transaction and decision-making costs, 
while they can at the same time enhance an institutions own efficiency and ability to cope 
with complex tasks.213
209 Normative-; rational choice-; empirical-; international-; societal-; and historical institutionalism as 
identified in Guy B. Peters detailed survey of ‘new institutionalism’, Peters, B. Guy - Institutional theory in 
political science. Pinter, London, 1999, pp 16-20
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In order to understand the possible long-term change of organisational operational 
routines and procedures, J. Knight emphasised the importance of informal institutions in 
providing the groundwork for the development of formal institutions. Alternatively, 
informal institutions are able to contradict or undermine formal rules, hence leading - 
over time - to the change of operational procedures.214
New political challenges and out-moded, for instance, formal (class-based) 
operating procedures for policy-making and decisions on party strategy and presentation 
have already been amended by the Labour Party and SPD leadership to correspond with 
perceived political, economic and electoral requirements.215
Even the temporary severe backlash experienced in the Labour Party against the 
adoption of /informal/ Labour policy procedures chosen in government - followed by the 
short-term domination of its NEC by the left in the early 1980s - did not halt the slow and 
eventual adoption of new formal procedures in the form of a shift of policy making power 
towards the party leadership and a change in the party's institutionalised economic 
paradigm. In turn, the particularly slow change in the old 'formal' procedures of economic 
policy making expressed in the party's policy programmes (Chapters 5 and 8) contributed 
to the slow policy responsiveness to new conditions and challenges and therefore to an 
electoral crisis, which included four consecutive general electoral defeats.216 In fact, as 
parties are based on a set of standard operating procedures and programmes, their 
organisational behaviour - in any particular policy issue - is "determined primarily by 
routines established in these organisations prior to that instance" rather than as the result 
of deliberate rational choices.217
Hence, to account for the variety of organisational responses possible, standard 
operational procedures provide parties with a response continuum that has been 
"developed and learned at some previous time". The "routinised" end of the continuum -
214 Knight, J. - Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p 172
215 Formal (class-based) operating procedures had already been undermined by previous policy 
makers/leaders through informal operating procedures throughout the 70s. The Labour leadership had already 
successfully put forward far more moderate policy positions than had been favoured by party activists and 
adopted at party conferences. (See Chapter 2)
2,6 According to Allison, “dramatic organisational change occurs in response to major disasters.” (Essence of  
Decision, 1971, p 68)
217 Allison, Graham T. - Essence o f Decision - Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown and Co., 
Boston, 1971, p 68
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depending on the stimulus - sets off parties "performance programmes almost 
instantaneously" ,218
Although political party leaders are able to influence their organisations, they are 
not able to control the behaviour and inevitably policy positions of their organisations as 
standard operation procedures apply. Organisational learning takes place gradually and 
substantial changes occur only in the medium-term, because as Allison described this, 
"both learning and change are influenced by existing organisational capabilities and 
procedures".219
Although organisational responses depend on actions chosen by unitary, rational 
decision-makers, party organisations consist of a conglomeration of sub-groups and actors 
each with a life of their own. Parties develop policies and estimate consequences as their 
sub-groups and actors process information, which is then dealt with within organisational 
routines.
As a consequence, party policy processes must be understood as a reflection of the 
sum of independent output of several groups and individuals which gets partially co­
ordinated and institutionalised within standard operating procedures,220 such as, (party) 
rules and policy principles (paradigms) which determine programmatic responses.
4.3.2. Actors, rules and procedures
Having identified the constraints and impacts of institutional standard operating 
procedures on individual decision-makers, we must now attempt to link them to the 
actions of individual actors. Here, a helpful conception is the principle of actors' 
"bounded rationality" developed by Herbert Simon, which lies at the core of 
organisational theory.221 Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary have supported this 
notion by arguing that the human limits on actors, or constraints, "lead decision-makers 
to deviate considerably from the comprehensive rationality model."222 There are at least
218 March, James and Herbert Simon - Organisations (2nd ed), Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, p 160
219 Allison, Graham T. - Essence of Decision - Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown and Co., 
Boston, 1971, p 68
220 Allison, Graham T. - Essence o f Decision - Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Little, Brown and Co., 
Boston, 1971, p 68
221 Simon, Herbert A. - Models Of Man, Wiley, New York, 1957, p 200
222 Dunleavy, Patrick and Brendan O’Leary - Theories o f the state, MacMillan Press, London, 1987, p 172
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six major factors that can be identified and applied to parties that undermine and deviate 
the orthodox rationality of actors' decision-making.
I. Decision-makers respond to policy challenges with "performance programmes"223 
and "standing operating procedures" in order to allow organisations to use their past 
experiences when dealing with problems and enable organisational learning to take place. 
"Problems are categorised in elaborate ways and rules devised to determine how the 
organisation should respond to the arrival of any new problem falling into one or another 
of the existing categories."224
II. Decision-makers face problems, which are normally factored i.e. split into separate 
problems (rationale for organisations) carrying the potential to be tackled by sub­
organisations (each carrying responsibility for different parts of the problem) as 
individual decision makers are in no position to reach any decision with any high degree 
of rationality. In fact, rationality becomes essentially procedural as an organisation's 
values, prejudices, history and experiences prescribes outcomes that, at best, set out to 
actors the pursuit of choices which are susceptible of a broad measure of attainment.225
III. Organisations are more likely to hold amounts of information necessary for a 
rational decision, which leads them to satisfice 226 rather than maximise rules. In other 
words, policy-makers do not search for the best solution to a problem, but instead choose 
the first (policy) solution that satisfices their requirements.
IV. Following on from III., decision-makers do not consider all possible alternatives 
but instead engage in a limited search as they examine - first - the most familiar solutions in 
order to minimise information and transition costs associated with the search for 
solutions. This behaviour also makes incremental changes of policies by actors much more 
likely.227
223 March, James and Herbert Simon - Organisations (2nd ed.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, p 162
224 Dunleavy, P. and B. O’Leary - Theories of the state, MacMillan Press, London, 1987, p 173
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V. Decisions are taken by (party) organisations in sequences i.e. policy orientation 
changes take place over time as single policy areas will be dealt with via single decisions 
and not according to an overall plan. In other words, policy decisions can be expected to 
be 'path dependent' as they follow set sequences. This slows down a party actor's capacity 
to adopt substantial policy changes in the short term.
VI. In order to avoid and absorb the uncertainty of the (policy) environment, decision­
makers attempt to negotiate with other actors 'routine' approaches for operations that may 
carry substantial ideational values.
The above named factors all point towards the same direction. Party actors are not 
only influenced by institutions, but parties cannot function without the provision of 
processes which enable the prior co-ordination, negotiation and agreement of often long­
term ideational approaches as well as rules and procedures, assisting actors to interact and 
take decisions.
Rules and procedures adopted by parties are of vital importance as, shown in 
Graham Allison's bureaucratic policy process model, many actors within institutions are 
players who do not focus on single strategic issues or on a consistent set of strategic 
objectives, but instead act upon "various conceptions of national, organisational, and 
personal goals."228 Hence, individual actors engage in various 'messy' multi-faceted 
negotiation and discussion processes guided by their institutions, before deciding upon 
their individual actions.
Allison describes this (political) process as "...sometimes one group committed to a 
course of action triumphs over other groups fighting for other 
alternatives...(while)...equally often, however, different groups pulling in different 
directions produce a result, or better a resultant - a mixture of conflicting preferences and 
unequal power of various individuals - distinct from what any person or groups 
intended."229
228 Allison, Graham T. - Essence o f Decision - Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Little, Brown and Co., 
Boston, 1971, p 144
229 Allison, Graham T. - Essence o f Decision - Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown and Co., 
Boston, 1971, p 145
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4.3.3. Inefficiencies of rules and procedures
However, what Allison's model fails to reveal are the possible inefficiencies that 
may appear once rules and procedures have been adopted and become a substantial part 
of an institution's policy development process. In fact, parties' ability to change ideational 
as well as procedural routines may be severely inhibited by the fact that previously 
established procedures set up under different conditions may become benchmarks and 
potentially self-fulfilling gate-keepers, hindering actors in their search for 'new' more 
appropriate policy procedures. Hence, rules or procedures, which have been originally 
developed to guide the 'perceived' interests of the organisation, may in fact inhibit actors' 
future responsiveness to newly arising policy challenges.
Finally, to draw conclusions from empirical (informal and formal) 
documentation's and to explain the precise impact of procedures on parties policy games is 
a rather problematic task and would force the researcher to engage in a normative 
information validation exercise of multi-level negotiation processes, as there are hundreds 
of issues and numerous games taking place at one time, forcing actors (in un-identical 
positions and roles) to draw attention to their 'pet' issues and interests.
One way of dealing with this problem - used in this study - is to identify factors of 
policy principle, which provide overall policy guidance and set templates to actors' 
decision making. For this, policy paradigms can be identified whose general policy 
principle base offers far more conclusive evidence to understand actors behaviour and the 
integral part of their ranking process of policy choices than engaging in the analysis of an 
unchartable, multi-level negotiation process.
4.4. The role of ideas in the policy process
One of the best-known contributions in defence of 'ideas' has come from Charles 
Lindblom, who in various contributions to the study of policy-making, for instance in 
defending incrementalism and interactive problem solving, has been placing substantial 
emphasis on the role of 'people' - with all their shortcomings - as being influenced by 
ideas rather than - as he called it - the "clumsy realism" of their actions being scientifically 
guided.230 However, even the 'clumsy realists' who are more sanguine about the power of 
ideas as a 'reflection of interests to legitimise power' would agree, that ideas play an
230 Lindblom, Charles E. - The Intelligence o f Democracy, The Free Press, New York, 1965, p 16
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important role as, for example, demonstrated in the revolutions of Eastern Europe not so 
long ago, which brought about dramatic changes in policies and institutions.
It is however conceptually difficult for the historical institutionalist approach to 
draw a distinct line between policy choices being influenced by "incremental patterns' of 
policy-making common in industrialised democracies, and the specific policies which are 
at any one time influenced and 'path dependent' in respect to institutional policy choices 
made earlier. In the real world it must be assumed that both factors play a role, and that 
incremental patterns of policy making may reinforce path dependency and vice versa.
The interaction between ideas, interest and policy change is certainly complex, but 
their interplay provides us with a fuller picture of party policy change. In fact, ideas and 
interests are to a large extent interrelated as they are normally produced with some 
purpose in mind. This is particularly true in the case of public policies proposed by 
political parties whose goals and means have to be justified by policy-makers inside their 
parties as well as to experts, analysts, media experts, and the wider public.
A number of recent studies have been dealing with policy change in important 
policy areas such as the economy. Here investigations on the monetarist and supply-side 
counter revolutions of the 1980s as well as the increasing widespread adoption of 
deregulative policy measures and the drive towards the privatisation of public sector 
activities have highlighted that adequate models of policy making must include the 
notion of ‘ideas' in addition to interests and other 'causal' factors.231 In fact, it can be 
claimed that the real difficulty in explaining policy change lies precisely in the 
relationship between the of ten-ambiguous roles of 'ideas' and 'interests'.
For ideas to progress and gain entrance into parties' collective policy identity and 
be eventually adopted by policy-makers, they have to be 'viable' and 'fit' existing 
'economic' circumstances, while in addition, they must satisfy dominant 'political'
231 Derthick, Martha and Paul J. Quirk - The Politics o f Deregulation, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 
1985, Termin, Peter - The Fall o f the Bell System. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987; Helm, 
Dieter (ed.) - The Economic Border o f the State. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989; Hall, Peter (ed.) - 
The Political Power of Economic Ideas. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989
132
interests, as well as be judged feasible in Administrative terms'.232 When these conditions 
are met, ideas can 'catch on' and become influential. The spread and actual adoption of an 
idea can then be - furthermore - substantially advanced, if certain key-personnel within 
the party leadership is in addition strongly committed to the implementation of a new  
'idea based' approach.233
As such, Keynesian ideas became an institutional part of what developed to be 
Western Europe's post-WW2 'social democratic' state. In particular for many of Western 
Europe's social democratic parties, these ideas became an inseparable point of reference 
which - more than in any other party tradition - became an intra-party ideological schism 
that had a widespread effect on their policy choices, ideology and aims of actors.234
In turn, the decline of the Keynesian paradigm that began in the mid-1970s had a 
far greater 'negative' impact on the confidence and agenda setting capacities of Europe's 
social democratic parties than on their Christian Democratic and Conservative rivals. 
While Conservative and Christian Democratic parties displayed eventually far greater 
flexibility and ability to abandon former-'consensually' held Keynesian-led policy ideas 
and replace them with neo-liberal policy ideas of monetarism and deregulation, most 
Social Democratic parties encountered enormous programmatic problems when 
conditions forced them to repeal their former 'institutionalised' (Keynesian) belief 
patterns and fill a growing policy gap with meaningful and distinctive alternatives.
These problems became particularly apparent in their attempt to formulate labour 
market policies in response to the increasing problem of growing unemployment and 
increasing economic internationalisation.
This means, that party political actors face different circumstances which may 
enhance i.e. accelerate or alternatively discourage i.e. slow down their ability to accept, 
that new approaches to public policy should be considered and possibly adopted as party
232 Model: Factors affecting the reception o f Keynesian ideas, Hall, Peter A. - ‘The Politics o f Keynesian 
ideas’ in Hall, P - The Political Power o f Economic Ideas. Princeton Uni Press, 1989, p 371
233 Here, for instance, Thomas A. Koelble has been able show - in his study o f British and Germany trade 
unions under Conservative government in the 1980s - that the comparatively ‘union-bashing’ policies 
adopted by the British Conservatives - in comparison to the CDU - depended also strongly on the beliefs and 
ideology held by Margaret Thatcher (as leader of the party and government) as the risking o f high 
unemployment levels and the restrictive policies towards unions were partly “a matter o f political choice and 
not economic necessity.” Koelble, Thomas A. - ‘Challenges to the Trade Unions: The British and West 
German Cases’, West European Politics. July 1988, Vol. 11, No. 3, p 93
234 Braunthal, Gerard - The West German Social Democrats, 1969 -  1982: Profile o f a Party in Power, 
Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p 219
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policy responses to changing circumstances. Here, the idea that parties7 carry within 
themselves deeply rooted policy paradigms is a conceptually useful tool, as it broadens 
our understanding of crude party policy formation factors.
4.5. The Keynesian and Neo-Liberal paradigms, institutions and impacts
Paradigms can become an integral part of state institutions and political parties as 
well as companies, clubs and families. They can embody such things as defining and 
prescribing a specific state or party approach to economic policy making or committing an 
organisation to prioritise, for example, issues of environmental sustainability in 
investment and product development decisions, or define hierarchical, moral or 
behavioural principles and rules within communities.
The impact and the role of paradigms within institutions varies according to their 
scope, degree of prescriptiveness, costs of application, as well as the degree to which they 
are perceived as important by the actors/members of an institution. For example, a 
political party may have chosen to adopt a policy paradigm containing notions for the 
need of policies to contain aspects of environmental sustainability. The adoption of these 
principles could result in new or extra party operational policy development procedures, 
which will have to be applied by party actors in the future. As a consequence, a change of 
actors ranking of policy options and their perception of choices -  according to the new  
paradigm - takes place and could carry a lasting effect on future party policy positions as a 
consequence of the 'new7 prioritisation of environmental concerns set out by the 
paradigm. Finally, the changes described above may make it sometimes necessary for a 
party to revise substantially - over time - previous policy positions in order to up-date its 
overall programme according to the 'reformed7 policy prioritisation set out by the newly 
adopted paradigm.
Just to demonstrate the versatility of measuring the actual consequences arising 
from the application of a paradigm by an institution, its is important to realise that its 
impact may depend on numerous factors. The effects of a paradigm on a party's policy 
programme depend on conditions such as whether its adoption carries major 
consequences for many party policy areas or if it is only relevant with respect to minor
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parts of a party's policy positions. A paradigm may also be expressed in rather rhetorical 
or symbolical terms by a party whose actors emphasise its importance, but in reality are 
making every effort to surpass the prescriptions that would be appropriate in accordance 
with the paradigm template.235 Paradigms can also be a vital defining part of a party's 
traditions, membership ideology, or even define a priority purpose of party existence, 
while alternatively the inner-party pressures for the adoption of a new or abandonment of 
an old paradigm may be leadership driven and based on pragmatic considerations (such 
as measures to reduce state expenditure and as a consequence to cut provisions of the 
welfare state) and hence be initially unpopular or even widely rejected by a party's rank 
and file.
Overall, the strength and implementational effects of paradigms on individual and 
collective actors may vary substantially, and it is difficult to distinguish precisely between 
guiding policy principles which would be better described as (minor) single issue 
procedures without major consequence, and those paradigms which grow into major 
institutionally defining and refined policy guidance frameworks which carry a large 
overall impact on a party's strategy and its actors behaviour patterns. In the case of this 
study, we concentrate on major paradigms that once adopted by political parties have 
clearly been of major institutional importance to the organisations polity set up and 
played a major part in the self-perception, ideological base and economic policy outlook of 
individual and collective actors.
The Keynesian and Neo-Liberal paradigms have been referred to in this study as 
conceptual descriptions of two fundamentally different overall guiding principles for 
economic policy development. They were abandoned i.e. adopted and institutionalised 
within the Labour Party and SPD alike. They are purposely stripped-down versions of 
more complex and varied Keynesian /  neo-liberal policy style 'bundles' that the parties 
have been using to define their economic policy approaches. Individuals acting within an
235 This process happened for example during the late-1980s and early 1990s in the Labour Party, with most 
members o f the leadership around Neil Kinnock using publicly -  to appease the party’s activists and rank and 
file -  pro-Keynesian, state interventionist and ‘socialist’ rhetoric, while making every effort to moderate the 
party’s programme and displace those kind o f policies. Not surprisingly, this process took place at a time in 
which the party’s programmes began to reflected doubts about the future viability o f Keynesian policy 
prescription and increasinly adopted more mainstream pro-free market policy positions.
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institutional framework reflect commitments to values other than personal ones and carry 
a pronounced normative element.236
This then brings us back to the earlier mentioned wisdom of Herbert A. Simon 
(1957) who argued that the rationality of actors within organisations is significantly 
inhibited by various institutional factors such as their behavioural repertoire or portfolio 
available to them in form of institutional operational procedures, routines - and we may 
add - paradigms. Thus, actors within organisations behave 'intently' rational rather than 
carrying the ability to behave rationally in any orthodox sense.237 Hence, institutionally set 
party belief systems in form of paradigms reflect directly upon the actions and ranking of 
choices of individual decision-makers. Consequently, this investigation is in particular far 
more concerned with the overall study of actors' terms of preference rather than with the 
decision-makers 'intentionally' rational ranking process of the choices available to them.
4.5.1. Party policy and the Keynesian paradigm
When the Keynesian paradigm was adopted and institutionalised by many parties 
innorthern Europe during the late 1940-50 it resulted most commonly in the adoption of 
distinctive economic policies that held -  as a priority policy concern - the promotion and 
maintenance of full employment which was approached with tools of demand 
management. The inclusion of the paradigm into a party's policy development processes 
affected party actor's perceptions of how the economy worked and how to deal with 
problems. In fact, a majority of parties in Europe's political systems adopted the 
Keynesian paradigm and with it its economy policy goal-posts.
The Keynesian paradigm contains the main aspects of Keynes 'General Theory'238 
and at its heart lies the idea of the balancing of aggregate demand and supply as a concept 
of macroeconomic analysis. The Keynesian contribution to the analysis of unemployment 
is the emphasis on inadequate effective demand for goods and services as a major cause of 
unemployment. The essence of Keynesian government policy is the use of co-ordinated 
fiscal and monetary policy to stabilise employment rates at a high level.
236 Peter, B. Guy - Institutional theory in political science, Pinter, London, 1999, p 16
237 Simon, Herbert A. - Models of Man - Social and Rational, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1957, p 196
238 Keynes, John Maynard - The general theory o f employment, interest and money, MacMillan, London,
1946
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The Keynesian paradigm includes a particular set of policy prescription often 
referred to as "countercyclical demand management". This means, for example, that 
Keynesian policies advocate active fiscal state policies during times of recession such as 
the increase in public spending, tax reductions and public works financed by budgetary 
deficits in order to revive the economy with extra investment and demand.
Under the wider conception of Keynesian paradigm-led party policies, we can 
expect to find party measures to include the adoption of positive statements on the role of 
the public sector; public borrowing and spending; emphasis on the pro-social market 
economy (renewal of model); economic expansion; and tax increases to fund public 
investment or general tax decreases to encourage spending. Furthermore, party 
employment policies contain the substantial spending on infrastructure projects and 
public demand policies (e.g. spending on construction).
Other types of policy to expand the economy usually include additional public 
spending, lower overall taxation levels to stimulate the economy; reflationary 
programmes, and increased public purchasing. Finally, policy statements may be highly 
critical on monetarist measures and reject policies that prioritise the fight against inflation 
and accept in turn the idea of a natural rate of unemployment.
In addition to the economic measures, other consequences from a party's adoption 
of a policy approach under the Keynesian policy paradigm can also be expected to 
strongly affect parties public policy choices in regards to the expansion or at least 
maintenance of the general levels of state welfare provisions, the advocacy of a substantial 
role for state planning; policies in favour of comprehensive labour market regulation as 
well as a strong emphasis on the need to maintain high levels of public sector 
employment.239
Overall, the Keynesian paradigm contains the provision of an alternative rationale 
for active government management of the economy to the "classical" neo-liberal view that 
the market economy functions best when free from state intervention.
When the monetarist "counter-revolution" began to emerge in many northern 
European countries by the late-70s and to increasingly replace Keynesianism as the
239 See the labour market coding frame developed for this study and applied in Chapter 7 and 8 (see Appendix
I).
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template guiding policy, there was not only a radical shift in the public conception of how  
the economy worked but also an eventual shift in the hierarchy of guiding policy goals of 
party actors.
4.5.2. Party policy and the Neo-Liberal paradigm
What followed was the spread, increasing acceptance and adoption of neo-liberal 
ideas and eventually their adoption as a prescriptive paradigm by most Western 
European parties, first on the right of the political spectrum (embodied most dramatically 
in Europe by the British government under Margaret Thatcher) but measures were 
eventually also embraced by centre and social democratic parties.
The Neo-Liberal Paradigm -  as used in this study and in regards to employment -  
contains the assertion that unemployment is either structural or frictional, and caused by 
the wage demands of powerful unions; due to government regulation; or else should not 
exist. In other words, here the view dominates that what may be perceived as high 
unemployment is really rather the voluntary withdrawal from the labour force.
As defined in the labour market coding frame developed for this study, neo-liberal 
economic policies to influence the labour market can be expected to entail policy measures 
in favour of a more traditional orthodox economic policy approach containing the aim to 
achieve a balanced state budget; low taxation levels; pro-state expenditure savings; 
support for traditional economic institutions such as the stock market and banking 
system; support for a strong national currency; pro-monetarist; and pro-free market 
competition.
For this, a stable macro-economic framework is usually proposed in order to 
safeguard sustained economic growth, which is expected to bring further investment in 
capacity and skills. This paradigm prioritises the use of stringent monetary based inflation 
targets; the aim to curb inflation and to guarantee price stability.
Government attempts to control aggregate expenditure by using monetary and 
fiscal instruments are as much part of the neo-liberal economic policy tool kit as placing 
emphasis on the need to improve the efficiency levels of public services and 
administration; to encourage the privatisation of state industries, while aiming at the same 
time to curb public spending. In turn, the general reduction in tax levels is a major priority
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envisaged to free up private resources and increase overall spending levels in the 
economy.
In addition to these economic measures, other consequences can often be derived 
from a parties' adoption of this policy approach. Here, parties principle concern involves 
the aim to keep state interventionism in the economy to a minimum and to prioritise the 
achievement of low inflation levels and price stability. This is often proposed to be 
financed by cost saving in state expenditure, which in turn may lead to proposed cuts in 
welfare state provisions and public sector activities as well as public employment levels. 
Less state activity often also entails the reduction of state interventionist measures in the 
economy and the creation of conditions, which allow greater levels of labour flexibility for 
business, sometimes assisted by measures to 'cut red tape' as well as the reduction in 
labour market regulation and standards.
4.5.3. The parties' shift from a Keynesian to the acceptance of a neo-liberal policy 
approach
As mentioned earlier, the Keynesian paradigm and with it the aim to maintain full 
employment became a priority policy concern with demand management chosen as the 
institutional policy prescription to achieve this, and with a majority of institutions in the 
political system having adopted Keynesian interpretations, goals and solutions i.e. 
shifting the goal-posts according to Keynesian requirements.
1. Keynesian 'counter-cyclical demand management' meant that during recession 
Keynesian policies prescribed to active fiscal state policies such as increasing public 
spending, tax reductions or public works were financed by budgetary deficits in order to 
revive the economy with extra investment and demand.
2. Paradigms (such as the Keynesian) once adopted by state institutions become 
formalised in the minds of policy makers, get institutionalised and serve as a "template 
guiding policy" defining the hierarchy of goals, which then guides policy choices.240
Paradigms work on two levels, (a) On an individual level, 
decision-makers are often guided by a blanket "set of specific ideas that specify how the 
problems facing them (policy makers) are to be perceived, what the policy goals are and
240 Hall, Peter - ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, April 
1993, p 279
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what techniques can be used to attain those goals/'241 (b) In the case of the Keynesian 
paradigm, 'full employment' became the overriding major policy goal, which is perceived 
to be most effectively met with the help of demand management techniques.
3. Once a policy paradigm has been adopted and accepted as a frame of reference by 
political parties, state institutions and the civil service, it becomes institutionalised and 
thus reinforces the (established) perception of possible policy solutions as well as 
formatting the development and implementation of policies.
For example, once Keynesian ideas had taken root in the policy-making process by 
the British Treasury, its hierarchical administrative structure rendered them an 
entrenched component of the policy making process (for over thirty years) with policies 
being developed as closely and guided by Keynesian analysis and pre-perceived 
interpretations of the situation.242
When neo-liberal/monetarist ideas began to take hold in many European 
countries by the late-70s and challenged Keynesianism as the dominating template 
guiding policy, there was not only a radical shift in the conception of how the economy 
worked, but also a shift in the hierarchy of goals guiding policy. Although, economic 
experts were not necessarily in favour of monetarist solutions to economic problems (at 
the time),243 the state bureaucracy was quick in learning, adapting and supporting the 
implementation of monetarist policy ideas, hence starting the (rare) process of wholesale 
changes in policy institutionalising neo-liberalism and abandoning the Keynesian 
paradigm.244
The question is how did the crisis of the above describe Keynesian paradigm 
affected social democratic parties in Western Europe. The fact is, that Keynesian policy 
prescriptions were closely associated with social democracy and that social democratic
241 Hall, Peter - ‘The movement from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional analysis and British 
economic policy in the 1970s’, in Steinmo, Sven et al - Structuring Politics. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1992, p 91
242 Peter Hall - The Political Power o f Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations, Princeton University, 
New Jersey, 1989, p 379
243 For example, in Britain, the influential Cambridge Economic Policy Group rejected throughout the 1970s 
calls for monetarist solutions to economic problems.
244 Hall, Peter - ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State’, Comparative Politics. Vol 25, No 3, April 
1993, p 279
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parties all over Western Europe had incorporated this policy approach into their ideology 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. This circumstance created enormous problems for those 
parties at the end of the post-WW2 boom period. As significant changes in the socio­
economic environment began to undermine 'traditional' social democratic policy 
prescriptions, and while parties of different ideology moved away from formerly 
consensually held state interventionist policy prescriptions, most social democratic party 
organisations faced enormous problems in adjusting and modifying their policy approach 
in response to the new circumstances. This can be explained with the fact, that the 
Keynesian paradigm had - in addition - become a fundamental part of social democratic 
ideology whose continued adoption was sheltered and reproduced by the institutional 
rules and procedures of the parties in question.
In general, the alteration of the political and or economic situation (a slow, 
ongoing process) inevitably carries the necessity for agents in society to constantly act and 
react. This means, for example, that the factor of changing circumstances creates the need 
for political parties (in our case in opposition) to act/react, either by abandoning old 
policies, adjusting existing policies or developing new policies. Here, institutionalised 
party procedures hindered actors from choosing and adopting new policy approaches in 
response to the socio-economic environmental changes. Therefore, eventually both social 
democratic parties failed in their ability to set the political agenda in their countries and 
their electoral performances suffered as a result.
4.5.4. Consequences of the change in paradigm for the Labour Party and the SPD
The dilemma of the Labour Party and the SPD throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 
early 1990s has been the emerging crises of Keynesian-led policy prescriptions in a fast 
changing political and economic environment (Chapters 2 and 5). Both parties' failure to 
combine, at the same time, the reform of their Keynesian paradigmatic policy 
prescriptions and to embrace certain neo-liberal aspects and then to develop out of this 
'new' distinctive policy alternatives to challenge the growing wisdom of neo-liberalism 
led to a programmatic crises within the Labour Party and SPD as both parties were unable 
to bridge the above mentioned requirements. This explains also to some extent, why both, 
the Labour Party and the SPD failed to agree and develop clear coherent economic 
policies. Furthermore, it explains why both parties failed for a long time to set their
141
domestic political agendas and appeared to patch up their weakness of economic policy 
paradigm by either adopting temporarily orthodox radical socialist economic state 
planning policies (as in the case of Labour) or to cover coherently the need to decide upon 
a stronger economic policy approach by diverting attention to the development of policies 
on issues raised by the new social movements such as nuclear power, post-materialism 
and peace (as in the case of the SPD). The resulting electoral failure in the case of both 
parties is documented in this study, which additionally reveals that the institutional 
failure of parties to hold strong paradigms to guide their policy development processes 
may in fact increase the degree of inner-party conflict and create problems for parties to 
develop coherent convincing policies, as strong guiding procedures and principles are 
missing. As a consequence, this indicates a lack in policy vision and cohesion. Hence, 
failure or uncertainty over (party) paradigms may weaken a party's electoral and 
ideological strength as well as obstruct a party's agenda setting ability until it is able to 
agree upon and re-develop a strong enough policy alternative to that of its party political 
rivals and engage in the process of policy modernisation and paradigm shifting.
4.5.5. Path dependence and 'picking the right horse'
Studies on the change of technology have revealed the conditions and 
circumstances that surround path dependence.245 Here, the main idea is that a technology 
has been developed with large fixed costs which are perceived by developers, investors 
etc as likely to create increasing returns to further investment in that technology. This in 
turn provides individuals and decision makers with a strong incentive to continue to 
move down a 'chosen path' of development while identifying and sticking with a single 
option once an initial move into a specific technology direction has been taken.
These expectations and the focusing on one specific technological option by 
individuals can be expected to be even further enhanced, if individuals feel the need to 
'pick the right horse', because they fear that alternative options may in the end fail to win 
broad acceptance and could carry drawbacks for their position later on. Hence, 
individuals acting under these constraints may engage in decisions and technology usage 
patterns that may become self-fulfilling.
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Douglas North has argued that the above arguments developed for the 
explanation of technological change can be extended and applied to other social processes, 
with the concept of path dependence being a useful tool to characterise institutional 
evolution in general.246 Similarly, Gosta Esping-Andersen has been recently arguing that 
'postindustrial' transformation processes in welfare states must also be viewed under the 
notion of "path dependence7 as he found that existing institutional welfare arrangements 
"heavily determine, maybe overdetermine national trajectories."247
Consequently, path dependence can also be observed in respect to the 
development of policies by political parties, as traditional policy approaches can 
constitute systems of rules, incentives, and constraints that predetermine the choices of 
individual and collective decision-makers in favour of already established policy paths 
over possible alternatives. The degree of path dependence that inhibits actors ability to 
choose alternative policy approaches varies, and depends on the importance of the policy 
approach as well as the institutional sunk costs (e.g. in form of skills and policy 
credibility) of an adopted policy, however, established commitments can predetermine 
individual and collective actions onto a path that may be hard to reverse.
Once institutions have decided upon a specific path - such as the adoption of 
Keynesian principles - the "ideas7 ingrained in the path become a major part of an 
institutions policy make up and an essential conception of an institutions 7 own7 long-term 
value and perception system. In fact, variables present at the time of analysis of party 
policy may make no rational sense without a broader historical policy perspective, which 
places actors7 choices and decisions within a historical context. It is in this way, that social 
democratic parties commitment to active Keynesian-style state interventionist policy 
solutions must be understood, as their continuous choice played a key-role in the parties’ 
failure to speedily develop alternatives and adapt to the emerging neo-liberal paradigm.
Consequently, party actors policy behaviour cannot be sufficiently understood or 
predicted when long-term institutional pathways are overlooked. In other words,
245 Arthur, Brain - ‘Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events’, Economic 
Journal, No. 99, March 1989, pp 116-131; Anderson, P. W., K. J. Arrow and D. Pines (ed) - The economy as 
an evolving complex system. Addison Wesley, Reading, MA, 1988
246 North, Douglas C. - Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1990, p 93-5
247 Gosta Esping-Andersen - Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford and New York, 1999, p 4
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empirical snapshot observations of party policy processes must be avoided as they may 
lead to wrong conclusions. Instead, factors of institutional continuity must be accounted 
for when analysing institutional developments and policy choices. Therefore, periods of 
institutional crises and change can be identified and better understood with the help of 
the concept of 'critical junctures', an approach to the analysis of policy processes that may 
be lacking in elegance, but that adds an important historical perspective to the 
institutional development and programmatic change of the SPD and the Labour Party 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
Here, historical institutionalist analysis offers a coherent explanation of why 
learning processes and electoral crises may not be sufficient to prompt a party's policy 
reform or abandonment of an increasingly unsuccessful policy approach over a 
substantial amount of time. The underlying argument is, that once initial policies and 
institutional choices in one policy area have become established patterns, they can be 
expected to be stable and persistent. However, institutional (evolutionary) change does 
occur once sufficient force has developed within a party to question current paradigmatic 
prescriptions, which eventually propels the development of a new (replacement) 
paradigm to re-establish a new programmatic equilibrium.
Inevitably, "evolutionary" changes to institutionally prescribed policy paths takes 
place, but the ability for such development to take shape are constrained within the 
institutional experience of the (original) policy formative period. As described and 
applied in this context by Stephen Krasner, institutional 'evolutionary' developments 
consist of "short bursts of rapid institutional change followed by long periods of stasis" 
until the next "punctuated equilibrium" within an institution occurs.248 The institutional 
realisation and eventual response to a 'punctuated equilibrium' can be expected to take 
time - depending on the importance of the policy area and the degree of 
institutionalisation of a parties prescriptive paradigmatic response pattern. However, 
substantial disjunctures between existing institutional constructions and exogenous 
change can be expected to lead to a 'real' crisis and eventual change of institutional 
pathways.249
248 Krasner, Stephen D. -  ‘Approaches to the State’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2, January 1984, p 
242
249 As convincingly argued in the case o f welfare regimes by Gosta Esping-Andersen - Social Foundations of  
Postindustrial Economies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p 5
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As we have been able to observe this shift in the case of the SPD and the Labour 
Party, we can conclude that there must have been sufficient pressures to generate the 
observed shift in paradigm. Inevitably, failure of a party's economic policy paradigm can 
be expected to carry substantial consequences for a party's success and popularity of its 
policies approaches.
However, there remain some substantial problems with the application of sole 
path dependency theories, which must be mentioned. Path dependency theories fail to 
take account of mixed institutional legacies, and this is where the analogy of scientific 
paradigms carries the risk of becoming quite misleading in the study of complex social 
institutions. Often what happens during periods of crisis and change is that social actors 
(in particular social or political entrepreneurs) review their mixed institutional 
inheritance, and select policy 'possibilities' that are available to them somewhere in their 
general repertoire. In fact, these possibilities may have been well established, for instance, 
within the heritage and former policy beliefs of the parties, but had been neglected over 
time due to changing socio-economic circumstances and conditions.
One example for this is Thatcherism with the Conservative Party breaking off its 
previously held post-war adopted and institutionalised Keynesian inner-party policy 
consensus during the early 1980s as the party reached back - for policy guidance - to its 
pre-Keynesian and pre-1945 institutional repertoire of ideas that contained a lessening of 
the overall role of the state in society and offered a decisively reduced regulatory 
framework and hence more freedom to economic actors250 as well as offering certain 
possibilities already embedded in the role of the City of London.251
250 In the words o f Andrew Gamble, a ‘New Right had developed within the Conservative Party during the 
second half o f the 1960 that was distinct from the traditional right in so far as it drew its strength from a ‘new’ 
“rejection o f the consensus around social democratic values and objectives that had been established ever 
since the war-time coalition.” In fact, Thatcherism was based on these ideas o f the ‘New Right’ which 
advocated “the revival o f liberal political economy, which seeks the abandonment o f Keynesianism and any 
kinds o f government intervention” together with new economic liberalism and the concept of market order 
becoming the central doctrine of the social market economy, i.e. “notions [that] can be traced back a long 
way in liberal thought.” (Gamble, Andrew - ‘Thatcherism and Conservative Politics’, in Hall, S. and M. 
Jacques (ed) - The Politics o f Thatcherism. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1983, p 113) The Conservative 
Party chancellor Nigel Lawson confirmed this during a summary of his monetarist propositions given in his 
1984 Mais Lecture in which he expressed his belief that “the conventional post-war wisdom was that 
unemployment was a consequence o f inadequate economic growth” to be secured by macro-economic policy 
as well as fiscal stimulus with the help o f enlarged budged deficit and passive monetary policy, while 
“inflation was increasingly seen as a matter to be dealt with by micro-economic policy - the panoply o f  
controls and subsidies associated with the era o f incomes policy.” Here, Lawson stated his and the conviction 
of many others in his party which was based on the idea that the “conventional post-war wisdom” had been
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Here, we do not only expect - within the wisdom of path dependency theories - 
institutions to move 'incrementally' on and eventually change their overall policy 
paradigm, but parties may indeed even be drawn strongly back to their heritage and 
former historically held and institutionalised policy approaches.
Hence, one way of looking at the problems of social democratic parties at the 
present time is to ask, what policy approaches they might have had in their institutional 
repertoires which would have enabled them to find alternatives to Keynesianism, that 
would not have meant such a strong surrender to the ideas of neo-liberalism. It is clear 
from the evidence presented in this study that both parties certainly tried to search for 
alternatives in their repertoires - as in the case of the 1979 electorally defeated Labour 
Party - by adopting a strongly socialist influenced economic policy approach, or - as in the 
case of the opposition SPD - by searching for its 'reformist' party roots by attempting to 
open the party towards the political concerns of the new social movements and later by 
searching - under Oskar Lafontaine and his party allies - for the revival of an increased 
state interventionist role. In fact, the Labour Party and the SPD attempted throughout 
their period in opposition to find alternatives to Keynesianism that would not surrender 
too much of their parties former economic policy approaches to neo-liberalism.
This is certainly one way of looking at the Labour Party's policy developments 
during the 1980s, or to a briefer extent, the later but equally significant search by the SPD 
and Oskar Lafontaine, in particular, for a different, and as far as possible, non neo-liberal 
revived role for the state.
fundamentally flawed. Cited in (Willetts, David - Modem Conservatism, Penguin Books, London, 1992, p 
128)
251 For a discussion o f theories on the rise of Thatcherism, monetarism and the role o f the City see: Jessop, B. 
et al - ‘Theories of Thatcherism’, in Jessop et al - Thatcherism - A Tale o f Two Nations, Polity Press, 
Cambridge 1988, pp 22-56. Jessop et al described in their assessment o f theories on Thatcherism how its 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies had been supported by banks and financiers (e.g. the City) as policies 
of monetarism served as an antidote to the previous Keynesian policy approach that assigned to banks the role 
of instruments o f government policies. There is, furthermore, widespread belief in the idea that Conservative 
governments adoption o f monetarist policies was preceded by a shift in power from industry to banks that 
occurred though the rise o f the Euromarkets and other forms of banking business. Here the Conservatives re­
asserted with their monetarist policies the hegemony of financial capital with an overseas orientation in the 
British system. Hence, Thatcherism can be seen as reorganising and re-orientating the country's social and 
political order as well as economy by representing a strategy for capital accumulation that prioritised the 
interest o f financial and international capital over that of the domestic industrial sectors.
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Following from this, we have to admit that we are left with a question that remains 
largely unanswered by path dependency theories. Did a left Social democratic' alternative 
to the tendencies of neo-liberalism exist and failed, because it was incoherent and 
inadequate to the task, or because changing domestic as well as international power 
relations made its application impossible?
4.5.6. Path dependence and political parties
Nevertheless, for two significant reasons, the path dependence of political parties 
should not be viewed within over-rigid terms. Firstly, the notion clearly allows tangible 
flexibility in regards to the application and further development of paths, as eventual 
incremental changes to traditional institutionalised policy paths must and should be 
expected -  over time -  to develop.
In the case used for this study, overall path dependence was maintained, even 
when it seemed that both the SPD and Labour Party leaderships -  notably against the 
substantial protest of non-cabinet MPs, their parliamentary parties, party activists, rank 
and file, as well as trade unions -  were forced by circumstances to leave their parties' 
traditional policy path, such as during mid-70s when the Labour and SPD governments 
adopted increasingly monetarist government policies.
Furthermore, the policy backlash experienced by both parties leaderships 
immediately after the loss of government office (in 1979/82) which in the case of Labour 
even enabled the left for a short-term to shift the inner-party balance in its favour and 
push though temporarily the adoption of 'radical' orthodox left wing economic policies 
(even though the overall path dependent paradigm proved to be more resilient then the 
left expected).252 However, short-term policy exceptions -  in or out of government - do not 
necessarily contradict parties' path dependence or demonstrate substantial change. In fact, 
the change of institutionalised paradigms is a slow process. Therefore, it was predictable
252 For instance, proponents o f Labour’s new ‘left’ non-Keynesian ‘Alternative Economic Strategy’ policy 
approach, such as Tony Benn, wrongly expected - at the time of its adoption in the early 1980s - that a 
change in Labour’s policies towards a more socialist economic policy outlook would be irreversible. He was 
quickly proven wrong, as the party’s moderate institutionalised Keynesian paradigm continued to 
predetermine policy choices, as shortly after the lost election o f 1983 Labour moved inevitably - as could be 
expected - path dependently back to its former traditional party institutionalised Keynesian-led policy 
choices. If at all, one could consider the party’s greater movement around its traditional economic path as an 
indicator that the party was facing increasing problems with its path dependent approach. (Benn, Tony - The 
Benn Diaries, [ed. by Ruth Winstone], Arrow Books, London, 1995, p 550)
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and understandable, that both parties7 policy choices returned (during the year of 1983) to 
be dominated by their previously institutionalised long-term 'path dependent' Keynesian- 
led economic policy approaches, as they had remained to represent the institutionalised 
medium and majority spectrum of the parties. In fact, the parties only began to disengage 
from this path, once electoral as well as changing economic and social circumstances led 
to a clear long-term ideological and electoral crises, with the eventual parties response 
containing the overall amendment of their economic policy paradigm.
Secondly, path dependency allows for various streams of opinions, interests and 
beliefs to be present within pluralist parties. The difference and sometimes even 
conflicting policy beliefs of party members and decision-makers are not only natural and 
common within organisations, they are an essential part of the interactions, inner-party 
debates as well as part of the overall balance of interests under which a specific 'path 
direction' has been established and institutionalised within the sum of a party's 
institutional influence components. This means that path dependence should be 
understood as a 'path compromise' between the various policy actors' convictions 
represented within an institution.
4.6. Labour's and the SPD's 'delayed' shift towards more neo-liberal labour market 
policy approaches
When faced with the problem of how to understand Labour's and the SPD's 
'delayed' shift in prescribing to a more popular and (seemingly) 'current wisdom' neo­
liberal inspired policy approach when choosing their LMPs, three different explanations 
can be identified.
Namely, both parties (leaderships) may have encountered similar strategic 
problems when trying to shift their parties' policy approach, such as risking subsequent 
intra-party conflict or a substantial loss of electorate. Alternatively, Labour and the SPD 
may have been faced with a 'learning' problem as both parties did not contain sufficient 
policy development mechanisms to allow or encourage 'policy learning' being followed 
up by the adoption of new policy approaches. Finally, institutional factors may have been 
responsible for not allowing the rapid adoption of new policy approaches by the parties, 
as policy identities and path dependency inhibited actors from promptly changing their 
parties' policy approach.
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4.6.1. Problems of party strategy
The first explanation for both parties' rejection of adopting - from an early stage 
onwards - more neo-liberal based policy approaches is emphasised by the fact, that both 
parties in general, and the policy makers within them faced substantial strategic problems 
when attempting to abandon one set of policy ideas and replace it with another. In fact, 
trying to shift party policies substantially - to win new voters or react to conditional 
changes - could have been feared in case it deepened intra-party conflict and was 
envisaged to carry the substantial risk of alienating the traditional electorate in substantial 
numbers. Similarly, a change of policy approach could have been feared to provoke 
intensive intra-party conflict which could have endangered not only the unity but even - 
as in the case of Labour during the 1980s - the existence of the party as a single entity. 
Consequently, policy makers were prohibited from engaging in a radical push for a 
substantial reform of policy approach as they could not be certain that they would have 
been able to take along their own rank and file as well as traditional electorate.253
An interesting additional angle to this explanation is offered by John D. May's 
(1973) idea of parties acting within a common Taw of curvilinear disparity', by which 
party leaders are driven by tangible (salaries, expense accounts) and intangible rewards 
(prestige, power, interesting work) as well as vote-maximising imperatives, while activists 
are motivated by purposive incentives such as the desire to influence party policy and 
ideological purity rather than capacity to enlarge the party's electoral base.254 In fact, May 
argued that leaders can be expected to desire party policy positions that aim at attracting 
median voters, while party members are rather concerned with maintaining ideologically 
'pure' policy positions. Applied to the case of the Labour Party and the SPD, this offers 
one explanation, why both parties leaderships - although realising already during the
253 This problem was confirmed by David Hill who was right at the centre o f the party’s policy-making 
processes - first as a personal assistant to the party’s deputy leader Roy Hattersley and later as director o f  
party campaigns and spin doctor - who clearly described the slowness and carefulness with which the 
leadership pushed for policy change. He alleged furthermore that “the Labour Party had been so 
introspective during those 10 years [1976-86] and had spend so much time arguing with itself, it had lost 
track o f the fact that out in the wide world things had changed dramatically. It was during the post-87 period 
when Kinnock and Hattersley started gradually hammering home the message that we had spend years not 
relating to the general public at all. It was an immense battle for the party [activists as well as rank and file] 
starting to come around accepting that we had to change those policies. It was a real knock down, drag out 
fight, month in - month out, but it was about the leadership actually saying, we can’t win unless we change 
and seem changed.” (Interview with David Hill, London, 26/08/99)
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early 1980s the need for a substantial reform of their parties LMP positions - had to 
comprehend their inability to do so against the majority of their parties rank and file (and 
in the case of Labour Party influential trade unionists as well).
Sten Berglund (1980) underlines this, by pointing towards a paradox of interests 
between party leaderships and their rank and file. In fact, he claims that party leaderships 
can be expected to behave more rationally than their rank and file when making decisions. 
In fact, even though they ought to carry the obligation of representing the wishes of party 
members - leaders who are too strongly committed to please their rank and file run risk of 
failing to attract marginal voters and hence at achieving their ultimate goal of gaining 
electoral success.255 Consequently, policy-makers have to move policy changes in tune 
with their party's rank and file and as Webb and Farell have shown in the case of the 
Labour Party during the 1980s, the leadership consciously engaged ('pedagogically') in a 
long-term strategy of shifting the beliefs of the party's rank and file towards the 
acceptance of the need to reform party policies and institutions in order to win the ability 
to push through substantial policy changes.256
Furthermore, a second strategic problem encountered by both parties explaining 
the reasons behind their hesitancy to move towards more neo-liberal policy approaches 
may have been the fact that even though 'neo-liberal' policies throughout the 1980s were 
increasingly deemed necessary as a response to the changing environmental 
circumstances or even 'en vogue' with business and to an increasing extent with the 
electorate, social democratic party policy makers may have been held back from 
considering them as a real option, as they remained highly unconvinced about their 
economic wisdom or political desirability. Consequently, party actors decided to maintain 
their individual and/or collective 'identity goals' (such as the maintenance of full 
employment with Keynesian inspired policy means) as this was judged more important 
than compromising these aims to enhance electoral performance.
254 May, John D. - ‘Opinion structure of political parties: The special law o f curvilinear disparity’, Political 
Studies. Vol. 21, No. 2, 1973, pp 148
255 Berglund, Sten - Paradoxes o f Political Parties: Rational Choice and beyond, CWK Gleerup, Umea, 1990, 
p 59
256 Webb, P. and D. M. Farrell -  ‘Party Members and Ideological Change’, in Evans, G. and P. Norris (ed) -  
Critical Elections, SAGE, London, 1999, p 50. David Hill also confirmed this view in an interview with the 
author. (London, 26/08/1999)
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In fact, identity goals' may have even been perceived as electorally unpopular by 
politicians, but they represented deep rooted party policy preferences which could not be 
discounted and suddenly overwritten by an 'apparently' more popular or increasingly 
common policy approach. In fact, if one believes that parties are formed in order to 
promote specific policy ideas, interpretations and solutions, it must indeed be expected 
that they stick to those 'basic' principles for as long as they possibly can, as they are the 
base of the party's reason for existence and an integral part of membership for of the party 
'community'. In fact, party organisations have been frequently described by scholars as 
'epistemic communities' that are composed of members sharing one or more specific 
commitments (or even habits) to support a common set of political values. Therefore they 
share a common interpretation of problems, how to approach them and hence translate 
these beliefs into 'sets' of public policy ideas which they are convinced, if implemented, 
will be for the common good.257 This interpretation would help to explain, why party 
actors continued to advocate specific sets of policies, even if it seemed unlikely to find an 
electoral majority in support of them at a certain moment in time.
The above described ideas may hold some truth had both social democratic parties 
not faced substantial demographic changes, which led to strategic problems throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s when having to decide on how to appeal to the electorate. However, 
this line of argument does not explain why both parties struggled to reform - in particular 
- their policy approaches in the LMP policy area.
Furthermore, party 'identity' may have played a crucial role in predetermining 
party members attempts to avoid for as long as possible to consider neo-liberal policy 
ideas as a policy option. However, the notion of 'identity1 and its precise impact are 
extremely difficult to conceptualise. Therefore, when attempting to understand individual 
and collective behaviour of actors and their preference formation, the analysis of identity 
and policy principles should be viewed with the sharper lens of an institutional 
framework of reference, as the conception of party paradigms and their prescriptive 
policy templates recognise notions of 'identity' and 'policy principles' as well as the role of 
institutional influence components when party policy choices were taken.
257 Haas, Ernst - When knowledge is power: Three Models of Change in International Organisations, 
University o f California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, Cal. and Oxford, 1990, p 41-6
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4.6.2. Policy learning
Alternatively, could the SPD's and Labour Party's inability to consider more 
quickly neo-liberal LMP approaches have been caused by problems of individual or 
collective learning? In other words, can an explanation for the 'delayed' application He in 
the fact that both parties faced problems when engaging in learning processes, as the 
parties did not contain sufficient mechanisms to encourage policy learning and/or 
implement new policy approaches?
Various frameworks have been developed by scholars to enhance the 
understanding of processes that enable institutions to learn about - and their motivations 
behind - the application of new policies. For example, Paul Sabatier (1987, 1988) argued 
that 'policy-orientated learning' is a major factor contributing to policy innovation and 
change, stressing that "relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural 
intentions...result from experience and...are concerned with the attainment or revision of 
the precepts of one's belief system".258 According to this idea, (policy-orientated) learning 
must be understood as a mechanism in which policy makers (within advocacy coalitions) 
are engaged in an ongoing process of alliterating thought and intentions based on past 
experiences, motivated by the desire to accomplish policy outputs which respond to core 
policy beliefs. Here, group dynamics and turnover as well as communication among 
members can transform the overall interests and beliefs of advocacy coalitions. In other 
words, the individual learning experience can lead to changes in the belief systems of 
individuals which in turn can lead over time to amendments of 'advocacy coalitions' 
strategic policy aims and may therefore alter their perception of interests and policy 
beliefs which are then taken up by policy-makers exposed to their influence. If we 
recognise such a process, than we must also acknowledge that this process differs between 
organisations and that it may well be 'dysfunctional' in some of them? Consequently, this 
raises the question if Labour's and the SPD's hesitancy to quickly consider more neo­
liberal policy approaches could be the result of a certain 'dysfunctionality' encountered by 
both parties in their ability to learn and adopt new policy approaches?
The conception of institutional policy processes developed by Chris Argyris and 
Donald Schon deals with the question, if institutional 'learning' may be inhibited by
258 Sabatier, Paul. A - ‘An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role o f policy-orientated 
learning therein’, in Policy Sciences, 21, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988, p 151
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'dysfunctional' organisations. Both argue that institutions - and individuals working 
within them - are faced with a paradox.259 On the one side, they encounter the need to 
maintain stability, on the other side they face the necessity for change. Hence, institutions 
have to perform - as they call it - a 'double loop' (Model 2) of cultivating decision-making 
based upon openness towards information and taking action, while at the same having to 
nurture an atmosphere of joint inquiry and openness towards the reform of institutional 
norms, strategies and assumptions in order to safeguard a sufficient degree of 
organisational responsiveness. They argue furthermore, that institutions, which contain 'a 
double loop', do not suffer under an incapacity to learn. However, there is the possibility 
that institutions are caught in a 'single loop' (Model 1) in which single actors are driven by 
the desire to act independently and keep their ideas and beliefs to themselves in order to 
protect themselves from change. In this case, learning would be self-contained and self­
orientated, producing in turn conformity, mistrust and inflexibility among actors rather 
than facilitating organisational responsiveness and change. Hence Chris Argyris has 
argued that the defensive 'single loop' approach 'pollutes' institutions decision-making 
systems and makes them hostile and inflexible to change.260 Here again, we may ask if the 
Labour Party and the SPD were possibly caught in a 'single loop' situation?
Overall, Sabatier's framework as well as Argyris and Schon's models represent 
two examples of a broad range of attempts to conceptualise the notion of learning, 
applying it to institutions in an attempt to accredit it as a major determinant for 
institutions ability to successfully innovate and change their policies.
What is missing in Sabatier's model is the attempt to answer the question, why 
some institutions learn faster or more effectively than others. Without wanting to develop 
a detailed critique of his model, it is clear that at this point institutional procedures and 
policy templates offer a much more convincing account of what happened within the 
Labour Party and the SPD, than ascribing both parties 'delayed' shift in LMP approaches 
to structural insufficiencies in their learning processes. In particular, as both parties 
displayed in other policy areas - not connected to the Keynesian paradigm - full well their
259 Argyris, Chris and Donald A. Schon - Organisational Learning II - Theory. Method, and Practice,
Addison-Westley, Reading, Mass., 1996, p 244-50; Argyris, Chris and Donald A. Schon - Organisational 
learning: A theory of Action Perspective. Addison Westley, Reading, Mass., 1978
260 Argyris, Chris - Strategy, Change and Defensive Routines. Pitman, London, 1985
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ability to learn and change policy approaches in response to changing overall conditions. 
Similarly, Chris Argyris and Donald Schon's explanation - which applied to the SPD and 
Labour Party LMP formation would have to point at both as 'one loop' (Model 1) 
organisations which shied away from learning as actors preferred to protect themselves 
from new ideas, change and creating inflexibility seems unconvincing as, for example, 
both parties changed substantially their policy approaches in various areas during the 
1980s while however initially avoiding to move - in particular - towards more neo-liberal 
inspired economic and LMPs.
4.6.3. The role of institutionalised paradigms
Finally, the idea that institutionalised paradigms have been slowing down both 
parties ability to rapidly adopt new policy approaches as policy identities and path 
dependency prohibited change and bound actors to institutionally pre-defined policy 
paths seems to be the framework which offers the best explanation of what happened 
within the policy processes of the Labour Party and the SPD.
Over time, both parties overall concern with the question of how to deal with the 
problem of unemployment and what LMPs would be best to further this aim, can be 
measured in a consistent way that enables the analyst to link comparatively the parties 
measures to their policy priorities. In this case, the studied policies proposed by the two 
social democratic parties across time and a wide range of LMPs has provided us with an 
investigative tool that has enabled us to identify surprisingly similar patterns of policy 
and strategy development.
The party programme coding analysis developed for this study has identified 
consistent year by year shifts in party policy choices of Labour and the SPD between 
1979/80 and 1997/98 from Keynesian-style to increasingly neo-liberal-led economic 
policy approaches. Most significantly has been the discovery that both parties have 
engaged much later than their Christian Democratic and Conservative counterparts in the 
abandonment of Keynesian-led policy approaches and the adoption of increasingly neo­
liberal tinged policy solutions.
As already discussed earlier, the identities of individuals as well as institutions are 
defined by their rules and procedures, which are in turn responsive to external forces. In 
fact, political identities such as those of individuals or party officials also evolve
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indigenously within a political process that includes conflict, public discourse, civic 
education, and socialisation.261 In other words, politics develops, changes, and shifts 
values and identities - predominantly in an incremental fashion, while external forces 
influence different individuals and institutions with different intensity depending on the 
degree with which they are affected by changes to the external party environment and the 
institutions ability to envisage and allow appropriate responses.
This explains why the Labour Party and the SPD have shifted policy approaches 
with a delay of more than a decade - compared to most of their party rivals on the right - 
from a Keynesian inspired economic policy firstly into various policy directions (orthodox 
left and new social movements), before finally arriving (with a 'delay") at the point at 
which they began increasingly to embrace (the by then conventional wisdom of) neo­
liberal policy approaches in the mid-90s.
Institutional change is often the story of failing policy approaches, a failure which 
forces institutions in their (constant) struggle to survive to transform themselves. The 
degree of change required - and the "deep" shift from classic social democratic Keynesian 
led to neo-liberal policy principles - took place in a period in which the SPD and Labour 
Party institutions experienced increasing ideological and electoral vulnerability as they 
had not been able to re-establish the procedural balance they had lost during the late 
1970s.
The more an organisation is led by political ideology, traditions, loyalty and long­
term aims, the less can institutional rules be expected to allow actors' to change policies 
and institutional responses quickly.262 In fact, only in the world of free markets and 
business may we be able to witness fast moving innovative environments that allow or 
even expect from actors to change institutional procedures and missions according to 
market requirements. However, the conditions of fast institutional change and flexibility 
are a far cry from the decision- and policy making realities of political parties whose 
actors are instead faced with a high degree of prescriptive paradigms which inhibit - for 
better or worse - the engagement in rapid policy change. This may also explain why
261 March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen - ‘Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions’, Governance: An 
Institutional Journal o f Policy and Administration. Vol. 9, July 1996, p 257
262 Neil Kinnock added for the Labour Party, that after losing office in 1979, the party developed policy 
"stances that in many cases were well intended, but they were more to impress the already converted Labour 
supporter than to extent Labour's appeal." (Interview with Neil Kinnock, Bmssels, 24/07/2000)
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leading party modernisers often appear to battle with their reform ideas 'against' rather 
than within their parties. For instance, with regard to the Blair /  Schroder paper, Thomas 
Meyer observed that 'people such as [the SPD's influential spin doctor Bodo] Hombach 
believe, that the SPD's modernisation can only be attempted versus the party 
[organisation], as the party's own mechanisms contribute to the stabilisation of traditional 
positions'.263
Finally, in the case of both parties, this lack of unity and policy vision affected 
substantially their public appearance and ability to set their domestic policy agendas and 
impaired decisively their electoral attractiveness and hence electoral performance. Here, 
the fact that the Labour Party and the SPD spend an extensive period (in parallel) of 16 i.e. 
18 years in opposition - during which the parties attempted to re-balance their economic 
policy principles (paradigm) - clearly shows the high degree of vulnerability and damage 
that the eventual abandonment of the Keynesian led policy principles brought to both 
social democratic parties.
Policy processes tend to contain significant lags and delays of time before 
institutional perceptions change and actors realise the need to adjust procedures and 
policies in accordance to the requirements of the newly experienced conditions. In fact, 
March and Olsen have warned that these "lags... make institutional history somewhat 
jerky and sensitive to major shocks that lead not only to occasional periods of rapid 
change, but also to considerable indeterminacy in the direction of change."264 To take 
account of this problem is important, as it enables us to understand more fully the 
relationship between 'slow moving' institutions, 'ideational' factors and their often 
'delayed' impact on institutional change.
263 This observation can easily be extended to the impression Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroder gave about 
their relationship with their parties' during the early days of their leadership. (Interview with Thomas Meyer, 
Bonn, 24/06/1999)
264 March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen - Rediscovering Institutions. Free Press/MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1989, p 171
156
















/  Institutionally pre-defined space 
Actors'choicesc 1, c 2, c 3, c4 , c 5, c 6, c 7, c 8, fe 9, c 10, c 11
The strength of the ideas and policy challenge determines the strength with which those forces press for a shift. However, 
the strength of (party) rules, procedures and ideology often presses against paradigmatic change and their strength 
depends in turn on the traditions (strong) and quality (weak) of institutionalised procedures to deal (quickly) with policy 
challenges and eventual necessary consequences. (This includes various factors such as the structure of the party 
organisations, inner-party decision-making procedures, role and power of leadership, current state of party, and electoral 
performance.
Table 4.1.
4.6.4. Why Conservatives and Christian Democrats did not face the same problem?
Finally, a question that has so far remained unanswered is, if there has been a 
'delayed' shift in the SPD's and Labour's adoption of neo-liberal policy approaches in 
comparison with other major liberal and Conservative/Christian Democratic parties, why 
was it easier for those other parties to abandon previously consensually held Keynesian 
influenced policy principles?
The answer is, as already identified in Chapter 2, that for social democratic parties the 
question of unemployment and the Keynesian approach played a vital role in their 
ideological development which accommodated for the eventual acceptance of the post­
war economic system being based on capitalist principles - as Keynesian principles 
secured the development of 'social markets' and 'wealth redistribution'. This idea of 
rectifying capitalism with the help of Keynesian style policies became therefore an
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essential ingredient of Western European social democracy and major pillar of post-war 
social democracy.
Here, the case has been different for non-social democratic parties that consensually 
adopted the (Keynesian) paradigm in the post-war years, but did not (ideologically) 
internalise it to the same extent as their social democratic counterparts. Therefore, these 
parties were able to abandon this specific paradigm much faster and replace it with the 
/newly' evolving 'wisdom' of neo-liberalism, once conditions changed.265 In fact, one can 
expect, that in (other) policy areas nearer to the ideological heart of Conservatism or 
Christian Democracy, paradigms could be found for which attempts to change them - in 
response to changing circumstances - would cause conservative parties similar substantial 
problems, which could cause similar delays in policy shifts.266
4.6.5. The role of demographic change
The diversified character of the electorate has been a further factor that made it 
easier for Conservative and Christian Democratic parties to replace Keynesian-style 
policies with a neo-liberally inspired policy approach. In fact, the numerical decline of the 
social democratic parties traditional electoral constituencies of workers and public service 
employees began already in the 1960s (see Chapter 2). For them, neo-liberal policy 
approaches continued to remain an unattractive choice, because they meant an increase in 
work and income related risks, while at the same time reducing the re-distributional 
capacity of the state. During the 1980s, Social Democratic parties remained partisan about 
the interests of this part of the electorate as they perceived their ability to win an electoral 
majority dependent on the support of this group. However, as different interests (of the 
electorate) were represented and served by Keynesian-style rather than neo-liberal 
inspired economic policy approaches, the continuous demographic restructuring of the
265 Cemy, Karl H. (ed) - Germany at the polls -  The Bundestag elections o f the 1980s. Duke University Press, 
Durham, North Carolina, 1990, p 191-94; Norris, Pippa - Electoral Change. Blackwell Publishers,
Cambridge, Mass., 1997, p 154-55
266 We can expect Conservative, Christian Democratic or Liberal parties to encounter similar problems caused 
by path dependency, when faced with the need to shift paradigms in policy areas in which they hold strong 
(historically) institutionalised paradigms, which are of significant importance to their specific ideological 
make-up. One can, for example, expect that those parties would face problems with changes to their 
paradigmatic positions in the area o f family policy, multi-culturalism, the role of the church, (in the case of  
the British Conservative Party the role o f Europe), or environmental issues in which similar ‘shift delays’ 
could occur when the parties' would have to consider policy change in response to changing socio-economic 
or electoral conditions.
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electorate (a process which happened during the 1980s and 1990s) meant, that the Labour 
Party and the SPD finally had to change their policy approach as a declining share (and 
therefore decreasing influence) of the parties traditional core-electorate was increasingly 
insufficient to produce electoral majorities. Therefore, the partisan interests of this part of 
the electorate were overtaken by the need of Labour and the SPD to appeal to 'new' parts 
of the electorate -  with different interests - without both parties would not have been able 
to gain future electoral majorities. Hence, an opening up towards a more neo-liberal 
economic policy approach became a vital ingredient of both parties electoral strategy, as 
their ability to extent their electoral appeal and unite a 'new' type of overall electoral 
majority depended on a change in economic policies.
This consideration of demographic factors and their influence on party policy 
choices should and has not been ignored in this study, however, the rational ability of 
party actors to consider demographic change and its impact on policy choices should not 
be overestimated, as parties are not able to be as short-term flexible and responsive to 
consumer i.e. electorate demands. In any case, the development of the electorates' 
demographic situation and the interpretation of its consequences for voting behaviour 
was less clear during the 1980s than it may seem today. In fact, to conclude that the 
evolving demographic trends produced a clear policy wish-list of the electorate (in favour 
of less state interventionist measures) which social democratic parties could and should 
have adopted in order to gain an electoral majority of votes seems unrealistically far 
fetched.
Finally, demographic change may have, in fact, rather amplified the social 
democratic parties path dependence during the 1980s as the wishes of the traditional 
electorate remained an important factor for party policy choices. Influenced, however, by 
various other factors described in this thesis, policy makers increasingly came to the 
conclusion that a shift in their parties' economic policy paradigm was an inevitable 
precondition for regaining an overall electoral appeal that could provide 'new' electoral 
majorities.
4.7. The notion of institutional history
Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan pointed out that the analysis of parties and 
their policy choices contains a 'historical dimension' that inhibits 'rash' party policy
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changes.267 Similarly, Peter Hall argued that state institutions policy choices must be 
viewed over long-periods of time as they reflect long-term patterns of institutionalised 
commitments, which subsequently predetermine choices.268
Thus, a long term view must be taken when attempting to understand the logic 
behind how and why social democratic party institutions have developed their LMPs the 
way they have. By adopting Sidney Verba's branching tree model for the policy 
development of political parties, we can express the sequential developments of the 
various forces, developments and historical events that have shaped the values, interests 
and strategies of given actors within their institutional context over time.269 Picturing the 
inconsistent and varying growth of the branches of a tree (towards a specific direction) 
and applying it to the policy development of social democratic parties in Europe, Verba's 
model represents differences among those parties (due to specific national factors), but 
also reflects the substantial historical contextual similarities in direction they encountered 
(over time) when reaching common 'branching points' and 'critical junctures' during the 
growth of their policy paths.
4.7.1. The application of Historical Institutionalism
Four main features of historical institutionalism -  as pointed out by Peter Hall270 - 
contrast with the more common view in the social sciences which assumes, in the words 
of March and Olsen, often quite specifically that "institutions and behaviour...evolve 
through some form of efficient historical process...that moves rapidly to a unique solution, 
conditional on current environmental conditions, and is independent of the historical 
path".271 In addition, however, to the synchronic determinants of policies such as current 
economic conditions and existing political alliances, policy patterns must be understood 
as unfolding over time.
267 Lipset, Symore M. and Stein Rokkan - Party Systems and Voter Alignments. The Free Press, New York, 
1967, p 2
268 Hall, Peter A.- Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1986
269 Verba, Sidney - ‘Sequences and Development’, in Binder, Leonard et. al. - Crises and Consequences in 
Political Development. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971, pp 283-316
270 Hall, Peter A. and R. C. R. Taylor - ‘Political Science and the three New Institutionalisms’, Political 
Studies. XLIV, 1996, pp 936-57
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Historical institutionalists have, firstly, developed a distinctive view of historical 
development. They perceive "social causation" as "path dependence" in a way that they 
reject the idea that the same pressures and forces will generate and lead to the same 
outcomes everywhere. Instead, historical institutionalists argue that similar inputs 
(conditions and forces) can lead to differing results as outcomes depend predominantly on 
the contextual features of a given situation. Although institutions are still seen as a major 
factor premeditating the "path" of historical development, policy and party institutional 
change must be understood as "embedded" in contextual features and behavioural 
outcomes.
Secondly, historical institutionalists stress the unintended consequences and 
inefficiencies that can be generated by existing institutions. This means, for example, that 
the lack of ability by social democratic parties to develop distinctive "new" or "reformed" 
economic policy principles throughout the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in response to the 
growing neo-liberal policy paradigm can be partly explained by unintended inefficiencies 
(institutional refusal to consider neo-liberal policy approaches and change of paradigm) 
generated by the party institutions themselves.
Thirdly, historical institutionalists distinguish between 'historical events of 
continuity' and "critical junctures' which arise when historical developments move onto a 
new path (e.g. due to economic crises, fundamental economic and political change) and 
parties are either capable of change though learning and move among equilibria by 
responding to new information and challenges by themselves, or face crises and be forced 
to move policies in response. If parties engage in learning, or face crises or both, 
"branching points" are reached at which institutions engage in substantial procedural 
changes. These changes are expressed by substantial organisational and policy changes, 
which often occur in parallel to a party's shift, or change of policy guiding paradigms in 
policy areas that have been specifically affected by the policy or system crises that has 
caused the historically motivated "critical juncture".
Finally, historical institutionalists tend to locate institutions in a causal chain of 
factors that recognises, in addition to the role of factors such as socio-economic
271 March, J. and Olson, J. - Rediscovering institutions: The organisational basis o f politics. Free Press, New  
York, 1989, p 5-6
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developments, the diffusion of ideas and the behaviour of rational actors. This explains, 
why historical institutionalism is a highly inclusive theoretical approach that explains 
most realistically the interaction among a variety of influence components that have been 
responsible for the behaviour of social democratic party actors analysed in this study.
4.7.2. Comparative findings: Historical Institutionalism and the decline of the 
Keynesian paradigm - The case of the Labour Party and the SPD
As this thesis focuses on social democratic party behaviour under changing socio­
economic conditions combined with the decline of Keynesian- and rise of the neo-liberal 
policy paradigm throughout the 1970s and 1980s, social democratic party behaviour must 
be understood in the context of social democratic policy principles and "ideas' entering a 
major historical branching point. In fact, the causal arguments which were appropriate for 
the period when a policy approach was first institutionalised by an organisation may not 
be appropriate any more at a later stage as a policy response for developing policies under 
changed conditions.272
As will be shown in Chapter 5 and 6, in the case of the Labour Party this period of 
change prompted significant institutional change between 1979 and 1997. In the case of 
the SPD, institutional and programmatic changes took also place, but were less drastic 
(because of the party's more moderate policy programme and federal structure that 
contained various Lander-SPD party power bases).273
Summing up the argument, socio-economic changes and the increasingly global 
and neo-liberal environmental conditions as well as the continuous electoral failures were 
experienced by both parties and exposed them to problems in policy development and a 
considerable indeterminacy in the direction of change.
The inability of both Social Democratic parties throughout the 1980s and early- 
1990s to respond successfully to the growing influence of the neo-liberal paradigm cannot 
be solely understood by analysing environmental variables and forces that may have 
driven the momentum of change. The hesitancy of both social democratic parties to adapt 
or abandon their Keynesian/ Neo-liberal based policies can be explained by the role of
272 Krasner, S. D. - ‘Approaches to the state’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2, Jan. 1984, p 225
273 The federalist system in Germany, combined with the more fragmented structure of federal as well as 
Lander party layers make it more difficult to assemble sufficient political authority to redirect existing party 
institutional arrangements.
162
historical institutional and ideational forces which shaped actors preferences and 
strategies. In fact, as Guy Peters vividly described, historical institutionalism explains that 
policy decisions taken at one time within a party organisation often "appear to endure on 
auto-pilot, with individual behaviour being shaped by the decision made by members of 
an institutions some years earlier."274
The 7 auto-pilot' affects general long-term party policy principles expressed in 
various policy paradigms. Furthermore, we are able to show that the Keynesian paradigm 
remained in place as a strongly influential and institutionalised prescriptive force that 
directed party actors policy choices into a certain direction. However, looking at the 
precise programmatic policy developments of the Labour Party and the SPD, we were 
able to witness that both parties engaged in a very slow process of policy change partly 
'against' the wisdom of their own long-term policy paradigm. As the quantitative analysis 
of major-mid term and electoral manifestos clearly shows, both parties engaged from the 
late 1980s onwards in a slow process of moving policies away from Keynesian-led to 
increasingly neo-liberal policy prescriptions. Here, leadership and conditional pressures 
were certainly a pre-condition for the eventual overall shift in the parties policy paradigm 
that took place in the early 1990s and meant as a consequence, that actors choices were 
from then on institutionally 'bend' towards a substantially different (neo-liberal) policy 
direction. (See Chapter 8)
Therefore, a crucial factor explaining the failure of both social democratic parties to 
develop substantially innovative policies and to modernise their institutions can be found 
in the parties structural incapacity - in the words of Margaret Weir - "to extend the 
institutionally rooted boundaries of existing policies."275
When viewing institutional developments, we have to stress 'path dependence1 
and 'unintended consequences' as factors within a historical institutionalist approach by 
attempting to "integrate institutional analysis" with the contribution of other kinds of 
factors, such as ideas, which also influences overall political outcomes.276 From this 
follows, that historical institutionalism perceives party organisations not as an actor
274 Peters, B. Guy - Institutional theory in political science, Pinter, London, 1999, p 71
275 Weir, Margaret - ‘Ideas and the politics of bounded innovation’, in Steinmo, S., K. Thelen and F. 
Longstreth - Structuring Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p 212
276 Hall, Peter A. and R. C. R. Taylor - ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political 
Studies. XLIV, 1996, p 938
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regulating competing interests, but instead as a complex organisation that can structure 
the character and outcomes of group conflict.
Although 'historical institutionalism' does not necessarily offer new insights into 
the functioning of party institutions, it provides a useful conceptual angle when 
investigating the policy processes of the parties. Although authors such as R. A. W. 
Rhodes criticise the institutional approach for having a slightly apologetic air because it is 
"a subject in search of a rationale",277 this rationale can be found in the multi-theoretic 
approach employing a plurality of research methods.
Overall, historical institutionalism is potentially a fruitful approach, however, its 
application to party behaviour will inevitably raise questions that would be served well, if 
not better, by behavioural or rational approach models. However, as Steinmo, Thelen and 
Longstreth et al have demonstrated in their highly influential book on historical 
institutionalism, "while many theories achieve elegance by pointing to particular variables 
that are alleged to be decisive", new historical "institutionalist analysis...focuses (on) how  
different variables are linked."278
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the remaining substantial traditional differences 
between party institutions and policy making processes, which could have been expected 
to have led to a consistently larger range of varying party policy approaches, were 
significantly overwritten by the greater picture of social democratic parties having to re­
orientate their common policy approaches (and paradigms) according to the requirements 
of the substantial changes experienced in political and economic circumstances.
Policy paradigms can become a crucial part of a party's ideological base as they 
carry the ability to become a significant institutionalised policy definition for long periods 
of time. Changes to major policy paradigms within parties can be a very slow processes 
that leads to great difficulties for a party to maintain a clear and coherent policy profile in 
the 'specific' paradigm area requiring change. This development can also be expected to 
weaken party unity, policy coherence and often electoral performance. In case of the
277 Rhodes, R.A.W. - Understanding Governance, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1997, p 79
278 Steinmo, S., K. Thelen and F. Longstreth - Structuring Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992, p 64
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Labour Party and SPD, both were faced with immense problems when modernising and 
reforming their labour market policy approach.
The institutionalised Keynesian paradigm clearly showed a substantial degree of 
path dependence that can appear when political party actors and party institutions are 
bound to use historical long-term policy visions, prescriptions and approaches. Once a 
path is chosen, it "canalises future developments"279 with the continuous application of 
institutional rules and procedures that are generated by functional demands of the past 
and that perpetuated themselves into the future, even if functional imperatives have 
substantially changed.
Party Policy Processes -  the paradigmatic 'bending' of rational actors' ranking choices

































Rules, procedures and ideology
Define a common institutional purpose; allowing only incremental changes, ‘socialising’ and ‘embedding’ actors into 
institutions via beliefs, policy templates and rankings.
Ideas and Interests
Ideas allow the consideration of new policy approaches; new (scientific) understanding or a changing way 
interpreting problems and solutions.
Paradigms
Once adopted and applied by party institutions, they are highly influential slow moving, path dependent policy 
templates that are highly prescriptive to party actors. As a consequence, they ‘bend’ and diverge the ranking of 
actors’ policy choices and thus parties’ decision-making outcomes towards historical policy paths.
Policy Challenge
Domestic and international challenges, policy problems or new interests arising from changing circumstances such 
as changes in socio-economic environment (demands, crises and branching points) encourage party political 
responses and policy changes.
Individual / Collective party actors’
Party leadership and activists -  acting with reason, ‘intently’ rational, and being ‘embedded’ within their institutional 
routines.
Choices C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6...
Various policy options available to party policy makers, with the choices considered and chosen by the parties' being 
strongly influenced by the above mentioned factors.
Table 4.2.
Hence, significant change in the economic political environment and thus 
conditions experienced by both social democratic parties under investigation led 
eventually to a critical juncture and forced the replacement of the Keynesian with the neo­
liberal policy paradigm and the abandonment of previously held and institutionalised 
economic policy approach patterns in order to re-establish a new functional equilibrium
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between the parties operational conditions, requirements and their chosen policy 
approaches.
Here, in fact historical institutionalism clearly helps us to understand why party 
actors were initially inhibited from making 'rational' policy choices i.e. moving policies 
towards the medium voter and adopting different economic policy approaches and 
instead accepted a path dependent 'paradigmatic bending' of choices.
This study, however, also shows that historical institutionalist forces only 
succeeded temporarily to postpone policy shifts as actors knowledge explaining the 
electorates behaviour and economic environmental conditions inevitably led them to act 
increasingly 'rational', in the Downsian sense, by eventually adopting neo-liberal 
influenced policy approaches and changing their parties economic policy paradigm.
4.8. Conclusion
For those wishing to advance a historical institutionalist account of explaining or 
predicting party policy outcomes, the task remains daunting and requires further study. 
The temporal processes outlined in this study would have to be further specified to 
generate a clear hypothesis concerning, for instance, answers to the question of when we 
should expect policy makers to employ short-term policy horizons, when to expect that 
unintended consequences will spread from long-term institutionalised paradigms, or how  
particular institutional rules influence the prospect of closing the gaps between long-term 
policy paradigms and party policies responsiveness to fit contemporary needs?
The problem in this study - when attempting to develop a historical line of 
argument with the help of interviewing policy actors - has been to trace the 'true' 
motivations of political actors and to separate their perceptions over the intended and 
unintended outcomes of policy choices as well as differentiating between 'after­
rationalised' or idealised descriptions of motivations behind events.
The collection of evidence for this study has been a strenuous exercise of studying 
policy developments in detail over a long period. The historical institutionalist line of 
argument encourages studies to focus on detailed analysis of particular cases, rendering 
any investigation vulnerable to being criticised as having chosen cases, which are 
unrepresentative. Hence, this study is only an attempt among many others in this area to 
analyse actor behaviour within a historical framework of path dependence that offers an
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enhanced theoretical explanation to the individual and collective behaviour of party 
actors.
The refinement of 'new' Institutionalist approaches280 - since Allison wrote his 
book on the 'essence of decision' in 1971 - enables us to analyse institutions less on purely 
'hyperfactual' grounds, as Rhodes calls it.281 Of crucial help for the evaluation of the 
rational and institutional components in party policy-making have been the developments 
in institutional literature that enable us to recognise 'intermediate-level institutional 
factors' such as party structures and paradigms.282 Emphasis on these factors allows a 
more holistic picture of the incentives and constraints faced by individual political actors 
when acting within party institutions. Furthermore, the 'new' institutional approach 
enables analysts to be comparative by identifying and explaining systematic differences 
across countries.
Overall, 'new' institutionalists in political science make the strongest claims for the 
power of institutions as independent variables 'binding the rationality' of political actors 
and groups.283 Institutionalised policy paradigms also influence an actor's definition of his 
own interests, by establishing his institutional responsibilities and relationships to other 
actors. Therefore, institutionalised factors affect both, the degree of policy prescriptive 
pressure encountered by policy makers and the likely direction of this pressure.284
Furthermore, the establishment of institutional constraints is helpful when 
applying rational choice theory to explain the behaviour of political parties, as parties - as 
shown - carry the 'baggage' of long-established interests, positions or even morals and 
principles which are deeply rooted within their institution and that cannot be changed 
indefinitely and speedily in order to increase utilities.285
280 ‘Old’ institutionalism neglected the use o f modem and political theory leading to analysis often being 
solely based on detailed institutional configurations.
281 Rhodes, R. A. W. - Understanding Governance, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1997, p 65
282 Steinmo, S., K. Thelen and F. Longstreth - Structuring Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992, p 6
283 Koelble, Thomas A. - ‘The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology’, Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 27, No. 2, Jan. 1995, pp 231-44
284 Hall, Peter - Governing the economy: The Politics o f state Intervention in Britain and France. Oxford 
University Press, 1986, p 19
28' In contrast to ‘bounded’ political parties, company organisations operate, for example, ultimately for the 
sole purpose o f increasing utility in a market exchange system with a company's past not necessarily having 
to pre-determine rational future decisions.
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Lipset and Rokkan described them as "historical packages of programmes, 
commitments, outlooks, and, sometimes, Weltanschauungen"286 that are carried by every 
political party and that hold substantial influence over individuals as well as collective 
actors policy formation processes and party policy choices. Part of these historical policy 
sequences - which define long term leverage over specific issues and approaches within 
parties - are policy paradigms', whose shift, as is shown in the following chapters, unveil 
fundamental changes within the economic or political policy making process of parties.
Finally, political parties, and as shown in this case, social democratic parties are 
slow moving organisations. The former SPD party manager Peter Glotz described the SPD 
as a tanker, which engages in policy and programme changes at exceptionally slow 
pace.287 Instead of purely heading for greatest utility, programme based political parties 
have to go in circles when amending policy positions, paradigms and outlooks and face 
often extensive prior debate and negotiations inside the parties before policies can be 
amended.288 Similarly, Neil Kinnock pointed out that when proposing to the Labour Party 
policy change from 1983 onwards, he had to "turn the ship round at a speed that 
prevented it from breaking up, but enabled it to go in a more appealing direction", 
something "that took longer than it should have".289 Hence, once new 'ideas' and 
'agendas' take root among party leaders and members, the actual process of adopting 
changed polices remains as slow as 'turning the wheel of an oil-tanker to change 
direction'.
Both, the Labour Party and the SPD failed to abandon key Keynesian policy 
principles at an early stage. Their slow reaction to the neo-liberal hegemony as well as the 
hesitancy of their party institution to react to changes demanded by the party elite's can 
be attributed to the importance of historical institutional factors. These included 
'ideational' factors, historical events of continuity and critical junctures as well as the fact
286 Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan have argued that voters do not express their wishes according to single 
issues, but that “they are typically faced with choices among historically given ‘packages’ o f programs, 
commitments, outlooks, and, sometimes, Weltanschauungen, and their current behaviour cannot be 
understood without some knowledge of the sequences of events and combinations o f forces that produced 
these ‘packages’. (Lipset S. M. and Stein Rokkan (ed)- Party systems and voter alignments: Cross national 
perspectives. The Free Press, New York, 1967, p 2)
287 See: Glotz, Peter - Die Beweglichkeit des Tankers: die Sozialdemokratie zwischen Staat und neuen 
sozialen Bewegungen, Bertelsmann, Miinchen, 1982
288 Budge et al - Ideology. Strategy and Party Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p 18
289 Interview with Neil Kinnock, Brussels, 24/07/2000
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that inefficiencies can be generated by existing institutions, rules and procedures that 
constrain policy development and innovation.
Overall, this study helps to understand the party problems, which surround policy 
processes in a policy area at the heart of Social Democratic identity in order to draw wider 
conclusions on social democratic policy-making in long-term opposition. The historical 
institutionalist approach is not the sole, but the most "inclusive" theoretical approach, 
which adds an important layer of analysis to the common rational choice attempts to 
explain party policy, processes though exchange models and utility maximisation. There 
is currently a rigorous debate going on in die field of institutional theory, and this thesis 
contributes to that debate and adds a further relevant application that shows that 
analysing and understanding present party policies which are linked to long-term values 
and ideology is only possible, if we look beyond the language of the present.
170
Chapter 5: Labour Market Policies: Comparative elements of the 
Labour Party's and SPD's party policy making and actor's choices
5.1. The developm ent of Labour Market Policies during the 1970s, 80s and 90s in  Germany and the UK
5.1.1. Introductory remarks on the politics of labour market policies
5.1.2. Labour market policies in Britain and West Germany: The post-war boom years
5.1.3. Labour market policies under 'conservative' governments: The 1980s and 90s
5.1.4. Some conclusions on the development of labour market policies under 'conservative' governments
5.1.5 Search for policy modernisation: Labour's 'Policy Review Process' and the SPD's new  'Basic Programme'
5.2. The Labour Party and the 'Policy Review  Process'
5.2.1. The 'Policy Review Process': Structure and policy making
5.2.2. The report of the 'Commission on Social Justice'
5.2.3. An evaluation of Labour's 'Policy Review Process'
5.3. The SPD's and the 'basic programme' review  process
5.3.1. The n ew  basic 'Berlin' programme: Structure and policy making
5.3.2. An evaluation of the SPD's basic 'Berlin' programme development process
5.4. The significance of 'Looking to the Future' and the 'Berliner' Grundsatzprogramm
5.4.1. Conclusions drawn from Labour's and the SPD's policy reform processes
5.1. The development of Labour Market Policies during the 1970s, 80s and 90s in 
Germany and the UK
The variety of policy approaches available to political actors to enhance the 
performance of labour markets and to tackle unemployment reflect different degrees of 
state interventionism, de-/regulation and levels of commitment to spend state resources 
on programmes. This corresponds to the wide scale of political and economic interests 
and convictions held by different political actors. In order to account for this, this chapter 
deals with the development of domestic Labour Market Policy (LMP) strategies and how  
they conditioned the development of Labour's and the SPD's LMPs during the 1980s and 
90s. For this, we investigate - furthermore - in the second part of this chapter - how both 
parties engaged during the second half of the 1980s in major policy review exercises that 
were aimed to alter and modernise the parties overall policy outlook.
5.1.1. Introductory remarks on the politics of labour market policies
Before we look at the development of LMPs in Britain and Germany, historically 
and in particular during the 1980s and 1990, let us briefly define the most common factors 
on which LMP change can be expected to be based. Firstly, as set out in Chapter 4, party 
actors are influenced by changes in institutionalised policy templates which have been 
defined by their party's policy paradigms. With an overall change in economic and 
political circumstances, policies may lose their appeal, functionality or they may even be
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perceived as counter-productive to meet intended goals. This can be expected to be 
reflected - at least in the medium term - by shifts in parties policy paradigms.
In fact, paradigm shifts can be expected to reflect also changing attitudes and 
perceptions of the wider society and hence electorate. This means, that certain policy 
approaches may lose their electoral appeal over time - encouraging government as well as 
opposition parties to abandon policy positions - while 'new7 public beliefs and ideas are 
expressed by the adoption of 'new7 policy approaches to deal with certain problems.
Here, previously advocated policies may have lost their functionality as 
circumstances have changed and with them the nature and cause of specific labour market 
inefficiencies. In other words, specific problems may have been solved or lost their 
significance while changing developments or conditions may have caused new problems 
in the labour market that require new or different policy approaches to tackle them. In 
addition, relative net costs of programmes may be judged - at some stage - as too high and 
their continuation may be halted. Furthermore, presentational problems (e.g. 'public job 
creation schemes' may frighten financial markets etc. or be perceived by the electorate as 
'high tax and spend7 policies); questions over the selection of beneficiaries; or the long­
term sustainability of programmes - to name just a few of concerns - may be raised by 
actors and the wider public, when policy choices to influence the functioning of the labour 
market are determined.
Finally, certain policy approaches may have to be ruled out as they have lost - over 
time - their moral acceptability (such as the discouragement of women to seek 
employment; or high levels of taxation to fund state spending on public programmes or 
extensive welfare provisions).
Furthermore, labour market policies can be aimed at improving the employment 
situation as a whole or to help particular groups of the unemployed (for instance, with the 
help of 'selective job creation' schemes.) Clearly, many measures intended to positively 
influence the labour market are 'second-best7 approaches as they are only able to improve 
the situation rather than tackle the underlying causes of unemployment. In fact, many 
forms of state labour market intervention introduce inevitably new distortions to the 
functioning of the labour market and the economy. Hence, while LMPs may have a 
positive impact on many peoples lives - as the stimulation of the functioning of the labour
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market substantially improves their situation - there are no cures or final solutions for the 
apparent inability of capitalist economies to create sustainable conditions for 'full 
employment'.
Importantly, a common argument in support of the development of LMP 
programmes - as for instance used by Paul Ormerod (1996) in his study of the relationship 
between the distribution of income and unemployment - is based on the fact that 
unemployment creates costs. In fact, scholars such as Ormerod have pointed out that the 
costs of unemployment are firstly 'direct' in terms of the 'financial cost' to the taxpayer 
(i.e. the need of the state to offer welfare provisions as well as dealing with a shortfall of 
tax receipts that have to be covered by the taxpayer). Secondly, unemployment carries 
'indirect social costs' to society in terms of decreasing levels of social cohesion, poorer 
overall health levels and increases in crime levels.290
As shown later with the labour market policy framework developed for this study, 
labour market policies are far more varied and extensive than just containing aspects of 
aggregate demand management techniques. Policies also entail job placement policies, 
education and training policies, aspects of the industrial relations system, and today 
increasingly certain aspects of welfare state and family policies. The recognition of this 
wider circle of policies (in the numerous coding categories) has been important in order to 
account for the generalisations on labour market policies that have been previously 
applied in the theoretical path dependency framework when attempting to analyse the 
theoretical aspects of the development of labour market policies by the Labour Party and 
the SPD.
In the 'real' world, however, we are not only faced with a choice between clear cut 
Keynesian-led or neo-liberal labour market policy approaches, but instead with various 
combinations of both together with a variety of other labour market policies as well.291 
Hence, the polarised generalisations used in Chapter 4 must be understood as a necessary
290 Ormerod, Paul - Unemployment: A Distributional Phenomenon, EU Working Papers, European University 
Institute, No 96/30, Florence, 1996, p 22
291 For instance, the initial lack o f Keynesianism-led policies implemented in post-war Germany was partly 
compensated by the character o f the countries industrial (co-determination) relations system and the countries 
(high-skill apprentice based) training system.
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simplification that has enabled the analyst to generalise and identify changes within 
parties7 underlying bases for their policy actors' choices. Furthermore, they have assisted 
the development of a clearer comparative understanding of the more fundamental 
changes experienced by the Labour Party's and the SPD's re-development of economic 
policy design, strategies and approaches. It remains nevertheless an undisputed fact, that 
there are clearly multiple and often complex interactions that can be identified among 
various 'labour market policy approaches' and 'welfare state policies', with many policies 
- such as early retirement schemes - clearly belonging to both domains and hence 
reflecting the interactions of 'real world' policy choices.
5.1.2. Labour market policies in Britain and West Germany: The post-war boom  years
During the post-war boom years, labour market policies in West Germany and the 
United Kingdom were - if at all - adopted to improve only temporarily occurring labour 
market insufficiencies and aimed at sustaining (exceptionally) low levels of 
unemployment.292 Hence, public labour market policy schemes were - until the 1970s - 
predominantly aimed at re-integrating the unemployed back into work - a strategy that 
was only a viable option as long as the number of those out of work remained 
comparatively low.293
The central policy pillars of German (pre-SPD governmental) labour market 
policies had originally been built upon three main components. Firstly, an apprenticeship 
system that had been set-up after the war successfully and has been autonomously run by 
employers and their associations. This system has ensured - with the help of vocational 
training available to predominantly young employees - that a steady supply of skilled and 
highly productive labour has been available to satisfy the needs of industry to support an 
economy based on a high-value added manufacturing sector.294
Furthermore, a collective bargaining system functioning independently of state 
control (Tarifautonomie) had been developed between employers and trade unions. The 
autonomy of a collective bargaining structure on sectoral and firm levels as well as the use
292 Lutz, Burkart and Wemer Sengenberger - Arbeitsmarktstrukturen und offentliche Arbeitsmarktpolitik, 
Verlag Otto Schwarz, Gottingen, 1974, p 95; Lindley, Robert M. -  ‘Employment in transition’, in Lindley, R. 
M. (ed) -  Economic Change and Employment Policy. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1980, pp 330-79
293 Gourevitch, Peter et al - Unions and economic crises, Allen and Unwin, 1984, London, p 129-30
294 Streeck, Wolfgang - Industrial Relations in West Germany. 1974 - 85: An overview. Wissenschafts- 
zentrum Berlin, Berlin, December 1985, IIM/LMP 85-19, p 2
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- for this purpose - of 'works councils' has led to the development of a highly stable and 
co-operative industrial relations system that has been able to accommodate high but stable 
wages, and regularly long-term arrangements between employers, their associations and 
trade unions.295
Finally, Germany adopted an unemployment insurance system that enabled 
workers to search for jobs that matched their qualifications and maintained high 
replacement rates while offering substantial contribution based (later means tested) 
financial assistance to those out of work. Although, most of the above mentioned policies 
were meant to improve conditions on the labour market, they were not explicitly labelled 
as labour market policies by the government and parties.296
In contrast to Germany, British employers and trade unions had not been able to 
agree on co-ordinated governance structures that would have allowed the creation of a 
similar system. In fact, the British system was not able to safeguard the universal training 
of the labour force with transferable skills. As a result, youth unemployment in Britain 
remained at a constantly higher level than in Germany (see table 5.1.), while the general 
lack of training provision has inhibited productivity levels.
Male youth unemployment (15-24 years) (in thousands /  April each year)
Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Germany 108 95 68 89 271 280 304 280 262 232 230 216 160 145
UK 370 365 329 400 630 746 753 753 765 728 627 471 365 355
Source: Yearbooks of Labour statistics, International Labour Office Geneva
Table 5.1.
Similar to Germany, Britain did not witnessed the conscious application of a state 
labour market policy strategy before the arrival of mass unemployment during the 1970s. 
However, Sectoral Training Boards had been established on a tripartite basis in 1964 
together with a levying system to improve - rather unsuccessfully - the skills base of the 
country's labour force.297 This attempt was followed by the establishment of the 
Manpower Services Commission that introduced a number of public training programmes
295 DGB Bundesvorstand (ed) - ‘Konzeption zur Mitbestimmung am Arbeitsplatz’, DGB Schriftenreihe Nr 7, 
Mitbestimmung, Deutscher Gerwerkschaftsbund, Diisseldorf, 1985
296 Streeck, Wolfgang - Industrial Relations in West Germany. 1974 - 85: An overview. Wissenschafts- 
zentrum Berlin, Berlin, IIM/LMP 85-19, December 1985, p 10-4
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aimed at the young unemployed. However, this body also failed to have a strong impact 
on the development of the UK labour market.
Here, a strong, but decentralised and divided trade union movement in addition to 
an indifferent employers association must be blamed for the subsequent failure of the 
establishment of a national incomes policy or minimum wage legislation as part of a more 
co-operative and consensual industrial relations system in the UK.298
5.1.3. Labour market policies under 'conservative' governments: The 1980s and 90s
In Britain and Germany, labour market policies eventually gained in importance 
during the 1970s as the level of unemployment began to rise and created a new set of 
policy challenges to policy makers. During the 1980s and 1990s, both countries began to 
experience not only a further dramatic increase in unemployment rates, but 
unemployment remained at persistently high levels as both economies experienced 
sluggish demand with persistent high levels of unemployment increasingly being the 
result of long-term structural and exogenous developments.
Furthermore, both economies witnessed a decrease in the level of demand for low- 
skilled employees due to the introduction of new production technologies as well as the 
growing competition from low cost manufacturing of Newly Industrialised Countries 
(NICs). In Germany, unemployment rates during much of the 1980s remained at levels of 
between 8-9%, while the UK witnessed an average of well over 11%. Only from the mid- 
1990s onwards did Britain experience a gradual decline in its rate of unemployment, while 
Germany's remained at an exceptionally high level inspite of the extensive use of early 
retirement schemes and active labour market policies since unification. (See: Table 5.2)
297 Lindley, Robert M. -  ‘Employment in transition’, in Lindley, R. M. (ed) -  Economic Change and 
Employment Policy. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1980, pp 359-66
298 Jacobs, E., S. Orwell, P. Paterson and F. Welts - The approach to industrial change in Britain and 
Germany. Anglo-German Foundation for the Study o f Industrial Society, London, 1978
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Table 5.2. (Source: Yearbooks of Labour statistics, International Labour Office Geneva)
In response, pressures on state budgets and changes in labour market policies 
increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s and led to attempts by both countries 
'conservative7 governments to subsequently change their countries labour market policy 
approaches.299 Here, an ideological shift could be observed among US American and 
various European centre-right governments as well as influential 'think tanks' - such as 
the OECD - which began to advocate increasingly measures of labour market deregulation 
and flexibilisation in order to counteract high unemployment levels.300
The additional 'voluntary' adoption of highly prescriptive convergence criteria for 
Economic and Monetary Union set out in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty by the EU member 
states in preparation for a single currency placed further pressures on the countries' 
budget discipline, that prohibited further (at least in the case of Germany) the use of 
domestic reflationary measures. In fact, it helped to publicly justify the reduction in 
expenditure on labour market programmes.301
299 Adnett, Nick - European Labour Markets, Longman, London, 1996, p 250
3°° OECD - Economic Outlook, Paris, 1994
301 Dohse, Dirk and Christiane Krieger-Boden - Wahrungsunion und Arbeitsmarkt - Auftakt zu 
unabdingbaren Reformen. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel, Kiel, 1998, p 123
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Finally, continuous high levels of unemployment and a substantial decline in 
membership had a negative effect on the strength of trade unions.302 Their waning 
influence on governments to maintain highly protective labour markets made it also 
easier for government actors to engage in the reform of traditional labour market policy 
approaches.
The two conservative governments that had won government office in Britain and 
Germany (by the late 1970s and early 80s) clearly conditioned and amended the direction 
of future domestic LMPs in their countries, and with it the eventual choices taken by their 
political 'social democratic' opponents.
In fact, both 'conservative' governments promised the renewal of their countries 
economic vitality. Although the degree differed, the Conservatives and CDU/CSU's 
economic programmes were increasingly based on assumptions of neo-classical 
economists who blamed welfare state excesses during the 1970s for the economic crises, 
and here in particular the imposition of 'excessive' taxation regimes, 'extravagant' social 
security provisions, as well as state 'restrictions' on working conditions and employers 
investment decisions.303 Hence, to re-gain economic growth, both 'conservative' 
governments envisaged that the factor of labour had to be made more flexible in order to 
allow the quicker adaptability of new technologies and production methods; to reduce 
trade union power; and curb the overall level of state interventionism in the economy.
At no time, however, did the German Christian Democratic/Liberal coalition 
government - in contrast to the British Conservatives - choose the trade union movement 
as a 'whipping boy' by declaring and punishing the unions as the main factor responsible 
for the economic crises that had beset the country during the 1980s.304
302 Brown, Alice and Desmond S. King - ‘Economic change and labour market policy: Corporatist and dualist 
tendencies in Britain and Sweden’, West European Politics. July 1988, Vol. 11, No. 3, p 84-5; Visser, Jelle - 
‘The strength o f union movements in advanced capitalist democracies: Social and organisational variations’; 
in Regini, Mario (ed) - The future of Labour Movements. Sage Publications, London, 1992, pp 17-52
303 Offe, Claus - ‘Unregierbarkeit. Zur Renaissance konservativer Krisentheorien’, in Habermas, Jurgen (ed) - 
Stichworte zu ‘Geistigen Situation der Zeit’, (1. Band: Nation und Republik), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a. 
M„ 1979, p 294-97
304 Koelble, Thomas A. - ‘Challenges to the Trade Unions: The British and West German Cases’, West 
European Politics, July 1988, Vol. 11, No 3, p 97
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Germany
After the SPD's loss of government office in 1982, the new CDU/FDP government 
coalition developed a labour market policy strategy that had at its heart the aim to reduce 
the degree of regulatory labour market hurdles faced by employers.305
The most significant part of this plan was the amendment of the Employment 
Promotion Act (Arbeitsforderungsgesetz-AFG) in 1985 which allowed fixed term work 
contracts for between 12 and 18 months to enable employers to test employees and 
terminate their employment more easily, while increased labour flexibility was to be 
achieved with the adoption of further regulation to promote part-time employment. Even 
though the effects of these measures were later judged negligible - their introduction was 
controversially discussed between the government, SPD and trade unions and their 
adoption carried significant symbolic importance.306 In fact, in December 1988, the CDU- 
led government introduced further amendments to the AFG (9. Novelle) that included 
cuts in state expenditure (DM 1.8 billion) on employment creation schemes 
(Arbeitsbeschaffungsmafinahmen-ABMs). Here, the SPD criticised the CDU-government 
for not prioritising to tackle unemployment and to adopt policies that paid for the high 
number of people out of work rather than using the same money to state create and 
expand employment opportunities.307
The CDU/FDP government also adopted legislation that was aimed at weakening 
the trade unions ability to engage in "political strikes" by stopping the ability of "indirectly 
affected workers" to claim unemployment benefits during temporary lay-off's caused by 
putative strike action. Here, the government aimed at undermining the DGB's ability to 
target strikes and protect its funds by having state benefits supporting those union 
members that were "indirectly" not able to work due to the strike action.308 This initiative, 
however, remained the only major blow against the German trade union movement.
305 Zohlnhoffer, Reimat - ‘Institutions, the CDU and Policy Change: Explaining German Economic Policy in 
the 1980s’, German Politics. Vol 8, No 3 (December 1999), p 145
306 ‘Zeitgesprach - Das Beschaftigungsforderungsgesetz 1985’, Wirtschaftsdienst. 1984/IX; Michaels, Heinz - 
‘Briicke ins Ungewisse’, Die Zeit, 23 January 1987
307 Member o f the SPD’s-executive committee and vice-president of the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit. (Engelen- 
Kefer, Ursula - ‘Mehr offentliche Investitonen’, Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst Wirtschaft, 44. Jahrgang, 
4, 12 January, 1989, p i )
308 Koelble, Thomas A. - ‘Challenges to the Trade Unions: The British and West German Cases’, West 
European Politics, July 1988, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp 99-101
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In the end, it was the exceptional challenge caused by German unification that led 
the CDU-led government to substantially transform its labour market policy approach. 
The old German contribution based unemployment benefit system began increasingly to 
crack under the weight of the high employment rates experienced in Eastern Germany, 
which of course were a direct result of the industrial restructuring process that took place 
on the territory of the former GDR. In fact, previously applied labour market policies were 
fast proving to be financially unsustainable by the challenges of the new economic 
conditions, as the FRG had inherited a labour market that was structurally very different 
from the Western Lander.309 The exceptional circumstances of unification did not only 
increase dramatically the costs of traditional labour market policies, but they also pushed 
up the tax burden for employees (in form of a 7.5% Solidarity' income tax surcharge as 
well as through non-wage costs as contributions were raised) to cope with the extra 
demand on the public welfare and benefit systems.310
As the labour market policies developed for the West appeared inappropriate for 
the East, the new Lander were provided with extensive 'counter-cyclical programmes' in 
the form of employment subsidies, public infrastructure employment, public re-skilling 
and training programmes - to cope with the collapsing labour market. In fact, unification 
had forced the German state to play an interventionist role to a degree that had previously 
been unknown.
At the same time, early retirement schemes successfully applied throughout the 
1980s in the pre-unification West were reduced and eventually turned around. 
Furthermore, employment protection legislation and the amount of employment benefits 
available were reduced in 1996, while conditions for claimants to receive state benefits 
were tightened by 1997.
However, much of the labour market reforms intended and passed by the 
CDU/FDP government during the 1990s to improve flexibility and to deregulate the
309 This included, for instance, policies that had been implemented successfully in the old FRG, such as early 
retirement schemes or short-time work benefits (Kurzarbeitergeld) - originally introduced to bridge 
temporarily companies short-term lack o f employment (by paying part o f short-term employees incomes) in 
order to sustain employment until the slack period had passed.
310 In order to grasp the severity o f the employment crises, let us remind ourselves that at by the end o f 1989, 
the number o f people engaged in full time work in the GDR economy consisted of 9.6 million people, while 
by the summer o f 1992 this number had dramatically fallen to 6.3 million jobs (of whom many were even 
state funded job creation schemes). See: Griinert, Holle und Burkart Lutz - ‘Quantitative und qualitative
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German labour market failed to impact as most of the time employers and trade unions 
did not embrace the legislation as intended by the government.311 Both sides often defused 
newly introduced legislative rules within their collective bargaining negotiations. For 
instance, when the government changed sickness payment levels and retirement 
arrangements, unions and employers re-established or confirmed the old levels as part of 
their general collective agreement. Similarly, many of the governments new labour market 
legislation initiatives, such as the 'partial retirement law' (Altersteilzeitgesetz) or the 
reduction of sickness payments (to 80% of the previous average income) - passed in 1996 - 
usually triggered sectoral, collective or company-level agreements between employers 
and employees that concluded arrangements which often re-confirmed the status quo of 
previous arrangements.312
Finally, even the widely hailed tripartite negotiations between employers 
confederations, trade unions and the state for a so-called 'Biindnis fur Arbeit' (Alliance for 
Employment) failed miserably in 1996 and 1997 and clearly indicated the difficulties and 
substantial veto points the CDU-led government was faced with when attempting to 
reform the functioning of the German labour market.
United Kingdom
There could not have been a bigger contrast between the ability and determination 
with which the Conservative Party government in the UK engaged in the deregulative 
reform of the labour market in comparison to the restrained initiatives of the German 
CDU/FDP government. In fact, one of the major ambitions of the Conservative's under 
Margaret Thatcher had been the reform of the labour market.313 Here, the Conservative 
government had been particularly successful - due to the negative feedback and 
unpopularity of the unions as well as its absolute majority in the House of Commons - in
Arbeitsmarktfolgen der deutschen Einheit’, in Nickel et al - Erwerbsarbeit und Beschaftigung im Umbruch, 
Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1994, p 3-5
311 For example, one legislative initiative of the CDU/FDP coalition government aimed at greater labour 
market deregulation was the introduction of a new highly flexible working contract (Eingliederungsvertrag). 
The idea was to enable employers to make it easier to employ the long-term unemployed. However, 
employers have used this flexibility-creating contract only rarely, so far.
312 Wood, Stewart - Labour Market Policy and Path-Denendencv. “New Politics o f the Welfare State” 
Conference, 30 Oct. - 1 Nov. 1998, Harvard University
313 In other policy areas such as the NHS, the Conservatives faced more resistance from interests groups, the 
electorate, and within the NHS system when attempting to introduce market reforms. This partly explains, 
why the party was much more successful in its attempt to deregulate the labour market.
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its conscious and popular effort to weaken the power and influence of the trade union 
movement.314 In fact, three industrial acts were passed in rapid succession during the early 
1980s that reduced trade union power by forcing liabilities upon them in the case of union 
initiated industrial action that was not authorised by newly prescribed procedures. In fact, 
the degree of liabilities was envisaged to be as high as possible, even able to threaten the 
financial survival of non-complying individual unions.
As intended, employers' power in the workplace was strengthened by this kind of 
legislation. In addition, the Conservatives engaged in further labour market deregulation 
exercises with initiatives that saw the abolition of 'Wage Councils'; the relaxation of 
regulation to protect employees from unfair dismissal; the weakening of public 
employees; and finally the determined privatisation of public utilities and state owned 
companies.315
The Conservative government also eroded progressively during the 1980s and 90s 
the levels of unemployment benefits while introducing increasingly 'means testing' for 
claimants benefit entitlements. Furthermore, the right to benefit payments began to 
depend on the ability of claimants to successfully prove that they had been 'available for 
work' -  and from 1996 with the introduction of the 'Jobseekers Allowance' onwards - that 
they would and had been 'actively seeking employment'.316 Here, 'job centres' had been 
made increasingly responsible for checking on claimants' entitlements for income support, 
while claimant advisers would re-assess the cases of claimants more often and offer more 
extensive advice on 'back to work' strategies.
Various 'youth training' schemes had been revised and adopted by the 
Conservatives throughout the 1980s and 90s. It is, however, fair to say that they succeeded 
rather in reducing youth unemployment statistically and providing companies with low-
314 Dingeldey, Irene - Britische Arbeitsbeziehungen: Gewerkschaften zwischen Konflikt, Kooperation und 
Marginalisierung, Deutscher Universitats-Verlag DUV, Wiesbaden, 1997
315 Caley, Mark and Oliver Sun - ‘Atypische Beschaftigung in GroBbritannien’, WSI-Mitteilungen. 9/1993, p 
609; Machin, Stephen and Alan Manning - ‘The effects of minimum wages on wage dispersion and 
employment: Evidence from United Kingdom wage councils’, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, No 
47, 1994, pp 319-29
316 Taylor, Robert -  ‘Official jobless figure create credibility gap’, Financial Times. 17/04/1999
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skill, low-cost employees rather than in offering genuine training places.317 Here, Labour's 
'new deal' must certainly be seen as a continuation - even if better in quality, resource 
provision and success rate - of the Conservatives' training and benefit conditioning 
policies as the direction of both parties approaches has been growing substantially similar. 
In fact, the Labour Party eventually accepted that the lack of quality and amounts of 
training and skill provided were inhibiting Britain's economic competitiveness and 
should be rectified by a more active labour market policy.318
With regard to the issues of skills training and labour market policies, the 
Conservative government decided in 1987 to abandon the 'tripartite' Manpower Services 
Commission and replaced it with exclusively employer-run Training and Enterprise 
Councils (TECs) - a change that was symbolic rather than effective in changing much of 
the training situation for youngsters on the labour market.319
Overall, the Conservatives clearly engaged in a labour market policy strategy that 
re-balanced the distribution of power in favour of employers and that was far more 
radical than what the CDU/FDP coalition government proposed during the same time in 
Germany. Here, not only constitutional arrangements and the more consensual and 
moderate German policy model, but also the more moderate, consensually accepted role 
of the trade union movement determined the substantial differences in labour market 
policy reform outcomes between both countries.
5.1.4. Some conclusions on the development of labour market policies under 
'conservative' governments
The German CDU/FDP's government coalition substantially changed its labour 
market policy tools during its time in government. Policies contained rather moderate 
efforts to introduce greater labour market reform, which was partly due to the 
requirements of unification, but also due to the more co-operative, consensual and 
corporate character of German politics. However, the government increasingly applied
317 Finegold, David and David Soskice - ‘The failure o f training in Britain: Analysis and Perception’, Oxford 
Review o f Economic Policy, 4/1997, p 20; Bolger, A. - ‘Still high on the national agenda’, Financial Times. 
20/11/1997
318 Metclaf, Hilary - Future skill demand and supply. Policy Studies Institute, London, 1995, p 110
319 Disney, Richard and Alan Carruth -  Helping the unemployed -  Active labour market policies in Britain 
and Germany, Anglo-German Foundation, London, 1992, p 7
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public policies and direct job creation programmes, while reducing the use of early 
retirement schemes to improve the situation on the labour market.
In contrast, policies under the Conservatives took a very clear deregulatory 
direction. In fact, many of the policies - strongly resisted at the time - often enjoy by now  
the broad support of the Labour Party. As explained by Thomas Meyer, the radicalisation 
with which Tony Blair was later prepared to renew the traditional social democratic 
project was of course directiy linked to the high level of deregulation in the economy and 
the labour market that had already become a reality under the Thatcher governments of 
the 1980s.320
Differences in the Labour Party's and the SPD's development of labour market 
policies and choices of programme reform must be understood within the context of the 
policy changes implemented by their political opponents in government; the political 
systems that conditioned the policy choices (i.e. the Conservatives were able due to the 
winner-takes-all political system to push through much more radical labour market 
reforms in the UK than could have ever been imagined in Germany); as well as the 
generally differing domestic labour market policy traditions, conditions and varying 
electoral incentives for policy change. In addition, however, it is fair to say that domestic 
conditions and the actions of their political opponents (in government) during the time 
under investigation have been highly influential on the outcomes of Labour's and the 
SPD's LMP choices, as both parties agendas were ultimately set by differing 'conservative' 
labour market policy approaches which they had to act and re-act to.
Finally, the paradigmatic ideas of flexibilisation and neo-liberal economic policies 
gained in popularity, not only among politicians, but also in the media, among 
economists, think-tanks and among the electorate. This has been an important component 
that eventually forced all major parties - Conservative, Christian Democrat as well as 
Social Democratic - to consider the reform of increasingly obsolete labour market policy 
approaches, even if the utility of the new policy approaches could not be necessarily 
empirically backed up. Here, Nick Adnett has been arguing in his study of European 
labour markets, that the philosophical shift away from interventionism and regulatory
320 Meyer, Thomas - ‘The Third Way - some crossroads’, Working Papers I. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Forum 
Scholars for European Social Democracy, Bonn, May 1999, p 2-6
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policies and the present "fashionable" popularity of flexible labour market policies lacks 
substantial empirical justification and often reflects rather the public's concerns over the 
state of public finances, rather than a common trust in neo-liberal policy prescription to 
cure labour market problems.321
5.1.5. The search for policy modernisation: Labour's 'Policy Review Process' and the 
SPD's new 'Basic Programme'
When Gerald Holtham - former director of the British Labour Party friendly think 
tank the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) - posed the question of where policy 
ideas were developed and originated from, he rightly pointed at political parties; the civil 
service; universities and the input from interest or professional groups. Holtham also 
argued that politicians and political parties have encountered the biggest changes in this 
constellation as "the business of politics" has - in recent years - become increasingly 
professionalised. In fact, as - according to Holtham - the majority of the electorate is rather 
badly informed about politics, politicians who want to win elections would have to 
increasingly realise that the importance of their party's image should not be 
underestimated for the electoral success, as this is often of far greater importance than the 
development of improved party programmes. This is, why Holtham has been arguing that 
"no opposition party will spend much time in future developing policies as the route back 
to power. The haziest sketches will suffice; politicians will concentrate on finding a 
message, developing the slogans that fix a winning image in the public mind."322
Although these observations of a 'think-tanker' who has a legitimate interest in 
believing in the importance of his own profession may reflect the realities of party policy 
development in the second half of the 1990s, these beliefs were certainly not shared by the 
Labour Party and the SPD during the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this period, both 
parties felt the need to engage in extensive policy reform and development exercises as 
well as trying out new policy making procedures to deal with their problems of 
"intellectual incoherence",323 continuous electoral failure and to re-establish what 
precisely a social democratic policy approach would mean under the fast changing overall 
environmental conditions.
321 Adnett, Nick - European Labour Markets. Longman, London, 1996, p 250
322 Holtham, Gerald - ‘Confessions o f a clocking-off think-tanker’, in progress, IPPR, Autumn 1998
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In the case of the SPD, a policy review was approached by developing a new basic 
programme that was envisaged to integrate new policy concerns such as the environment 
and equal rights into the party's policy make up. Stephen Padgett noted rightly that "the 
[SPD's] lack of direction and purpose...characterised the 1980s programme review [and] 
underlined the absence of any sense of strategic orientation. Indeed the party's posture 
was one of profound disorientation."324 This view could easily have been extended to the 
Labour Party as well as Swedish and Italian social democrats which all chose at a similar 
time to engage in attempts to substantially overhaul their parties' programmes as they 
increasingly failed to deliver publicly popular and credible policy solutions. Hence, the 
Labour Party's attempt to review policies was envisaged to lead the party to embrace 
more moderate policies that would be more in tune with public opinion as well as the 
wishes of the electorate and relief the party of some of its previous orthodox policy 
rhetoric and 'baggage'.
In order to understand the significance of the role of Labour's and the SPD's policy 
review processes, their outcomes, impacts and failures, we have to assess their most 
important LMP and party institutional features.
5.2. The Labour Party and the 'Policy Review Process'
The Labour Party leadership decided in 1985 to develop a new statement of the 
party's definition of contemporary aims and values of socialism. After various attempts by 
politicians and sympathetic academics, Labour's deputy leader Roy Hattersley wrote a 
statement on 'Aims and Values' in which he borrowed heavily from his book 'Choose 
Freedom' which had just been published.325 The 'Aims and Value' statement was 
eventually adopted by the party, however not without being strongly criticised by the left 
for being too pro-market. The adoption of the statement clearly indicated that the party 
leadership was increasingly aiming at more moderate and pragmatic policy positions and 
that they saw the party's future in turning itself into a continental style social democratic 
party. In fact, Labour's policy review process was viewed by many observers as being 
equivalent to the policy moderating Bad Godesberg programme review of the German
323 Interview with Tony Wright, London, 01/02/2000
324 Padgett, Stephen - ‘The German Social Democrats: A re-definition of Social Democracy or Bad Godesberg 
Mark II’, in Special Issue o f West European Politics. No 16, 1993, p 34
325 Hattersley, Roy - Choose Freedom - The future for democratic socialism, Joseph, London, 1987
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Social Democratic Party in 1959.326 In fact, continental Social Democrats observing 
Labour's programme review process, such as Bodo Hombach (then Landesgeschaftsfuhrer 
of the SPD Nordrhein-Westfahlen) described the review condescendingly as a sign that 
Labour's principle based but publicly widely unpopular rejection of capitalism was about 
to be overcome and that the party seemed to have finally chosen a programmatic 
development path that would transform it by the early 1990s into a mainstream 
continental style peoples' party.327 If not quite aiming at a mainstream continental policy 
style, Gerald Taylor described the review process rightly as an exercise in populism as 
much as an attempt to create a lasting democratic socialist policy strategy for the Labour 
Party.328 This view has been confirmed by Neil Kinnock, who described the review as 
"very leadership driven" and its aims at the time as "to re-attach the party to general 
popular sentiment, to demonstrate that we were normal, that we were not pre-occupied 
by small minority issues.. .".329
5.2.1. The 'Policy Review Process': Structure and policy m aking
The policy review took place between 1987 and 1991 and served clearly different 
purposes to different party members. Apart from becoming a way for the party to prepare 
a programme for the next general election and a possible future Labour government, it 
was also a means of clarifying and thus resolving many of the previous left/right 
disagreements by setting in concrete terms which policies would be advocated by the 
party in the future.
The review process required the setting up of a new policy-making system within 
the party as existing structures were not designed to cope with the sheer scale and pace 
the review process was envisaged to take.330 Seven working groups were set up along the
326 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh - The British General Election of 1992. St. Martin’s Press, 
Basingstoke, 1992, p 61
327 Hombach, Bodo - ‘Labour Party auf dem Weg nach Godesberg’, Neue Gesellschaft / Frankfurter Hefte, Jg. 
36, 08/89, p 699
328 Taylor, Gerald. R. - Labour’s Renewal? The Policy Review and Beyond. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 
46
329 Interview with Neil Kinnock, Brussels, 24/07/2000
330 The policy review consisted of three phases of policy development. (1) Phase one led to the writing and 
publication o f two documents - ‘Democratic Socialist Values and Aims’ and ‘Social Justice and Economic 
Efficiency’ - that were primarily laying out the ideological groundwork as well as setting out the economic, 
social and political landscapes under which a future Labour government would be envisaged to operate in the 
early nineties. (2) The second phase consisted of most review groups submitting a preliminary report to the
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thematic policy lines of "People at Work"; "a Productive and Competitive Economy"; 
"Consumers and the Community"; "Democracy and the Individual"; "Physical and Social 
Environment"; "Economic Equality"; and "Britain in the World" for the process. Three of the 
seven review groups dealt to some extent with LMP issues, namely the 'Productive 
Economy" (chaired by Labour's shadow spokesman on Trade and Industry Bryan Gould); 
the "Economic Equality' group (shadow chancellor John Smith); and "People at Work' 
(conducted under the chairmanship of shadow employment secretary Michael Meacher).
The chair and most members of the review groups came either from the party's 
Shadow Cabinet or the National Executive Committee (NEC), hence a domination of the 
groups decision-making by Labour members of parliament (MPs) and therefore ultimately 
by the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) was virtually guaranteed. This meant, that the 
review groups policy recommendations and outcomes were bound to be moderate as MPs 
could be expected to be far more willing to accept the electoral aspirations of the review 
process than being prone to show particular concern for the ideological aspirations of rank 
and file party members.331
Apart from the MPs domination of the review groups, another interesting 
development in the party's decision-making process involved the role of the trade unions. 
A number of trade union general secretaries gained - for the first time - direct access to the 
party's policy-making structure as they gained seats in the review committees to make the 
unions voice heard.332 This development carried significant repercussions, as the direct 
access of trade union general secretaries to the party's policy-making committees was a 
persuasive argument for the eventual reduction of the role of trade union delegations at
1988 annual Labour Party conference, which contained policy recommendations for a new programme. This 
was followed by the publication o f the ‘Meet the Challenge, Make the Change’ document in May 1989 that 
consisted o f a collection o f substantive policy output proposed by the seven review groups. In fact, ‘Meet the 
Challenge’ was already very close to the review’s final outcome as it was a comprehensive policy statement 
by itself. While the document was approved by the annual party conference in October 1989, it was 
acknowledged that further changes in style and presentation were necessary as the document had become far 
too long for an electioneering instrument that could sell policy contents beyond the party’s membership. (3) 
The final review phase took place in the early 1990s and consisted of deciding upon the details o f particularly 
controversial policy issues, such as defence and economic policy. The final version o f Labour’s policy review 
exercise was published on the 24 May 1990 under the title ‘Looking to the future’ and followed by the 
publication o f ‘Opportunity Britain’ in 1991. Both documents were based on ‘Meet the Challenge’, but far 
shorter, precise and accessible to the wider public. (Taylor, Gerald. R. - Labour’s Renewal ?, MacMillan, 
Basingstoke, 1997, p 42+69)
331 Taylor, Gerald. R. - Labour’s Renewal?, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 47-8
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the annual Labour Party conference. In fact, the idea of trading in one way of trade union 
access to Labour's policy making (the conference dominating block vote) with a 'new' 
more 'direct' ability to influence the party's policy choices ultimately encouraged the trade 
union leadership to consider giving up their block vote and accepting party institutional 
reforms along the line of the 'one member, one vote' (OMOV) system as favoured by the 
Labour Party leadership.
The role of the party leadership during the review process was quite ambiguous. 
In cases where review groups dealt with particularly difficult and controversial issues - 
such as defence, social ownership or the economy - Neil Kinnock made sure that he was 
not seen as being personally involved with the groups work on policy recommendations. 
However, the party leaders secretariat worked closely together with the secretariats of the 
NEC and shadow cabinet, and was therefore not only able to monitor policy 
developments in the various groups, but also to deliver the leaderships suggestions and 
requests on policy matters directly to the groups.333
Furthermore, during the review process, the individual groups were formally co­
ordinated by the Campaign Management Team (CMT), which was chaired by Tom 
Sawyer and included senior figures from Labour's headquarters at Walworth Road and 
Neil Kinnock's office (such as Charles Clarke, Peter Mandelson and Patricia Hewitt) who 
had the administrative task of co-ordinating the work of the various policy groups and to 
deal with any disputes of overlapping responsibilities. In fact, the role of the CMT 
provided the leadership with a further path of access and influence over the groups work 
and inevitably the content of their policy recommendations.
Additionally, certain actors outside the party machinery were also given access to 
the review groups policy-making process, such as outside advisers as well as the general 
'public' in the 'Labour Listens' exercise which was an attempt to give a voice to party 
members, supporters and the electorate by providing them with a forum for input. 
However, during the later stages of the review process the party preferred to turn to
332 Taylor, Gerald. R. - Labour’s Renewal?, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 48-9
333 Taylor, Gerald. R. - Labour’s Renewal?. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 49
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private polling instead of consulting public opinion directly in order to gain the ability to 
test the popularity of the reviews policy outcomes on the general public.334
Most of the policies recommended by the review groups and later adopted by the 
Labour Party clearly reflected the party leadership's intention to aim for a change of 
policy approach towards more moderate policy aims. Here the groups clearly accepted the 
given conditions of the economic and political environment; recognised the need to work 
together with the market and to aim at a reduction of state interventionist policies within 
their policy proposals. Furthermore, it was felt by the party leadership that if a "critical 
mass could be reached...on particular policies" with changes on positions been agreed 
upon, then this "would be a general mandate" to push for further change.335
The report of the 'Productive and Competitive Economy' (PACE) review group 
underlined the need for the state to provide predominantly supply side policies. Hence, 
the review's outcome confirmed a change in Labour's policy emphasis as policies 
proposed did no longer include the avocation of nationalisation or even the re­
nationalisation of recently privatised utilities. Instead, policies focused on the envisaged 
need for the state to play an active role in regulating those industries and promote 
competition.
The review group on 'Economic Equality' covered the policy area of distribution of 
income and wealth, taxation and social security. Its policy recommendations clearly 
reflected change as the party's previously common setting of targets for the reduction of 
unemployment (1983 and 1987 manifestos) had been abandoned. In addition, levels of 
envisaged state spending had been reduced and made way for a new emphasis on fiscal 
prudence. Furthermore, pro-market policies and the tackling of inflation had clearly been 
given priority status in this groups policy recommendations.
The 'People at Work' review group had been concerned with employment issues 
and in particular the collective role and rights of trade unions. The final report of this 
group under the title 'a talent based economy' dealt in great detail with the state provision
334 Taylor, Gerald. R. - Labour’s Renewal?, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 56
335 Interview with Neil Kinnock, Brussels, 24/07/2000
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of training. Interestingly, this group's report contained - in comparison to the other policy 
review groups - exceptionally strong references in favour of the extensive use of state 
labour market interventionism. In fact, this group had envisaged various institutional 
responses and schemes to improve training provisions; reform the present Youth Training 
Scheme (YTS); and extend provisions for employment training by setting up a new  
training agency called Skills UK (financed by a National Training Fund) that would 
administer a new 16-plus Traineeship Scheme and an Opportunity Training Programme 
aimed at adults.336 Both trainee schemes envisaged a high degree of state set labour market 
legislation to safeguard an increase in the flexibility and productivity when allowing 
easier labour market entry and exit for employees. For this, the group proposed the 
implementation of legislation that would provide greater opportunity to employees to 
take 'career breaks'; an extension to employment rights for part-time workers as well as 
the improved provision of child-care facilities (to improve catering for the requirements of 
individual circumstances). Here, the report advocated furthermore legislation that would 
enable employees to retire earlier in order to "make the period from sixty to seventy a 
decade of flexibility."337
This groups report defined the notion of training as something that had to be led 
by the state rather than be driven by the individual, with the state as a responsible player 
providing training 'opportunities' with the government envisaged to decide which skills 
would be required in its nation-wide industrial policy strategy to "assist the smooth 
running of the economy" at any one time.
Furthermore, various traditional Labour Party LMP schemes included in the 
groups report included the pledge for the provision of more rights for the individual 
employee by proposing a 'Charter for Employees' that was envisaged to contain 
regulation on matters of health and safety; welfare; unfair dismissal; the right to trade 
union representation; discrimination; leave due to 'family responsibilities' as well as 
provision of a national minimum wage.338
Finally, in regards to employment legislation, the 'People at Work' group's report 
emphasised the need to create a 'partnership at work' between trade unions and
336 See: Labour Party - ‘Meet the Challenge’ (1988); Looking to the Future (1991) and ‘Opportunity Britain’ 
(1991)
337 Labour Party - Meet the Challenge. London, 1988, p 22
338 Labour Party - Meet the Challenge. London, 1988, p 22
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employers. This was the first step towards a general overhaul of the parties relationship to 
business, and from the review process onwards it has been possible to witness the 
increasing degree of attention being given to the needs of business and its interests.
5.2.2. The report of the 'Commission on Social Justice'
A continuation of the Labour Party's 'policy review process' and a further 
important attempt to reform the party's policy making procedures was the increasing use 
of semi-independent policy commissions. Here, the most important and influential 
became the Commission on Social Justice (CSJ), a committee that had been set up at the 
end of 1992 by party leader John Smith to develop new tax and benefits policies.339 As the 
Labour leadership expected a substantial amount of publicity to surround the work of the 
CSJ with its consultation exercises and possible policy recommendations, it was decided 
to distance the party further from the commissions work by placing it under the 
independent auspices of the IPPR, an arrangement that was to grow into an important 
new strain of the party's future policy making machinery.340
The commission identified seven conditions in the CSJ's report to achieve "full 
employment" (defined as creating a "number of vacancies...at least equal to the number of 
unemployed") envisaged predominantly on labour supply-side policies which were 
envisaged to be supplemented by the provision of a stable macro-economic environment 
and rather orthodox market-led state policies.341 Although the report was critical about 
"common" neo-liberal policy prescriptions that focused predominantly on increasing 
market efficiency, it concluded that for labour market inefficiencies, deregulation was "no 
magic cure" while one would also have to be aware of the "damaging over-regulation of 
labour markets."342
339 McSmith, Andy - John Smith - A Life. Verso, London, 1994, p 330-31
340 The IPPR has remained an independent - although Labour friendly - think tank in its own right. The CSJ 
chairmanship was held by Sir Gordon Borrie and Neil Kinnock’s former press and broadcasting secretary 
Particia Hewitt who had been appointed secretary and chief administrator. Including the chair, sixteen 
members were chosen for the CSJ which included six academics, four representatives from research 
institutes, two from charities, and one representative each from the business community, trade unions, church, 
and former government official. (Report of the CSJ -  Social Justice -  Strategies for National Renewal. 
Vintage, London, 1994, x-xi)
341 Report o f the CSJ -  Social Justice, Vintage, London, 1994, p 155
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The outcome and nature of the Commission's policy recommendations on labour 
market policies was more basic and less groundbreaking than Labour's earlier Policy 
Review Process. In contrast, the policy review process had contained proposals for the 
setting up of various new organisations (e.g. British Investment Bank, Skills UK, British 
Technology Enterprise etc....) to enable the functioning of 'newly' envisaged labour 
market policies. The CSJ's recommendations clearly displayed further policy moderation 
as the commission widely accepted the existing state frameworks for economic and 
political intervention, followed increasingly a liberal democratic policy approach and did 
not propose any major institutional changes.
Labour's increasing reliance on policy commissions could be criticised as an 
attempt to consciously deprive certain party actors and activists on the 'left' from the 
party's policy formation process. In fact, a commission based policy development 
approach inevitably favoured the contributions of various outside 'specialists' to 
formulate policies and strengthened the hand of the party leadership to make the final 
policy choices, even if 'new' Labour thinkers such as Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle 
have rightfully claimed "that policies that emerge are better thought through and more 
relevant to the real needs of society and industry, as well as commanding substantial 
consensus in their support."343
Finally, while it is difficult to judge the overall impact of the CSJ on Labour's 
policy choices, it is clear that the party's new leadership under Tony Blair (from 1994 
onwards) was far more interested in re-examining the party's overall basic ideological 
positioning than to give extensive public attention to the outcomes of the commissions 
recommendations.344
5.2.3. An evaluation of Labour's 'Policy Review Process'
The 'Policy Review Process' as well as work of the 'Commission for Social Justice' 
were successful in as far as they provided the party with a set of concrete policy proposals 
that could then be used by the leadership for the formulation and legitimisation of party 
programmatic ideas. The use of these new forms of policy development provided the
342 Report of the CSJ -  Social Justice. Vintage, London, 1994, p 158
343 Mandelson, Peter and Roger Liddle - The Blair Revolution - Can New Labour Deliver. Faber and Faber, 
London, 1996, p 221-22
344 Taylor, Gerald. R. -  Labour’s Renewal?, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 164
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party with the chance to re-examine its policy principles in the least controversial way; to 
gain experience with other policy-making procedures; to develop new or refine policies; 
increase leadership control over policy choices; and to experiment with an approach to 
change party policy that was expected to be popular with the electorate.
Still, was it the overall aim of the review process and the CSJ to drag along the 
party's rank and file in a leadership instigated process of policy change? As Tony Wright 
has been pointing out, the 'majority' of the party's rank and file members did not take part 
in the review process and had probably no idea that the CSJ existed. Instead, Wright 
argued, "it was very much a high level leadership related activity and ...not designed to 
impact directly [on the party members]...unlike in Germany where there is a much more 
organic relationship between the thinking bits and the rest of the party."345 In fact, this 
evaluation was confirmed by various Labour's policy actors during the interviews 
conducted for this study. Most agreed, however, that Labour's 'Policy Review Process' of 
the late 1980s was a tool of the leadership to shift party' policies.
Hence, the review and the increased use of commissions were tools to question 
Labour's old policy making structure such as the trade union's voting power (at annual 
party conferences) that had made previous attempts to change the party's policy direction 
very difficult. In fact, as argued by John Braggins, the review was the "way which we 
went around a very condescending and conservative structure to try to bring new ideas 
and modernisation into our policies" and "initially a tool to try to get rid of the more 
arcane and unpopular aspects of our policy" and "move away from the national and 
public control agenda into a more modem approach."346
Although the 'Policy Review Process' had been initiated by the party leadership, it 
is not clear how far the outcomes had already been precluded by it. Colin Hughes and 
Patrick Wintour have argued that Neil Kinnock had designed the review process in a way 
that gave "fair" access to all groups within the party, even those which held dissident 
political views from his own.347 Gerald Taylor took the even more positive view that the
345 In fact, Tony Wright argued, that only in the case of Clause IV did the party engage as a whole in a 
process o f “actually discussing some basic reformulation o f purpose.”(Interview with Tony Wright, London, 
01/02/2000)
346 Interview with John Braggins, London 08/02/2000
347 Hughes, Colin and Patrick Wintour -  Labour Rebuilt: The New Model Party. Fourth Estate, London, 1990,
p 102
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policy review process, rather than arriving at pre-imposed conclusions planted by the 
leadership, was an exercise in which the numerous individuals involved reached "the 
same conclusions and opinions about the direction which Labour should take" leading to 
a wider realignment within the party around the Kinnock leadership.348 Gerald Taylor's 
conclusion, however, must be taken with a pinch of salt as the case of the party's shadow 
spokesman on employment and chair of the 'People at Work' working group - Michael 
Meacher - clearly shows. His 'group's' final report was condemned among the members 
of the CMT loyal to Kinnock, such as Peter Mandelson, Geoff Bish and Charles Clarke as 
being unacceptable. This dispute led to the group's chair Michael Meacher being bypassed 
when the review group's outcome was finalised, something that indeed points rather 
towards the enforcement of a distinctive degree of influence exercised by the leadership 
over policy outcomes.349 Furthermore, by the end of the second phase of the policy review, 
Tony Blair replaced Michael Meacher as Labour's employment spokesman, a move that 
indicated that Michael Meacher's more traditional Keynesian-state interventionist policy 
beliefs were no longer tenable in a party that was planning to substantially shift its policy 
approach towards an increasingly neo-liberally influenced Zeitgeist. In his defence, Neil 
Kinnock argued later that he had to replace Michael Meacher as he could not ask him 
anymore - after his groups initial 'final report' -  to go back once more to the trade union 
leaderships and tell them "convincingly" of what the Labour Party leadership felt by now  
were no longer policy "options" as previously, but had become "requirements of policy" 
positions since.350
Overall, the Policy Review had sought to affect four elements of the party. Firstly, 
to help to advance and promote changes in the party's institutional policy making 
procedures and a useful tool to set into motion the party's reform of its policy making 
system.351 Secondly, to tone down the party's ideology, re-define and moderately de- 
radicalise it. Here, the party policies adopted moved the party undeniably towards the
348 Taylor, Gerald. R. -  Labour’s Renewal?, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 50+193
349 Hughes, Colin and Patrick Wintour -  Labour Rebuilt, Fourth Estate, London, 1990, p 147
350 Interview with Neil Kinnock, Brussels, 24/07/2000
351 The ‘Policy Review’ also succeeded in instigating the foundation o f the Labour Party friendly centre-left 
think tank ‘Institute for Public Policy Research’ (IPPR) in 1989. Ever since, studies of the institute have 
explored a wide variety o f policy issues such as market mechanisms and green taxes, constitutional issues, 
ERM, flexible working arrangements and social justice; and found their way not only into policy review 
documents, but also played an increasingly instrumental role in the party’s policy development process.
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centre of the political spectrum,352 and the review process had been part of a strategy to 
improve the party's electoral appeal in time for the next general election.353 Even though 
the 'review process' failed to develop a so-called big idea -  something comparable to 
Thatcherism or neo-liberalism -  it led to major policy amendments, with many of the 
policies developed and agreed upon by the review groups being later used as the basis for 
Labour's 1992 election manifesto.
Finally, the 'Policy Review' did not receive a particularly positive echo in the 
media and the policies developed did not receive the public exposure the party had hoped 
for. For this, part of the blame falls on Labour itself as many of the party's policy changes - 
to avoid controversy - had been buried in the small print of the party's manifesto.354 
However, Labour's ability to avoid any major publicised inner-party conflicts concerning 
the review process and the portrayal of a strengthened degree of party unity certainly 
improved the party's public's perception.355 Even though the policy review process was 
only little noticed by the electorate, it improved and moderated Labour's party image, 
which although not winning Labour the next general election, certainly helped the party 
to regain policy credibility and extra votes in 1992.356
5.3. The SPD and the 'basic programme' review process
The SPD began to face calls for a programmatic renewal from the late 1970s 
onwards. In particular the belief in continuous economic growth; the uncritical treatment 
of science and technical development as an engine of progress as well as the lack of an
352 According to Tom Sawyer, the ‘new’ policy review approach had successfully avoided past fragmentation 
by having brought closer together the Shadow Cabinet and the NEC in their policy-making role. In his view, 
the policy review process had furthermore strengthened the role and authority o f the leader; led to a process 
o f careful (re)-consideration o f the traditionally strong influence of the trade unions on Labour’s policy­
making processes; and had raised questions on institutional inner-party reform such as how the constituency 
party’s and their members role in policy-making could be enhanced. (Sawyer, Tom -  ‘Dear Member’, New  
Socialist June/July 1989, p 11)
353 Taylor, Gerald R. - Labour’s renewal?. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 192
354 Heath, A. and R. Jowell -  ‘Labour’s policy review’, in Labour’s Last Chance?. Darmouth, Aldershot,
1994, p 191
355 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh - The British General Election of 1992. St. Martin’s Press, 
Basingstoke, 1992, p 60
356 A. Heath and R. Jowell discovered in a study investigating the electorates’ perception o f the three main 
parties undertaken between 1987 and 1992 that the electorate’s perception o f Labour had - by 1992 - changed 
substantially. In fact, both authors felt, that the more moderate image Labour had gained through the review 
process had led to a ‘spill over’ process into the electorates’ perception of other Labour policies which were
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ecological dimension within the party's programme had been increasingly criticised by 
members of the party's rank and file as well as influential party ideologists.357 
Furthermore, during the final years of the SPD/FDP government under Helmut Schmidt 
(1974-82), party activists had felt increasingly alienated from their party's leadership on 
issues such as the governments approval of NATO's plan to deploy middle-range nuclear 
missiles in Western Europe; issues of environmental protection as well as the question of 
the safety of nuclear power plants.
In fact, by the early-1980s the SPD was increasingly heading towards a serious 
split into two fractions that were divided about the future programmatic direction of the 
party.358 Those factions consisted, on the one side, of members of the traditional trade 
union wing and moderates with an agenda for economic growth. On the other side were 
party activists and increasingly leaders on the left that pushed for a programmatic 
modernisation and the inclusion of 'post-materialist' policy issues.
Hence, after the loss of government office and twenty five years after the 1959 
Godesberger Programme (that had sucessfully transformed the SPD into a 'peoples party' 
embracing the free market economic system), the party's leadership felt that 
circumstances had significantly changed to justify the development of a new 'up-dated' 
basic party programme. The party's veteran chairman Willy Brandt (who in 1979 had still 
rejected the need for renewing the basic programme) positioned himself at the forefront of 
the movement for programmatic renewal by calling for the setting up of a programme 
commission as he acknowledged that political and economic conditions had changed 
significantly since 1959 which had affected social democracy and 'our perceptions of the 
world.'359 Hence, by the time of the SPD's 1984 Essen party conference, a general 
consensus had developed within the party that programmatic change was deemed 
necessary and it was agreed to design the development of a new basic programme in three 
stages.360
not necessarily dealt with by the review. (Heath, A. and R. Jowell -  ‘Labour’s policy review’, in Labour’s 
Last Chance?. Darmouth, Aldershot, 1994, p 195)
357 ‘Schon geschafft’ - Per Spiegel. No. 25, 12 June 1986
358 Eppler, Erhard - ‘Ende der siebziger Jahre spekulierten nicht wenige auf die Spaltung der SPD’, Die Zeit, 
17/05/1991
359 Brandt, Willy - ‘25 Jahre nach Godesberg’ - Rede im Erich-Ollenhauer-Haus am 12. November 1984, in 
SPD - Willy Brandt: Zwischen Essener Parteitag und Irseer Entwurf, Materialien, Bonn, June 1986, p 3-4
360 Firstly, the ‘Programmkommission’ (programme commission) submitted a fust ‘Irsee’ draft (Irsee 
Programm) for a new basic programme (June 1986) as the base for inner-party discussions. Secondly, a
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At that stage, as identified by the party specialist and SPD sympathiser Peter 
Losche, the SPD faced a programmatic, organisational and electoral strategy 'dilemma', 
that had to be addressed in response to ongoing social, economic and political changes.361 
Here, the SPD's situation showed certain parallels to the programmatic problems faced by 
the Labour Party, which also felt the need to search for a 'new' electoral and 
programmatic social democratic strategy to face ongoing changes in socio-economic 
conditions.
Similarly to Peter Losche, Wolfgang Bok identified - in a detailed study on the 
motives, aims and outcomes of the SPD's basic programme review process - four main 
challenges that the party had to deal with.362 Namely, the SPD had to re-gain its capacity 
to attract a majority of the electorate; increase the party's ability to form 'new' coalitions; 
strengthen and revive the party's programmatic base; and finally mend the various 
divisions that had appeared within the party. Furthermore, the continuous electoral rise of 
the Greens, if not programmatically answered, threatened the SPD's ability to re-gain an 
electoral majority at the federal level, while the party faced growing sympathies of many 
of its own members with Green policy issues, something that certainly influenced the 
outcome of the basic programme review.
5.3.1. A new basic 'Berlin' programme: Structure and policy making
By the time the programme committee submitted its first "Irsee" draft for a new  
basic programme (June 1986), a considerable degree of agreement had been reached. One 
of the main policy reform ideas expressed in the draft was the questioning of the SPD's 
traditional belief in the wisdom of unchecked economic growth. In fact, the draft 
expressed the belief that the future development of growth and consumption should be
second draft that would reflect the wide-ranging inner-party discussions would be submitted (by the 
‘Programmkommission’) to the party. This took place much delayed on the 09 March 1989 ( ‘fourth version’), 
which meant, that there was no sufficient time left to further consider key aspects o f the paper. Thirdly, the 
second draft was then considered by the party’s ‘Antragskommission’ (commission for submissions) with a 
final version agreed upon by November 1989. During this process, the ‘Antragskommission’ had considered 
2500 proposals for changes to the second draft that had been submitted by various party institutional layers. 
Finally, the basic programme was briefly discussed and finally adopted at the party’s Berlin party conference 
in December 1989.
361 Losche, Peter - ‘Ende der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterbewegung?’, Neue Gesellschaft, May 1988, p 12- 
8
362 Bok, Wolfgang - Zeitgeist-Genossen - Das Berliner Programm der SPD von 1989 - Motive - Ziele - 
Folgen, Peter Lang, Europaischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt 1995
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viewed under the condition of ecological sustainability. In addition, the draft contained 
demands for a more ethnically orientated state control of production and technological 
development.
However, as the first draft had been developed predominantly in isolation from 
the rest of the party, the outcome had neither sparked much enthusiasm among party 
members nor initiated a lively inner-party discussion process. Furthermore, the text of the 
draft was commonly perceived as a collection of programmatic compromises agreed upon 
in order to achieve a broad consensus. This led to a document that had been criticised for 
consisting of a rather streamlined text, with long boring passages, and those parts aimed 
at young voters being rather embarrassing.363
The Irsee Draft was already a good indicator of the policies that SPD policy makers 
were going to prioritise. Hence, the final version of the new "Grundsatzprogramm" 
published in 1989 underlined further that this programmatic review had not so much 
been an attempt to "exclude7 policies that had been adopted previously and that were now  
judged too "radical7 from the party's programme (as in the case of the Labour Party), but 
instead, that the 'basic programme" development process was more an exercise of 
updating the SPD's general policy guidelines; an attempt to include "newly7 emerging 
policy issues in the party's agenda; as well as attempting to improve the party's overall 
policy appearance and coherence.
The final version of the programmes "economic policy chapter" set out some 
strong, but rather nebulous guiding principles for the "ecological and socially responsible 
running of the economy". While the use of traditional socialist rhetoric aimed at reassuring 
the reader that the party intended to place "democratic decision-making processes over 
the interests of profit maximisation and the power of business7,364 the programme also 
stated that "economically powerful players or companies in dominant positions should 
not define the space for political action, but instead democratically legitimised decisions - 
in the interest of the common good - should lay down the framework and rules for
363 Losche, Peter and Franz Walter - Die SPD, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1992, p 127
364 “Okologisch und sozial verantwortliches Wirtschaften laBt sich nur erreichen, wo der Vorrang der 
demokratischen Entscheidung vor Gewinninteressen und Wirschaftsmacht durchgesetzt wird.” Vorstand der 
SPD - Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Bonn, 1989)
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economic activity/365 Reading between the lines, party modernisers felt obviously the 
need to re-emphasis the idea that the nation state should set out the framework in which 
economic activity should take place, even though the emerging trends of economic 
internationalisation had already begun to undermine the ability of nation states to act.
Furthermore, policy makers re-emphasised the idea that the state should remain a 
strong player to offer "overall democratic economic guidance" in a "mixed economy in 
which competition and the state act together" to guarantee the interaction of "market and 
control". However, policy makers failed to define clearly how they precisely intended to 
apply the above policy principles into a policy path that would secure the realisation of 
those stated principles. Finally, the SPD re-stated its commitment to the German model of 
"co-determination of employees" at company level.
When the programme makers took account of the "newly" emerging international 
dimension of the economy and recognised that a just and democratic economic system 
could not be safeguarded any longer within national boundaries, they emphasised 
extensively the growing importance of the European dimension in economic policy 
making as an answer. In fact, the "Berlin Programme' clearly stated the belief that future 
macro-economic policy making would require greater co-ordination efforts on a 
transnational level for which the European Community was envisaged to be the major 
future player. Here, one member of the "Berlin" programme commission - Thomas Meyer - 
explained later that the programmes extensive emphasis on EU level policy co-operation 
clearly showed that the programme makers used the EU as a stopgap ("LuckenbiiEer") to 
cover the immense cleavage that had appeared between their desire to continue and 
advocate "traditional" social democratic style state interventionist policies and the realities 
of an increasingly globalised economy.366
Not surprisingly, the development of the chapters on "economic policy' and the 
"future of work' of the new "Grundsatzprogramm" were those most controversially
365 “Nicht wirtschaftliche Macht oder marktbeherrschende Untemehmen diirfen der Politik den 
Handlungsrahmen vorgeben, sondem demokratisch legitimierte Entscheidungen miissen im Interesse des 
Gemeinwohls Rahmen und Ziele fur wirtschaftliches Handeln setzen.” (Vorstand der SPD -Grundsatz­
programm der SPD. Bonn, 1989)
366 Interview with Thomas Meyer, Bonn, 24/06/99
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discussed during the programmes development process.367 The original draft for the 
'future of work' had been developed by the commission members Thomas Meyer and 
Erhard Eppler. It was, however, replaced by an alternative draft that had been put 
forward by the 'left-leaning' party executive member Sigrid Skarpelis-Sperk. Her draft - in 
contrast to the Meyer/Eppler paper - defined 'work' in rather 'traditional' employment 
terms by emphasising the view that 'mass unemployment signifies political failure' which 
would have to be met by the 'duty of the democratic and social state to provide sufficient 
levels of employment for all.'368 In fact, persistent disagreements among commission 
members on the issue of the future role of work led eventually to the setting up of two 
special policy working groups that operated outside the commission structure in order to 
negotiate more effectively a compromise text.369
The debate on the 'future role of work' was further fuelled (during the later stages 
of the negotiations) by the new programme commissions chair and party vice-chairman 
Oskar Lafontaine, who began to strongly question the party's as well as DGB's traditional 
'economic growth' and 'demand management' strategy that had still been part of the 
earlier Irsee Draft.370 Similar to Meyer and Eppler, Oskar Lafontaine believed that a 
strategy of aiming at economic growth rates in order to re-gain higher levels of full 
employment was unsustainable. In fact, Oskar Lafontaine's contribution to an 
increasingly wide ranging inner-party discussion on LMPs argued, that the battle against 
mass unemployment should include a re-definition of the notion of 'work' that would 
include not only income based employment (Erwerbsarbeit), but also non-income based 
activities (Nichterwerbsarbeit) which should be recognised and valued according to their 
usefulness to society.
Secondly, by Oskar Lafontaine calling for a reduction in working hours together 
with a parallel cut in wages, he strongly confronted the trade unions that had previously 
resolutly rejected such demands. In fact, Lafontaine called for a greater degree of
367 Interview with Thomas Meyer, Bonn, 24/06/99
368 Skarpelis-Sperk, Sigrid -  ‘Unsere Demokratie ist in Gefahr’, Vorwarts. 10/12/88, p 13
369 ‘Zukunft der Arbeit’ -  Karl-Heinz Blessing and Elisabeth Vogelheim (IG Metall), Thomas Meyer, Johano 
Strasser, Inge Wettig-Danielmeier (ASF); ‘Wirtschaftspolitik’ - Ilse Bmsis (federal DGB-Executive), Erhard 
Eppler, Wolfgang Roth, Krupp and Peter von Oertzen.
370 A central point in the earlier Irsee Draft had been the idea of a reduction in working hours together with 
the provision o f full wage remuneration. (SPD - Irsee Draft. Bonn, 1987, p 23-5)
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solidarity of those in employment, as he demanded that job holders should not only share 
their work (by working less hours), but also part of their income (as he argued that a 
reduction in income would enable employers to create more employment opportunities).
Finally, Lafontaine recognised the overall demographic change that was taking 
place; the increasing degree of individualisation; the emergence of a post-industrial 
society and an inevitable decline in union membership. This he believed, would allow the 
SPD to draw a stronger dividing line between itself and the union's interests and would 
permit a weakening of the unions influence on the party's policy choices, thus enabling 
the SPD to widen its appeal to more service sector and non-unionised employees.371
In the end, the long-term vision agreed upon and set out in the Berlin Programme 
envisaged an overall reduction in working time as a contribution to create full 
employment. The programme stated that the party would eventually aim at the 
establishment of a six hour working day and a thirty hour working week. It was however 
also concluded that a shorter working week would not mean a shortening of overall 
machine running times as it would have to go together with the provision of a greater 
degree of labour market flexibility and deregulation as the competitiveness of German 
industry would have to be safeguarded.
The final outcome of the negotiations on the new basic programmes chapter's on 
'economy policy' and the 'future of work' were vowed as a win for the SPD's free 
marketers as the party had followed predominantly the direction of the 'modernisers' and 
'pragmatists' such as Thomas Meyer and Oskar Lafontaine.372 However, when looking at 
'the future of work and spare time' ("Zukunft der Arbeit und der freien Zeit") in 
retrospect, the overall character of this part of the programme seems rather ambiguous as 
many of the statements had been watered down and based on such general compromise 
formulas, that the programme did not succeed any longer in carrying a clear message, nor 
did it provide pre-scriptive orientation for future labour market policy choices.373
371 Lafontaine, Oskar - Die Gesellschaft der Zukunft - Reformpolitik in einer veranderten Welt. Hoffmann & 
Campe, Hamburg, 1988, p 206
372 Bok, Wolfgang - Zeitgeist-Genossen, Frankfurt, Europaischer Verlag, 1995, p 132-43
373 Vorstand der SPD - Grundsatzprogramm der SPD. 1989, Chapter IV. 2
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Two factors were responsible for the acceptance of the programme by the party's 
'left' in spite of its tame and unorthodox economic policy chapter in which state 
interventionist measures played only a very moderate role. Firstly, demands for structural 
state policies had been included in the final version of the programme, while secondly, the 
emerging collapse of the GDR had weakened the left of the party with representatives 
admitting that the 'questioning of the economic system could not take place any longer in 
1989.'374
Furthermore, the programme appealed to the party's traditionalists, because it 
stated the party's commitment to policies in favour of the reduction of working time, and 
envisaged an extension of the German model of co-determination and works councils to 
the European Community level. Finally, the programme dealt with many concerns raised 
by the new social movements as it included pleads for a greater emphasis on equal rights; 
a new environmentally conditioned re-orientation of the party's economic policy outlook; 
and even an end to unchecked economic growth.
Overall, the 'Berlin Programme' had been a valuable attempt to redefine the term 
'progress' in the party's economic policy approach by adding a strong 'ecological' 
component together with an overall more sceptical outlook on 'technological progress'. In 
the words of one of the programme commissions members, the programme had 
attempted - more or less successfully - 'to combine the issues raised by the new social 
movements and link them to the basic principles of traditional social democracy.'375
5.3.2. An evaluation of the SPD's basic 'Berlin Programme' development process
The chapter on the 'future of work' of the Irsee draft had already indicated that the 
issue of employment rights would remain at the centre of the SPD's policy priorities. 
Here, themes included the protection of humans from the uncontrolled needs of capital, 
and the necessity to make use of modern information and production technologies to 
further humanise employment. These ideas were linked to the issue of tackling 
unemployment by calling for a shorter working week (preferably without loss of income), 
the creation of an improved training infrastructure for employees and the claim that a
374 Horst Peter, Frankfurter Rundschau. 19/12/1989 (Member of the ‘Frankfurter Kreis’)
375 Interview with Thomas Meyer, Bonn, 24/06/1999
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greater need for environmental protection could carry positive effects for the creation of 
new employment opportunities.
In fact, a theme of "rebuilding industrial society on the basis of ecological 
requirements" was followed throughout the programme.376 Here, the SPD emphasised a 
"new understanding' of technological progress which was to be anchored between the 
positivism towards technological progress displayed by CDU and the post-materialistic 
technology pessimism of the new social movements. In fact, the SPD advocated to 
distinguish between "good technology" - such as the use of alternative energy technology - 
and bad or unsafe technologies - such as nuclear power stations.377
A further significant change in the SPD's traditional outlook on society was the 
strong emphasis on the notion of 'self-fulfilment of the individual' that was placed even 
above the individual's duty for solidarity.378 Overall, new Basic Programme documented a 
change in policy outlook in multiple areas aimed at programmatically widening the SPD's 
appeal. In fact, influential programme makers such as Erhard Eppler and Thomas Meyer 
had been able to create a platform from which the SPD could hope to appeal to a new 
majority (to the left of the CDU/FDP) by attempting to cater for the interests of the 'old as 
well as new social movements'.379
However, after its adoption in December 1989, the new basic programme was 
widely ignored by SPD policy actors as it failed to enhance the party's electoral 
performance.380 Issues in which the SPD had expanded its programmatic competencies 
and developed new visions, concerning inter alia ecology, disarmament and equal 
opportunities did not widen the party's electoral appeal as expected, even though the loss 
of the following 1990 general election must be predominantly blamed on the dominance
376 Vorstand der SPD - Grundsatzprogramm der SPD. Bonn, 1989, p 39
377 Vorstand der SPD - Grundsatzprogramm der SPD. Bonn, 1989, p 39
378 Bok, Wolfgang - Zeitgeist-Genossen, Europaischer Verlag, Frankfurt, 1995, p 181
379 Vorstand der SPD - Grundsatzprogramm der SPD. Bonn, 1989, p 51
380 Quite revealingly, Germany’s first SPD Chancellor after the adoption of the ‘new’ basic programme - 
Gerhard Schroder - did not even bother to mention its existence with one word in his book ‘Reifepriifung - 
Reformpolitik am Ende des Jahrhunderts’ ( ‘testing maturity - reform-policy at the end of the century’) that he 
wrote not even four years after the Berlin Programme had been adopted. (Schroder, Gerhard - Reifepriifung - 
Reformpolitik am Ende des Jahrhunderts. Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Koln, 1993)
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of issues surrounding unification; the popularity of Helmut Kohl and the rather sober 
stances the SPD had taken on various unification issues.381
In fact, the 'newly' emphasised issues adopted with the new Berlin programme 
(and the party's 1990 election programme) seemed strangely overtaken by events, as the 
dramatic process of unification made the electorate feel increasingly vulnerable and look 
for 'reassuring' policy proposals in the more traditional policy areas of the economy, 
wealth and security. In addition, Helmut Kohl managed to portray himself successfully as 
the guardian of stability in times of dramatic change, by reassuring the Western electorate 
that their lives could continue as they had done in the old FRG, while appealing to the 
Eastern electorate by promising 'bluhende Landschaften' and a rapid catching up process 
with living standards in the West. In contrast, the SPD's warnings about the spiralling 
costs of the unification process, the previous (Bundestags-) vote of Chancellor Candidate 
Lafontaine against the unification treaty and his rejection of a 'one to one' exchange rate 
with the East German Mark did not help to enhance the SPD's electoral popularity in the 
East.
The SPD sympathiser and academic Oskar Negt explained the minor impact of the 
new basic programme by blaming the party's programme makers for having been pre­
occupied with integrating issues raised by the new social movements and trying to please 
everyone, something he felt had made the policy makers blind for considering conditional 
'realities'; future programmatic challenges; and to make tough choices. Therefore, Negt 
critisised the writers of having succeeded in creating a toothless document that ended up 
'containing nothing wrong, nor anything right'.382 In fact, the gap between the issues 
raised in the programme and the issues that gained prominence throughout the 1990s - as 
convincingly argued by Wolfgang Bok - clearly showed that the SPD had fallen into a 
'Zeitgeist-trap' when developing its new basic programme.383 According to his view, the 
party's policy makers miss-read and ignored - at the time - the policy issues that the 
majority of the electorate would have judged relevant. In fact, while the SPD had offered 
the electorate a programme that was strong on the 'deeper' issues of a post-industrial
381 Kitschelt, Herbert - ‘The 1990 German Federal Election and the National Unification’, West European 
Politics. Vol 14, No 4, 1991, pp 121-48
382 Negt, Oskar - ‘Ein Programm des guten Willens, aber ohne Gesellschaftsanalyse’, Neue 
Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte. 8/89, Jg. 36, p 739
383 Bok, Wolfgang - Zeitgeist-Genossen. Europaischer Verlag, Frankfurt, 1995, p 185
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society, the party had not responded effectively to a new national mood that demanded 
increasingly political answers to "bread and butter" issues.
Understandably, Hans-Jochen Vogel (head of the SPD during most of the 
programmes development phase) later expressed his deep frustration with the failed 
impact of the programme, which he believed "gave concrete answers to the growing 
challenges of the future of work, the environment, the worlds "North-South" divide and 
international policy co-operation." In fact, Vogel blamed the neglect of the programme "on 
a tendency of the SPD not to utilise detailed policy programmes, to tuck them away and 
forget about them rather than applying them to the party's advantage", something - he 
concluded - meant, that "valuable programmatic resources were commonly wasted.'384
Overall, as shown later by the content analysis of the SPD's programmes, the party 
had been relatively open towards policy pledges dealing with issues raised by the new  
social movements. However, after this, the programmatic policy discourse became once 
more increasingly social democratic (emphasising, for instance, policies concerning 
unemployment and the inequality between the rich and poor) as severe economic 
problems in the unification aftermath shifted the political agenda away from many of the 
"newly" adopted 1980's concerns.385
Hence, the increasing economic problems caused by unification and a growing 
neo-liberal policy agenda meant that the SPD began - in contrast to the policies 
emphasised in the Berlin Programme - to increasingly embrace neo-liberal policy 
solutions.386 This re-direction in policy agenda became already identifiable in the party's 
run up to the 1994 election.387 Here, the SPD had realised that the credibility of its 1994
384 Hans-Jochen Vogel had not only been the chair of the ‘Basic Programme’ commission for some time, but 
he had also been a member o f another major SPD programme commission from 1973-75, that had been set up 
by the party to assess future party policy challenges and responses. The party had swiftly adopted the 
resulting document ‘Orientierungsrahmen ‘85’ in 1985, only to be - similarly to the Berlin Programme - 
quickly forgotten afterwards. (Vogel, H.-J. - Nachsichten. Piper, Miinchen, 1996, p 496)
385 Jahn, Detlef and Matt Henn - ‘The ‘New’ Rhetoric of New Labour in Comparative Perspective’, Western 
European Politics. Vol 23, No 1 (January 2000), p 34
386 Jahn, Detlef and Matt Henn - ‘The ‘New’ Rhetoric of New Labour in Comparative Perspective’, West 
European Politics, Vol 23, No 1 (January 2000), p 32
387 Lafontaine, Oskar - ‘Rezession und Massenarbeitslosigkeit bekampfen’, Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst 
- Wirschaft. 48. Jahrg., 88, 11/11/93; Fuchs, Anke - ‘Wir wollen die nachste Regierung fiihren’, 
Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, 48 Jahrg., 218, 15/11/93; Lafontaine; Oskar - ‘Rezession und 
Massenarbeitslosigkeit energisch bekampfen (Teil II), Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst Wirtschaft. 48. 
Jahrg., 89 , 16/11/93; ‘Eine gesamtdeutsche Strategie fur Modemisierung, Beschaftignung und
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election programme depended on the party's ability to put forward a pragmatic 
programme with pledges that would shed the party's unpopular high spend and tax 
image, while adopting at the same time policies that embraced publicly the new market 
realities.388
5.4. The significance of 'Looking to the Future' and the 'Berlin' Grundsatzprogramm
Labour's 'Policy Review Process' should also be understood as a successful tool to 
rid the party of policies that were perceived electorally unpopular, even though the 
review itself had not been particularly successful in developing a new positive 
programmatic identity for the party.389 However, by the end of the 'Review Process' - that 
had been widely perceived as successful in introducing a new policy making approach to 
the party - influential voices inside the Labour Party favoured as a consequence the 
further use of policy commissions as well as think tanks for future policy-making, and in 
response the party began to set up various commissions for policy development.390
Hence, from the review onwards, the Labour Party took increasingly advantage of 
the expertise, research results and reports that labour friendly think-tanks such as the 
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), the Fabian Society, Demos and the 
Employment Policy Institute produced for the party. This meant, on the one hand, that 
extra expertise was available to overcome the party's structural disadvantage of being in 
opposition as it enabled Labour to adopt and advocate more detailed policy proposals. On 
the other hand, this process sidelined Labour's traditional policy-making forums and
umweltvertragliches Wachstum - Sozialdemokratische Pressedienst, 92, (Teil I) 25/11/93; (Teil II), 30/11/93; 
Ostertag, Adi - ‘Arbeit schaffen statt Arbeitslosigkeit verscharfen’, Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst 
Wirtschaft 48. Jahrgang, 07/12/93
388 ‘Die SPD im Konflikt zwischen Finanzpolitik und politischen Mehrheiten’, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 04/03/1994
389 Seyd, Partick -  ‘Labour: The Great Transformation’, in Anthony King et al - Britain at the Polls, 1992. 
Chatham House Publishers, New Jersey, 1993, p 85
390 For example, in 1989 the trade union leader John Edmonds called for the establishment of a new policy 
commission (consisting o f 200 NEC and conference members) to develop detailed Labour Party policies for 
two-year rolling programmes. Independently o f Labour’s usual policy making procedures, a Commission was 
set up in 1991 to consider alternative systems o f proportional representation. And from 1992 onwards, 
Labour’s policy making contained the new Leadership Committee, an Economic Commission (under the 
chairmanship o f Gordon Brown) and the Commission on Social Justice (under the chairmanship o f Sir 
Gordon Borrie). See: Sawyer, Tom -  ‘Dear Member’, New Socialist. June/July 1989, p 11; Seyd, Partick -  
‘Labour: The Great Transformation’, in Anthony King et al - Britain at the Polls. 1992. Chatham House 
Publishers, New Jersey, 1993, p 90; Taylor, Gerald A. -  Labour’s Renewal. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 
137
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increased the leaderships control over the party's policy making. However, the increasing 
role of think tanks and their role of turning around Labour's policy making processes 
should not be overestimated. In fact, consequences should not be confused with the cause, 
as it took the Labour Party - as argued by the influential MP Tony Wright - a long time to 
reach a position in which it felt confident "to use and set up organisations of that kind and 
then to be confident to deal with what they produce."391 Hence, organisations such as the 
IPPR were not necessarily a source for Labour's basic political re-positioning, but instead 
they were "possibly more an indication of a party that was prepared to re-think things."392
SPD actors have also judged the use of commissions to develop party policies as 
something very positive, in particular as the SPD has been traditionally using these kind 
of forums - often including outside policy specialists - for a very long time and on a 
regular base.
The party's former general secretary Peter Glotz has emphasised the usefulness of 
party policy commissions as he believes that the composition of the SPD's membership 
has been growing increasingly unrepresentative of the wider German public. In addition, 
he has pointed out that with the help of commissions, parties' could thoroughly remain in 
control of the final policy choices they are going to make as commission proposals 'still 
have to pass party processes that continue to judge, if proposals developed by an expert 
commission are acceptable to the party' or not.393 Similarly, Friedhelm Farthmann 
underlined that 'ideas may well be developed by elite thinkers - not necessarily the 
leadership - but they must then be allow to be tested, accepted or rejected at the party's 
rank and file level',394 while Hans-Jochen Vogel emphasised that commission 
recommendations have to be ultimately designed and implemented at the political level.395
5.4.1. Conclusions drawn from Labour's and the SPD's policy reform processes
The Labour Party's 'Policy Review Process' and the SPD's 'Basic Programme' 
development processes clearly showed that both parties had recognised that they had to
391 Interview with Tony Wright, London, 01/02/2000
392 Interview with Tony Wright, London, 01/02/2000
393 Interview with Peter Glotz, Erfurt 14/06/1999
394 Interview with Friedhelm Farthmann, Dusseldorf 24/06/1999
395 Interview with Hans-Jochen Vogel, Miinchen 21/06/1999
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deal programmatically with increasingly apparent shortcomings of their policy 
programmes as their electoral popularity remained weak after various electoral defeats. 
Hence, both parties engaged in a significant process of policy streamlining and change 
with the aim of re-establishing a coherent 'alternative' policy vision that could re-unite the 
parties, give them a new sense of purpose, tackle newly evolving policy challenges and 
lead them eventually back into government office. Furthermore, specific emphasis was 
placed on the fact that all levels of the parties should be involved and enabled to 
contribute to the formation of the parties' reformed policy outlooks.
A further factor behind both parties need to engage in programmatic reorientation 
played - no doubt - demographic developments. The parties membership structures as 
well as the composition of their voters had changed to their disadvantage. Both party's 
membership had steadily declined, while the majority of newly recruited members did 
not belong any longer to the traditional core membership groups previously represented 
by both parties. Hence, the re-composition of the electorate and party members called for 
strategic changes in the parties policy appeal, something that had to reflect the overall 
changes that were taking place in both countries development towards post-industrial 
societies and service sector economies with white collar employees increasingly 
outnumbering blue collar workers.396
Similarly, a polarisation of policy ideas among party members and decision­
makers had taken place inside the Labour Party and the SPD that had to be dealt with 
(even though conflict lines in both parties were based on different issues). In the case of 
the Labour Party, conflicts had arisen between party's traditionalists on the right and the 
socialist left and later between 'new' and 'old' labour, while in the case of the SPD the 
ideas of the traditional right had clashed increasingly with those of the post-materialist 
and liberal left. Here, consistent intra-party arguments had made the SPD as well as the 
Labour Party appear divided, which had weakened their ability to present their policy 
agendas convincingly as an alternative to their conservative counter-parts ideas of neo­
liberalism. In this case, policy makers accepted the need to engage in a process aimed at 
modernising and re-assessing traditional policy positions inside their parties as well as the 
attempt to demonstrate a 'new' degree of policy credibility to the electorate.
396 Ladrech, Robert and Philippe Marliere (ed) - Social Democratic Parties in the European Union,
MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1999, p 86-7, 104
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However, there were additional party specific factors that encouraged them to 
engage in the policy review processes. According to views expressed by most Labour 
Party policy makers during the interviews, the policy review was also motivated by the 
need to rid the party's programmes of its electoral legacies and negatives as much as 
possible, and to make the party's policy positions correspond more closely to ''opinion 
polls and private qualitative research" with the party's Shadow Communications Agency 
providing "information on public attitude about policy for most groups and made 
suggestions" about appropriate policy choices and presentation.397 Hence, the 'Policy 
Review Process' was clearly intended to provide a set of policies with which Labour could 
win the next election.
In contrast, the development of the Berlin Programme had rather been an attempt 
to synthesise the interests and values of the traditional employee wing with the new  
political demands of the post-materialist members of the younger generation and middle- 
classes, to interrelate the challenges of a changing industrial society with ecology, the 
welfare state and globalisation in order to attempt to set up a new alliance of increasingly 
more varied groups in society.398
Labour's 'Policy Review Process' and the SPD's development process of a 'new' 
basic programme are two very good examples of two simultaneous attempts to engage the 
parties in substantial policy reforms to rectify programmatic weaknesses, but without a 
newly developed sense of an alternative vision or the ability of major paradigmatic 
change.
In fact, both review attempts were - in spite of all the good intentions and the 
recognition that substantial policy change was necessary for all the previously described 
reasons - held back by strongly institutionalised policy beliefs and a still active Keynesian- 
led economic policy paradigm. In that sense, both reviews were major indicators of a 
forthcoming shift, but at the same time an example of how strongly path dependent policy 
making remains, even after both parties had realised that their consistent election losses 
had to be - at least - partly blamed on programmes that failed to appeal sufficiently to the
397 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh - The British General Election o f 1992. St. Martin’s Press, 
Basingstoke, 1992, p 53
398 Meyer, Thomas - ‘Der Blair Effekt’, in Thierse, Wolfgang (ed) - 1st die Politik noch zu retten?
Standpunkte am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Aufbau Verlag, Berlin, 1996, p 228
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electorate as it was deemed not to offer adequate responses to changing political and 
economic challenges.
However, there is also another useful role of long-winded party policy review 
processes that should be mentioned. In his autobiography, Hans-Jochen Vogel has pointed 
out his belief that the actual programme output is not necessarily the most important 
aspect of the work within policy commissions during party policy reviews processes. In 
fact, the work within commissions creates a useful inner-party process that encourages 
dialogue and consensus building among the various commission members and the 
conflicting interest groups they represent. In particular, as this co-operative process of 
policy-making is witnessed by all the other party actors and therefore often encourages 
party members to re-focus their energies and interests on common aims and ideas rather 
than to waste them on inner-party conflicts.399 This then leads to an overall de-fusion of 
the sharpness of divisions among various party factions and leadership personnel within 
the party. Here, David Hill added his observation that the "review gave an opportunity to 
people to be taken along the process...they were part of it...[and] there was at least some 
form of consultation" which was necessary to "achieve change as a whole" party.400
Overall, although successful, both programmatic reviews failed to spark major 
policy innovations or an electoral revival (instead being only steps on the way towards an 
overall paradigm shift) as both parties policy makers avoided to consider and engage in 
more substantial reforms that would have questioned further the parties Keynesian 
paradigm and proposed alternative approaches. In fact, party policy makers were held 
back by their traditional paradigm and past institutional policy legacies,401 with both 
parties unable and unwilling to open themselves towards considering substantial aspects 
of neo-liberal policy approaches. In fact, only when both parties reached the mountain top 
of paradigmatic change (during the mid- and late 1990s) did they regain electoral 
majorities as they were able to play a 'pro-active7 role of acting as the more caring and 
socially aware executioner that could be trusted to implement necessary - let us say neo- 
liberally inclined - political and economic transformations.
399 Vogel, Hans-Jochen - Nachsichten - Meine Bonner und Berliner Jahre. Piper, Miinchen, 1996, p 59
400 Interview with David Hill, London, 26/08/99
401 The Labour Party tried to regain its political credibility after years o f radicalism and the ‘loony left’ image 
of the early 1980s, while the SPD aimed at integrating issues of the new social movements into its 
programme that had already peaked in popularity during the late 1980s.
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Chapter 6: The Labour Party and SPD: Comparative elements of 
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6.2.2. Changes in personal actors beliefs and their explanations
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6.3. Conclusions from actors beliefs, perceptions and observations
6.1. Organisational change and procedural reforms
During the Labour Party's and the SPD's long period in opposition, both parties 
engaged in considerable change and reform of institutional procedures as well as change 
in fundamental policy positions. This chapter looks at the most important institutional 
changes that took place within the parties' and then assesses party actors' interpretations 
and evaluations of policy processes in order to establish in a comparative way if common 
patterns, perceptions and actions can be identified.
6.1.1. The organisational reform and policy transformation of the Labour Party
The Labour Party's loss of government in 1979 was followed by a political 
backlash to the left, which called successfully for a variety of programmatic as well as 
party institutional changes aimed at undermining the power of the party's leadership, 
while strengthening at the same time the role of the annual party conference and the trade 
unions. Here, the left was able to introduce, for instance, the mandatory re-selection of 
constituency MPs and an electoral college for the election of the party leadership (see 
Chapter 2).
A combination of factors, such as Labour MPs leaving the party to found the rival 
SDP; Labour's disastrous 1983 general election defeat; and Neil Kinnock's election as 
party leader led to the establishment of a new leadership that was strongly committed to 
reforming the party. In fact, the reforms of the party's organisation envisaged by Kinnock 
became the base for a reform project that was to be continued and concluded years later 
under the leadership of John Smith and Tony Blair. Pippa Norris argued that the main 
motivation behind the reform of Labour's party organisations and its programme had
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been Neil Kinnock's overriding goal "...to purge Labour of its image as an extremist and 
divided party."402 This was confirmed by Labour veteran David Hill who argued that the 
main activity within the party between 1983 and 1987 had been to purge the left, which 
was a precondition and followed up by the policy moderation and modernisation of the 
party.403
The reform efforts started under Neil Kinnock had been targeted at increasing the 
power of the party leadership in order to re-gain greater central control over the party's 
policy-making, electoral campaigning, policy presentation and the co-ordination of party 
activities, with policy decisions envisaged to be increasingly taken by the PLP (which was 
seen as supporting policies identical to the party leadership). In fact, most other party 
forums were eventually weakened and their influence over party policy-making and 
strategy were substantially reduced. Reforms included the reversal of the party reforms 
pushed through by the left during the early 1980s and hence the abolition of the 'new' 
electoral college as well as the ending of the trade union block vote and its replacement 
with a 'one member one vote' system; and a greater central control over the selection of 
constituency candidates for the House of Commons.
David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh argued that the leadership had succeeded in 
passing policy making increasingly from the conference and NEC to the joint 
NEC/Shadow Cabinet policy groups, in which the party's shadow spokesman usually 
held the initiative. According to one Blair adviser, the party leader believed that this shift 
in policy-making power was of great importance as it not only re-enforced central party 
control, but also made it easier to cater for the policy-making requirements of the mass 
media age in which - as Blair was convinced - "policies had to be primarily formulated to 
win elections."404 If this was true, then a significant shift in the party's perception of 
policy-making had taken place. In fact, a shift had taken place away from Labour's 
previously ideology based policy choices towards a far more pragmatic approach towards 
policy making that strongly emphasised the presentational requirements of policies and 
will to gain office.
402 Norris, Pippa - ‘Labour Party factionalism and extremism’, in Heath et al (ed) - Labour’s last chance? The 
1992 election and beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p 173
403 Interview with David Hill, London, August 1999
404 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh - The British General Election of 1997, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 
1997, p 61
213
In order to reduce the influence of trade unions member votes in party decision 
making processes, a "levy plus' model was introduced in the early 1990s that deprived 
members of unions associated with the Labour Party of their automatic vote in party 
decision making processes. Instead, special membership conditions were offered to those 
union members.405 In addition, the Labour leadership felt the need to reduce the party's 
reliance on trade union funds by initiating successfully a major membership recruitment 
drive that led to the party depending by the late 1990s for less than half of its overall 
income on trade unions contributions.
A further highly symbolic step taken by the party leadership was the amendment 
of the party's constitutions Clause IV (defining the aim of the Labour Party to promote 
nationalisation and public ownership)406 that was substituted in 1995 by a far more 
'moderate' and redefined statement of party aims and values that rooted the party firmly 
among Europe's social democratic mainstream.407 Even though Tony Blair encountered 
staunch opposition from the trade unions and the left of the party, he eventually 
succeeded in pushing through this notable change to the constitution. He was crucially 
helped in this attempt by influential and senior left-wingers such as Robin Cook who had 
previously strongly rejected demands for a change to Clause IV. In fact, this time Robin 
Cook went to great lengths to publicly reassure the left of the party that the rewriting of 
Clause IV served only "the objective...not to drop common ownership, but to focus it on 
the circumstances where it is appropriate."408 In fact, the new version excluded any 
references to the party's aim of extending public ownership, and advocated instead "a
405 Union members were offered to pay a discount £3 Labour Party membership levy on top o f their trade 
union membership fee, if  they wanted to become party members with the right to take part in inner-party 
electoral contests.
406 The most controversial part o f the ‘old’ (1918) Clause (IV, 4) stated: “To secure for the workers by hand 
or by brain the full fruits o f their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible 
upon the basis o f the common ownership of the means o f production, distribution, and exchange, and the best 
obtainable system o f popular administration and control o f each industry or service.” (Labour Party - 
Labour’s Objects: Socialist Values in the Modem World. London, 1994, p 4)
In contrast, the rewritten Clause IV from 1995 (2a) emphasised the need for the party to work for a “dynamic 
economy...in which the enterprise of the market and the rigour o f competition ...produce the wealth the nation 
needs.” (Labour Party - The Labour Party Rule Book, London, p 4)
407 Blair, Tony - 1994 Conference Speech in, Labour Party - Labour’s Objects: Socialist Values in the Modem 
World, Labour Party, London, 1994
408 The Times, 26 January 1995
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dynamic economy...in which the enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition 
are joined with the forces of partnership and co-operation...(in) a just society."409
Furthermore, the new Clause IV addressed the party's policy making orientation 
by committing the party to "an open democracy" (['new'] Clause IV, 2c, 1995), hence 
demoting the traditional link with trade unions, which had been described in the old 
Clause IV as "the main grouping the party is linked with" (Clause IV, 2,1918).
Gerald Taylor rightly concluded that the challenge to change Clause IV contained 
two major aspects: Firstly, it was the aim of the modernisers to amend the ideological 
commitments enshrined in Clause IV, which they perceived as outdated. Secondly, the 
actual process of abandoning the 'old' Clause IV carried a substantial degree of 
symbolism, as the party's ability to overcome 'old' Labour clearly demonstrated to the 
public the strong degree of control held by the 'reformer' Tony Blair over his party.410 It 
also demonstrated Labour's continuous move towards the political mainstream similar to 
those continental parties, on the centre-left with Labour's former deputy leader Roy 
Hattersley, one of the traditional advocates of Croslandite revisionist social democracy, 
welcoming the reform of the Clause as proof that Labour had finally turned itself into a 
social democratic party.411
However, the party reform did not finish with the highly symbolic change of 
Clause IV. As Steven Fielding pointed out, while some inside the party had hoped that the 
new Clause IV had meant a climax and an end to the internal reform process of the party, 
for Tony Blair and his followers the need to change Clause IV only demonstrated the 
necessity for further modernisation.412 In fact, as concluded by Tudor Jones, the 
modernisation of the party machinery and programme were intended by the leadership to 
bring about an ideological re-foundation of the party's values and ideas.413
Hence, immediately after taking up the party leadership, Blair engaged in a wide- 
ranging agenda of continuous modernisation, which entailed (a) the final abandonment of
409 Labour Party - New Labour. New Britain: The Guide. London, 1996, p 60, cited in Fielding, Steven - The 
Labour Party, Manchester University Press, 1997, p 148-9
410 Taylor, Gerald R. - Labour’s Renewal? MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p 169
411 ‘Tone o f the times’, The Guardian. 27 April 1995
412 Fielding, Steven - The Labour Party. Manchester University Press, 1997, p 149-50
413 Jones, Tudor -  Remaking the Labour Party, Routledge, London, 1996, p 147
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the union block vote and a general decrease of union influence and party reliance on 
union funding; (b) a drive to increase mass membership of the party; and (c) a greater 
centralisation of the party's decision-making structure, while attempting to increase the 
party's responsiveness to party members. Strategically, Blair aimed to re-occupy the 
political centre ground and move beyond the traditional notions of left and right as well 
as the divisions of socialism versus capitalism.414
Finally, a continuous professionalisation of Labour's election campaign machinery 
began in 1987 that included by 1997 the development of a database to enable instant 
Labour PR rebuttals; the use of targeted telephone canvassing; a transparent and 
supportive campaign structure; flexible campaign planning; and the development of 
policy presentation built around a programme of themes which each contained a set of 
consistent messages (see Chapter 3).
Not surprisingly, the continuous policy changes under Tony Blair faced numerous 
inner-party critics. For instance, Bryan Gould (former shadow minister and party 
leadership contender in 1992) argued that the necessary modernisation of Labour had 
already occurred before the 'New' Labour modernisers around Blair ever took control of 
the party. In his words, "the reappraisal of Labour policy, the rethinking of the relevance 
of Labour principles to modern circumstances, the recognition of people's aspirations as 
well as their needs,...the reaching out to a new majority -  all of this was already being 
undertaken by many Labour thinkers and activists who did not see the need for 'New' 
Labour."415 In addition, Gould -  who left British politics shortly after 'New Labour' had 
taken control - claimed that 'New' Labour, instead of meaning the updating or 
modernisation of the party stood for a complete break with its past as well as for a 
rejection and denouncement of Labour Party tradition, hence leading to a situation in 
which - as Gould bitterly called it - " 'New' Labour... is meant to be 'Not' Labour."416
6.1.2. The organisational and policy transformation of the SPD
The idea of reforming the SPD's party machinery had been raised under the party 
chairmanship of Bjorn Engholm. At the 1991 Bremen party conference, a 'commission for
414 Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh - The British General Election o f 1997. MacMillan, Basingstoke,
1997, p 51
415 Gould, Bryan -  ‘The long retreat from principle’, New Statesman. 29 January 1999, p 45
416 Gould, Bryan -  ‘The long retreat from principle’, New Statesman. 29 January 1999, p 45
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reform' was set up to recommend procedures that would help to extend inner-party 
democracy as well as increase the ability of the party's members to participate in the 
party's decision making processes. Most of the commissions recommendations were used 
in a new SPD 'Organisationsstatut' that was adopted at the party's 1993 conference. They 
contained an extension of direct involvement in party decision making to the party's rank 
and file by introducing the possibility of direct leadership elections, inner-party plebiscites 
and membership consultation exercises.
A major motivation behind the modernisation of the party structure was the fear 
that the SPD was loosing its innovative edge; that it was growing increasingly 
unattractive for potential new members, while it was growing increasingly 
unrepresentative for society.417 Furthermore, as described by Herbert Kitschelt, the reform 
of the SPD inner-party organisation was an attempt by the leadership to "free itself from 
the powerful countervailing forces struggling inside the party and stake out a consistent 
strategy" that would help to overcome the "organisational and strategic paralysis and 
indecisiveness [encountered by the SPD] throughout the 1980s."418
In fact, many recommendations made by the commission were eventually 
adopted. Although the introduction of 'consultative membership inquiries' (konsultative 
Mitgliederbefragungen) were eventually rejected by the majority of the party's 
Antragskommission (conference composite/partition commission), the party executive 
gained nevertheless a powerful tool by winning the ability to initiate and call for decision­
making votes among the party's membership.419
Evaluating the reform outcomes further, it must be said that doubts have remained 
over the question, if the new organisational tools embraced by the SPD have had any 
major positive impact. In fact, the first direct election of the party leader by members - 
won by Rudolf Scharping - ended in huge disappointment, when his performance in 
office was generally judged as 'weak', something that led to his replacement - by popular
417 For a detailed account of the problem see: Glotz, Peter - ‘Die politische Krise als Kommunikations-Krise’, 
Das Parlament, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte - Beilage zur Wochenzeitung, 27 August 1997, B36-37/97
418 Kitschelt, Herbert - The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1994, p 247
419 However, the SPD party leadership does not hold the same kind of power then Labour’s leadership. In 
contrast to the Labour Party where the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) has (apart from the early 1980s) 
traditionally being placed right at the centre o f the party’s policy decision-making, the polarisation between 
the SPD’s parliamentary party and the SPD party organisation (Fraktion und Partei) remained a strong feature 
of the SPD’s policy making structure.
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demand - (at the 1995 Mannheim party conference) by Oskar Lafontaine. Subsequently, 
the implementation of further inner-party reforms were put on hold or progressed very 
slowly as the party's leadership decided to prioritise the issue of policy change.
However, various examples exist where party rank and file members have voted 
successfully and directly on questions of Lander party candidates and strategy, for 
instance by choosing a candidate for the position of (Bremen) mayor; a preferred coalition 
partner on Lander level as well as the party's candidate for the Berlin senate elections.420
The SPD also advocated the idea of opening the party organisation further towards 
non-members in order to aim to become increasingly a forum for dialogue among citizens. 
Here, the adoption of new rules allowed non-party members to put forward petitions at 
local party level and to stand on local party lists. The underlying idea was to enable non- 
party members to contribute to the work of the party, work in policy forums and project 
groups, while the new rules were also envisaged to encourage and enable new party 
members to jump the party hierarchy and rise faster through the organisational ranks. 
Here, Peter Glotz argued that the party institutional changes signalled the SPD's 
abandonment of its traditionally 'stale' and increasingly unrepresentative party 
composition, as the party aimed to develop inner-party policy-making mechanisms that 
would recognise and appeal more successfully to the new groups in society that would 
not be prepared or able to join a traditional party organisation and succeed in its 
mechanisms for choosing candidates.421
Even though the general embrace of party members of the inner party reforms had 
been at times rather lukewarm, with direct inner-party local or Lander level votes still 
remaining the exception rather than the norm, the new procedures still offer real potential 
and could eventually be extended to include direct inner-party decision-making 
participation at the federal level. In fact, attempts for inner-party reform do not appear to 
have finished with the SPD's move into government office in 1998. For instance, at the 
forefront of the reform movement has been the party's general secretary Franz
420 Jun, Uwe - Tnnerparteiliche Reformen im Vergleich: Der Versuch einer Modemisierung von SPD und 
Labour Party’, in Borchert (ed) et al - Das sozialdemokratische Modell - Organisationsstrukturen und 
Politikinhalte im Wandel, Leske und Budrich, Opladen, 1996, p 222-23
421 Glotz, Peter - ‘Die politische Krise als Kommunikations-Krise’, Das Parlament. Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte - Beilage zur Wochenzeitung, 27 August 1997, B36-37/97
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Miintefering who proposed a ten point paper in early 2000 that advocated the 
introduction of US style pre-elections for party candidates (even open to non-members); 
national level plebiscites, as well as internet links for all 12500 local SPD party 
organisations in order to extent public participation in party policy presentation and 
decision making.422
Overall, the degree of institutional and programmatic change encountered by the 
SPD during the final years in opposition has been far less drastic than that of the Labour 
Party. However, policy and presentational professionalisation have also been of 
increasing importance to the SPD, in particular after the Labour Party's great electoral 
success of May 1997. Planning in great detail the SPD's electoral campaign, the party used 
the pragmatic Franz Miintefering and Bodo Hombach (frequently referred to as the 
German Peter Mandelson) as election campaign co-ordinators. In fact, Hombach 
confirmed the SPD's intention to run a highly personalised 1998 election campaign, and 
while recognising the importance of an election programme, he expressed his believe that 
the electorate was far more interested in the personal views and beliefs of the party's 
Kanzler-candidate.423 Hence, the SPD's 1998 election campaign ended up focusing 
strongly on its candidate Gerhard Schroder.424
In fact, this approach was not only inspired by the election machine used by the 
Labour Party, but Labour's Peter Mandelson and Philip Gould as well as US president Bill 
Clinton's electoral campaign advisers Doug Schoen and Henry Steinkopf were directly 
involved in advising the SPD's campaign headquarters on how to 'standardise' and 
increase the 'effectiveness' of the party's 'communication' machinery.425
In contrast to the Labour Party and the cohesive policy ideas of its leadership, the 
SPD was faced with the problem of a difference in economic policy visions expressed by 
its Kanzler-candidate Gerhard Schroder and the party leader Oskar Lafontaine.
422 Knaup, Horand - ‘Zehn von auBen’, Der Spiegel. 10 April 2000
423 ‘Schroders Botschaft soil auf eine Scheckkarte passen’ -  Welt am Sonntag, 15/03/1998
424 Franz Miintefering chaired the so-called ‘Leitungskreis’ comprised o f Peter Struck, Pit Weber, Barbel 
Diekmann, Christine Bergmann, Bodo Hombach und Carsten-Uwe Heye which was responsible for all 
election campaign strategy decisions. Spin-doctoring were Miintefering’s former office manager Matthias 
Machnig (overall co-ordination), Michael Donnermeyer as well as Bemd Schoppe (head o f the department 
for communication and elections). (W&V, 16/98, p 71)
219
While Gerhard Schroder favoured the predominant use of labour supply-side 
measures to improve the attractiveness of Germany as a 'Standort' (location) for capital 
investments (to improve the competitiveness of the country as a location for industry), 
Oskar Lafontaine advocated Keynesian style finance policies of tax reduction and/or 
increases in public spending in times of recession as well as tax increases and public 
spending reductions in times of boom.
In fact, Gerhard Schroder argued that "the protection of national markets with the 
help of national policies had become impossible. Even though international approaches 
were possibly of good intention, they were generally bound to fail due to different 
national self-interests - such as the use of comparative cost-advantages of reformed 
industrial competitive structures - which would make them ineffective."426
In contrast, Lafontaine called for a substantially greater co-operation between 
countries on an international level in order to improve macro-economic convergence and 
to develop common strategies to secure sustainable growth.427 He warned, furthermore, of 
the risks of countries engaging in a 'downward' competition on social standards. 
Therefore, he envisaged that "the rich countries should hold on to their high standards of 
wealth and social security for the majority of its people with the help of fair competition 
policies to safeguard proper social and ecological standards, a stable international 
currency system, as well as a high degree of economic policy co-ordination between the 
larger industrial nations that should make it possible to develop a policy consensus 
between the countries of the north and the south.428
Lafontaine's resignation in March 1999 as Minister of Finance - after only five 
months in office - clearly showed which of the two approaches had succeeded or 
alternatively which approach had proven to be politically un-implementable. Here, it 
must be pointed out that the success of Schroder's approach had been predictable as it had 
been consistent with the party's programmatic developments throughout the 1990s.429
425 Ruzas, Stefan - ‘Marketingkommunikation -  Im Wechselfieber’, W&V, No 16, 17 April 1998, p 70-1
426 Gerhard Schroder’s speech at the congress ‘Innovationen fur Deutschland, Bonn, 21/05/1997, p 1, cited in 
Unger et al -  New Democrats. Elefanten Press, Berlin, 1998, p 153
427 Lafontaine, Oskar and Christa Muller - Keine Angst vor der Globalisierung - Wohlstand und Arbeit fur 
alle, Verlag J. H. W. Dietz Nachfolger, Bonn, 1998, p 79-81
428 Lafontaine, O. and C. Muller - Keine Angst vor der Globalisierung. Dietz, Bonn, 1998, p 81
429 See quantitative and qualitative programme content analysis in Chapter 8
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In fact, even though both positions were seemingly still presented and advocated 
on equal terms inside the party by Schroder and Lafontaine until well into the period of 
the SPD's win of government office in 1998, Schroder's position had long before gained 
programmatic dominance.
Finally, we should not forget to briefly mention that both, the SPD as well as the 
Labour Party, witnessed a significant change in the roles and fortunes of their countries 
trade union movements during the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, both parties saw 
substantial changes in their relationship with the unions and a weakening of the 
communality of interests. In particular the Labour Party substantially loosened its 
previously very close institutional as well as financial ties with the countries trade unions. 
Overall, both parties weakened their link with the unions in order to re-orientate their 
strategy and policy outlook as well as to attract new voters that were rather weary of the 
parties previously strong link with the unions (see also Chapter 2).
6.1.3. Inner-party change - differing and common features betw een Labour and the SPD
The Labour Party as well as the SPD witnessed substantial inner-party 
organisational reforms that led to an increase in influence and control over policy-decision 
making by the parties leaderships as well as an increase in the means for direct 
participation of the parties rank and file. The losers of these reforms were predominantly 
delegates and party activists as well as the leaderships of the trade union organisations 
affiliated to the parties. The introduction of direct membership plebiscites on party 
leadership personnel decisions and/or policy programmes can be interpreted as an 
increase inner party democracy that - in the words of Ian McCartney - "opened up the 
party in a way that no one has tried before, empowering members to participate in policy 
making. It has been a huge cultural change."430
However, in parallel an increased use of opinion polling and focus groups to 
decide upon policy contents took place that underlined at the same time the growing 
importance of the wider public opinion rather than a furtherance of party member 
involvement. Here, party leaderships gained further autonomy, as they were increasingly 
able to claim successfully that they were accountable and responsive to a greater variety of
430 Interview with Ian McCartney, New Statesman. 08 July 1999
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interests than previously (such as the wider public and not just party members due to the 
use of public opinion surveys and focus groups; commissions; think tanks, academics, 
outside specialists and party members).
While consultation exercises with the above mentioned groups may help to make 
policy development more functional and reduce the ability of the leadership to be 
preoccupied with their own personal concerns, the vast number and often vague inputs of 
those policy influence components, however, ultimately enables leaderships to play off 
different interests against each other, and to pick and choose recommended policies felt 
appropriate, as control from party rank and file as well as party functionaries on policy 
decisions has been decreasing. Hence, the accountability of the parties leadership to 
various party institutions has decreased as a result of both parties organisational reforms 
during the 1980s and 90s.
The opening of both parties to non-members - directly or indirectly - by using 
increasingly 'specialists' and 'interested groups' as well as commissions or think-tanks has 
not only been a way to gain extra 'objective' outside expertise for party policy making, but 
also a way to increase the general level of party participation and to integrate more party 
sympathisers in party processes. After all, both parties were motivated to engage in an 
overall review process of their organisations in order to regain policy credibility and the 
ability to challenge more effectively political rivals.
After having briefly looked at the parties attempts to change their policy making 
structure and to open themselves up to the wider public, we can now move on to assess 
the perceptions and evaluations of Labour and SPD policy actors involved in the parties 
programmatic and institutional transformation processes during the 1980s and 1990s.
6.2. Actors' perceptions and evaluation of Labour's and the SPD's policy development
Before engaging in the content and statistical data analysis of the Labour Party's 
and the SPD's policy changes in the following chapters, we must firstly look at the 
evidence that can be drawn from the interviews conducted with Labour Party and SPD 
policy actors. Actors' perceptions of events; their individual explanation of policy change; 
and in particular the change to their own policy convictions and beliefs has been the focus 
of the conducted interviews. Even though the evidence from the interviews with policy
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actors is not necessarily self-explanatory and at times rather sketchy - as actors 
explanations cannot offer an overall inside in the greater picture of policy formation - they 
do, however present a revealing snapshot observation of formation processes that can be 
used to assist in confirming and substantiating policy trends and underlying actor 
motivations identified in this study.
In fact, it is important to remind ourselves that party functionaries should not be 
expected of having solely evaluated possible choices within their party position, but also 
(and probably more importantly) as 'representatives' of their own perceptions and beliefs. 
In addition, interviews have been a useful source of information as - in the nature of 
parties - discussions among actors also take place informally or without any written trace 
to constitute evidence. This is despite the fact, as pointed out by Janet Buttolph Johnson 
and Richard Joslyn that interviewees may possibly behave unnaturally, or be reluctant to 
admit in an interview that their actions have been guided by a different paradigm or that 
they have even failed to understand the need or importance for a change in party policy.431
Finally, limitations within the official requirements of the size and structure of this 
thesis have meant that only excerpts from various interviews could be used mainly as 
evidence for, or to illustrate an argument. This way, however, we have been able to avoid 
excessive reliance on this kind of source for evidence, a circumstance that has helped us to 
avoid the pitfalls of actors sometimes distorting memories and motivations of past events, 
as the evidence drawn from interviews has been limited and can be looked at from some 
distance. Interviews have frequently been criticised for providing material that neglects 
the embeddedness of interviewees in social interactions, institutions or contextual 
conditions.432 However, as this thesis uses data from interviews only to a limited degree 
and in order to gain some understanding of actors' motives and their evaluation of 
circumstances, risks of over reliance have been mostly averted.
431 Buttolph Johnson, Janet and Richard A. Joslyn - ‘Making Empirical Observations: Survey Research and 
Elite Interviewing’ (Chapter 8), in Buttholph Johnson, J. and R. A. Joslyn - Political Science Research 
Methods. CQ Press, Washington DC, 1991, p 158
432 Kvale, Steinar - Interviews - An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. Sage Publications, 
1996, London, p 292
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A variety of Labour and SPD party actors were chosen for the interviews on the 
base that they had either been actively involved as key figures in their party's formation of 
policy paths and choices or that they have been able to witness thoroughly developments 
from within the parties that have enabled them to offer a competent evaluation of the 
processes that had been taking place.433 Hence, the data derived from the verbal face-to- 
face questioning of Labour Party and SPD political actors or advisors can be expected to 
be able to give a more practical 'real world' account of the factors that had influenced their 
own or colleagues policy-making decisions. Politicians and party functionaries were 
chosen for this study on the base of representing the parties key 'policy elite's', 'insiders' 
or 'opinion-leaders' (Meinungsfuhrer) in the policy area under investigation, with the 
data collected from interviews being intended to add further detail and provide an 
additional account of points made in a more scientific way in previous and following 
chapters.
In fact, interviewed key actors were identified according to their activities and/or 
responsibilities held within their parties during relevant and specific periods in time. They 
were identified during the research for this study as their roles were referred to in intra­
party publications and/or the general literature on the parties as well as by 
recommendation from other interviewees.
Here, elite interviews - as described by George Moyser - provided additional 
information about actors motives, understandings and outlooks which help to explain 
actions and constraints in policy-making.434 In fact, talking to those in leadership positions 
became an excellent way of checking theory against their actual behaviour and evaluation, 
with questions being focused on the changes of individual actors policy beliefs (over time) 
and the judgement of their party's labour market policy and paradigm changes.
Hence, in this study elite interviewing has been used to gain a greater 
understanding of the behaviour and thoughts of long-term party political professionals,
433 Interviewees: Labour Party - John Braggins; David Hill; Dr Tony Wright; Lord (David) Lipsey; and Neil 
Kinnock. SPD - Bjom Engholm; Prof. Dr. Friedhelm Farthmann; Anke Fuchs; Prof. Dr. Peter Glotz; Dr. 
Thomas Meyer; Adi Ostertag; Helmut Rohde; Ottmar Schreiner; Dr. Sigrid Skarpelis-Sperk; and Dr. Hans- 
Jochen Vogel. See Appendix I for a more detailed description o f the positions held by the interviewed policy 
actors’, questions used and the key for analysis. Appendix II as a guide to the author’s questions.
434 Moyser, George - ‘Non-standardized interviewing in elite research’, in Burgess, Robert G. - Studies in 
Qualitative Methodology. Vol 1, JAI Press, Greenwich, 1988, p 114
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with responses being utilised as additional qualitative empirical data to verify the 
accuracy as well as the findings and conclusions drawn from other sources.
Describing the initial problems the Labour Party faced when entering opposition 
in 1979, David Hill believed that "the great problem was that the Labour Party's attitude 
towards the labour market, towards business, towards the market was very similar to the 
attitudes it had in 1945." In fact, Hill expressed furthermore his believe that this problem 
was only rectified when Tony Blair succeeded in changing the highly symbolic Clause IV 
of the party's constitution as this was "essentially the big statement about the relationship 
between government and the market".435 Similarly, Tony Wright argued that the Labour 
Party represented at that time "the state that was in retreat, the working class that was in 
retreat, the union movement", eventually ending up with "every idea that we 
had...[being] un-modern, anti-progressive in crucial ways, and deeply conservative..." as 
Labour "had become the party...instinctively against any change" which hence 
manoeuvred itself into "a debilitating position".436 This explained, according to Wright, 
why Labour governments were - at that stage - associated by the public with economic 
crises, while markets lost all their confidence in the ability of a Labour government to be 
able to manage successfully the economy.437
David Hill expanded on this by describing the Labour Party of the period between 
1976-1986 as holding on to the view "that people - by large - still had the same old values, 
still had the same old approach - essentially very high public spending, very high level of 
public ownership, because the Labour Party had been so introspective during those 10 
years and had spent so much time arguing with itself, it had lost track of the fact that out 
in the wide world things had changed dramatically."438 Hill concluded that "what was 
needed by the Labour Party was to be released from this stranglehold. And it required 
three election defeats before it really began to understand that it had to do something" 
and fundamentally change policies and structure.439
435 Interview with David Hill, London, 26/08/1999
436 Interview with Tony Wright, London, 01/02/2000
437 Interview with Tony Wright, London, 01/02/2000
438 Interview with David Hill, London, 26/08/1999
439 Interview with David Hill, London, 26/08/1999
225
Here, the SPD's former general secretary from 1981-87 Peter Glotz pointed out, 
that the most important motivation behind the party's policy change had been the 
recognition that conditions had changed and that old policy subscriptions could not be 
successfully applied any more. Here, he used the example of the French government 
under the leadership of Frangois Mitterrand in the early 1980s which attempt to 
implement a Keynesian inspired policy approach and failed as the approach had seized to 
be functional.440 Similarly, Anke Fuchs argued that 'after 16 years in opposition, we [the 
SPD] must face today's realities, and therefore old programmes may be of no use', 
concluding that 'reality is the true engine of policy change', although 'policy change does 
not take place without controversy and fractures which are often complicated 
developments.'441
Not surprisingly, most policy actors expressed during the interviews that the 
tension between changing conditions and traditional party approaches and beliefs 
together with electoral failure were the main factors for initiating shifts in personal as well 
as overall party policy approaches.
6.2.1. Actors evaluation of major influence components on party policy change
Actors were asked about the influence components they felt had been most 
influential in determining their parties programmatic reforms in LMP. Here, one of the 
most prominent responses found among the interviewees was that in addition to 
responding to the specifics of the domestic LMP situation as well as agenda's chosen by 
their national political opponents (in government), both the Labour Party as well as the 
SPD looked for new policy ideas and strategies intensively to their European social 
democratic sister parties that were 'electorally' successful.
Without wanting to engage in a discussion on the currently growing body of 
literature stressing the importance of 'policy transfer' processes in which knowledge of 
policies and strategies are used by one actor (government, country or party) and can 
become the foundation of policies and strategies developed by a different actor at a 
different time and/or place,442 the interviews with party actors clearly indicated that
440 Interview with Peter Glotz, Erfurt, 14/06/1999
441 Interview with Anke Fuchs, Bonn, 23/06/1999
442 For a comprehensive survey of ‘policy transfer’ literature see: Dolowitz, David P. and D. Marsh - ‘Who 
leams what from whom? A review of the policy transfer literature’, Political Studies. No 44, 1996, pp 343-57
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policy ideas' successfully applied by one social democratic party or government could 
become of substantial influence to another sister party. In other words, Labour as well as 
SPD policy actors confirmed that they had not only been looking abroad at other parties 
for policy and strategic ideas, but that the performance of other party's had had a distinct 
influence on their own policy preferences and perception of choices.
For example, Peter Glotz argued that during inner-party discussion processes 'one 
looks at what social democrats are doing in other countries such as Holland or England'. 
With regard to the fact that Gerhard Schroder succeeded within the SPD with his policy 
ideas against those of Oskar Lafontaine, Glotz explained that 'if there would have been an 
example of a country in which a policy approach envisaged by Lafontaine would have 
been a great success, SPD policy making actors would have embraced this approach.'443 
However, as this was not the case, a different more neo-liberal influenced approach 
succeeded to set the SPD's economic policy agenda.
This view was strongly supported by the SPD's labour market policy specialist Adi 
Ostertag, who argued that 'in regards to European labour market policies, one country 
looks at what the others are doing, and everybody searches for the good bits of one 
another.' In fact, according to Ostertag, the SPD's policy actors engaged in detailed 
research exercises in order to gain a good impression of what the precise policies 
developed by policy makers abroad entailed and how, for instance, 'Holland reduced 
unemployment, how have they done it in Denmark, or how the youth employment 
programme developed by the Labour Party in England works'. The answer's to these 
questions, as Ostertag explained, provided an enormous push to the SPD's policy making 
with many of the policy measures eventually adopted into the SPD's programme not 
having even existed 10 or 15 years ago.444
In addition to the search by policy makers for successful examples of policy 
making abroad, politicians are reliant on outside expertise as much as on those actors in 
society that lead public opinion. From the position of a decision making actor, Bjorn 
Engholm argued that 'politicians talking to economists will find that 99% of those people 
would not share the visions Oskar Lafontaine have held. In fact, Engholm feared that the 
'muliplicators' in today's national economy and macro-economy are only people that
443 Interview with Peter Glotz, Erfurt, 14/06/1999
444 Interview with Adi Ostertag, Bonn, 25/06/1999
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think policy only in one direction. Hence, Engholm argued that with this mix of 
information, data and analysis available that clearly favours the current neo-liberal status 
quo, policy makers must be understood when increasingly favouring a neo-liberal policy 
direction.445
This view was confirmed by the member of the SPD executive Sigrid Skarpelis- 
Sperk who expressed her belief that'a shift of paradigm took place within the heads of 
social democratic politicians which had something to do with the fact that people within 
the entire area of policy advice had turned7 towards a new paradigm.446
6.2.2. Changes in personal actors beliefs and their explanations
Another set of questions dealt with the changes of individual policy beliefs 
experienced by actors during the 1980s and 1990s. Actors were asked to indicate to what 
extent they thought their own beliefs had been predetermined by their party. Here we 
found a clear division between politicians who emphasised that their policy convictions 
had not changed to a great extent during the previous two decades, and those who 
explained that they have had to substantially change previously held beliefs and 
convictions.
One the one side we found politicians such as Adi Ostertag who insisted that by 
the later 1990s he still shared most of the major beliefs he had held during the 1980s, such 
as 7 the need for a reduction in weekly working hours as well as the fight in parliament for 
a formula that would distribute wealth in a more just manner/447 Similarly, Ottmar 
Schreiner insisted that his personal economic policy beliefs had 7not changed at all7 with 
7 the demand management aspect always having been naturally important to social 
democrats...together with aspects of social justice7.448
Labour Lord David Lipsey emphasised that it had not so much been his beliefs 
that had changed over time, but instead those of his party. In fact, he believed that while 
having been located on the right of his party's political spectrum during the 1980s, since
445 Interview with Bjom Engholm, Liibeck, 15/06/1999
446 Interview with Sigrid Skarpelis-Sperk, Bonn, 25/06/1999
447 Interview with Adi Ostertag, Bonn, 25/06/1999
448 Interview with Ottmar Schreiner, Bonn, 23/06/1999
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the mid-1990s he had begun to find himself increasingly on the left of his party on various 
policy topics.449
The SPD's former party chairman (1987-93) and 1983 'Kanzler'-candidate Hans- 
Jochen Vogel - along with most of the other social democratic party actors interviewed - 
expressed - not too surprisingly - his belief that 'the reasons for a change in his personal 
opinions had mainly been based on the given framework of policy options that had 
changed substantially during the previous 20 years', and here 'in particular in regards to 
the process of economic globalisation'.450 Therefore, Vogel argued that 'during the 1980s' 
he had been 'convinced that unemployment would not be such a difficult and long-term 
problem, while demand-management measures would be a more successful policy option 
to reduce unemployment.'451 However, by the 1990s he had revised those previously held 
beliefs.
In contrast to the above, Friedhelm Farthmann underlined a substantial change in 
his personal policy beliefs, emphasising as one reason for this - as he called it - 'the shock 
of globalisation'. Here, Farthmann described, how he negotiated on 'social policies in the 
past... with all my heart and that was basically focused on the battle of the inner-German 
distribution of wealth,' thinking during the negotiations about 'how much we could 
squeeze out of the companies', while aspects of international competitiveness or if 
'invested capital brought 1% or 5% or no profit at all' did not play part in those 
considerations.452 Here, Friedhelm Farthmann stated that he had fundamentally changed 
his personal policy convictions since the mid-1980s. With regard to LMPs, he underlined 
this by pointing out that he had 'thought in the past that unemployment could be dealt 
with -  or at least reduced -  by distributing work differently,' an idea on which he had also 
changed his mind.453
Similarly, under the leadership of Bjorn Engholm in the early 1990s, the SPD had 
adopted the 'Arbeit statt Arbeitslosigkeit' employment programme that had envisaged the
449 Interview with Lord Lipsey, London, 08/02/2000
450 Interview with Hans-Jochen Vogel, Miinchen, 21/06/1999
451 Interview with Hans-Jochen Vogel, Miinchen, 21/06/1999
452 Interview with Friedhelm Farthmann, Dusseldorf, 24/06/1999
453 Interview with Friedhelm Farthmann, Dusseldorf, 24/06/1999
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creation of 500000 new jobs within three years. This programme had contained 'deficit 
spending' and was modelled on the SPD's 1973 'Zukunfts Investitions-Programm' (ZIP). 
Talking about this programme in 1999, Bjorn Engholm expressed that he had previously 
held far 'more hope that the state would be able to reduce unemployment with the help of 
state spending programmes' even though he had 'never been a great fan of sole demand 
management programmes.'454
Labour Party veteran organiser John Braggins described how - in 1981 - he had been 
personally feeling rather "tribalist" and strongly "in favour of state ownership, 
nationalisation,...more powerful local authorities and public ventures... 1 while being at 
the same time "against private capital" and the state's "lack of control" over it.455 
However, explaining the process that initiated his personal move towards more moderate 
policy ideas, John Braggins described how under Neil Kinnock and Tony Blair he had 
become eventually "brave enough" to ask "why do you want to have state ownership" as 
"ownership in itself does not give you anything" only "a government trying to run 
industry, which it has no professional expertise in so doing."456 Hence, Braggins 
emphasised the importance of policy learning and how he realised that "what would have 
been an acceptable policy solution 20 years ago is no longer an acceptable."457 Neil 
Kinnock himself argued, that "the SPD and the Labour Party became [originally] the 
parties of public investment and public management...as a reaction against the huge 
deficiencies of profit-led capitalism." However, by the late 1970s "public ownership and 
control [had]...become an article of faith... [with] an element of conservative thinking 
[being] repelled, because it was ideological. When you got rid of the ideology of public 
bad - private good and viewed it pragmatically, you then had to ask yourself, yes, why is 
the state running this as a monopoly?"458
John Braggins used the example of how he realised by the mid-1990s that the party's 
"mission statement" in form of Clause IV - proposing common ownership - had been 
"great at the turn of the century, great in 1945" but meant nothing anymore in 1995. Hence,
454 Interview with Bjorn Engholm, Liibeck, 15/06/1999
455 Interview with John Braggins, London, 08/02/2000
456 Interview with John Braggins, London, 08/02/2000
457 Interview with John Braggins, London, 08/02/2000
458 Interview with Neil Kinnock, Brussels, 24/07/2000
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he realised how the party was, firstly, failing to "speak to the voters whose votes we 
wanted and needed to put us into government", while secondly the party had learn to 
"focus on what was really important and how we can make life better for a vast majority 
of the population."459
Overall, Labour Party as well as SPD party actors indicated strongly that they had 
either been forced to substantially change their policy beliefs in response to emerging 
socio-economic conditions or that their beliefs had remained the same, although 
previously used policy approaches to meet their visions had been amended to 
accommodate for substantially changed conditions.
6.2.3. Labour and SPD in office: The Blair/Schroder 'Third W ay/Neue M itte' paper
In order to evaluate outcomes from Labour's and the SPD's new policy making 
processes as well as changed economic policy direction, it is revealing to sample some of 
the views, interpretations and opinions from recent and former party actors on the widely 
discussed 1999 Blair/Schroder paper. In fact, at the time most of the interviews for this 
study were conducted (in mid-1999), the Blair/Schroder paper had only recently been 
published and was still strongly on the minds of most (in particular SPD) interviewees as 
a possible indicator of the future policy direction envisaged by the parties' leaderships.
Peter Glotz, although in favour of the 'paper', clearly recognised that the 
leadership had engaged in a new exclusive way of developing and proposing policies that 
he perceived as "a massive change within the SPD." Hence, Glotz feared that the party 
would react in a very negative manner, if "Gerhard Schroder develops policy papers in 
London without bothering to consult the basic value or programme commissions" of his 
party.460 In fact, this aspect of the papers development was also strongly criticised by the 
member of the SPD party executive - Ms Skarpelis-Sperk - who called the way it had been 
developed by the party leadership as a "coup'd'etat from the top."461
Thomas Meyer underlined furthermore that the paper's blunt message of 
demanding further 'liberal corrections' was generally not easily acceptable for continental 
social democrats. However, he also believed that the paper was predominantly intended 
to give an impulse, set a theme and symbolise the direction in which both parties' leaders
459 Interview with John Braggins, London, 08/02/2000
460 Interview with Peter Glotz, Erfurt, 14/06/1999
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envisaged party policy reforms to go. Hence, according to Meyer, the Blair/Schroder 
Paper had predominantly been intended by the leaderships "as a media-effective bang' 
rather than an attempt to set out future policy ideas in 'absolute terms.'462
The contents of the paper were criticised from various angles, with Hans-Jochen 
Vogel pointing out that it had failed to address 'essential questions' such as the fact that 
the market may be a very useful tool, but that 'for social and ecological considerations and 
outcomes, market decisions are of a rather blind nature'.463 Friedhelm Farthmann 
expressed his belief that the paper - although aimed into the right direction - was not 
concrete enough as it had been written in the highly ambiguous "Hombach'sche 
Schonsprache" ('art' language of one of the authors of the paper - Schroder's adviser Bodo 
Hombach).464 Similarly, the former party leader Bjorn Engholm criticised the paper for 
reminding him of "political lyricism" that confirmed the acceptance by social democracy 
of the total dominance of the market.465
In fact, the SPD's social policy veteran - Rudolf Drefiler - angrily accused the 
authors' of the paper of failing to point out any positive evaluation of the past 
achievements of the social democratic and trade union movements. He also criticised the 
paper for having being dominated by its emphasis on style, arguing bitterly that the 
Marxist notion of "Sein bestimmt das Bewufitsein" (being determines consciousness) had 
been changed to "Design bestimmt das BewufBtsein" (design determines consciousness).466
In fact, DreEler disputed the fact that the implementation of Keynesian theory was 
wrong (including deficit spending), but argued instead that 'politicians had been too 
fearful to use the theory in its entirety, similarly to the way today's politicians held a one 
sided view of the macroeconomy while ignoring the fact that employers also have a duty
461 Interview with Sigrid Skarpelis-Sperk, Bonn, 25/06/1999
462 “Ich verstehe das Blair / Schroder Papier als medialen Paukenschlag und nicht als ganz so pur zu 
verstehende Thesen.” (Interview with Thomas Meyer, Bonn, 24/06/1999)
463 Interview with Hans-Jochen Vogel, Miinchen, 21/06/1999
464 Interview with Friedhelm Farthmann, Dusseldorf, 24/06/1999
465 Interview with Bjorn Engholm, Liibeck, 15/06/1999
466 DreBler, Rudolf - ‘Eine linke Rechtskurve, kann es die geben?’, Frankfurter Rundschau. Dokumentation, 
25/06/99, p 12
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to sustain societal foundations and responsibilities that have nothing to do with the one­
dimensional thinking of shareholder-value/467
Overall, actors' evaluation of the reasons behind the development of such a 
document varied widely. Anke Fuchs felt that one of the prime reasons behind the 
Blair/Schroder paper had been the fact, that Gerhard Schroder wanted to use the 'Blair 
bonus' - as she called it - to help him move policies within his own party, however clearly 
underestimating the negative response he would encounter within the SPD to this kind of 
proposed policy changes.468
In contrast, Sigrid Skarpelis-Sperk remarked that she thought the paper had been 
designed for "British home consumption", as a large part of it had nothing to do with the 
actual economic and social situation of Germany.469
In contrast to the SPD's economic specialist Skarpelis-Sperk, Labour's former spin- 
doctor David Hill argued that the Blair/Schroder paper had been predominantly "written 
for German consumption" in the sense that by Tony Blair "doing a joint paper with 
Schroder gave a clear signal that there was a new type of social democratic partnership 
developing" with Tony Blair always "looking for ways to influence...[and] drive messages 
forward by whatever means he can".470 This view was confirmed by party veteran worker 
John Braggins who pointed out that "in terms of the Labour Party's relationship with 
Europe, there is an inner drive to want to...lead the modernisation of the left of centre in 
Europe.471
Finally, in contrast to the lively reactions to the paper experienced within the SPD, 
Labour's Tony Wright expressed that "there was little political discussion here, except in 
some political circles which - I think - tended to see it [the Blair Schroder paper] as 
marking a right wing version of a third way position."472 Hence, Tony Wright concluded
467 DreBler, Rudolf - ‘Eine linke Rechtskurve, kann es die geben?’, Frankfurter Rundschau, Dokumentation, 
25/06/99, p 12
468 Interview with Anke Fuchs, Bonn, 23/06/1999
469 Interview with Sigrid Skarpelis-Sperk, Bonn, 25/06/1999
470 Interview with David Hill, London, 26/08/1999
471 Interview with John Braggins, London, 08/02/2000
472 Interview with Tony Wright, London, 01/02/2000
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that the statement had been "a very neo-liberal paper" and was "probably the furthest 
point that social democracy has so far travelled in becoming at least in part neo-liberal, 
giving praise to the market...[as there]... was little suggestion that the market works 
against the public interest."473
6.3. Conclusions from actors beliefs, perceptions and observations
The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed the greatest transformation in socio-economic 
conditions for the policy-making of political parties since the end of the WW 2. The 
Labour Party and the SPD - in opposition for most of this period - have been eventually 
reacting to those challenges in different ways and with different - although increasingly 
more converging - policy approaches.
What has been the most surprising finding from the interviews conducted for this 
study with Labour Party and SPD policy actors is that motivations, thoughts and 
reflections on the transformation of conditions, party responses as well as the actors' 
hesitance to abandon traditionally held policy ideas as well as personal beliefs have been 
quite similar, even in spite of the fact that they have come from different parties as well as 
different wings within them. This kind of finding has been confirmed by D. Mach and W. 
Wesolowski, who have also been able to show in their study on politicians during times of 
transformation that a "fundamental similarity of direction in the perception of aims occurs 
among politicians in times in which they are confronted with systematic conditional 
transformation."474
What remains is the question, did politicians agree with the hypothesis of this 
study, did an institutionalised paradigm shift take place and was this something that had 
been recognised by the politicians at the time of change? Here, we can refer to Peter Glotz 
who described how he had already been urging in 1982 (together with many others) for 
necessary changes to the German welfare state system. These demands were, as he put it, 
"always pushed aside by the party [SPD] as it did not want change...[and instead]... 
wanted to stick to the classic ideas of wealth redistribution," an institutional behaviour
473 Interview with Tony Wright, London, 01/02/2000
474 Mach, Dogan W. and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski - ‘Politiker in Zeiten der Transformation: 
“Transformational correctness” oder divergierende Wahmehmungen’, Berliner Journal fur Soziologie, Vol 9, 
No 3, 1999, p 395
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pattern that must be interpreted as confirming the party's pre-scriptive institutionalised 
paradigm.475
Things have changed since, and according to Peter Glotz a shift had taken place in 
the SPD's economic paradigm. However, Glotz explained this as 'a political process is a 
process of opinion formation' from Keynes to monetarism that has naturally been 
reflected within the SPD.476 In fact, even though the SPD had not formulated a 
substantially new monetarist position, the party's aim to adopt - as Bodo Hombach called 
it - 'supply side policy from the left' marked a significant difference to the party's classic 
'deficit spending' policies of Keynesianism.477
Here, Peter Glotz used the example of Oskar Lafontaine and his insistence - until 
his resignation as finance minister - of favouring traditional Keynesian policy positions as 
prove, how difficult it is for party actors to undergo a transition of paradigm as 'many 
want to hold on to old positions'.478
Here, Glotz was also talking about his party colleague and current vice-president 
of the Bundestag Anke Fuchs, who agreed that 'a shift in paradigm had been accepted' 
within her party during the 1990s. However she still expressed substantial doubt about 
those changes, as she admitted that the shift was "something I have not quite accepted yet 
even though one will have to", in particular considering that the newly adopted economic 
policies mean for instance 'that business has been' - as Fuchs described - 'mostly freed 
from carrying out common duties' such as 'to offer training' as part of this shift.479
Opinions from both parties' policy actors on the policy direction in which Labour 
and the SPD were expected to move have been surprisingly similar. SPD policy maker and 
academic Thomas Meyer appealed for the need of consistency as he argued that "the 
comprehensive message of classical social democracy has always been that there is and 
must be a guarantee to a decent living for each individual, irrespective of his economic
475 Interview with Peter Glotz, Erfurt, 14/06/1999
476 Also see: Dombusch, Rudi - ‘Eine einzigartige Prosperitat’, Per Spiegel. No 24, June 1999, pp 132-47
477 Interview with Peter Glotz, Erfurt, 14/06/1999
478 Interview with Peter Glotz, Erfurt, 14/06/1999
479 Interview with Anke Fuchs, Bonn, 23/06/1999
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fortunes, because the risks of the labour market are predominantly created by its way of 
functioning and individual failure."480
Similarly, Labour Party veteran and former spin-doctor David Hill concluded that 
the most important aspect of Labour's changes in the late-80s and early 90s had been "not 
to lose track of its values" as the party's success would rely on its ability to keep 
"traditional values in a modern setting."481 Likewise, Tony Wright expected that the new 
make or break issue for the success of social democratic parties in general would be their 
ability not to be associated with economic crises, but instead to successfully manage "a 
capitalist economy."482
Overall, the above collected views of events and interpretations from relevant 
policy actors and party insiders about the significance of factors that have determined 
their parties policy making choices offer some interesting additional detail from an 
"inside party perspective" to this study. Here, the aim has been to enrich and validate the 
points and arguments made in the previous chapters and to add a "practitioner's 
dimension" to the likely variety of policy actors' opinions and their behaviour. At the 
same time, however, this has been an attempt to clarify common themes and experiences 
that are i.e. have been shared among them. Only after having looked in greater detail at 
actors - that are after all a vital component in this study - can we now move on to look at 
the quantitative content analysis of party documents before being able to draw safely 
conclusions from the analysis of the various theoretical and empirical findings in this 
thesis, as the above "party inside view" does not contradict, but instead strengthens the 
arguments made in the previous and following chapters.
480 Meyer, Thomas - The Third Wav - some cross-roads. Working Papers I, Forum Scholars for European 
Social Democracy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, May 1999, p 12
481 Interview with David Hill, London, 26/08/1999
482 Interview with Tony Wright, London, 01/02/2000
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Chapter 7: The quantitative content analysis of party programmes 
and 'major' mid-term policy statements
7.1. Party programmes and statements - aims and meaning
7.1.1. The role of election manifestos /  programmes
7.1.2. 'Inside' and 'outside' use of party programmes
7.1.3. The role of language in party programmes
7.1.4. The rationality of party politics and programmes
7.2. The SPD's and Labour Party's programme development structure
7.3. The development of an analytical framework for a cross-national study
7.3.1. The comparative approach
7.4. The development of a Coding Frame
7.4.1. The use of Content Analysis
7.4.2. Units of Content Analysis
7.5. Requirements for Content Analysis
7.5.1. 'Labour Market Policies' in party programmes /  statements
7.6. A coding frame for Labour Market Policies
7.6.1. Extensions and specifications of the coding frame
7.6.2. The Basic Research Design
7.6.3. Classifying Labour Market policies
7.6.4. The Labour Market Policy frame design
7.6.5. Collapsing the LMP coding frame
7.7. The recognition and use of 'major' mid-term statements
7.7.1. The specific features of mid-term party statements
7.7.2. 'Major' mid-term statements as policy templates
7.7.3. Further operational procedures
7.8. Adding qualitative components to the quantitative approach of programme analysis
7.8.1. Other data chosen for cross-referencing the collected quantitative data
The aim of this chapter is to explain the methods chosen and developed for the 
comparative analysis of the parallel developments and changes of Labour Market Policies 
(LMPs) advocated by the Labour Party and the SPD during the period between 1979/80 
and 1997/ 98/483
As a basic research design, a coding frame for the quantitative analysis of party 
election programmes, manifestos and party platforms as well as 'major' mid-term 
statements on LMPs has been developed. This chapter will cover the methods for data 
collection, coding and content analysis in order to account for and justify the decisions 
taken on the quantification and classification of party policy statements. In addition, a 
short account of the operational procedures involved will be given.
483 The time period chosen for this study and hence the analysis o f the party programmes policy documents 
contains the years the Labour Party and the SPD spent in opposition, starting with their final election 
manifestos in office which also marked the beginning o f their periods in opposition while finishing with the 
election manifestos which marked the return to government office. In the case o f the Labour Party this means, 
we are investigating the period from 1979 to 1997 and in the case o f the SPD the period between 1980 and 
1998. As the SPD was forced into opposition during mid-term in 1982 and therefore had spend already one 
year in opposition before the general election of 1983, we have included the SPD’s 1980s manifesto in the 
analysis even though the party remained in government office after the election. As the Labour Party’s 1979
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However, before looking in detail at the approach used for the analysis of party 
policy developments, we have to clarify first of all the role and impact of party 
statements/manifestos and assess the various forms of policy programmes that have been 
used by the two parties in question.
7.1. Party programmes and statements - aims and meaning
Wolfgang Luthardt has described party policy programmes as documents in 
which parties normatively define the pillars of their understanding of politics and society 
and in which they set out their medium- and long-term policy perspectives and perceived 
own role and aims within it.484 We can add to this view the more pragmatic description of 
the role of programmes by Richard Rose, who sees election manifestos as "pieces of 
political journalism" with the purpose to persuade the electorate to vote for them by 
"evoking partisan slogans and symbols" and denouncing political opponents.485 
Programmes express parties political preferences and sustain the central mechanism of 
ensuring meaningful choices for the electors as political parties' programmes differ in 
content. Here, Lipset and Rokkan have rightly argued, as mentioned earlier, that in 
western democracies "voters are typically faced with choices among historically given 
'packages' of programmes, commitments, outlooks, and, sometimes, Weltanschauungen" 
expressed with the help of programmes and pledges by parties and presented to voters 
with the task of offering the most appealing bundle of issues and policies to the 
electorate.486 In fact, "the willingness and ability of parties to carry out campaign pledges 
is a central concern for democratic theory".487 Here, pledges in party documents 
"generally present the party's views of the history of a certain problem's development and 
characteristics, while also emphasising its importance and priority... [and] what 
specifically is to be done about the problem is implied or minimised" by parties offering
and the SPD’s 1980s programmes were both written and developed before the parties lost government power, 
they mark the best starting point for this comparative analysis.
484 Luthardt, Wolfgang - ‘Uberlegungen zur Programmaktivitat und -innovation der SPD’, in Schmid, Joseph 
und Heinrich Tiemann (ed) - Ausbruche: die Zukunftsdiskussion in Parteien, Verbanden und Kirchen, SP- 
Verlag, Marburg 1990, p 153-54
485 Rose, Richard -  Do parties make a difference?. MacMillan Press, London, 1984, p 61
486 Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan (ed) - Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Free Press, New York, 1967, p 2
487 Royed, Terry J. and Stephen A. Borrelli - ‘Parties and economic policy in the USA’, Party Politics. No 1, 
1999, p 115
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information on what future action can be expected by them when holding office.488 In fact 
- as rightly described by Richard Rose - "party manifestos are not so much in conflict 
about how to resolve commonly perceived problems, as they are statements of differing 
priorities for government action"489 that allow the measurement of party policy positions 
emphasised in their programmes documenting "parties desired portrait of image".490
7.1.1. The role of election manifestos /  programmes
Laver and Hunt have discussed three possible methods for determining issue 
positions of political parties, namely the analysis of party documents, the use of mass 
public opinion surveys and the use of expert judgements.491 For this study, we have 
chosen the analysis of party documents as it holds the significant advantage for the 
analyst to rely on information and data directly provided by the parties themselves, while 
data from mass public opinion surveys as well as expert judgements often suffers from the 
problem of relying on public perceptions and perceived party images rather than on 
concrete factual evidence (not to mention the severe difficulties faced when collecting and 
analysing data from mass opinion surveys or expert judgements).
While dealing with the development and adjustments of Labour market policies by 
the Labour Party and SPD, we assume that political parties - in general - take manifestos 
and policy statements very seriously and regard them as manifestations of intended 
government policies.
The writing of a party manifesto consists of two exercises. A party must be able to 
develop and agree upon policies proposed in the manifesto, while having to predict at the 
same time which policies may be able to gain the support of the electorate. Hence, the 
programme drafting process can sometimes become a somewhat painful exercise with the 
content of manifestos sometimes clearly reflecting the state of inner-party conditions. 
Party actors who are responsible for the drafting of the documents that set out policy 
guidelines for the future are prone to disagree on issues such as the strategy necessary to
488 Klingemann et al - Parties, Policies, and Democracy. Westview Press, Oxford, 1994, p 25
489 Rose, Richard - Do parties make a difference?, MacMillan Press, London, 1984, p 68
490 Jahn, Detlef and Matt Henn - 4 The ‘New’ Rhetoric of New Labour in Comparative Perspective: A Three 
Country Discourse Analysis’, West European Politics, Vol 23, No 1 (January 2000), p 37
491 Laver, M . and B. Hunt - Party Policy Competition, Routledge, New York, 1992
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win an election, the prioritisation of pressing issues, how they should be tackled and how  
they should be translated into the programme, often reflecting different inner party 
factions and tensions.
Furthermore, high ranking party politicians usually have an interest in 
formulating policies in vague or cautious terms in order to minimise inner party disunity 
on policy issues while wanting to keep many options open for possible negotiations over 
their implementation.492 In contrast, party activists tend to demand more explicit wordings 
and precise commitments from party policy statements. Finally, election manifestos - until 
recently - have often been drafted, agreed upon and published against tight deadlines 
with little time for negotiating policy compromises.493 Even thought there has been a 
recent significant change in this area with the development of roll-over or permanent 
election programmes (as taken up by Blair and Schroder), the often rushed development 
in the past provides some explanation why election manifestos make hardly an exciting 
read.
It is conceivable that only a small amount of the electorate attempts to read entire 
manifestos never mind reading the manifestos of numerous parties and comparing them 
to make an informed electoral choice. Peoples choices of voting for a specific party rely 
often on numerous factors such as their ability to identify with one of the parties; the 
degree of emotional and traditional attachment to a party; support for a party's broad 
policy direction and image; its ideology; merit of past record and 'policy baggage'; a 
party's positions on certain single issues; and finally voters support for a range of party 
policy positions expressed in a party's manifesto.
Hence, apart from the precise changes in policy contents, the above mentioned 
factors must also be taken into account by party actors who influence and decide upon 
policy choices and priorities.
The precise role of party (electoral) programmes, the motivations behind their 
development and their effect on the electorate are open to controversy. While the analysis
492 Luebbert, Gregory - Comparative Democracy: Policy-making and government coalitions in Europe and 
Israel, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p 46
493 This has been a particular problem within the UK, where the government (party) is able to call a general 
election date within four weeks. However, with the recent introduction o f rolling party manifestos and long­
term manifesto development and pledge planning, the time factor has lost its significance.
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of programmes and their development can be expected to offer an insight into the 
importance and function of programmes and manifestos, political scientist have not given 
this too much attention. This may be due to the fact that the precise impact and the 'value' 
of party programmes on electoral outcomes cannot be empirically measured. Therefore, 
academic research has dealt predominantly with theoretical questions surrounding the 
aims and motivations that can be linked to party programmes and their formulation 
processes (e.g. Downs 1957, Kitschelt 1994).
However, during the next chapters this study attempts to answer, if the 
formulation of policies has been influenced by the decline of the Keynesian paradigm and 
if eventual policy path changes by political parties indicate inevitability an overall change 
of a party's economic paradigm. In addition, we attempt to answer the question, if the low  
expectations and opinion often ascribed to party programmes by political science research 
are justified or not, or if their analysis reveals firm policy trends and detail of parties 
policy developments?
An ambivalent view of the role of party programmes can be identified. On the one 
hand, parties spend a great deal of time and resources on the development of programmes 
and the formulation of the policy contents. In fact, in Germany parties are even 
constitutionally obliged to play 'a role in the formation of the public political will' and to 
express their 'aims in written political programmes'.494 No doubt, election manifestos are 
viewed by the public as important documents which help to evaluate parties policy 
positions and assist the electorates decision for party preferences. However, it is not only 
the public that takes interest in programmes. Civil servants are also certain to study 
election manifestos and use them - in case of opposition party manifestos - as a guide to 
policies that they might need to prepare if there is a change of government, while they 
must regard policies advocated in the manifesto of the party in power of particular 
importance as the party's government in office is legitimised and electorally bound to act 
upon programme pledges and with it, its civil servants.495
494 Grundgesetz, Artikel 21, Abs.l; Parteiengesetz, Paragraph 1 and 6 (1 ) (BGB1.I), also see 
Parteiendemokratie, Bundesministerium fur politische Bildung, Bonn, 1997
495 Here, Joel Aberbach et al have been pointing at civil servants having to regularly persuade politicians to 
confront “vague” political programmatic “goals with intractable facts” and practicable ways to implement
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In fact, programmes and statements exhibit political intentions, ideas and goals of 
parties, and are often used as a point of reference by politicians and voters as well as the 
media while it is a certain fact that the political opponent will study programmes 
intensively. Even if they are not read by many voters, Hans-Jochen Vogel pointed out that 
parties will still have to develop programmes and find a policy consensus during that 
process that may have to last for many years.496 Furthermore, even if many party 
managers increasingly belief that election manifestos play a minor role compared to 
advertised political communication and that possibly two thirds of the electorate may be 
reachable with staged TV campaigns, 'there is still that one third of the electorate that 
wants ideas, arguments and visions and staged electoral communication/497
On the other hand, political scientists as well as the public seem to perceive party 
election manifestos as documents which must be read with great care as they contain 
rather opinionated statements and hold the intent to advertise a party rather than 
intending to reflect a true assessment of current economic or political circumstances. From 
this follows, that programmes are not necessarily taken at face value with readers 
searching for any clues between the lines. However, the ambivalent image and role 
accredited to programmes emphasises the important need to clarify their significance and 
the implications and information they hold in respect to the overall development of 
parties self-description and hence their own relevance in an ever changing political 
environment. The questions that can be addressed with the help of the analysis of party 
programmatic developments include:
1. Does the process of party programme formulation and development enables the analyst 
to link the state of parties to the actual content of their policy documents?
them. (Aberbach, J. D. et al - Bureaucrats and politicians in Western Democracies. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1981, p 93); while Robert Pyper has been stressing that “ ministers are expected to give 
reasonable consideration to the policy advice given by civil servants” even though “they are not obliged to 
accept this advice.” (Pyper, R. - The British Civil Service. Prentice Hall, Hemel Hempstead, 1995, p 81). In 
fact, Klaus von Beyme observed that a change in government may entail consequences o f personnel ‘rotation’ 
affecting the higher levels o f the German civil services - even though civil servants perceive themselves en 
grow  as politically neutral. These conditions certainly contribute to the interest o f civil servants in 
governmental change and hence the policy programmes and proposals pledged by ‘major’ parties. (Beyme, 
Klaus von - Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Piper, iiberarbeitete 8. Auflage, 1996, p 
294-99)
496 Interview with Hans-Jochen Vogel, Miinchen, 21/06/99
497 Interview with Thomas Meyer, Bonn, 24/06/99
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2. What is the role of environmental factors such as the changes in the economic and 
political system as well as the continuous loss of elections on party policy formation 
processes. Furthermore, how are new challenges integrated in party policy agendas?
3. Finally, how do party policy makers assess the success or failure of their programmatic 
strategy? Is the time, energy and money spend on programme development and 
modernisation compensated by the expected gains? Are they able to perceive and learn 
from their mistakes?
In order to answer those questions, we have to differentiate between three 
different types of party policy statements, which are available for the analysis of party 
policy change. First of all there are the 'long-term' policy statements such as basic party 
programme or party constitutions, which are developed or changed very infrequently. 
They define the party profile and legitimacy, long-term policy goals, aims, values and 
ideological principles. Long-term statements are meant to lay down general guiding 
principles and belief patterns to determine the direction of more pragmatic 'medium-' and 
'short term' policy-making, and their development usually includes various years of 
preparation and inner-party discussion exercises - such as witnessed in the case of the 
Labour Party's Policy Review Process and the SPD's preparations for its Berlin 
Programme - before a 'long-term' programme is agreed upon and adopted. However, 
party policy aims and solutions advocated in these long-term statements often lack 
preciseness and leave plenty of room for interpretation in order to offer party policy 
makers of the day a high degree of flexibility when having to react fast and develop more 
precise medium or short term policies in response to policy challenges.
However, as a basis for the quantitative analysis of programmes, 'medium' term 
electoral programmes and 'major' party statements are of greater use in particular if one is 
investigating the changes in a specific policy area such as Labour Market Policy over a 
time-span of twenty years, as this requires the analysis of more frequent and detailed as 
well as responsive and therefore more transient party statements of policies advocated 
and proposed by the parties. In other words, policy statements given by parties at 
medium-term intervals (every two to four years) reflect in greater detail programmatic 
changes and reveal parties medium-term strategic considerations as well as the overall
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political and economic circumstances which were present at the time of policy formation. 
Both kinds of programmatic statements contain pledges for medium-term action, 
something which is often referred to in the German literature as 'Aktionsprogramme', i.e. 
programmes of action (in contrast to statements dealing with long term aims, vision or 
ideology) as well as general election programmes.498 
The properties of those 'medium' statements can be described as:
1. Programmes and statements are often developed for a precise purposes, such as 
elections or to offer and pledge in depth policy approaches and solutions for topical 
problems.
2. From this follows, that medium term statements often offer precise policy approaches, 
time-frames and even detailed allocation of pledged resources to address policy concerns.
3. Medium statements attempt to appeal to the reader as informative, realistic and 
pragmatic in order to gain a necessary degree of credibility to meet the statements 
intended purpose.
4. Statements should contain a list of carefully co-ordinated, interacting policy pledges 
which work as a whole instead of a list of random pledges. Only this way will it be 
possible to assess, if single aims and pledges; their ranking order; and function can be 
combined to form an overall policy approach.499
Finally, a third category of party statements contains the expression of policy aims, 
responses and opinions that are part of the parties running of day to day politics. These 
kind of often semi-official party statements on policies include press releases; statements 
by various party bodies and from rebuttal units; leading politicians etc. responding to 
current and topical needs where fast; and precise or explanatory (mainly short in length) 
communications to the public and press are required Although these statements have 
been looked at and will be added to the assessment and analysis of the changes of 
medium term 'action' election manifestos and policy statements to offer a more 
comprehensive overall picture, they solely by themselves fail to provide sufficient ground, 
depth and consistency for the analysis of party policy change.
498 Flohr, Heiner - Parteiprogramme in der Demokratie, Schwartz, Gottingen, 1968, p 70
499 Flohr, Heiner - Parteiprogramme in der Demokratie, Schwartz, Gottingen, 1968, p 90
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7.1.2. 'Inside' and 'outside' use of party programmes
When looking at the role of programmes, we can furthermore differentiate 
between the impact they have on the 'internal' live of parties and the use of programmes 
as a tool to present parties' ideas and aims to the 'outside' i.e. wider public. This 
differentiation between 'inside' and 'outside' use of party programmes has been borrowed 
from Heino Kaack's study of the history and structure of the German party system, but 
can be easily applied within a wider cross-national context.
Functions of party programmes aimed at the 'inside' of parties include their 
general usefulness in setting out binding party policy guidelines and principles, which 
party members are obliged to adhere and also use as a basis for their political activities 
and judgements. This role has been numerously confirmed in discussions with party 
actors such as Anke Fuchs who argued, for instance, that 'election programmes reflect the 
current state of inner-party discussions and are for everybody which engages in election 
campaigning a minimum of recourse of binding values as they are a summary of the up to 
date state of the party's specific messages.'500 This is also true if party policy makers have 
tried to avoid to address certain contentious policy issues in their party programmes. In 
fact, Leonard Ray has been pointing towards reasons such as the low salience of an issue 
for a party, the absence of a clear party position on a specific issue as well as internal 
divisions or inner party dissent over a policy area that may lead to the avoidance of a 
party addressing a specific policy or policy area within their programme.501 Here, 
manifestos themselves do not permit a determination of which, if any, of these 
interpretations applies. Hence, in order to explain and interpret the reasons behind 
changes in parties programme policy emphasis, we have used additional qualitative and 
contextual information in order to explain why issues may have been mentioned or were 
avoided in the programmes under investigation.
Consistent with this, Friedhelm Farthmann has been pointing out that in his 
experience a successful election campaign must be based on a party appearing united, 
something for which a widely agreed 'programme and programmatic commitments offer 
an indispensable framework'.502 Hence, ideally programmes guide the identification of
500 Interview with Anke Fuchs, Bonn, 23/06/99
501 Ray, Leonard - ‘Measuring party orientation towards European integration: Results from an expert 
survey’, European Journal o f Political Research. Vol 36, No 2 (October 1999), p 285
502 Farthmann, Friedhelm - Blick voraus im Zorn. ECON Taschenbuch Verlag, Dusseldorf, 1997, p 15
245
members with their party as they refine and emphasise political beliefs that are 
consensually held within the party.
However, programmes can be used (and abused) by the party leadership 
attempting to control the party organisation and its members as programmes serve as the 
common denominator. However, the final interpretation of its precise meaning falls 
usually to the party leadership, which gains a decisive advantage in determining what 
policies should be advocated. Here, Richard Topf - also a keen advocate of the 'inside' and 
'outside' functions of programmes - has been arguing that manifestos provide a 
leadership elected into power "with a mandate to carry out the policies set in the 
manifesto" enabling them to claim legitimacy for the policies they pledged to 
implement.503 In fact, party leaders gain the ability to claim legitimacy for their policy 
ideas even against the wishes of fractions within their own party as they have been 
elected by a majority of voters to implement the policies advocated in the party's 
manifesto.
Finally, Kaack has argued that programmes offer party leadership and members 
the ability to legitimise their political actions as they are able to point out the fact, that 
they acted according to policies set out in a party programme that were agreed by 
important party decision making bodies.504 However, Kaack's generalisations on the 
'inside' role of programmes are not as clear cut as he makes them out to be. For instance, 
examples such as the formation of the Labour Party's general election manifesto of 1983 - 
whose contents were clearly driven by a minority of party activists than by the majority of 
the party leadership - indicates, that generalisations on various 'inner' party roles of 
programmes are not necessarily appropriate and that exceptions are part of the rule.
As described earlier in greater debts, the 'outside' functions played by party 
programmes are far more straight forward. Party programmes have the purpose to 
advertise party policies, enhance a party's public perception as well as help to appeal to
503 Topf, Richard - ‘ Party Manifestos’, in Heath, A. et al - Labour’s Last Chance?, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 
1994, p 150
504 Kaack, Heino - Geschichte und Struktur des Deutschen Parteiensystems, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 
1971, p 403
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the electorate and increase a parties share of votes at elections (to gain a majority). 
Programmes also have the role of helping the electorate to identify specific party profiles 
in order to enable the voter to distinguish among various party policies. From this follows, 
that programmes do not only emphasise the will of parties to compete with one another, 
but programmes often set out the political battle ground and express political demands on 
which conflict-lines with other parties can be based.505
7.1.3. The role of language in party programmes
Party programmes reflect (possibly increasingly) the role language plays in the 
playing field of party competition. Although the assumption of the sociologist Helmut 
Schelsky (1974) that "the struggle for power is a struggle for the dominance of language, 
with those who can decide upon the words used in the daily political conflict emerging as 
the winners' appears to be slightly exaggerated, there is a certain degree of truth in his 
observation that the control over language plays a crucial factor in today's processes of 
party competition, and hence in the use of language in party programmes and therefore 
the communication of policy contents.506
The ability of a party to dominate and 'occupy' key policy areas and use key words 
and phrases can be decisive in the electoral contest. Here, programmes are of vital 
importance, as the "provide the territory for political argument".507 The increasing 
occurrence of so-called 'sound bites' in politics or the linking of party profiles with a range 
of 'positive' sounding words and phrases, such as the Labour Party's excessive use of the 
words 'modernisation' and 'new' during the British 1997 general election campaign show 
the power words hold over party imaging.508 Other examples include the SPD's attempt to 
claim to be the 'Neue Mitte' i.e. the 'new' middle ground of the German political spectrum 
which aims to leave the electorate with connotations about the SPD such as 'balanced',
505 Kaack, Heino - Geschichte und Struktur des Deutschen Parteiensystems. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 
1971, p 402
506 Schelsky, Helmut - Deutsche Zeitung, 12/04/1974 (“Wer die Sprachherrschaft in der unmittelbaren 
aktuellen Politik erwirbt, wer die Wortfelder besetzen kann in denen die tagesfalligen Konflikte ausgetragen 
werden. Wer hier dem anderen die Worte vorschreiben kann oder vorreden kann, hat schon gesiegt.”) cited 
in, Fletcher, I. and H. E. Richter (ed) - Worter machen keine Politik, Rowolt Taschenbuch Verlag, Reinbek, 
1976, p 39
507 Interview with Tony Wright, London, 01/02/00
508 Fairclough, Norman - New Labour, new language?, Routledge, London, 2000
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'changed/moved' and 'non-extremist' while the political opponents are 'imbalanced' and 
'immoderate' in comparison.
These few examples clearly indicate that language plays a greater role in politics 
than just being a tool to transmit messages of content. The ability of parties to adopt sound 
bites and occupy issues which stick to the conscience of the electorate can be of decisive 
importance. This has, for instance been clearly shown by the Labour Party's and SPD's 
successful adoption of five simple and short pledges (published on credit card sized 
pledge cards during their 1997/98 campaign), which occupied these chosen policy areas 
with clear policy commitments and suggested in addition a greater degree of party 
accountability towards those pledges. Furthermore, the fact that parties have recognised 
the important role of language in advertising themselves and transmitting their image and 
message to the electorate is clearly underlined by parties inclination to commit increasing 
amounts of resources to the marketing efforts of 'sound-bite' messages.
In addition, the Labour Party and SPD - in line with other parties - have 
substantially increased their effectiveness (throughout the 1990s) in dealing with the 
media - as the media has been identified by party strategists as being of prior importance 
when it comes to the transmission of messages to the electorate. Overall, the use of words 
and language by parties in their programmes and for the transmission of image to the 
electorate must not be underestimated and plays a decisive factor in parties ability to sell 
policy contents to the voters.
7.1.4. The rationality of party politics and programmes
The degree to which the programmatic policy choices of parties as well as the 
electoral choices of voters are primarily led by economically rational considerations 
remains a contentious issue.
Anthony Downs economic theory of democracy is a prime example for academic 
research into the role and meaning of party programmes using party manifestos to prove 
theoretical assumptions on party behaviour without attempting to analyse actual 
programme contents, their development processes or policy changes that have taken place 
over time. Downs hypotheses on the behaviour of parties are based on the rational 
behaviour of party actors as well as the electorate and have had an immense impact on the 
world of academia.
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Downs7 argued that voters7 preferences are formed independently of parties7 
interests and beliefs. According to this view, political parties use policy programmes only 
as a means of gaining power, but do not aim to win government office in order to 
implement previously designed policy programmes or to serve specific interest groups. In 
the rather controversial words of Downs, "...politicians...never seek office as a means of 
carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office per 
se. They treat policies purely as a means...to attain the income, prestige, and power which 
comes from being in office."509 According to this view, programmes must be discounted as 
a catalogue of pledges that have been presumed by politicians to find the favour of the 
majority of the electorate as most voters perceive to be better off under one set of 
proposed policies than under those proposed by other parties.
The attempt to assess party politics with the help of an economic theory has gained 
further credibility by the fact that parties are increasingly using market research 
techniques and marketing strategies to enhance their image and electoral performance.510 
Even the publication of party manifestos and major-mid-term statements has evolved 
nowadays "into occasions carefully planned to exploit the resource of the mass media to 
best effect" with marketing professionals having been recruited by the parties to improve 
programmes that can be increasingly read "both as a series of highlighted headlines" or 
77as lengthy, business-like reports77.511 Here, parties focus more and more on the "style of 
manifestos77 when developing programmes with the "heavy involvement in the final 
drafting processes of policy advisers and ex-political journalists, often working directly 
with the party leader" becoming increasingly the rule.512
Hence, parties7 attempt to present and popularise themselves in their programmes 
(sometimes independent of the actual programme contents). Therefore, the role of 
programmes can be compared to the way in which marketing influences consumer 
preferences by attempting to encourage consumers to purchase products that they would
509 Downs, Anthony - An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957, p 28
510 In the case o f the SPD, one of the first major attempts to use modem techniques to enhance the SPD’s 
electoral performance was a study by the Forschungsprojekt des Vorstandes der SPD called Planungsdaten 
fur die Mehrheitsfahigkeit der SPD - zusammenfassender Bericht, (unpublished internal paper), Bonn, 1984
511 Topf, Richard -  ‘ Party Manifestos’, in Heath, A. et al -  Labour’s Last Chance?, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 
1994, p 52+149
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otherwise not have been inclined to buy, while reassuring at the same time those 
customers that have already been voting for the product. As Albrecht Muller has argued, 
the role programmes play in the image building and marketing efforts of parties should 
not be underestimated, in particular as the interest of the majority of the electorate in 
politics - in general - as well as their degree of knowledge about single political issues is 
often overestimated by politicians and those interested in politics.513 This is why policy 
pledges are an appealing and important part of party programmes.
However, parties are well advised to consider carefully what type and degree of 
pledges to include in their programmes. Differences in policy proposals vary from very 
clearly defined minor and costed policy schemes to rather general promises whose scope 
of parties to successfully act upon them depends on factors that may not be entirely in the 
hands of government. This would include, for instance, the promise to aim at dramatically 
reducing unemployment -  something that depends on many factors of whom some are 
certainly beyond the control and influence of single national governments. However, 
parties are aware that pledges must be perceived as realistic and pragmatic in order to 
gain a status of credibility in the eyes of the electorate that they actually intend to meet 
their stated intentions. David Hill has been pointing out that this is one of the areas where 
Tony Blair and his allies have been learning from Labour's past record and that his 
strategy has been to emphasise "hard economic policies which show competence" to 
make people "belief that you can put things into practice. It is all about people trusting 
you with the basic economics of everyday life."514
Here, parties are heavily constrained by their own history, intra-party relations 
and the long-term expectations of their electorate, party members and activists. Hans- 
Dieter Klingemann is certainly right by emphasising that "even if parties wanted to 
repudiate their past for short-term advantage...they might not be believed if they tried. 
Previous action casts doubt on present promises when the two are not consistent...Parties 
are historical beings...expected to stand for something that separates it from
512 Topf, Richard -  ‘ Party Manifestos’, in Heath, A. et al -  Labour’s Last Chance? Dartmouth, Aldershot, 
1994, p 151-2
513 Muller, Albrecht - ‘Demokratische Willensbildung und veroffentlichte Meinung’ (Chapter 4), in Fletcher, 
I and H. E. Richter (ed) - Worter machen keine Politik. Rowolt Taschenbuch Verlag, Reinbek, 1976, p 140
514 Interview with David Hill, London, 26/08/99
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competition."515 This point is furthermore underlined by the fact that parties consist only 
to a minor extent of full-time politicians which earn a living with their job. For the 
majority of active and passive party members, moral considerations and party values are 
their dominant reasons for playing an active role within a party. This means that ideology 
is not only a means to tie the uninformed electorate to the party, but in contrast it is often 
the vital base for a parties actual existence. Inevitably, active party members will oppose 
party policy changes that abandon their ideological or moral convictions, while passive 
members could be expected to leave the party.
Examples backing this behaviour include the period at the end of the SPD/FDP 
coalition (1980-82) when many SPD party members began to openly criticise the move to 
the right of the SPD-led government, a development that was also experienced by the 
Labour Party towards the end of its term in office in 1979. Clearly, parties are highly 
restricted and slow in changing their choices of policies as they are not able to pick and 
chose policies that are perceived as momentarily electorally popular. In fact, past and 
present party promises and behaviour can be expected to be largely consistent to be 
believed.
Overall, the role of party programmes and in particular election manifestos in 
convincing the electorate to cast their vote in favour of a specific party has to be placed 
into perspective. A recognisable party statement of policy, which is backed by the 
leadership as the authoritative definition of party policy constitutes what parties are seen 
to be standing for. In fact, manifestos "form the basis for comment in the mass media and 
provide cues for...party candidates... Not only does the manifesto-equivalent determines 
the main campaign themes and lines of discussion, it has usually been the subject of 
extensive prior debate and negotiation inside the party."516 Additionally, statements made 
during election campaigns are not entirely independent of the general party ideology. 
Thus election campaign programmes mediate between the party ideology, political trends, 
situations and the voters.517 Furthermore, party leaders feel bound to make policy 
pronouncements throughout electoral campaigns as they presume that they will influence
515 Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard I. Hofferbert and Ian Budge - Parties, Policies, and Democracy, 
Westview Press, Oxford, 1994, p 24
516 Budge, et al - Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p 17
517 Jahn, Detlef and Matt Henn - ‘ The ‘New ’ Rhetoric o f New Labour in Comparative Perspective: A Three 
Country Discourse Analysis’, West European Politics, Vol 23, No 1 (January 2000), p 37
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the outcome to their advantage. If issues prove prominent and popular with the electorate, 
it is hoped that as a result, an influx of votes will enhance and strengthen the party's 
position.
Finally, the degree of rationality found within the actions of individual party 
actors and party institutions when dealing and developing party programmes will be 
further discussed during the following chapters, when we assess policy changes over 
time, analyse the role of Keynesian and Neo-Liberal paradigms and look at the 
institutional constraints rational party actors are faced with when changing strongly 
institutionalised party policy positions.
7.2. The SPD's and Labour Party's programme development structure
The SPD traditionally issues a variety of policy programmes of differing 
importance and detail. 'Programme' and 'Manifeste' pass between the party chairman, the 
executive committee, the small party congress, the main committee, basic value and 
programme commissions, and sometimes exceptional congresses. A substantial problem 
when analysing policy and programme-making in the SPD is posed by its federal 
structure which accommodates for various federal power brokers and influential Lander 
leaders and party organisations (in particular those who hold Lander-government office).
This means, that the content of national SPD programmes is often composed of 
policy ideas, which have been originally developed and popularised by SPD Lander-level 
policy-makers. Hence, the federal party system deprives the national level SPD 
organisation and parliamentary party (especially when in opposition federally) over 
central control of policy development. Instead of ultimately deciding upon programme 
content, the central party organisation is strongly occupied with the role of policy co­
ordination, searching for compromises and agreement among the federal party 
organisations' policy interests and ideas. Only after serving this function is it possible for 
the national party officials to compose national party programmes.518
In addition to general electoral programmes and the more specific and detailed 
policy statements (published during the mid-term of parliament), the SPD adopts 
infrequently major long-term all encompassing Basic Programmes (as described earlier).
518 Interview with Gisela Nauk, foreign policy adviser to the SPD Executive, 07/12/1997
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These programmes are adopted by the Party Congress after long preparatory periods and 
widespread party participation and are envisaged to give the party a long-term 
orientation and philosophy for periods in excess of decades. They can sometimes be of 
fundamental importance and reshape the party's overall policy outlook and image ('Bad 
Godesberger Programme' 1959), although by the same token, the follow up 1989 Basic 
'Berlin Programme'519 was already outdated when accepted by a special congress. In this 
case, the end of the East/West divide and German unification had overtaken the SPD's 
policy outlook and hence the 1989 programmes strong bearings on 1980s German 'post- 
materialistic' Zeitgeist meant that it failed substantially to provide a clear future policy 
vision in many areas.520 However central, such documents (often of substantial size) 
appear only very infrequently and are not primarily intended to respond to shorter-term 
electoral considerations.
Fritz Scharpf, who played an advisory role in the development of the economic 
part of the SPD's 1989 Basic 'Berlin Programme' identified two major advantages in 
parties developing a basic programme in order to define long-term aims. First of all, basic 
programmes enable parties to identify and formulate innovative long-term aims and 
visions, which can be identified and formulated without having to cater for short-term 
electoral considerations and strategy. Secondly, the choice of a long-term perspective to 
party policy aims increases the variety of political responses which can be advocated by 
the parties, as short-term pragmatic policy answers can be replaced with more desirable 
long-term policy solutions.521
Not only the SPD, but also the Labour Party engaged during the late 1980s in a 
comprehensive process of re-drafting their basic policy outlook. The significance and 
timing of these exercises and the reasons behind them will be discussed later. While the 
SPD developed a new Basic Programme (Berlin Programme), the Labour Party engaged in 
a substantial 'policy review' throughout the late 1980s. Both drafting processes of the 
programmatic documents were rather extensive and took a considerable period of time. 
Both attempts to redefine the parties' policy outlooks produced similar fundamental
519 Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei, Programme Parteitag, 20 December 1989 (5/93) 
commonly referred to as the ‘Berlin Programme’
520 Bok, Wolfgang - Zeitgeist-Genossen - Das Berliner Programm der SPD, Europaischer Verlag der 
Wissenschaften, Frankfurt a. M., 1995, p 15
521 Mayntz, R. - Planungsorganisation, Piper, Miinchen, 1973, p 108-14
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conflicts among traditional social democratic ideas and values and their functionality in a 
fast changing political and economic environment.
In contrast to the operations of the SPD in Germany, the Labour Party's National 
Party Executive (NEC) and Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) carry much greater leverage 
and influence over deciding party policy initiatives and in controlling the programme 
making process than the SPD. The centralised character of the British political system also 
means that the local constituency Labour Party organisations have far less resources at 
their disposal and carry much less importance than those of their German sister party.
Theoretically the Labour Party election manifesto is supposed to be prepared by 
the NEC in conjunction with the leaders of the PLP with the annual party conference 
clearly defining policy guidelines. From this follows the setting up of a joint drafting 
committee that then develops and negotiates the party's election manifesto. However, in 
practice this procedure has not been functioning particularly well in the past as the party 
leadership has often been able to impose their policy and programme ideas on the 
drafting committee, which in the month prior to an election had been under extreme 
pressure to accept the leaders draft and display party unity.522 This procedure, however, 
has undergone substantial re-organisation by the Labour Party throughout the 1990s, with 
the establishment of a 'new' medium-term manifesto development strategy.
This is partly due to the fact that in the British political system, the exact election 
date often remains uncertain which means that only a very limited amount of time is 
available for parties to develop precise election programmes or hold special pre-election 
conferences. This often led in the past to election programmes being developed by 
leadership associates which were able to substantially water down proposed policies 
according to the wishes of the party leadership, even if they had been previously adopted 
by the party's National Executive Committee.523 However, since the late 1980s, the Labour
522 An exception took place when the Labour Party’s general election manifesto o f 1983 was written. An inner 
Labour Party move to the left had meant, that at that time the left dominated NEC temporarily gained a 
stronger position and was able to determine the programme content.
523 James Callaghan was able to veto the 1979 programme (Butler and Kavanagh, 1979) while Neil Kinnock 
was, in particular after 1985, able to instruct (with the help of his office) loyal members on the NEC and the 
Shadow Cabinet on how to vote on crucial policy decisions. (Butler and Kavanagh, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 
1988, 1992)
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Party has been progressively adopting new procedures to develop her election 
programmes well in advance.
Overall, we assume that in Britain and Germany, election manifestos as well as 
mid-term statements have been written to both maintain and attract electoral support, i.e. 
to inform and reassure traditional supporters about the policies advocated by the parties, 
but also to appeal to floating voters and gloss over possible internal party disputes on 
policy. Furthermore, manifestos as well as policy statements have also been intended to 
not only express party consensus on advocated policies, but also to provide a broad 
framework in which party actors as well as members are supposed to define and perceive 
the political situation and the policy options available to the parties.
7.3. The developm ent of an analytical framework for a cross-national study
The approach chosen for the comparative study of the development of policies by 
Labour and the SPD has been the development of an analytical framework, which will be 
applied to the different methods used for the party's policy analysis in order to provide an 
overall structure to the study of policy development. As this study concentrates on the 
policy area of Labour Market Policies (LMPs), a LMP coding framework has been 
developed to aid the collection of quantitative data from programmes and statements. 
However, this frame has also been used to structure the qualitative investigation into 
party policy changes to aid the analysis of policy-making behaviour. From this follows, 
that the findings of the quantitative data collection and analysis undertaken in this study 
will be used to provide cues for the qualitative research into the parties' policy 
development. Hence, this chapter aims to account for the methodological requirements 
and approaches chosen for the comparative content analysis of LMP development by the 
SPD and Labour Party.
7.3.1. The comparative approach
Parties and their changing political appeals are best studied on a comparative 
cross-national scale, as the basis for judgement must be relative rather than absolute. For 
example, when investigating the programmatic developments of only one social 
democratic party in isolation, the analyst would not be able to assess properly whether a 
party has exploited the full range of policies and appeals available to her. In fact, even
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when comparing two parties based in one country, the analyst might miss out on policy 
choices available to the parties, as different party strategies, ideologies and voter clientele 
reduce the insight into the variety of appeals and policies available to any party. Hence, 
the comparative analysis of parties of the same ideological orientation based in different 
countries enables the researcher to gain a more revealing insight into the behaviour of the 
parties under investigation. Only a cross-national approach is able to shed light on 
questions such as - have parties made use of the entire range of strategies and appeals 
utilised by their (social democratic) sister parties? In which areas and to what degree are 
there cross-national congruities? What are the national factors influencing parties' 
choices?
These questions can be best addressed within a comparative research path of two 
or more similarly sized parties with a common Socialist/Social Democratic ideological 
tradition, operating within comparably large western European countries.
7.4. The development of a Coding Frame
The coding frame has been designed to cover, although not exclusively, the most 
common micro-economic LMP initiatives and measures (in the UK and FRG) intended - 
directly or indirectly - to improve the functioning of the labour market and reduce or 
stabilise employment levels. However, the coding scheme includes additional policy 
categories such as 'external relations' and 'ideology and institutions' to recognise overall 
policy shifts in other key areas which carry direct relevance to party policy attempts to 
improve the employment situation and possible paradigm shifts.
The coding frame has been developed to divide, standardise and refine the various 
LMPs advocated by the SPD and Labour Party since 1979/1980 and has been derived 
from ideas and instruments developed by the European Party Manifesto Group (MRG).524 
However, the almost all inclusive nature of the MRG coding frame and its rather general 
policy focus required the development of an entirely new coding scheme which focused 
exclusively on party policies to improve the functioning of the labour market. Hence, the
524 Budge et al’s research had the aim to design instruments to facilitate comparisons and support 
generalisations about the way parties shaped their appeals. Their objective was the investigation o f the 
ideology and strategy o f post-war parties across countries with the help o f a common framework covering all 
policy areas (developed by the MRG). See: Budge et al - Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1987, Appendix B, pp 456-67
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coding frame developed for this study focuses and identifies solely the various policies 
developed to deal with labour market inefficiencies. Therefore, an economic perspective 
for the development of coding frame categories was chosen, which relies heavily on the 
analytical and sectoral breakdown of LMPs devised in various economic studies on the 
subject (OECD 1990, Calmfors 1994, EPI1994, Robinson 1996).
7.4.1. The use of Content Analysis
Content analysis as an investigative tool emphasises the importance of language 
used in communications. In the rather elevated words of Harold Lasswell, one of the 
founding fathers of modern political content analysis: "The language of politics is the 
language of power. It is the language of decision. It registers and modifies decisions. It is 
battle cry, verdict and sentence, statute, ordinance and rule, oath of office, controversial 
news, comment and debate."525
Lasswells' description emphasises the significance of the language used in the 
political discourse i.e. the importance of the precise wording of political expressions, 
statements and messages. Consequently, content analysis is predominantly a qualitative 
research technique, which analyses the qualitative description of the contents of 
communication. However, by using quantitative methods of secondary analysis, it can be 
applied quantitatively. It then becomes a useful approach for information-processing in 
which communication content is transformed with the help of objective and systematic 
applications of categorisation rules into data that can be summarised, compared and 
analysed. Hence, it is a technique, which describes various facets of communication 
content in a summary fashion.
Content analysis can be used to look at texts by assuming that content in itself is an 
important factor in the communication process. Inferences can then be made by 
systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within texts. In fact, by 
looking at texts by inference implies that words do not only reflect the signification of 
what the reader imagines their nature appears to be. In addition, texts also reflect the 
disposition and interests of the writer, i.e. the pressures of the situation and environment
525 Lasswell, Harold D. et al - Language o f Politics - Studies in quantitative semantics. The Massachusetts 
Institute o f Technology Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, (1949), 1968, p 8
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writer (s) find themselves in. Furthermore, factors which determine the writers choice of 
topic or policy for his/her text can be considered as well as the particular effects or 
impacts on the reader that were envisaged by the author. Textual content analysis can 
furthermore provide leads to the nature of the author such as individual characteristics, 
while styles of expression may give clues to the possible influence of the 
authors/organisations past experiences or traditions. Overall, the approach chosen for this 
study should be understood as a bridge between qualitative and quantitative methods.
In the case of party manifestos and statements, we assume that these documents 
reflect the implicit and explicit views of the party leadership, if not of the party as a 
notional collective whole.526 This assumption is backed up by the fact that party leaders 
have not only put their signature to the document (often in an introductory note), but 
their involvement in the final stages of the drafting process has been confirmed and 
described by a variety of publications on election campaigns.527 Furthermore, manifestos 
provide an official record of party intentions and an authoritative guide to party members, 
supporters, campaigners and later -  in case of a majority party - elected members in 
parliament and government.
This raises inevitably the question, if content analysis is primarily a means to 
investigate manifest content (the surface meaning of the text) or can it also be used to 
analyse the deeper layers of meaning embedded in a text document?
The answer to the first question is yes, while to the second the scope of content 
analysis is limited as additional contextual sources and information are required to back 
up initial findings. According to R. P. Weber, content analysis cannot just rely on 
interpretation, but "must be related either to the context that produced them or to some 
consequent state of affairs."528 Hence, in addition to the quantitative methods applied 
during this study, we look at the qualitative domestic and international party political 
context when analysing the party's policy contents. As we are not particularly interested 
in the readers and writers perception of the policy documents, we are able to neglect the 
ambiguous, but nevertheless interesting attempts of 'discourse analysis' (J. L. Austin
526 Topf, Richard - ‘Party Manifestos’, in Heath et al (ed) - Labour’s Last Chance?, (Chapter 9), Darmouth, 
Aldershot, 1994, p 155
527 See: Butler, David and Dennis Kavanagh - The British General Election o f 1979 (79), 1983 (84) 1987 
(88), 1992 (92), 1997 (97), MacMillan, Basingstoke
528 Weber, Robert Philip - Basic Content Analysis, Sage, London, 1985, p 63
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1961; F. Burton 1979; M. Stubbs 1983) of attempting to understand and investigate the 
deeper socio-linguistic dimensions of the textual content. Even though the writers (party 
actors) intentions and transmission of the communications as well as the readers (voters) 
expectations and understanding of texts rely on a pre-defined context of shared 
knowledge and assumptions, the scope of discourse analysis for a comparative study 
compiled in two different languages is rather limited.529
Upon the selection of texts and the specification of procedures, the content analysis 
process enables the observer to engage in systematic measurements of texts by identifying 
occurrences of specified characteristics. These measurements can then be used to serve as 
a reference for drawing inferences, i.e. interpretations drawn from the initial results of the 
content analysis. While the content analysis process is objective and direct (quantitative), 
the inferences drawn from the results may be quite subtle and indirect. Often, an 
important part of the inferences process consists of the recognition and collection of 
external information aiding the interpretation of the content analysis of the text 
(qualitative). In other words, external sources should be used to support inferences made 
from the quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the text as quantitative content 
analysis solely undertaken by itself does not necessarily lead to reliable research results. 
Therefore, it is desirable when possible, to add qualitative data to the analysis based on 
quantitative findings.
7.4.2. Units of Content Analysis
Scholars of content analysis have continuously emphasised that the procedure 
requires the interaction of two processes:530 Firstly, the specification of content 
characteristics to be measured and secondly, the application of rules for identifying and 
recording the characteristics when they occur in the data. Hence, a precondition for any 
content analysis is the quantification of content elements. For example, relevant aspects of 
the content - in the case of this thesis different LMPs proposed in party programmes - can 
be identified by introducing a set of standard subdivisions in categories, which may then
529 Stubbs, Michael -  Discourse analysis: the sociolinguistic analysis o f natural language, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1983, p 4
530 Stone, Philip J., Dexter C. Dunphy et al - The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content 
Analysis. The Massachusetts Institute o f Technology Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, p 7
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be applied to the programme text. The choice of recording units varies according to the 
specific goals set out in the study. Depending on the requirements and goals of the 
research, a single word or term may be as well applied as a 'theme' (a sentence or 
sentence-compound under which a range of specific formulations can be subsumed) for 
the purpose of identifying whether a particular word, term, 'theme' or policy appears 
with regular frequency or not.
For this study the 'theme' as unit of analysis has been chosen, because it is the 
most accurate unit when analysing ideas, policies, issues and concerns with respect to a 
specific policy area which can be worded in various ways. The 'theme' is particularly 
useful for the study of the effect of communications (such as party programmes) upon 
public opinion as it "focuses on the form in which issues and attitudes are usually 
discussed".531
Of great importance for the functionality of content analysis of texts is the precise 
definition of the counting units. The attempt to count predetermined phrases or single 
words as quantitative expressions and indicators for policies in the documents under 
investigation was ruled impractical, as these extremely small units of content vary 
intensely in meaning and connotation not only between English and German, but often 
even in the same language as words depend strongly on the context provided by 
sentences to reveal their true meaning. Furthermore, similar ideas can be expressed in 
different words and terms, which again would distort the outcomes of any text analysis 
based on single words. For example, Gerald R. Taylor described how the same policies 
expressed in Labour's 1987 programme as "socially just" were transformed into "social 
justice" during the 'Policy Review Process'.532 Therefore, it was decided that the counting 
and coding of terms or words would be impracticable for the purposes of this research. 
Following from this, comparability was instead ensured by only counting and comparing 
pledges and pledge counts which although expressed in a great variety of ways, would 
still be identifiable according to the specific content characteristics of the policy 
advocated. Hence, 'socially just policies' were counted under the same coding category
531 Berelson, Bernard -  Content Analysis in Communication Research. Hafner Publishing Company, New  
York, (1952), 1971, p 139
532 Taylor, Gerald R. - Labour’s Renewal?, MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, 1996, p 70-1
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than 'policies for social justice'. (See full LMP coding frame - Category: 4010 Social Justice 
/  Social Stability).
Of course, it has been a subjective process to identify and count policy pledges, 
with the fact that all parties make statements of intent which range from broad 
commitments to very specific promises not helping either. In addition, it is important to 
be alert to the fact that there is a possibility that not only words, but also political terms 
undergo redefinition and may change their meaning.533 From this follows a tendency 
away from clearly stated policy content (e.g. tax policy 1992) by parties towards an ever 
increasing emphasis of policy presentation and image, which - although being a revealing 
detail and an interesting process in the policy formation of parties itself - certainly hinders 
the meaningful comparison of programme and manifesto texts over time. However, as the 
period of investigation chosen for this study comprises less than twenty years, the cases in 
which redefinition of political terms has occurred were few and will be specifically 
pointed out and accounted for during the course of the analysis.
Furthermore, the choice of categories and content units similarly enhances or 
diminishes the likelihood of valid inferences. Unless they are appropriate indices of the 
events, attitudes or behaviours the analyst wants to measure, inferences drawn from the 
categorised findings will not be valid. Therefore, the validity of any study is inextricably 
interrelated with its sampling design and reliability.
7.5. Requirements for Content Analysis
The analysis of content requires "objectivity, system, and generality" as a 
precondition for the application of scientific methods to documentary evidence.534 By 
attempting objectivity is meant that a clear, well-defined explicit set of rules is applied as
533 An increasing redefinition o f political terms could be detected throughout the 1990s, a development, which 
has been motivated by the attempt o f political parties to improve ‘policy presentation’. At the forefront in 
Europe has been the ‘new’ rhetoric developed by ‘New Labour’. Hence, the electoral success o f the Labour 
Party has certainly encouraged other parties to follow their example.
One such example for the re-definition of a policy term has been the Labour Party’s use o f the notion of 
‘social justice’ in respect to employment, which in their 1997 election manifesto stressed the party’s aim to 
improve the citizens ‘ability to work’. This definition must be seen in stark contrast to the traditional meaning 
of the term, which previously was used to emphasise equality and the state role o f re-distributing resources 
towards the more disadvantaged in society. Hence, the analyst must be aware that a tendency towards the 
redefinition or even re-branding o f parties’ policy contents and pledges exists that must be taken into 
consideration when using qualitative research tools.
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criteria to decide on content units (e.g. themes) placed in one category in order to 
minimise the impact of the analyst's subjective prepositions.
'Systematic' application of content analysis thus means, that the inclusion and 
exclusion of content categories is dealt with according to consistently applied rules, for 
example, no sentence of a text can be categorised more than once.
Finally, 'generality' of content analysis requires that findings have theoretical 
relevance i.e. that the data gained must be related at least to one other document to give 
meaning to its findings. Preferably -  as in this study - programme texts are analysed with 
the help of the same categories at different points in time and comparatively for two 
parties
However, one thing seems clear when dealing with the various types of content 
analysis. Whatever the precise content analysis technique used, the overriding aim of 
content analysis remains the same. As Stone points out, "...content analysis does not 
study behaviour itself, rather it focuses on artefacts produced by behaviour ...[while] 
content analysis infers the orientation and concerns of a speaker [or writer].. .from the 
record of what is said."535 In other words, the data collected is not self-explanatory, and 
thus at the heart of this approach still lies the analyst's interpretation of the collected data.
From this it also follows, that the outcome of content analysis cannot be better than 
the developed system of categories, since they contain the substance of the investigation. 
Furthermore, when coding content data, the decision on the boundaries of units of the 
coding scheme must be clearly and objectively defined (unitising) in order to ensure that 
each sentence is only ascribed once, and appropriately to one of the available coding 
categories.
For various reasons, there is a general absence of prescription regarding a 
universally applicable system of standard coding categories in content analysis literature. 
This is due, firstly to the fact that there seems to be an overall reluctance of analysts to 
adopt the categories of others, while secondly there are few areas of social inquiry in 
which there is a sufficient consensus on theory that would allow the formation of a set or 
selection of generally applicable coding categories. One exception to this rule is the work
534 Holsti, Ole R. - Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Addison-Westley Publishing 
Company, London. 1969, p 3-5
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of the MRG, which developed 'project specific' categories used by all the groups members 
while attempts were made to 'marry' other sets of data with their categories to aid 
analysis.536 However, so far, researchers have developed predominantly more or less 
unique (project specific) coding frames that have specifically addressed their research 
aims. Thus the scope of coding schemes is usually limited by the number of different 
substantive questions which one seeks to answer with the help of the content data. 
Nevertheless, it is intended that the LMP framework developed for this study provides 
practitioners of content analysis which attempt to develop policy specific frames of 
analysis with an instructive example.
7.5.1. 'Labour Market Policies' in party programmes /  statements
The object of analysing party programmes and 'major' statements on LMPs in a 
comparative perspective is to assess the development and changes over time within a 
common framework. In fact, the programmes and statements on LMPs are taken as an 
indicator of the overall development of the policy emphasis and paradigm applied by the 
Labour Party and SPD during their long-term period in opposition (1979/82 to 1997/98).
The term 'policy' itself has been used in a variety of ways by different scholars, 
and in different contexts. In his comparative policy analysis of programmes, Rose (1988) 
identified four distinctly different ways in which the term 'policy' is commonly used. 
They include the use of the term as a synonym for a problem or issue area; 'policy' as a 
statement of intention about what politicians and/or parties intend to promote when 
(re)elected; the term 'policy' may refer to a programme of public services delivering 
particular services; and finally 'policy' refers to the impact of a government programme.537 
Here, during the course of this study, the term 'Labour Market Policy' (LMP) refers to 
consciously advocated policies to improve the functioning of the labour market and 
reduce unemployment. From this follows, that LMPs are predominantly aimed at 
responding to the problems of structural change, encouraging the search for jobs and
535 Stone, P. J., D. C. Dunphy et al - The General Inquirer. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, p 19
536 Evans, Geoffrey and Pippa Norris (eds) -  Critical elections. Sage, London, 1999; Norris, Pippa, John 
Curtice, David Sanders, Margaret Scammell, Holli A. Semetko -  On message -  Communicating the 
campaign. Sage, London, 1999
537 Rose, Richard - ‘Comparative Policy Analysis: the Program Approach’, in Dogan, Mattei (ed) - Comparing 
Pluralist Democracies, Westview Press, 1988, p 220
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assisting labour mobility counter to the reliance on 'passive' policies such as payment of 
unemployment benefit.
The policy area of LMPs has been chosen and is justified as an example of policy­
making by social democratic parties (in opposition), as the fight against unemployment 
has been an integral and defining aspect of social democracy since its foundation.538 In 
fact, Keynesian state interventionist policies to check unemployment have been a vital 
component for the success of social democratic parties throughout Western Europe since 
the end of World War 2. The pressures, which developed throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
for policy change in the face of the gradual replacement of Keynesianism with a neo­
liberal policy paradigm, were particularly impacting on the area of Labour Market Policy 
making and particularly instructive for analysing policy change.
Therefore, this study deals with the development and nature of LMPs as reflected 
in the electoral programmes and mid-term statements of the SPD and Labour Party. 
Questions to be addressed include, what are the basic LMP issue-dimensions? What are 
the changes within the parties LMPs since 1979? Did both parties use LMPs to directly 
confront or challenge the policies of their government (party) competitors? Can the 
changes in LMPs advocated by both parties be ascribed to the gradual shift from 
Keynesian to a neo-liberal paradigm? Did the change in policy take place because or in 
spite of an all encompassing shift in the policy paradigm?
7.6. A coding frame for Labour Market Policies
The coding scheme for the analysis of LMPs developed for this thesis evolved as 
already mentioned from the MRG scheme used by Ian Budge et al.539 The groups original 
research objective was based on a general attempt to investigate the ideology and strategy 
of post-war parties across countries within a common framework (covering all the policy 
areas covered by the programmes), so as to facilitate comparisons and ultimately to 
support generalisations about the way parties shape their appeals over time. Findings
538 See Chapter 2.
539 See: Budge, Robertson and Hearl (eds) - Ideology, Strategy and Party Movement. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1987
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were first published in 1987540 and the specific approach to manifesto coding and analysis 
was further developed and refined in the following years as documented in a 1994 
publication541 which added to the analysis of election programmes the calculated variable 
of 'expenditure priority factor scores'.542 Finally one major great advantage of this 
comparative research method is the ability to compare party policy content in a 
quantitative way, over time and space published in different languages.
Three major changes to the general coding approach of Budge et al (1987) have 
been made in order to recognise the specific requirements and needs of a coding frame 
which deals with the study of LMPs in party programmes.
Firstly, instead of counting sentences, we have decided to count policy pledges - or 
in the words of Rose "policy intentions"543 - in party manifestos. Pledges reveal more 
about party intentions as they consist often - although not exclusively - of a 
"'commitment' phrase ('we will', 'we support', 'we oppose' etc.) and a phrase indicating 
the actions for which commitment is indicated", and that often on a concrete level.544 
Rather than focusing on sentences, we recognise that often numerous pledges can be 
found in one sentence. (For example, 'we will expand apprenticeship type youth training 
schemes and subsidise newly created jobs for long-term unemployed persons over fifty by 
offering employers and companies a new range of tax brakes.') In fact, its was Railings 
who defined a pledge as a specific commitment on behalf of the party to act in a certain 
area, following an identified and specific policy strategy.545 Hence, a specific manifesto 
pledge - rather than text solely dealing with a policy area - expresses a party's 
commitment to engage in a specific approach or action to deal with an issue according to a 
set out policy strategy.
540 Budge, Ian, David Robinson and Derek Hearl (ed) - Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change: Spatial analysis 
of Post-war election programmes in 19 democracies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987
541 Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard I. Hofferbert and Ian Budge - Parties, Policies, and Democracy, 
Westview Press, Oxford, 1994
542 In their study, policy priorities were measured as percentages o f total central governmental annual outlays 
devoted to particular functions. Spending indicators were then calculated with the help o f published public 
records (providing the raw data.) However, the use of ‘party programmes’ and ‘spending priorities’ in the 
context o f LMPs seems ill suited for this study, as we are solely dealing with parties in opposition, which are 
usually not only trying to avoiding to commit themselves to precise spending pledges, but which (due to their 
‘structural disadvantage in opposition’) are often ill prepared to undertake such an exercise in a credible way.
543 Rose, Richard - Do parties make a difference, MacMillan Press, London, 1984, p 9
544 Royed, T. J. and S. A. Borrelli - ‘Parties and economic policy in the U SA’, Party Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
1999, p 125
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However, at the same time, one cannot count as a pledge those instances where a 
party manifesto is criticising specific policy mistakes of political opponents - as this does 
not constitute any commitment to a particular alternative policy approach - while the 
expression of a general desire to 'try7 to do 'x' or to achieve 'y' as soon as practicable can 
also not be counted as a pledge, as in neither case, failure to deliver would break a firm 
commitment.
Secondly, while Budge et al used an 'all inclusive' coding frame for their analysis 
of programmes, a coding frame has been developed to focus 'exclusively' on the Labour 
Market policy content of the party documents under analysis.
Finally, we have added additional texts to the analysis of electoral party 
programmes and platforms, especially 'major' mid-term party statements on LMPs.
7.6.1. Extensions and specifications of the coding frame
The coding approach chosen by Budge et al was to design a coding frame that was 
all-inclusive. This meant they developed very general coding categories, which would 
cover most policy areas encountered in the policy statements under analysis. In contrast, 
in this study we have aimed to distinguish between pledges and policy contents being 
related and 'relevant' to LMPs or 'irrelevant' and unrelated to the aims of this analysis, 
hence analysing a more specifically defined and narrower range of manifesto/statement 
pledges.
Even though during the coding process all the pledges featured in the party 
statements under investigation were assessed and looked at, a pre-selection process took 
place in which only those pledges were coded and counted, which could be clearly related 
in a broad sense to purposely, directly and/or actively influence the situation on the 
labour market. It was felt, the process of pre-selection of pledges into labour market policy 
related policies as well as codable and non-labour market related policies (which were not 
coded) led to a useful reduction in data and meant 'policy coding bins' within the LMP 
framework could be avoided. By 'coding bins' we mean the existence of policy coding 
categories, which would have been unrelated to the LMP area and are a collection of data 
of neglectable use. In fact, the inclusions of those 'bins' in our coding frame would have
545 Railings, Colin - ‘The influence of election programmes’, in Budge et al - Ideology, strategy and Party 
Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p 2
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meant a considerable expansion in the number of coding categories which would have 
had to be defined in extremely general terms (such as "Law and Order' or 'Freedom and 
Democracy') containing pledges which would have been clearly unrelated and of no 
interest to the intended content analysis of LMPs. Therefore, the developed LMP frame 
contains solely categories that broadly represent party policy statements, which can be 
clearly related to LMP initiatives.
Furthermore, while the MRG aimed at comparatively studying a great variety of 
parties in a large number of countries with the help of rather general policy coding 
categories, we focus instead only on two parties based in different countries. 
Furthermore, we do not only investigate the more specific aspects of the party documents, 
but also include more specific and detailed party mid-term policy statements in the 
analysis that enable us to comparatively study the changes of the parties' policies within a 
greater body of documents.
7.6.2. The Basic Research D esign
During the testing and development stage of the LMP framework it became clear 
that party documents often consisted of rather ambiguous policy statements, sole 
comments on the mistakes of other parties/governments or general lengthy descriptions 
of the overall political situation without revealing policy positions or advocated 
alternatives. In order to exclude these parts of the policy documents from the coding and 
counting process as they would have distorted the quantitative content analysis and led to 
the misrepresentation of the actual policies emphasised and advocated by the parties, only 
clear pledges i.e. descriptions of (intended) policies have been chosen as units to be 
expressed in the coding categories.
Each policy pledge devoted to a LMP has been coded and allocated to one of the 
categories or sub-categories. Next, the pledges were counted and re-calculated in 
percentage terms in order to gain quantitative data of pledge count values, which could 
then be assessed comparatively and independently of the actual size of the document. 
This approach has also helped to document the substance and actual shifts in policy 
ideas/pledges in LMPs covered by the various programmes. The analysis of the texts,
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expressing changes in percentage points of counted LMP pledges also enabled us to cut 
through the size differences of programmes (for instance a programme could be long and 
contain surprisingly few pledge counts), hence distinguishing between (sometimes long 
winded or ambiguous) programme rhetoric and actual (pledged) policy plans.
In addition, policy pledges were only counted if the pledges were perceived to be 
aimed or intentionally affecting the situation on the labour market. In other words, if for 
instance a pledge to improve the provision or expansion of education for young people 
(14+) has direct preparatory relevance to labour market entrance, then it would have been 
coded and counted. Hence, on the one hand the coding of the programmes contained a 
certain normative aspect on behalf of the researcher as the attempt has been made to take 
coding decisions for the various documents with the greatest possible consistency. On the 
other hand we have attempted to avoid coding extremely ambiguous or unclassifiable 
general statements or intentions such as "we believe in our scientists ability to 
achieve...economic growth" expressing beliefs rather than a party's commitment to 
undertake any kind of action.
7.6.3. Classifying Labour Market policies
The LMP coding frame has been based on previous studies of labour market 
policies that are briefly described below. The OECD546 as well as Lars Calmfors547 
developed two basic classification frameworks for Active Labour Market Policies. Both 
frameworks included supply and demand side measures such as:
• job brokering to make the matching process between vacancies and job seekers more 
efficient;
• the promotion of a spirit of active search - this includes the involvement of 
employment services to get claimants back to work with schemes such as work trials as 
well as the threat of removal of benefit, if claimants are not prepared to accept the 
employment offered to them;
546 OECD - Labour Market Policies for the 1990s. Paris, 1990
547 Calmfors, Lars -  Active Labour Market Polices and unemployment - A framework for the analysis of 
crucial design features. Seminar Paper No. 563, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm, 
1994
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• labour market training to improve and upgrade the skills of job applicants; by 
developing employment-related skills7 - this category includes measures to 
provide/improve education, on-the-job training schemes, apprenticeships etc.; and
• direct job creation including public sector employment or the subsidisation of private- 
sector work.
In contrast, William McCarthy developed a more inclusive system by identifying four 
types of - what he called - "Active Labour Job Market Creation Schemes" which proved to 
be a more useful classification scheme for distinguishing LMPs.548
• Public Investment Schemes - using public funding to create additional jobs 
(predominantly in the public sector);
• Recruitment Subsidies - consisting of per capita payments to employers willing to 
take on additional employees, with subsidies being intended to lower the marginal 
cost of additional labour and thus increase labour demand;
• Work-sharing - attempting to create additional jobs by reducing the working hours of 
the existing labour force; and
• Quality Training - the provision of quality training to the unemployed is based on the 
belief that many more jobs would become available for the unemployed, if only they 
were better qualified.
In addition, McCarthy argued that there was a need for special measures to force 
down high levels of unemployment for particular groups such as the long-term or young 
unemployed (with the help of "strategic job creation7 schemes) as an economic strategy 
generally aimed at higher growth rates may be helpful, but would currently not be able to 
produce levels of "full employment7.549
McCarthy's division of LMPs was more relevant to our research than those 
categories used by the OECD and Calmfors as they were particularly specific when 
distinguishing the more supply side and less macro-economic measures used to reduce 
the number of people unemployed, precisely the kind of labour market policies we intent 
to focus upon assessing the policy and programme making processes of Social Democratic 
parties. However, William McCarthy's LMP division has left out the use of negative 
sanctions to encourage job search - such as benefit withdrawal or its reduction in case of
548 McCarthy, William - New Labour at Work - Reforming the labour market IPPR, London, May 1997, p 10
549 McCarthy, William - New Labour at Work - Reforming the labour market. IPPR, London, May 1997, p 8
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claimants rejection of job offers - something that has figured strongly in the neo-liberal 
political rhetoric of the 1990s and that has therefore been included in the coding frame 
developed for this study.
Overall, Robinson's study on the role and limits of LMP, similar to that of 
McCarthy, emphasised the role of Employment Services when implementing LMPs. His 
framework distinguished between measures to reduce the mismatch of job-seekers to 
notified jobs, measures to raise the stock of skills, measures to directly increase the 
demand for labour, and measures to promote equality of opportunity in employment.550 
Overall, the above mentioned studies have been a strong point of reference for the LMP 
framework developed for this study.
However, for the purpose of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of party 
policy documents and the aim to prove a change in the parties applied policy paradigm, 
we have developed and applied a more inclusive and heuristic 'Labour Market Policy- 
framework' which aims at identifying all of the parties policy initiatives directly intended 
to reduce unemployment and improve the overall labour market and employment 
situation.
7.6.4. The Labour Market Policy frame design
Each Labour Market policy pledge (as defined by the framework) was classified 
into one of 32 distinctive categories with an additional 39 sub-categories of LMP themes to 
reflect many shades of policies.551 This technique of coding and the standardisation of the 
programme text led to a reduction in content details and increased the focus of analysis. 
Policy details were unified in a framework, which left the analyst with a comprehensible 
and much reduced amount of data. In other words, the frame consists of various coding- 
and sub-categories, which had been developed to filter LMP pleads out of the programme 
text and group them into policy categories. The varying numbers of primary and sub­
categories does not reflect a measure of their relative importance, but rather of the 
complexity of the area of policy issues and advocated solutions.552
550 Robinson, Peter - The Role and limits of Active Labour Market policy, EU Working Papers, EUI, No.
96/27
551 See: Appendix III, Full LMP Coding Frame
552 See Annex B in Budge, Ian, David Robinson and Derek Hearl (ed) - Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change: 
Spatial analysis o f Post-war election programmes in 19 democracies, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1987, p 459
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The categories have been grouped into seven 'domains' each covering broad areas 
of LMPs. Considerable attention has been given to the analysis of each 'domain', with 
sub-categories sometimes being later collapsed to express developments within a whole 
domain. The domains have been deliberately chosen as priori theoretical groupings 
representing specific types of common labour market policy approaches.
The coding categories of the LMP frame have been developed specifically, on the 
one hand, to reflect as closely as possible the most important and contentious LMP issues 
as well as pledges which would have had a significant impact on the economy or on the 
labour market, such as EEC/EU level policy activity, state planning, full employment etc., 
while on the other hand an attempt has been made to emphasise and differentiate with 
the help of the coding categories in a comparative way the various obvious types of LMPs 
used by the parties. Furthermore, it should be noted that the specifications of the coding 
categories were intended to be descriptive and illustrative of the types of policies and 
pledges rather than being exhaustive definitions.
7.6.5. Collapsing the LMP coding frame
As mentioned earlier, the LMP coding frame contains 32 categories and 39 sub­
categories. However, when felt appropriate in order to enhance the analysis and 
expressiveness of the data, we have - in addition to the original LMP frame - collapsed 
certain similar LMP categories and sub-categories into 23 more general and larger data 
categories for a second 'collapsed LMP-frame'. In other words, to assist the data analysis 
and to enable us to express the findings more graphically and effectively, in cases were 
the sub-categories were too detailed for arguing more general points, we have used - apart 
from the full LMP coding frame - a collapsed version of the frame during the analysis.553 
For this second frame, coding categories (predominantly sub-categories) have been 
collapsed and combined under more general headings to strengthen further their 
analytical expressiveness.554 Overall, coding sections have sometimes been combined
553 See: Appendix IV, Collapsed LMP Coding Frame
554 For example, in case of the Keynesian Demand Management, the various categories and sub-categories of 
the full LMP coding frame were collapsed in to one category expressing the combined pledge count o f all the 
coded Keynesian Demand Management policy pledges. (Coding categories 6020 / 6021 / 6022 / 6023 / 6024 
were collapsed into one category).
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under more general section headings to represent more basic differentiation's in the coded 
LMP areas to improve the overall comparability of policy domains.
7.7. The recognition and use of 'major' mid-term statements
In addition to the widely tried and tested assessment and coding of party election 
manifestos, we have added to the content analysis 'major' mid-term party 
statements/policy documents on Labour Market policies which often deal in greater detail 
with the policies involved.555
Although mid-term statements often contained a higher degree of specification of 
advocated policies than election manifestos, they displayed - as shown during the analysis 
of the data -  substantially similar tendencies in the parties' development of advocated 
policy preferences.
A precondition for the choice of mid-term statements was the timing of the 
publication, which had to fall within the required time frame (preferably published 
between two election manifestos). The statements also had to clearly deal with LMP 
concerns, something, which was tested by insuring that the mid-term statements LMP 
counts were in a comparable range with those of election manifestos.
Furthermore, the mid-term statements chosen for this study were all passed and 
agreed upon by the SPD's and Labour Party's Parteivorstand i.e. National Executive 
Committee which made them documents that represented the official party policy line.
7.7.1. The specific features of mid-term party statements
In general, we have aimed to combine as much as possible the data gained from 
the party manifestos with that of mid-term statements. The result has been encouraging, 
with data collected being surprisingly corresponding - often supplementing each other 
and providing a common ground for the conclusions which could be drawn from the data 
findings. Hence, whenever possible, we have combined the data from election manifestos 
with that of mid-term party statements which in most cases displayed highly congruent 
patterns. However, mid-term statements have to be analysed with extra care as they 
sometimes contain novel and even contradicting patterns.
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Firstly, mid-term statements can often be more specific and less heuristic than 
election manifestos. In fact, mid-term statements dealing with LMPs can reveal a far 
greater amount of policy detail than election manifestos.
Secondly, while election manifestos place policies more into an international 
economic context, hence placing greater emphasis - for example - on "international co­
operative" policies envisaged within the "European Union", mid-term statements on LMPs 
often tend to focus more on the specifics of the "domestic" environment and on how to put 
policies into practice by defining details of their envisaged implementation.556
Thirdly, another difference between mid-term and electoral statements lies often in 
the fact that election programmes contain -  for the benefit of the electorate - clearer and 
often more straightforwardly worded policy pledges, while mid-term statements can be 
often less precise and more ambiguous in their wording of policy prescriptions.
From this it follows that during the coding process of the mid-term statements a 
greater degree of flexibility and interpretation of expressed policies was required. 
Seemingly vague statements of "intent" were included in the coding process as long as 
their context was able to sufficiently determine their coding category. This means, that 
pledges were counted when it was possible to interpret them according to their content 
and context within the texts.557 For example, a sentence such as ""a central condition will be 
the raising of the educational standards and improving of skills of the British people'" was 
still coded -  in this case under 3010. (Labour - Meet the Challenge, 1989, p 6) Flowever, the 
re-interpretation/construction of programmatic mid-term statements and their meaning 
for the purpose of deciding how to code them was statement specific and only rarely 
necessary. Consistent with the coding of manifestos, when statements were on topics 
irrelevant to the general running of the economy or to LMPs in particular, they were not 
included in the coding process.558 As the above-described rules were continuously
555 To determine the Labour Party’s and SPD’s ‘most important’ mid-term policy manifestos/ publications 
containing LMPs, we have used as a criteria their detail and length dedicated to LMPs, the timing of their 
announcement and significance in changing, refining or confirming party policies.
556 In response, when analysing and interpreting the SPD’s and Labour Parties LMPs dealing with the specific 
area of EU (1010/1020/1030), we have excluded the data gained from mid-term statements as - for the 
described specific reasons - the inclusion o f mid-term statements would have distorted the gained data.
557 Prime example for a problematic mid-term statement that required a strong need for the re-interpretation of 
vague pledges was the Labour Party/TUC 1985 document ‘A New Partnership - A New Britain’.
558 For example, pledges such as “..more efficient use o f resources, reduction o f bureaucracy in area of 
policing or N H S.. .’’etc. would have been clearly left uncoded and uncounted
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applied, the greatest possible standardisation, accuracy and consistency of the coding of 
the party documents has been achieved.
7.7.2. 'Major' mid-term statements as policy templates
Overall, the inclusion in the analysis of a great variety of policy documents 
roughly at the rate of a two year frequency for each party means that more attention could 
be given to the policy changes over a relatively short period of time. We found that certain 
mid-term statements contained (a) specified policy pledges often in greater detail than 
election programmes, and (b) that they were often aimed at 'domestic' party consumption 
by setting out new policy guidelines, documenting the state of the latest inner party 
positions, informing and instructing party actors and members rather than advertising 
policy positions to the wider public.
In fact, consistent with the theoretical considerations expressed in chapter four and 
the arguments of Fritz Scharpf (1997), there is a major significance in policy contents 
expressed through official institutional (party) publications (such as 'major' mid-term 
statements) as they intent to provide guidance as well as policy orientation to party 
members and activists and by setting out at least partly the templates for the party's 
future policy decision-making, policy options, directions and even the parties overall 
policy paradigm. In other words, actors within party institutions use publications, such as 
policy specific mid-term statements, as frames of reference and templates for future 
'incremental' policy decisions and developments. Therefore, to include the 'major' 
statements concerned with LMP in the study of policy development of parties recognises 
their importance and increases the overall understanding of the parties' policy direction, 
which influences after all the actions of individual and composite actors within the 
parties.559
7.7.3. Further operational procedures
It is important to point out that the percentage figures and the changes in the 
pledge counts (which sometimes appear to be shifting excessively) are expressed only for 
a specific area of programme pledges (often between 5% and 15% of the pledge total),
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hence changes only relate to the specified and limited policy area covered by the LMP- 
coding frame.560
Finally, one technicality concerning the presentation of the quantitative research 
results in the form of graphs must be mentioned. The graphs used during this study have 
been interpolated in order to display the change of pledge counts over time from one 
programme/statement to the next without gaps.
7.8. Adding qualitative components to the quantitative approach of programme 
analysis
The quantitative approach chosen for this study has been extremely useful when 
the aim is - as in this study - to gain research data on policy processes that have taken 
place in the recent past. Although requested several times, both the Labour Party as well 
as the SPD denied as a rule access to internal party papers that could have given a further 
inside view to the workings of the parties decision-making processes and to the actual role 
of individual actors involved. In fact, both parties justified their decision to withhold 
inner-party documents by referring to the common policy of refraining from giving 
researchers access to 'sensitive' qualitative records and memos of national executive and 
working group meetings for a period of twenty years.
In response to this lack of inner party sources, the quantitative approach was 
chosen as the adopted time-frame would not have allowed the use of any 'unofficial' 
inner-party protocols, reports, statements or transcripts of meetings. In fact, in order to 
avoid having to wait for twenty years before these documents can be assessed, other 
sources of data must be used to analyse parties more recent policy making processes. As 
the aim of this study was to look back at the fairly recent development of policies by the 
Labour Party and SPD (during their time in opposition) and the parties handling of the 
overall change of the policy paradigm in Western Europe's political systems, the
559 See: Scharpf, Fritz - Games real actors play - Actor-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research. Westview 
Press, Oxford, 1997, p 40; Lindblom, Charles E. - ‘The Science o f ‘muddling through’, Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 2, Spring 1959, pp 82-144
560 For example, the dramatic change in the in SPD’s 1990’s (collapsed) LMP pledge count concerning 
Keynesian Demand Management. The change appears very dramatic, precisely due to the fact that we are 
investigating and documenting variations in the percentage of pledges concerned with a very specific area of 
the programmes analysed.
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quantitative approach was extremely useful in supplementing the qualitative data 
available on the policy development processes of both parties.
In fact, the reliability of an approach exclusively based on the use of quantitative 
data analysis of party documents would be highly questionable for the aims of this study, 
as the frequency of an assertion may not necessarily reveal its importance. It is, for 
example, possible that a single appearance - or omission - of an attribute in a document 
may be of more significance than the relative frequency of other characteristics. Therefore, 
after the coding and data analysis, re-assessing the parts of the documents under analysis 
by comparing the quantitative findings with qualitative content analysis checks the 
quantitative results. In turn, quantitative results may highlight qualitative aspects of the 
text, which otherwise could have been missed by the analyst. Thus the 'ideal' content 
analysis, in the words of Ole R. Holsti, "should use qualitative and quantitative methods 
to supplement each other. It is by moving back and forth between these approaches that 
the investigator is most likely to gain insight into the meaning of his data."561 Therefore, in 
addition to the quantitative section of programme analysis, qualitative sources have been 
used to back up quantitative findings and as a point of cross-reference to determine and 
test results based on the analysis of quantitative data. Hence, the use of additional 
qualitative sources and their analysis are intended to add a further dimension to the 
results of the quantitative data collection and analysis. Linking quantitative with 
qualitative research is a natural choice, as both do clearly interrelate, prove or disprove 
findings gained from the analysis of one of those components, and as they provide leads 
for cross-investigation and increase the credibility of research findings and analytical 
explanations. Furthermore, it has been widely accepted that the quantitative analysis of 
manifesto texts assumes that the message is "what you read is what you get", i.e. the 
meaning of the test is its surface meaning.562 However, in order to draw wider 
conclusions, the additional analysis of quantitative information about the parties' (actors) 
ideological and historical context is useful as it enables the analyst to "read between the 
lines."
While the precise changes in officially advocated LMPs by parties can be best 
assessed and studied by analysing programme content, the reasons and circumstances
561 Holsti, Ole R. - Content Analysis. Addison-Westley, London, 1969, p 11
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behind the changes can only be fully understood with the help of qualitative and 
contextual data. Furthermore, qualitative research can cover some of the shortcomings of 
quantitative research findings. For example, a problem of quantitative programme 
analysis lies in the fact that pledges valid and revealing in one country, may be 
insignificant in another, hence making statements incomparable. For example, the pledge 
for the introduction of a minimum wage is not mentioned in any of the SPD programmes, 
as the minimum wage is an established widely accepted part of the German political 
environment (accepted by all parties). However, in the case of the Labour Party, the 
pledge for minimum wage legislation has been highly contentious and appears with great 
frequency in programmes of the party. Here, we are faced with the problem that the 
coding and counting of specific policy pledges may have substantially inflated Labour's 
'pro-labour market regulation' figures in the quantitative programme analysis. (2040) As a 
result, the SPD could, for instance, appear to have been overall less concerned with labour 
market regulation. However, we have found very few cases like this, and they are pointed 
out during the analysis. In fact, even where coding categories attract zero scores such as in 
the SPDs count on 'pro-minimum wage legislation', this result clearly documents and 
reveals an interesting point such as the one described above.
7.8.1. Other data chosen for cross-referencing the collected quantitative data
In this study the qualitative component of party policy analysis is not 
predominantly based on programme/statements content analysis, but consists of the 
analysis and evaluation of secondary literature, 'accessible' internal party documents and 
interviews with policy makers and party insiders that were directly or indirectly 
decisively involved in the LMP-making formation process of the Labour Party and the 
SPD. This approach will enable the observer to draw together conclusions from the LMP- 
making processes and place findings in a more holistic frame of reference, hence 
increasing the overall understanding of social democratic party policy development 
behaviour during the 1980s and 1990s.
In other words, the collection of quantitative data with the tool of a LMP 
framework provides researchers with further leads for the collection of qualitative
562 Riffe, D. et al -  Analysing media messages -  Using quantitative content analysis in research, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1998, p 29
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evidence on individual or composite decision-making actors.563 The analysis of qualitative 
components - clearly defined by the quantitative research results - adds not only the 
context of the political system or developments in the political and economic environment 
to the analysis, but qualitative research may also provide vital information about the state 
of the party itself, its self-perception, state of cohesion or division, basic beliefs, priorities 
and aims (ideology), adopted paradigms, as well as the capabilities, strategy and strength 
of decision-makers and the leadership, which may have been instrumental for the policy­
making process and parties amendments of policies previously advocated.
The additional qualitative data collected for cross-referencing parties policy 
choices consists of extensive research of primary sources, such as interviews with 
politicians and decision-makers from the Labour Party and SPD, policy advisers and 
observers, their memoirs, diaries, speeches and statements, as well as of newspaper 
sources, books and articles on the subject. Furthermore, party publications, policy 
documents, reports and pamphlets from leading think tanks as well as contributions from 
academics on the parties7 thinking or that of policy-makers have been used in the analysis. 
The qualitative research includes furthermore the analysis of election results in the UK 
and FRG between 1979 and 1998, and figures on the unemployment rates and economic 
growth rates in the UK and FRG (OECD -  Historical Statistics).
563 The notion o f ‘composite actors’ implies for international action at a level above that o f individuals 
involved In other words, we use ‘composite actors’ as aggregates o f individuals when explaining policy 
outcomes in terms o f their preferences and strategy choices. (See also: Scharpf, Fritz - Games real actors play 
- Actor-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research, Westview Press, Oxford, 1997, p 52)
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Chapter 8: The quantitative /  qualitative analysis of the Labour 
Party's and the SPD's party programmes and 'major' mid-term policy
statements
8.1. The quantitative analysis of party manifestos and statements
8.1.1. European Community /  Union LMP initiatives: Positive
8.2.1. Full Employment and intention to tackle unemployment /  high employment
8.2.2. Pro-economic state planning and nationalisation
8.2.3. Pro-labour market regulation
8.2.4. Negative on economic state planning and nationalisation; pro-public/private partnerships; pro-deregulative 
labour market measures
8.3.1. Positive statements on (state initiatives for the provision of) training and education, training subsidies, and youth 
training
8.3.2. Technology, industrial policy and competitiveness
8.4.1. Social Justice /  Social Stability
8.4.2. Benefit conditioning
8.4.3. Role of Labour Market Agencies (Arbeitsamt, Jobcentre)
8.5.1. Public Sector and social employment
8.5.2. Employment Taxes
8.6.1. Keynesian Demand Management
8.6.2. Economic Orthodoxy, Government Efficiency, pro-free market economy
8.7.1. Corporatism
8.8. Conclusion
8.1. The quantitative analysis of party manifestos and statements
During the following analysis and interpretation of the collected quantitative data 
of the content analysis of the Labour Party's and the SPD's policy documents, we intend 
to establish common patterns and explain LMP policy choices. The graphs used in the 
following content analysis have been compiled from the quantitative data collected from 
the parties policy documents and are intended to demonstrate in a comparative way the 
overall tendency and trends of the parties policy development and treatment of specific 
LMP pledges.564
While policy trends can be clearly identified, the graphs can not be expected to be 
clinically consistent as the pledge counts have to be expected to contain a certain error 
margin due to differences in the parties document forms, length and variations in the 
expression of the pledges. However, these variations - expressed in the graphs - are 
surprisingly insignificant and have shown to be the exception to the rule during the 
course of the analysis. Furthermore, in order to enhance the visualisation of data trends, a 
variety of types of graphs have been used (see key to figures).
564 For a list o f the Labour Party and SPD general election programmes and ‘major’ mid-term statements used 
in the quantitative content analysis see Appendix V. For the counting o f the parties manifestos / documents 
see data sheets in Appendix VI.
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KEY TO FIGURES:
Full Standard C oding Fram e (FC F) representing single categories used during coding process. 
C ollapsed C oding Fram e (CCF) containing collapsed categories for a more general picture. 
Election program m es and m id-term  statem ents (PM S)
E lection  program m es only (EPO )
Finally, the following analysis deals predominantly with LMP-frame categories, 
which were found to express most clearly the policy shifts attributable to the changing 


















8.1.1. European Community /  Union LMP initiatives: Positive
The data clearly displays a rising interest and advocacy of both parties to advocate 
EC/EU level LMP activity and integration (1010). By the mid-80 the parties began to 
increasingly adopt policies, which favoured European level initiatives to improve the 
condition of the labour market (1020) by advocating, for instance, the European level co­
ordination of infrastructure projects etc.
The SPD's attitude towards these policies remained consistently positive. Already 
in 1986, the party called for European Community wide policy co-ordination to tackle 
unemployment as the decreasing scope of national initiatives was recognised.565 A notable
56? gpQ Nurnberger Aktionsprogramm: Massenarbeitslosigkeit iiberwinden - die Wirtschaft okologisch und 
sozial Erneuem, Politik, No. 9, Sept. 1989, Informationsdienst der SPD, Bonn, p 13
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exception was the SPD's failure to pledge policies in favour of European level LMPs in its 
programmes between 1990 and 1992. This circumstance must be understood in the light of 
Germany's domestic policy agenda, which was temporarily dominated by concerns of 
German unification. With the SPD's programmes been dominated by policies to deal with 
the challenges of unification, questions of security, the new world order and support for 
Eastern Europe, these were concerns of significant political relevance during the 
immediate period following German unification.566 However, once the political situation 
normalised and unemployment - in particular in the new Lander grew dramatically - the 
SPD re-affirmed its commitment to encourage and foster European Union/EC wide LMP 
initiatives. By the time of the 1998 election manifesto, the party clearly stated its intention 
to work for a European employment pact, greater European level co-ordination of 
economic and fiscal policies, common and binding rules against tax- and social dumping 
as well as the strengthening and 'bundling up' of European level infrastructure and R&D 
investments.567
This intention was confirmed -  once in office - by the SPD's finance minister Oskar 
Lafontaine who expressed his belief that apart from the introduction of the 'Euro', there 
should be a determined push for the thorough implementation of Article 103 of the 
Maastricht Treaty, which committed 'Euro'-member states to increase the co-ordination of 
economic and financial policies across the EU. Lafontaine felt that this also had to include 
the (greater) harmonisation of tax levels within the EU.568 However, he resigned after not 
even six months in office and many of his ideas became party history.
On a similar note, Germany's new SPD Bundeskanzler Schroder used Germany's 
EU presidency in the first half of 1999 to promote European wide action on employment 
to the top of the EU's policy agenda. However, Lafontaine and Schroder clearly 
represented two different approaches to European level wide action. While Lafontaine 
perceived European level co-operation, re-regulation and harmonisation of legislation as 
the necessary response to the threat of social dumping and endless competition among 
national economies, Schroder was far more cautious about European level initiatives and
566 see: SPD -  Per Neue Weg, Bonn, 1990; SPD - Parteivorstand - SPD Sofortprogramm, Protokoll vom  
Au|3erordentlichen Parteitag, 16-17 Nov. 1992, Bonn, 1992, p 392-416
567 SPD - Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit - SPD-Programm fiir die Bundestagswahl 1998, Bonn, 1998, p
73
568 Lafontaine, Oskar - ‘The Future of German Social Democracy’, New Left Review, Number 227, 
January/February 1998, p 75
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interventionism. In fact, Schroder doubted that nation states would be able to overcome 
their national policy interests and be effective as combined players, hence drawing the 
conclusion that the initial starting point for any state would be to use and enhance their 
national economic competitive advantages. In particular after Lafontaine's sudden 
departure from government in March 1999, the SPD's European level labour market 
policies were focused increasingly -  similar to those already advocated by New Labour -  
on the aim to improve ' employ ability'. This was in contrast to demands for a European 
level re-setting or re-regulation effort of welfare provisions or standards on which 
competition among the member states (for instance via a harmonised tax-regime as 
demanded previously by Lafontaine) would take place. The fact that the SPD immediately 
after taking office confirmed the parties growing commitment towards European-level 
LMP's was not surprising after the previous development of pledge counts. However, the 
actual impact of this development can only be properly understood if one looks in greater 
detail at the development and changes of the labour market policies advocated by the 
party over time.
The Labour Party's programmes also expressed a steady increase in interest in 
European level policy initiatives from 1987 onwards that represented a substantial break 
with the party's recent past, which had witnessed the advocation of clearly anti-EC 
policies (even pledging to leave the EC altogether in 1983) and the ruling out EU wide 
policy initiatives altogether. Labour's European policy increasingly developed towards a 
pro-European direction under the leadership of Neil Kinnock and John Smith that was 
prompted in part by the greater emphasis on an EC social agenda put forward by Jacques 
Delors' (president of the European Commission from 1985-95) and by the increasing 
prominence and impact of EC level co-ordinated policies for industry, economic growth, 
regional development, industrial restructuring and the proposed social dimension of 
Europe.569
By the 1990s, Labour's programmes advocated the completion of the single market 
and the party's intention to sign up to the EC's Social Charter. At the height of Labour's
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endorsement of EU-level policy co-ordination and interventionism, the party proposed in 
1995, "the creation of a European recovery fund that is unashamedly contra-cyclical, 
permanent and ...able to invest not only in infrastructure but in employment projects" as 
well as "greater co-ordination of public investment, including a timetabled approach to 
new infrastructural developments."570
Under Tony Blair's leadership, Labour's general enthusiasm for European level 
initiatives continued only for a limited amount of time with the party's chosen approach 
to macro-economic policies and the party's rhetoric aiming at playing a leading role at the 
heart of the European integration process. The party also warmed to the idea of 
membership of EMU based on 'real' convergence of growth and employment 
performance, not just on monetary targets, arguing for British participation at the right 
time dependent on a 'yes' vote in a national referendum.
In fact, 'New Labour's' enthusiasm for policy positions towards EU level actions 
eventually hardened under Blair, in particular with regards to EU-level legislation, which 
could interfere with nationally set labour market conditions. From 1995 onwards, 'New  
Labour' increasingly adopted a rhetoric which favoured a less interventionist free market 
approach towards economic policy, urging the avoidance of state intervention on the 
grounds of rising high social costs, while advocating policies for a more minimalistic and 
effective Anglo-Saxon state economic approach in contrast to what was perceived as the 
continental 'over-interventionist' model.
By 1997, Blair and Brown were stressing the need for the EU to encourage greater 
labour market flexibility in order to tackle structural unemployment and to embrace 
substantial welfare reform. Labour was arguing for toughness when enforcing single 
market competition regulation while any common EU level labour market initiatives, 
including the social chapter, would - according to Gordon Brown - have to show that they 
increased productivity, employment opportunities as well as labour market flexibility 
before being considered suitable.571 In fact, in Labour's 1997 election manifesto the party 
renewed, but also defended its intention to sign up to the 'Social Chapter' by stressing that
569 The party’s increasingly positive attitude was clearly expressed in Labour’s 1994 document ‘Economic 
renewal in the European Union: The UK Labour Party and the Delors’ White Paper on growth, 
competitiveness and employment’, 1994.
570 Labour Party - A new economic future for Britain - Economic and employment opportunities for all. 
Labour Party, London, 1995, p 17
571 ‘Chancellor goes to Europe with plan to create more jobs’ - The Times. 05/06/1997
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it "cannot be used to force the harmonisation of social security or tax legislation", but 
instead will "promote employability and flexibility, not high social costs" rather than 
focusing on the co-ordination of common European wide action to tackle 
unemployment.572
Overall, the data shows that both parties increasingly envisaged a greater role for 
European level activity to tackle unemployment, although the Labour Party eventually 
retracted some of its enthusiasm for European level legislation and interventionism, while 
the SPD continued to perceive EU activities as a major building block for a more effective 
LMP approach. Eventual differences in approach between the two social democratic 
parties grew increasingly along the conflict lines between the Anglo-Saxon and the 
(continental) Rhein economic philosophies. However, even though we can still detect 
significant differences between the parties policy approaches in this area, overall the 
parties policies have grown substantially more similar since the mid-1980s. Furthermore, 
the resignation of Oskar Lafontaine as Germany's finance minister in early March 1999 
must be understood as a clear indication that Gerhard Schroder and his political allies 
inside the SPD have been able to push through their ideas of promoting a more limited 
role of European level policy interventionism in favour of more nationally based economic 
policy approaches. Hence, to some degree the SPD's previous enthusiasm for EU level 
initiatives can be expected to be replaced during the next years by a more cautious 
approach towards European level policy initiatives following 'New1 Labour's lead on 
viewing European Union initiatives increasingly critically.
In fact, the European dimension on policy making played a substantial role in the 
parties policy choices as the acceptance and support for the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 led 
to a barrage of policy consequences and provided a further policy prescriptive framework 
to the parties wider economic policy choices - something which certainly contributed to 
Labour's and the SPD's coming into line with many of the policy approaches that had 
already been embraced by their national political opponents during the 1980s. In fact, the 
adoption of an increasingly neo-liberal policy approach was cemented by both parties 
support for the Maastricht Treaty, as this meant that the neo-liberally orientated process of 
European integration was accepted as a policy path. As pointed out by Unger et al, the
572 Labour Party - New Labour - because Britain deserves better. London, 1997, p 37
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Maastricht Treaty did not only specifically avoid a commitment to any measures for a 
European level labour market policy approach, but it furthermore merely ruled out the 
adoption and implementation of national labour market policy initiatives that would 
require substantial levels of state spending as ultimately necessary in the case of demand 
management policies.573 In fact, the neo-liberal orientation of the Maastricht Treaty (and 
the convergence criteria for EMU) calling for further deregulation, privatisation, and the 
reduction in national public spending and tax levels was accepted by Labour and the SPD 
and constituted - once adopted - the new economic realities in which both parties had to 
embed their future policy approaches. This carried substantial consequences for many of 
the parties economic policy options, underlining the overall importance tied to both 
parties policy approaches towards European integration. This 'acceptance' took place in 
spite of the fact, that both parties -  at the time - had clearly increased their programme 
pledges in favour of EU level LMP initiatives.
















8.2.1. Full Employment and intention to tackle unemployment /  high employment
The overall concern to deal with the unemployment problem (2010/20/21) 
remained at a high level throughout the period under investigation, however the data 
shows that both parties convictions on what policies could and should be adopted to solve
573 Unger, Frank, Andreas Wehr and Karen Schonwalder - New Democrats, New Labour, Neue 
Sozialdemokraten, Elefanten Press, Berlin, 1998, p 155
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the problem changed considerably between 1979/80 and 1997/98, from the initial 
emphasis on direct state interventionist stimulation of the economy to measures which 
dealt predominantly with the supply side of the labour market. This change in approach 
has also been revealed in the parties declining emphasis on pledges aimed at establishing 
conditions of full employment towards various more moderate pledges stating the parties 
intent to 'reduce' unemployment.
Here, Rolf Heinze et al have argued convincingly that the notion of 'full 
employment' had become a concept that no longer reflected the labour market realities of 
the 1990s as it was developed at a time - during the 1960s - when a demographically far 
smaller group of people (certainly consisting of far less women) were seeking full time 
participation in the labour market. It is interesting to remind ourselves, that if the 
percentage of people attempting to enter successfully or being part of the labour market at 
the late 1990s would have been as low as it was during the 1960s and 1970s, unemployed 
figures in Germany would be halved immediately.574
Furthermore, Gosta Esping-Andersen has been expanding on this idea by arguing 
that apart from 'macroscopic global' driving forces responsible for socio-economic change, 
potent 'microscopic forces' (such as family structures and women's decisions) have been 
equally important for accelerating the change in European welfare systems and LMPs. In 
fact, Esping Andersen has been pointing out that "the new political economy presents 
trade-offs that make it exceedingly difficult to harmonise some egalitarian goals with a 
return to full employment."575 Here, social democratic parties abandonment of the 
'traditional' full employment promise must be seen as part of this realisation process that 
things had changed and that full employment had to be re-defined with the consequence 
that a 1960 term (and certainly its definition) had to be dropped for a notion that 
responded more clearly to the new emerging realities of the labour market.
574 Heinze, R. G., J. Schmid and C. Striinck - Vom Wohlfahrtsstaat zum Wettberwerbsstaat, Leske und 
Budrich, Opladen, 1999, p 29
575 Esping-Andersen, G0Sta - Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford University Press, 





















A comparison of the data collected in the categories of pledges aimed at re­
establishing conditions of full employment (2010) and the toned down commitment of 
tackling unemployment (2020/21) demonstrates, that both parties from the early 1980s 
onwards substituted their pledges of full employment with the more moderate and less 
ambitious pledges to attempt to tackle unemployment. The change in emphasis and the 
moderation of aims was predominantly based on the realisation of the parties that the 
much higher numbers of people out of work and /o r the increasing importance of external 
economic factors reduced the credibility of the full employment pledge. This trend even 
included Labour's 'radical' 1983 election programme which witnessed already a steep 
decline of full employment pledges in favour of the more modest commitment to reduce 
unemployment. Furthermore, the substantial abandonment of 'full employment' pledges 
throughout the parties programmes infers that an overall change in the political paradigm 
applied by the parties took place, when they were choosing their policies.
The data collected confirms that both parties engaged in parallel in a highly similar 
change of policy patterns. The decline in full employment pledges (2010) was counter­
balanced by an increase in the more moderate pledges to tackle unemployment (2020/21) 
which kept the overall count of policy pledges committing the parties to reduce 
unemployment (2010/20/21) at a continuously high and stable level.
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Both parties had been very pragmatic in their policy choices during their previous 
terms in government office (Labour Party 1974-1979 /  SPD 1976-1980) during which they 
had witnessed the increasing failure of Keynesian demand management techniques, even 
though they continued to state full employment as a policy priority. In 1979, Labour 
promised to provide during the life-time of the following parliamentary term every 
person which had been unemployed for more than 12 months with a job offer or place to 
re-train.576 At the same time the SPD re-stated in its 1980 manifesto the responsibility of 
the state to aim for full employment as well as its conviction that policies to create 
employment would remain an essential part of the parties economic policies.577
However, as both parties had already encountered substantial problems fulfilling 
those policy pledges when they had previously held government office as well as the 
apparent lack of policy detail given in both programmes on how they intended to fulfil 
their pledge (in particular in regards to funding), it is fair to say - all good intentions aside 
-  that this pledge was added to the manifesto for good measure rather than as a serious 
proposal for future policy initiatives.
The failure of both parties to respond with new policy ideas to the increasing level 
of unemployment in Britain and Germany and to formulate alternative policies which 
could replace their increasingly unworkable Keynesian inspired demand management 
approach remained a clearly visible problem throughout the 1980s. This problem was only 
successfully tackled when both parties began to increasingly accept that changing external 
political and economic constrains had to be considered to a greater extent when making 
policy choices. As the following data shows - by slowly substituting state interventionist 
and demand side policies with those based on free market principles, the parties labour 
market supply side policies gained significantly in importance.
576 Labour Party - The Labour wav is the better wav. London, 1979
577 “Die SPD setzt sich mit aller Kraft fur die Vollbeschaftigung ein.... Beschaftigungspolitik ist ein 
wesentlicher Teil unserer Wirschaftspolitik.” - SPD - Sicherheit fur Deutschland - Wahlprogramm 1980. 
Bonn, 1980, p 18
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8.2.2. Pro-economic state planning and nationalisation
The data derived from Labour's and the SPD's election manifestos and major mid­
term statements on pledges in favour of economic state planning (2030) shows a clear 
decline in the degree to which both parties advocated these measures as realistic or 
helpful in improving economic performance and tackling unemployment.
Only from 1987 onwards did the Labour Party begin to move away from its 
substantial interventionist commitments and alliances with the public sector, and began to 
scrap its pledges on nationalisation.578 During Labour's 'Policy Review Process' in 1989 the 
party decided to practically rule out even the (re-)nationalisation of industries which had 
been privatised under the Conservative government.579
The SPD was much less prone to engage in dramatic policy changes in the area of 
state planning and nationalisation compared to Labour. In fact, policies advocating the 
nationalisation of businesses had already been abandoned during the 1950s and replaced 
by the social-market model adopted by the party in the 1959 basic Bad Godesberg 
programme.
578 Labour Party - Britain will win, London, 1987
579 Labour Party - Meet the challenge - Make the change, London, 1989, p 15
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Figure 8.5.* excludes the SPD's 1988 mid-term statement 'Unser Konzept: Humaner Fortschritt, okologische Emeuenmg 
und Vollbeschaftigung' as it proposes exeptionally high levels of state interventionism and regulation of the labour market 
due to the specific emphasis of the programme.
8.2.3. Pro-labour market regulation
In regards to state regulatory measures affecting the labour market 
(2050/51/52/53/54/55) an overall decline in this type of policy pledges throughout the 
period under investigation could be detected. The Labour Party initially expanded state 
interventionist policies after the 1979 general election loss as the party adopted its new 
'Alternative Economic Strategy' (AES) which carried at its heart the idea that direct state 
and union involvement at the company decision-making level would increase economic 
efficiency, accountability and equality. The AES was developed predominantly in 
response to the failure and abandonment of the Keynesian policies by the 1974-79 Labour 
government as this approach rejected the traditional 'revisionist' approach of the Labour 
Party to indirectly state intervene in the economy by managing levels of demand as 
insufficient. Instead, the AES contained at its centre direct measures such as planning 
agreements, nationalisation, price controls and import ceilings in order to reform the 
corporate and manufacturing sector of the economy.580 The data collected in the labour 
market regulation categories clearly supports this and indicates that Labour's intention to
580 Wickham-Jones, Mark - Economic Strategy and the Labour Party. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1996, p 193
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intervene in the economy remained strong (even after the abandonment of the AES in 
1983) until 1992.
In fact, Labour's abandonment of pledging state interventionist measures 
continued and declined to 4% of LMP pledges by 1992 in comparison to a level of well 
over 10% in the party's 1987 election manifesto, a trend that continued under the 
leadership of Tony Blair.
Furthermore, more stringent policies that had been envisaged until the late 1980s - 
setting out conditions of employment - were toned down and replaced by more moderate 
policy pledges such as initiatives to encourage work sharing, working time reductions, the 
encouragement of early retirement, measures for vocational rehabilitation and minimum 
wage legislation (2051/52/53/54/55). This meant that the amount of pledges in this 
policy area remained stable over time, while the actual pledge contents underwent 
substantial change. This change was vividly expressed in 1997, when - far from the days 
the party had been pledging rigorous labour market legislation - the manifesto placed 
great emphasis on encouraging a more or less voluntary "partnership at work" between 
employers and employees based on the idea that "employees whose conditions are good 
are more committed to their companies and are more productive."581 With the same 
intention, Labour pledged the signing of the EU's Social Chapter stressing, however, at 
the same time that this would have to be linked to insuring that any future initiatives 
would have to "promote employability and competitiveness, not inflexibility".582 In other 
words, Labour's policies on labour market regulation had changed fundamentally when 
the party advocated in 1997 the avoidance of state interference and legislation that could 
restrict labour market flexibility and incur extra costs on employers.
The SPD was much less prone to engage in dramatic policy changes in the area of 
state interventionism and labour market regulation during the 1980-98 period. In fact, one 
of the major economic policy principles adopted by the party in its 1959 basic Bad 
Godesberg programme was the 'subsidiarian' notion of "as much competition as possible 
- and as much planning as necessary", which meant that the party had - for a long time - 
been traditionally committed to keep state planning to a minimum.583
581 Labour Party - New Labour - because Britain deserves better, London, 1997, p 16
582 Labour Party - New Labour - because Britain deserves better, London, 1997, p 17
583 SPD - Basic Programme o f the SPD, Bonn (1959), 1970, p 10
291
Furthermore, the SPD had not been faced with the Socialist7 policy backlash as 
encountered by the Labour Party after the loss of government office that led to the 
adoption of the AES even though many of the party's policy makers also distanced 
themselves rapidly from the policies of the last SPD government and its former Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt once it had lost office. In contrast to the Labour Party, however, many on 
the left within the SPD did not perceive the party's programmatic future in a revival of 
socialist policy principles. Instead - conditioned by recent developments in Germany's 
political system - they advocated to place greater emphasis on post-materialistic issues 
that had increasingly been raised by the women's-, peace-, anti-nuclear power- and Green 
movements during the late 1970s and early 1980s.584 This explains, why issues such as 
economic planning and state interventionism were of far less significance and created less 
inner-party controversy than experienced by Labour and why policy changes embraced 
by the SPD in this policy area were by far less substantial.
Nevertheless, by the early 1980s, the SPD's programmatic approach towards 
economic policy contained a similarly high amount of pledges of state interventionism 
and pro-labour market regulation than that of the Labour Party.
Similar to the findings derived from the Labour Party programme data, the SPD 
witnessed a consistent decline in pro-labour market regulation commitments and engaged 
in replacing the stringent and costly labour market regulation pledges with policies that 
would allow greater labour market flexibility, shorter working times, accommodate for 
new models of working patterns and allowed for more flexible transitional arrangements 
between work, education and retirement.585
Not surprisingly, the decrease in number and change in quality of policies in 
favour of state interventionism and pro-labour market regulation by both, Labour and the 
SPD, did not only express a fundamental change in the parties policy approach and the 
recognition of the changing nature of the economy, but both parties also underlined 
slowly, however, increasingly their newly developed acceptance of neo-liberal policy 
principles by actively pledging their rejection of state interventionism in the economy as 
well as labour market ('over-') regulation.





2040/41/60/61/62/63/64 Anti-planning and 
nationalisation; pro-public private; pro- 













8.2.4. Negative on economic state planning and nationalisation; pro-public private; pro- 
deregulative on labour market measures
Looking at this pledge area, it is clear that the SPD -  after having 
programmatically as well as rhetorically abandoned demands for socialist state planning 
and nationalisation policies decades earlier - did not feel the need to include statements 
that specifically rejected the use of nationalisation and state planning within the party's 
programmatic statements.
In contrast, the Labour Party formally abandoned the old 'pro-nationalisation and 
public ownership' Clause IV only in 1995 even though this was only the formal 
recognition of a process of policy change that - although highly symbolic - had already 
taken place during previous years. Since the mid-1990s, Labour had transformed its 
attitude towards the traditional division of the public and private sphere with the 
consequence that exclusive state control of certain sectors in the economy was not 
envisaged any longer necessary, with Labour increasingly accepting the usefulness and 
need of markets to promote efficiency, which led to the promotion of public-private 
partnerships.
585 gpj~j Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit - SPD-Programm fiir die Bundestagswahl 1998. Bonn, 1998, p 
19
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Furthermore, as shown by the graph - from 1992 onwards - Labour felt rather 
strongly the need to explicitly emphasise and re-assure the electorate that the party had 
changed and abandoned these - at least rhetorically held - previous policy beliefs.
In parallel to the decline of pro-state interventionist policies, the data shows that 
by 1993, both parties had begun to substantially increase policy pledges rejecting state 
'over'-regulation and planning, while advocating instead greater deregulation and labour 
market flexibility (2060/61/62/63/64). Far from only reducing interventionist pledges 
(which had begun by the late 1980s), the parties change in policy paradigm was further 
compelled when they started (by the early 1990s) to stress specifically their newly found 
free market credentials and with it their intention to programmatically appeal to a wider 
electoral base. The increase in this category of pledges showed not only that the parties 
had finally accepted that the ability of the national state to intervene in the economy had 
been substantially limited, but both parties turned furthermore at the same time towards 
advocating policies that favoured explicitly the use of free markets and market 
mechanisms.
In case of the SPD, the party's 1980 programme contained an exceptionally high 
amount of pledges expressing reservations towards state interventionist policies. This 
must be understood within the context of the party's experiences of the previous years 
made by SPD's-led coalition government under Helmut Schmidt which had been forced 
to implement substantial state expenditure cutbacks in the face of economic crises and 
rising unemployment. Here, the party -  which in government had been in coalition with 
the increasingly market liberal FDP -  felt the need to justify previous policy choices and 
underline economic policy competency by emphasising pro-market measures within its 
1980 programme.
In contrast to the SPD, the Labour Party avoided - with its government also having 
been forced to adopt measures to drastically cut state spending during its previous term in 
office -  to advocate these type of policies altogether within its programme as it was felt 
that they were highly unpopular among the party's supporters, while deep divisions 
within the party on these policy measures added to the avoidance of programmatically 
addressing these issues.
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These differences between both parties also explain why - although an overall 
substantial increase in both parties pledges against state economic planning and pro­
public/private partnerships (2040/41) as well as in favour of deregulative market 
measures (2060/61/62/63/64) could be detected - the parties decided to express this 
differently. While the Labour Party felt the need to emphasise far more than the SPD it's 
negative attitude towards traditional planning and nationalisation policies, the SPD 
placed far greater emphasis than the Labour Party on pledges in favour of pro- 
deregulative labour market measures.
3010/20/30/40 Positive statements on training 




















8.3.1. Positive statements on (state initiatives for the provision of) training and 
education; training subsidies; and youth training
Data: CCF /  PMS
The quantitative content analysis of this section of LMP pledges clearly displayed 
that the number of policies aimed at labour market supply-side measures, such as the 
spending of extra resources on the provision of training and education, training subsidies 
and training related measures for the youth (3010/20/30/40) did not only remain at a 
high level throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but increased in count as well as importance 
for both parties over time.
295
In the case of the Labour Party, interest in policies to support human capital 
formation increased substantially after the 1989 'Policy Review Process'. Nearly half of the 
report of the Policy Review Group - People at Work 'a talent-based economy' centred on 
policies to offer provisions for an increasingly "knowledge based economy" by improving 
facilities to enhance the training and skills development, with the report stating the 
party's commitment that "investing in people is the basis of Labour's economic policy."586 
The adoption of this approach - based on education and labour market supply side 
measures was further strengthened by the policy recommendations made by the CSJ in 
1994. The report clearly confirmed that state demand management policies to improve 
employment levels had been replaced by a strategy of labour market supply side 
measures, which were heavily based on the idea that long-term economic growth, 
essential to create and sustain employment could only be achieved, if the state ensured 
that the countries workforce would be better educated and trained.587 By 1997, Labour's 
election manifesto was dominated by supply-side measures to improve the labour market 
and emphasis was placed on the belief that education had become the "number one 
priority" of the party with the additional 'welfare-to-work' programme offering 
"opportunities for work, education and training" for all under-25s (out of work).588 
However, from the early 1990s onwards the Labour Party markedly levelled out its pledge 
count in this policy area as the party began to perceive increasingly neo-liberal policy 
measures as an additional way of reducing unemployment.
Nevertheless, 'New Labour's' emphasis on the so-called 'skills revolution' (which 
claimed that the knowledge of skills and hence the role of labour in the productive process 
was overtaking the importance of capital) clearly challenged the Conservatives notion of 
promoting Britain's economic competitiveness by cutting labour costs, and instead 
stressed the need to raise the skills of the labour force.589
The increase of labour market supply-side policies in the case of the SPD took 
place in a more subtle way. In fact, supply side measures featured strongly in the SPD's 
first election manifesto developed as a party in opposition (1983), however pledges on
586 Labour Party - Meet the challenge - Make the change. London, 1989, p 19
587 IPPR/The Report of the Commission on Social Justice - Social Justice - Strategies for National Renewal. 
Vintage, London, 1994, pp 119
588 Labour Party - New Labour because Britain deserves better, London, 1997, p 7 and 19
589 Shaw, Eric - The Labour Party since 1945, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1996, p 203
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training and education initiatives were to be found among a great variety of other policy 
pledges advocated to tackle unemployment, such as initiatives to encourage economic 
expansion and growth, to encourage investment, corporatist attempts to create 
employment, the raising of new taxes to finance employment initiatives, state subsidies, 
R&D state spending and the reduction of working times, to name just a view.590 In fact, at 
that time the SPD still advocated the idea that the right traditional mix of demand and 
certain supply-side policies would lead to the desired and pledged reduction in 
unemployment. By the time German unification had occurred, the SPD had began to 
switch its policies to tackle unemployment in favour of supply side initiatives, most of all, 
to deal with the growing unemployment in the newly integrated Eastern Lander and to 
deal with the fact that many of the skills held by those in the East had become obsolete or 
were insufficient for the 'westernised' labour market, hence policies to re-train, re-educate 
and re-skill the workforce became the preferred policy option of the SPD's labour market 
policy approach.591 This overall trend could be detected throughout the 1990s, in particular 
as more state interventionist and demand orientated labour market policy options (in 
particular in West Germany) had to be ruled out on the grounds of workability and 
financability.
In fact, one of the reasons for this was the unique historical as well as political 
challenge of German unification, which induced a major state interventionist programme 
in the new eastern federal Lander containing unseen levels of financial transfers of 
resources to the East in order to support extensive state demand supply side policies in 
the new Lander. However, we have attempted to treat these policy initiatives - as far as 
possible - as exceptional and hence separate from the general development of the SPD's 
LMP trends detected. The very special circumstances and challenges of unification 
resulted in the adoption of policies which distract from the overall aim of this study which 
is to investigate if common patterns of the changing nature of the SPD's and Labour's 
labour market policy development can be established.
590 see: Part II. ‘Arbeit erhalten und neu schaffen’, in SPD - Regierungsprogramm derSPD - 1983-1987. 
Jahrbuch der SPD 1982-83, Bonn, 1983, p 167-74
59! gpj} _ p er Neue Weg - okologisch, sozial, wirtschaftlich stark - Regierungsprogramm 1990-1994. Bonn, 
1990, p 13, 19-20
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This ('exceptional') approach is justified and was helped by the fact that the SPD as 
well as other major German parties (CDU/CSU, FDP) also chose to treat the issue of 
Eastern integration and economic support for those regions distinctively different from 
their general LMP pledges in their policy documents, in fact referring to those initiatives 
related to the challenges of unification commonly as "Aufbau Ost" ('[re-]construction 
East').
By 1998, the SPD's chairman Oskar Lafontaine described clearly the caution with 
which the SPD should treat labour market supply side policies, as he felt those policies 
should not be predominantly used to increase competition for the most effective labour 
cost-cutting, but instead enable a well equipped state - for the greater benefit of the 
economy and long term growth - to fund schools, universities, R&D, and training. In fact, 
Lafontaine even emphasised the educational aim of supply side measures by expressing 
his belief that "it is important [for the state] to transmit not just economic values, but the 
values, which establish the cohesion of society via a modern education system."592
The need for greater labour market flexibility and the commitment to improve 
human capital formation by spending extra resources on education and training were 
pledged by the SPD in its 1998 general election manifesto as strongly as the Labour Party 
had previously done in its 1997 election manifesto. In fact, the common move of social 
democratic parties towards supply-side policies shown by the quantitative and qualitative 
content analysis of the programmes has been confirmed by various academic publications, 
such as the interesting book by Carles Boix (1998) on parties economic strategies in the 
world economy. He confirmed the findings of this analysis when he argued, that at a time 
in which the conventional wisdom of most political economists converges on the belief 
that electoral politics and political parties have lost much of their ability to shape public 
policies as they have been considerably constrained by the need to adopt macroeconomic 
discipline and price stability, governments have continued to adopt widely divergent 
economic strategies proving that the role and ability of political parties to significantly 
influence economic performance has not necessarily been diminished. In his view, the 
convergence of parties' macroeconomic policies (due to the increasing globalisation) has
592 Lafontaine, Oskar - ‘The Future of German Social Democracy’, New Left Review, Number 227, 
January/February 1998, p 79
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instead increased the significance of supply-side economic strategies which "remain the 
object of intense, even growing, ideological conflict and party competition."593 Boix argued 
furthermore, that social democratic politicians, once they had realised that expansionary 
policies were no longer the best means to achieve growth and equality, were bound to 
choose an approach to tackle unemployment and inequality that would reject deep cuts in 
social state spending, but even more importantly would embrace increases in public 
spending on human (and fixed) capital to raise its rate of productivity. In other words, 
Boix explained, why social democratic parties - after the abandonment of Keynesian 
inspired strategies and the substantial increase of unemployment in particular among the 
group of the unskilled - were inevitably drawn towards the adoption of policies that 
would focus on human capital formation and the improvement of long-term education 
and training facilities. In fact, the more cautious ideologically-anchored belief of social 
democratic parties in the sole ability of market forces to overcome the considerable 
barriers facing companies and workers considering investment in skills - ranging from the 
capital-market constraints facing individuals to the problem of companies free-riding on 
the training undertaken by other companies by poaching trained workers - made the 
adoption of policy initiatives on how to overcome those problems and to set up a system 
which envisages considerable state activity to deal with these market failures such an 
appealing policy choice for both parties.
Overall, Labour's and the SPD's changing programmatic emphasis from pledging 
state expansion of demand to the improvement of the quality of labour with the help of 
education and training by the mid-1990s indicated that social democratic policy makers 
saw this increasingly as the best way to tackle unemployment.
591 Boix, Carles - Political Parties, Growth and Equality - Conservative and Social Democratic Economic
Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p 3
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8.3.2. Technology, industrial policy and competitiveness
The data collected from the parties policy documents indicated clearly that 
consistently great importance has been given to policies on technology, industrial policy 
and competitiveness (3060/61/62). While the SPD maintained a high level of pledge 
counts in this area, throughout the period under investigation, the Labour Party began 
increasingly to adopt these policies from a low level and reached similar pledge counts to 
those of the SPD by the 1990s, displaying the tendency towards substantial programmatic 
cohesion between the two parties by commonly prioritising policies in this area.
With the development of new international trade patterns and the increasing 
interdependence of national economies, the parties increasingly realised that the future 
success of their national economies performance would rely substantially on the 
competitiveness of their domestic industries as well as the ability to be on top of the 
cutting edge of product and production innovation. Therefore, the adoption of policies to 
increase state support for R&D into new technologies and production techniques as well 
as industrial policy initiatives to enhance overall economic performance were increasingly 
perceived as necessary and desirable to enable the domestic economies compete 
successfully in the race of international competitiveness. Furthermore, the recognition by 
Labour and the SPD - throughout the 1980s and 1990s - of the declining ability of the state
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to enhance competitiveness and economic performance with the help of fiscal policies (e.g. 
competitive devaluation's) or (Keynesian) demand management measures inevitably led 
to the increasing importance of policies that were perceived to safeguard long-term 
economic growth by enhancing national competitiveness through innovation. As a result, 
issues such as international competitiveness, business location factors, R&D and the 
enhancement of new technologies, support for the environmental and energy producing 
sectors, and the resulting positive impact on economic growth and hence the creation of 
employment gained in significance with policy pledge numbers, in the case of both 
parties, increasing substantially.
However, before convergence, policies advocated by the parties had come a long 
way. In the case of the Labour Party, its early 1980s AES based programme attempted to 
strongly link policies of financial state support for the development of new technologies to 
greater state control of the industry. It was envisaged that direct government support for 
industry in the form of 'taxpayers money' spend on state subsidies and direct aid to 
encourage investment should in turn lead to a greater degree of direct state control over 
the companies decision making process.594
In contrast, at the same time the SPD could be found to link state investment 
policies to the achievement of 'post-materialist' aims by pledging the parties intention to 
encourage environmentally innovative products as well as to support the development of 
new technologies to "humanise work."595 Labour's and the SPD's distinctively different 
approaches in this area do not only display the great degree of national policy variations 
still possible during the 1980s (at a time when both parties were searching for new policy 
approaches and alternatives under increasingly difficult conditions and socio-political 
pressure), but it also showed how far and quickly the parties policy choices eventually 
converged during the 1990s.
In the case of the SPD, the party substantially backtracked on the previous 
prioritisation of ecological issues with Gerhard Schroder going as far as even stating in 
1998 that 'today hardly anyone understands any longer the conflicts which shook us
594 see: Labour Party - The Labour way is the better wav. London, 1979
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during the early 1980s. Today, we even have to be careful, that (restrictive) bureaucrats 
abuse ecological aims, for instance, by replacing (economic) dynamism with a mentality of 
blockading and slowing down (development)/596 In fact, Schroder and Lafontaine clearly 
indicated by the end of the 90s that the reduction of car production was no longer the aim 
of a 'modern ecological and industrial policy', but emphasis should be given to the 
development and production of cars that are more energy efficient and have reduced 
pollution levels. This 'new' policy approach was certainly more pragmatic, but a far cry 
from the SPD's former 1980s commitment for the "ecological- and social reconstruction" of 
industrial society that had been previously programmatically advocated by the party.597
Finally, by the mid-1990s, both parties" programmes contained extensive 
references encouraging partnerships between the state and business to raise investment 
levels in science and research,598 and support the development of new green 
technologies.599 In this policy area and at this stage, the parties" pledges appeared en mass 
similar. While the Labour Party pledged the former in 1997, the following pledges were 
taken from the SPD's 1998 programme. The SPD called for an "innovation offensive" in the 
areas of bio- and gene technology, energy saving and microprocessors etc. to ensure the 
nations future competitiveness in a world economy, which was seen as been increasingly 
dependent on the industries ability to be sufficiently innovative in production 
technologies and knowledge accumulation.600
Overall, the revolution in information technology and the knowledge based 
economy ensured that both parties had to recognise and account for the growing 
importance of this type of policies and the importance of the state in enhancing national 
economic competitiveness, with the SPD abandoning much of its 1980s anti-economic 
growth and future ecological and social reconstruction of society rhetoric.
595 SPD - Sozialdemokratische Perspektiven zur Wiedergewinnung der Vollbeschaftigung - Arbeit fur alle, 
Vorstand der SPD, Parteitag der SPD, Band II, 1982, Bonn, p 939-40
596 Gerhard Schroder in Lafontaine, O. and G. Schroder (ed) - Innovationen fur Deutschland. Steidl Verlag, 
Gottingen, 1998, p 80
597 Lafontaine, Oskar and Gerhard Schroder (ed) - Innovationen fiir Deutschland. Steidl Verlag, Gottingen, 
1998, p 11
598 Labour Party - New Labour because Britain deserves better. London, 1997, p 15-17
599 The SPD’s proposed adoption o f some kind o f ecology-taxation could be seen as the only exception.
6°° gp£j _ Arbeit. Innovation und Gerechtigkeit. Bonn, 1998, p 16-7
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8.4.1. Social Justice /  Social Stability
The data on the parties pledges to promote policies aimed at social justice and 
social stability (4010) remained stable throughout the period of investigation, which must 
be attributed to the fact that despite all the changes in policies detected between the 1980s 
and 1990s, social justice remained a key pillar of social democratic ideology. Interestingly, 
pledges in this more general policy area generally increased in programmes in which the 
parties attempted to avoid - for various reasons -  commitments to more specific policies 
enhancing social stability and justice.
8.4.2. Benefit conditioning
In this category we tried to identify policies aimed at the increasing conditioning 
of the allocation of unemployment benefits (4040), i.e. the removal of benefit payments, if 
claimants are not prepared to accept the employment offered by state labour market 
agencies. Although politicians often try to treat benefit conditioning together with general 
labour market agency initiatives (Arbeitsamt, Jobcentre) (4050/51/52/53/54/55)601 and 
state initiatives for provision of training and education, training subsidies, and youth 
training (3010/20/30/40), politically they are very different indeed and provide the main 
means for determining whether a policy is social democratic or neo-liberal, and it is 
therefore important to separate them. In fact, in this specific policy area a long-term policy 
pattern could not be established so far, as both, the Labour Party and the SPD only began 
to introduce this type of pledge in their 1997/1998 election manifestos.
The support for policies that threaten sanctions to benefit claimants can be linked 
to the increasing popularity of (communitarian) ideas that state provisions of welfare and 
the responsibilities of individuals to better themselves must be linked more strongly, and 
must be understood as part of the parties search for new ideological pathways. 
Ultimately, the new "carrot and stick" approach adopted by the parties hints potentially 
that policies based on the re-distribution of resources to improve equality may be - in 
principle - replaced by policies that focus on the improvement of access to the individual 
to means that enable him/her to help themselves, but rejects the previous "something" 
(state provisions) for "nothing" (no activity of claimants or state resource receivers in
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return) culture. However, it would be too early to draw any conclusions from the parties 
recent subscription to this new type of policy principle and the increased attention given 
to communitarian ideas.
4050/51/52/53/54/55 Role of Labour Market 















8.4.3. Role of Labour Market Agencies (Arbeitsamt, Jobcentre)
Data: CCF/EPO
After an apparent lapse of interest by both parties in the use and role of labour 
market agencies (4050/51/52/53/54/55) expressed in their manifestos during the late 
1980s, pledges advocating policies in this area regained their programmatic significance 
and have risen throughout the 1990s in importance. Interestingly, pledge counts of both 
parties in this policy area were at their lowest in 1987 at the height of the revival of neo­
liberal beliefs aswell as a time of economic recovery that was also a period in which social 
democratic parties were deeply engrossed by an ideological crises and lack of pragmatic 
vision on what policy solutions to adopt in order to respond to the new economic and 
political challenges.602 However, the eventual adoption, by both parties, of policies focused 
on the supply side of the labour market and the decision to increasingly advocate
601 Here we must take note that Labour’s 1998 youth focused “welfare to work” programme -  coded under 
coding frame section - 4052 also featured sanctions of benefit withdrawal, if claimants would refused to take 
part in those programmes.
602 Losche, Peter and Franz Walter - Die SPD. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1992, p 120- 
21; Sassoon, Donald -  One hundred years of socialism, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 1996, p 699-703
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pragmatic policies to tackle unem ployment as well as the acceptance for the need to adopt 
piecemeal initiatives for this made it necessary for the parties to programmatically revive 
the role of labour market agencies (to provide the state w ith an institution which could  
effectively deal and implement the various state policies envisaged). The revival of these 
policies took place at the same time as the appeal of pledges in favour of state 
interventionism in the economy on a macro level steadily disappeared from Labour's and 











8.5.1. Public Sector and social employment
Data: CCF/PMS
The role of the public sector and social em ploym ent policy initiatives 
(5 0 1 0 /1 1 /1 2 /1 3 /1 4 /1 5 ) had played traditionally an important role in Labour's and the 
SPD's ideological and political past. However, Labour's abandonment of Clause IV in 
1995 as w ell as the SPD's hesitant but eventual support for the privatisation of public 
sector companies symbolised the parties break with the formerly held advocacy of the 
distinct importance of marking out a clearly separate public sector. In fact, over time both 
parties began to replace their formerly held distinct belief in the importance of the 
division of the public and private sector by adopting policies in favour of creating more 
public and private partnerships. This development was in line with the abandonment of
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public demand management, the significant public budgetary constraints as well as the 
increasing realisation that the public sector had to increase its efficiency and would 
benefit from the introduction of market mechanisms. This in turn naturally decreased 
both parties7 ability to pledge the use of the public sector as a tool for the creation of 
employment leading to a substantial decrease in the pledge count of expanding the public 
sector to create employment. In fact, while this type of pledge had still featured 
prominently in both parties programmes between 1979 and the early 1990s (peaking in the 
mid-80s), policy pledges in favour of public sector employment initiatives had declined by 
two-thirds at the time of the 1997/98 general elections.
8.5.2. Employment Taxes
Data: CCF/EPO
Pledges in favour of policies to decrease taxes on employment (5020/21) such as 
the reduction of income tax (on low incomes), employers/employees National Insurance 
contributions or expenditure on 'Lohnnebenkosten' (health insurance and pension 
contributions) to reduce the price of labour and encourage higher levels of employment 
gained increasing party attention during the 1980s and 1990s. Policies to reduce 
employment taxes were adopted by the SPD in 1990, and the Labour Party in 1997. 
Interesting is the fact, that both parties similarly placed the greatest emphasis on this type 
of policies during their final election manifesto in opposition. The policy choice to reduce 
'taxes on labour' in order to be able to encourage higher employment levels clearly 
expressed the change in the parties policy paradigm applied in policy-making by the mid- 
1990s. The formerly strongly held belief in state bureaucracies imposing high levels of 
taxes in order to redistribute resources and provide revenues for state interventionist 
measures (for example to tackle unemployment via demand side management initiatives) 
had been ultimately replaced by the mid-1990 by a strategy that instead advocated cost 
cutting on the 'factor labour' to price employees back into the labour market. Once again, 
the parallel adoption by both parties of these type of policies shows the substantial degree 
of convergence of policy choices among Labour and the SPD.
The data derived from the content analysis of the Labour Party's and the SPD's 
election manifestos and major mid-term statements clearly indicates, that - although the 
domestic situation of the parties as well as the political systems in Germany and Britain
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they acted within differed substantially - the overall policy choices of the parties 
developed to a significant degree along similar lines. This indicates, that the fact that both 
parties contained a similar ideological core influenced substantially the outcome of their 
policy choices and resulted in the adoption of increasingly similar policies. In fact, the 
adoption and abandonment of similar policies, often in parallel with each other, 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, shows that the influences of the substantial differences 
among the parties' institutions and policy making processes were partly mitigated by the 
greater picture of social democratic ideas and principles. Furthermore, the search for a 
new credible and positive policy approach and the need to replace the parties traditional 
Keynesian paradigm - institutionally conditioning actors policy choice - led ultimately to 
the parallel acceptance of substantial neo-liberal policy principles and the eventual 
convergence - to a varying degree - of both parties policies along similar lines of social 
democratic modernisation.














8.6.1. Keynesian Demand Management
Data: CCF/PMS
The content data on these programme pledges revealed that the parties choice of 
Keynesian demand management policies (6020/21/22/23/24) declined significantly since 
the mid-1980s. This pattern had only been disrupted by the temporary elevation of these
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type of policies by the SPD (as well as CDU/CSU) during the period immediately 
following German unification.603 Hence, in 1990 and 1992, the SPD called for extensive 
public interventionism and policies to expand the economy in the territory of former 
German Democratic Republic. However, by 1994 the SPD was re-joining Labour by re­
engaging in the SPD's previously established policy trend of steadily omitting this type of 
policies from its manifestos and mid-term statements.
The parties pledge count of Keynesian demand management policies started off 
from an exceptionally low point during the beginning of the period under analysis 
(Labour's 1979 and the SPD's 1980 manifesto). This circumstance can be explained by the 
fact that both parties' programmes had been drawn up at a time when they still held 
government office. Policy-makers were still strongly influenced by the need to put 
forward pragmatic pledges which reflected both governments budgetary constraints 
experienced during their previous parliamentary term in office as well as the inability to 
successfully implement policies of state demand management.
The macro-economic policies pledged in the programmes are of particular interest, 
as they revealed a rising problem experienced by Labour as well as the SPD when 
attempting to reconcile traditional Keynesian policies with those of monetarism (which 
were increasingly demanded by the markets). The policy contradictions arising from those 
two fundamentally different policy approaches (Keynesianism and Neo-Liberalism) led to 
an overall lack of the parties policy coherency, vision and credibility not only during the 
midst of this period, but also explain both parties long-term spells in opposition.
The problem discussed above emerged already during the 1970s and was clearly 
expressed by both parties during their final years in government and following from that
603 The temporary jump in the application o f pro-Keynesian policies in Germany has been well explained by 
Josef Schmidt and Susanne Blancke as being due to the fact that established structures and institutions 
appeared inadequate for the economic and political pressures unleashed by ‘unification’. Hence, for a short 
period ‘active labour market policies’ were chosen that often failed to feature a specific coherent paradigm of 
a planned and centrally co-ordinated policy pattern. However, with the ‘normalisation’ o f the situation in 
Eastern Germany, these labour market policies lost this active momentum and parties re-engaged in their 
previous LMP development paths.’ See: Schmidt, J. and S. Blancke - ‘Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Ostdeutschland: 
Aufstieg und Niedergang einer Policy?’, Deutschland Archiv, No 6 (Nov./Dez.), 31 Jg., 1998, pp 944-45
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their last election programmes when still in office (1979; 1980).604 In Labour's 1979 
programme we find already substantial programmatic recognition of the perceived need 
for monetarist stability and tight budget conditions, even though traditional policy 
pledges of state interventionism and demand management were still pre-dominant. 
Hence, in response Labour's promise in 1979 - to boost employment with the help of a 
largely unspecified industrial and investment strategy delivering "a 3% annual rate of 
growth" lacked sufficient policy detail to give the pledge any credibility, in particular as 
the need for a tight budget had certainly been recognised.605 Similarly, the SPD 
emphasised in its 1980 election manifesto the role of state aids to create employment 
opportunities, but nevertheless felt the need to pledge on the opposite page of the same 
document its intention to stick to a tight state budget.606
It must be pointed out, that the credibility and coherence of policy pledges is an 
important part of party political programmes. In fact, most certainly any political party 
would easily agree that unemployment is a terrible thing, which needs to be tackled with 
great determination. However, as discussed earlier, the actual prioritisation and practical 
approach towards tackling the problem makes 'a pledge' a pledge on which parties can be 
measured. Good intentions (such as wanting to cut unemployment) pledged in manifestos 
that are not backed by any concrete plan or vision of implementation, lack credibility and 
degenerate pledges into pure rhetoric.
Overall, the data in this category shows that both parties engaged in a clear break 
from pledging Keynesian-style demand management and high levels of state 
interventionism in their policy approach during the period under investigation. In fact, by 
the time both parties regained government office in 1997/98, policies had switched and 
converged to an extent which made it difficult not only to find substantial major 
differences between Labour's and the SPD's macro-economic approach but also theirs and 
that of the previous CDU/CSU and Conservative administrations. Even though some of 
the SPD's and Labour politics would have been too dirigiste for the CDU or Conservatives
604 Here, we are referring to James Callaghan’s (Labour Prime Minister) 1976 IMF loan and Kanzler Helmut 
Schmidt’s change in conviction (according to Dr. Herbert Ehrenberg by the winter break o f 1979/80) not to 
advocate any longer programmes that were based on state demand management. (Discussion with Dr Herbert 
Ehrenberg -  [1977-80] Minister for employment [Minister fiir Arbeit und Sozialordnung]; member o f  SPD 
party executive; [1981] chair o f party commission for social policy -  Liibeck, 15 June 1999)
605 Labour Party - The Labour wav is the better wav, London, 1979
606 SPD - Sicherheit fur Deutschland. Bonn, 1980, p 20-1
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- (for instance, Labour's pledged interference with the rights of business to make profits 
and use them as they wished in the case of the windfall tax and abolition of tax credit on 
pension fund dividends) - key differences were detectable only in detail, tone and 
competence rather than principle.607 In fact, what Driver and Martell have been arguing in 
the case of the Labour Party's policy choices has also been true to a substantial extent in 
the case of the SPD. Tough policies on inflation as well as prudent fiscal and monetary 
policies, low taxes and low public spending commitments were all established policy 
approaches of the outgoing Conservative and Christian Democratic administrations as 
well as the incoming SPD and Labour administrations under Schroder and Blair, hence 
proving a substantial consensus on economic policies among the major parties in both 
countries.
6010/11/12/13/14 Economic Orthodoxy, 
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Figure 8.12.
8.6.2. Economic Orthodoxy, Government Efficiency, pro-free market economy
Data: CCF/PMS
The previous findings are confirmed by the analysis of the development of the 
category of policy pledges in the area of economic orthodoxy, government efficiency and a 
pro-free market policy orientation (6010/11/12/13/14).
607 Driver, Stephen and Luke Martell -  New Labour -  Politics after Thatcherism, Polity Press, Cambridge,
1998, p 65
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After experiencing an initial decline of pledges in this policy area when entering 
opposition, this type of policies experienced a clear increase in avocation by the Labour 
Party and the SPD from the late 1980s onwards. By the time the pledge counts of economic 
orthodoxy had reached very high levels, both parties were winning their respective 
general elections and taking government office (1997/1998). The delayed adoption of 
these type of policies by both parties (in comparison to other German and British centre- 
right mainstream parties) clearly indicated the delayed shift of Labour and the SPD away 
from the Keynesian paradigm towards the acceptance of substantial more neo-liberal 
policy principles. In fact, the increasingly consensual application of a Neo-Liberal 
paradigm confined the Labour Party and SPD to aim policies predominantly at providing 
stable monetary and fiscal conditions required by the markets to enable the maximisation 
of investment, output and employment.608
When comparing the parties choice of economic orthodoxy, government efficiency 
and pro-free market policies (6010/11/12/13/14) with those of Keynesian demand 
management (6020/21/22/23/24), the data indicates not only clearly a decline in the 
latter and increase in the former, but also policy development patterns between both 
parties which prove to be surprisingly similar. In fact, both parties began at roughly the 
same time to replace Keynesian inspired policies with those of economic orthodoxy. The 
overall policy shift and change of paradigms applied by the parties policy makers are in 
no other category more clearly expressed and shown than in those of demand 
management and economic orthodoxy.
However, it is important to emphasise that at no time did the parties ever question 
the active role of the state, which was seen as justified by the greater public interest. In 
fact, corrective action by the state to stabilised the business cycle as well as to ensure that 
supply-side tasks (markets tend to neglect) remained a vital programmatic part of the 
social democratic policy approach throughout the 1980s and 1990s.609
The period under analysis must be seen -  as shown by the data - as a phase of 
transition by both parties in which their policy principles changed and Keynesian inspired 
policies were slowly substituted by free market principles. Both parties' programmes were
608 Shaw, Eric - The Labour Party since 1945, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1996, p 202
609 Shaw, Eric -  The Labour Party since 1945. Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, p 202
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far from pledging solely stringent neo-liberal spirited government initiatives to reduce 
budget deficits, the programmes still contained a substantial amount of pledges in favour 
of state interventionism in the economy. However, after the parties had encountered 
consistent electoral failure throughout the 1980s, policy makers realised that they had to 
open the parties towards a greater degree of free-market policy attitude, as it also seemed 
more popular with the electorate. At the time, parties were caught in a strategic situation 
of uncertainty in which they had to increasingly attempt to bridge -  rather dubiously - the 
growing programmatic gap between their traditional interventionist policy pledges and 
the newly adopted ones of tight budgets and monetarism.
The SPD as well as the Labour Party lost their respective elections in 1992 and 1994 
due to the fact that voters - at best - did not trust or - worse - feared the parties tax policies. 
In the case of the Labour Party, it had already been constrained during the 'Policy Review 
Process' to introduce a more cautious policy approach towards public spending, a 
circumstance which clearly indicated a shift in attitude. From this it followed, that by the 
1992 election campaign, Neil Kinnock as well as his Shadow Chancellor (and future party 
leader John Smith) stressed that a Labour government would only spend the money it 
earned -  in turn ruling out any major borrowing by the state.610 This shift was then re­
enforced more adamantly by 'New Labour7 under the leadership of Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown, who pledged by the time of the 1997 general election that a Labour 
government would go as far as adopting the spending limits previously announced by the 
Conservative Chancellor Kenneth Clarke. The fact that Labour had also ruled out any 
increases in income tax during its first term in office showed, that a fundamental policy 
shift had been completed with little room left for any tax increases or measures to expand 
state spending (outflanking in its economic orthodoxy even the cautious tax and spending 
increases on education proposed by the Liberal Democrats). With the exception of the 
'windfall tax' on the privatised utilities to fund the 'welfare to work' programme, any 
other extra resources pledged by Labour in 1997 were envisaged to come solely from 
'efficiency savings', the 'de-freezing' of local authority council housing receipts, resources 
becoming available through a reduction in unemployment and the improvement of the
610 Driver, Stephen and Luke Martell -  New Labour -  Politics after Thatcherism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1998, p 66
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overall economic situation.611 In the case of the SPD, its 1998 election manifesto also placed 
extensive emphasis on the point that the party did not intend to increase taxes, but instead 
envisaged raising extra resources by cracking down on tax evasion and by using existing 
resources more efficiently.612 In fact, the trend to stick to the strict budget of previous 
conservative administration constraints is not limited to the SPD and Labour. Even the 
French Socialist Party under Lionel Jospin, which had won the 1997 election by promising 
a substantial return to Keynesian-style levels of public spending to stimulate the economy, 
admitted by early 1999 that the membership of the single European currency had not only 
severely restricted the party's economic choices, but that the Jospin government would 
have to re-impose the strict budget constraints introduced by the previous conservative 
government.613
Overall, consistent with the policy development patterns established in many of 
the previously analysed LMP categories, both parties applied (often in parallel) 
increasingly neo-liberal policy principles to their policy choices, reaching the highest 
levels at the time they were able to successfully challenge their opponents and win 
government office. Furthermore, the increased emphasis on the adoption of neo-liberal 
economic policies similar to those already favoured by the political opponents in 
government office meant, that Labour and the SPD were increasingly able to seriously 
challenge and increasingly question the economic politics of their Conservative and 
Christian Democratic opponents on the grounds of competence rather than on ideological 
grounds.
611 Labour Party - New Labour because Britain deserves better, London, 1997, p 12-13
612 SPD - Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit. Bonn, 1998, p 29














The number of positive pledges by Labour and the SPD in favour of the adoption 
of corporatist policies (7040/41/42/43/44) -  defined as in the state co-operating and/or 
co-ordinating the active participation of social partners (trade unions and employers 
federations) in policy-making - declined substantially during the period under 
investigation. In this category, figures expressed in the above figure (8.13.) may be slightly 
misleading as corporatist policies have meant very different things to both parties, while 
the precise meaning of these policies has - in addition - changed substantially during the 
period under investigation. For example, the Labour Party's high pledge count of policies 
in favour of giving trade unions a substantial policy role -  for instance - in company 
decision-making throughout the 1980s has increased Labour's pledge count which then 
appears to express a consistently higher commitment to corporatist policies than the SPD. 
However, the SPD's programmatic use of corporatism reflected Germany's more 
consensual system of industrial relations which had traditionally been based on 
considerable co-operation between the state, trade unions and employers confederations. 
Due to this fact, the SPD has been able to take the co-operation between the social partners 
to a greater extent for granted, a circumstance which has for obvious reasons not been 
expressed in the SPD's lower pledge count in this policy category. Nevertheless, while the
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SPD has been traditionally close to the German trade union movement, the emphasis on 
corporatism within the SPD's programmes also expressed explicitly the positive role 
envisaged for employers.
The degree of pledges in support of corporatism found within the Labour Party's 
programmes remained consistently high throughout the 1980s. However, it must be 
pointed out that the meaning of the term changed significantly after 1979, as corporatism 
stood at the time predominantly for government co-operation with trade unions. This 
understanding of corporatism remained prominent and at a high level in Labour's 
manifestos throughout much of 1980s and began to decline by the 1990s parallel to inner- 
party reforms which led to the reduction of trade union influence over the party's policy 
making processes.
Significantly, even though in Labour's 1979 programme the desire to improve the 
co-operation between employees and employers was expressed, in the case of the state's 
treatment of business and industry, the party envisaged a rather strong handed dirigiste 
state role by pledging that the National Enterprise Board should gain extra statutory 
powers to conclude "planning agreements with major industrial companies...to ensure 
that private industry plays its full part in the drive for prosperity and full 
employment.. .".614
However, from the moment the Labour Party reformed its relationship with the 
trade union movement, the corporate role pledged by Labour for the unions decreased 
dramatically. Furthermore, since Blair became leader, the corporate role formerly 
envisaged by the party as predominantly involving trade unions, was substituted by a 
growing presence of Labour policies envisaging a vital role for business and employers 
interest groups. Driver and Martell went as far as describing this development as 
"partnership now means not corporatist links with trade unions but co-operation with 
business", with a special relationship developing to sections of the business community 
seemingly at least as strong as the party's link with the traditionally allied trade union
614 Labour Party -  The Labour wav is the better wav. London, 1979
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movement.615 In fact, while the Labour Party was - by the early 1980s - strongly allied and 
influenced by trade unions and in turn committed to extent the influence of the union 
movement on economic decision making (e.g. AES's planning agreements), by mid-1995 
the trade union influence had not only been checked within the Labour Party, but had 
also lost much of its vital role in Britain's economy as a whole. 'New Labour's' positive 
attitude towards co-operation with business and the increasing marginalisation of the 
trade union movement meant, that in terms of traditional corporatism, Labour had been 
overtaken by the SPD (in terms of the significance given to trade unions in its 
programmes) due to the Labour Party's significant reduction in policies envisaging a 
primary role for trade unions in the economy.
Although the SPD's pledge count on corporatism envisaging it as a tool of 
approaching employment problems decreased in a similar manner to that of the pledge 
count of the Labour Party, the SPD continued to emphasise the vital role of the unions in 
its policy approach to the labour market. In fact, one of the priority pledges of the SPD's 
1998 election campaign was the setting up of a corporate "Bundnis fiir Arbeit" (alliance 
for work) between representatives of the government, trade unions, employers federations 
and churches to find solutions and agreement on measures to reduce the level of 
unemployment.616
Interestingly, while Labour's 1979 election programme - written under the 
impression of the then recently experienced disastrous 'winter of discontent' - included a 
positive reference to the traditionally more restrained 'continental model' relationship 
between the German SPD led government and the German trade union movement, a 
distinctly Anglo-Saxon policy approach was chosen by 1997. In fact, in 1979 the German 
relationship was perceived by Labour as a model for Britain, which had proven that talks 
between the social partners and the government were a "good way to reach agreement on 
how to expand output, incomes and living standards."617 In contrast, by 1997 - clearly 
displaying how far the Labour Party had moved - the party (at least partly inspired by Bill
615 Driver, Stephen and Luke Martell -  New Labour -  Politics after Thatcherism. Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1998, p 69
616 SPD - Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit, Bonn, 1998, p 11
617 Labour Party - The Labour wav is the better wav. London, 1979
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Clinton's New Democrats) openly embraced the idea that the Anglo-Saxon model was 
superior to the 'over-regulated' and 'inflexible' corporatist structures of continental 
Europe, which were thought of as preventing rather than encouraging greater labour 
market flexibility and employability envisaged necessary to tackle unemployment.618
8.8. Conclusion
In comparison to the British Conservative Party, the German Christian Democrats 
and Liberals (FDP), the delayed shift in Labour's as well as the SPD's party policy 
paradigm can be clearly shown with the help of the analysis of the changing content of the 
parties policy statements. Furthermore, the policy choices identified during the qualitative 
analysis of the programmes clearly enforces the pattern established by the quantitative 
assessment of the parties policy choices. Overall, the content analysis of the party 
programmes and major mid-term statements of the Labour Party and the SPD supported 
the qualitative findings of the parties programmatic trends - and vice versa. These 
findings have been confirmed by other studies -  such as that of Ian Budge -  who has been 
able to show in the case of the Labour Party - on a left-right policy scale - that Labour's 
policies outlook moved sharply towards the right after 1992.619 In fact, he discovered that 
for the first time in the party's post-war history a preponderance of right-wing positions 
over left-wing positions (+8) had taken place, confirming not only the perception that 
Labour had finally moderated dramatically its traditional policies with the party even 
'leapfrogging' the Liberal Democrats to the right during that process. In case of the SPD, 
Budge was also able to show that the party' programmes moved first to the left -  peaking 
in 1983 -  before policy positions began to move consistently towards the right of the 
policy spectrum since.620 Similarly, Richard Topf concluded in his content analysis of party 
manifestos in Britain, that during "the last 15 years [1979-94] the ideological language of 
British politics as a whole has tipped very sharply to the right."621
618 Wintour, Partick and Will Hutton -  ‘ How Brown borrowed to give Britain a New Deal’, The Observer. 
06/07/1997, p 22; Rustin, Michael -  ‘The Clintonising of New Labour’, The Guardian. 18/11/1996, p 16
619 See: Laver, Michael J. and Ian Budge -  Party Policy and Government Coalitions, St. Martin’s Press, 
London, 1992, p 25-7; Klingemann et al - Parties. Policies, and Democracy, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994, p 
38-42
620 Budge, Ian -  ‘Party policy and ideology: Reversing the 1950s’, in Evans, G. and P Norris (ed) -Critical 
Elections. London, Sage, 1999, p 6-8
621 Topf, Richard -  ‘Party Manifestos’, in Heath, A. et al -  Labour’s Last Chance?, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 
1994, p 165
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The data derived from the content analysis of the Labour Party's and the SPD's 
election manifestos and major mid-term statements clearly indicates, that - although the 
domestic situation of the parties as well as the political systems in Germany and Britain 
differed substantially -  the overall development of policy choices over time went - to a 
significant degree - along similar pathways. This proves, that both parties operated 
around a similar ideological core, a factor which affected considerably their choice of 
policies and resulted in the adoption of increasingly similar pledges. In fact, the parties' 
adoption and/or abandonment of similar policies took often place at the same time. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the substantial differences between the parties 
institutions and policy making processes, which could have been expected to have led to a 
consistently large range of varying parties policy choices were partly overwritten by the 
greater picture of social democratic parties having to re-orientate their common policy 
approach according to the requirements of changing political and economic 
circumstances. In fact, the search for a new credible and positive policy approach and the 
need to replace the parties' traditional Keynesian paradigm - institutionally conditioning 
actors policy choices -  led ultimately to the parallel acceptance of substantial neo-liberal 
policy principles and the eventual move towards partial policy convergence -  (to varying 
degrees depending on the precise policy area) -  with both parties ending up in an attempt 
to modernise social democracy along similar lines.
In comparison to the British Conservative Party and the German Christian 
Democrats as well as Liberals (FDP), a delayed shift in Labour's and the SPD's policy 
paradigm (consciously or unconsciously applied by policy making actors) can be clearly 
shown with the help of the content analysis of the parties' policy statements. This can 
certainly be partly credited to the fact that traditional batde-lines between domestic 
parties had been drawn until the early 1980s on direct forms of government intervention 
such as nationalisation and planning as opposed to incentives, free enterprise and 
economic orthodoxy.622 From the mid-80s onwards, an increasing policy convergence took 
place among most parties to the right of the Labour Party and SPD that was based on the 
general acceptance of the superiority of free markets, the need for the reduction in state
622 Budge, Ian -  ‘Party policy and ideology: Reversing the 1950s’, in Evans, G. and P Norris (ed) -Critical 
Elections. London, Sage, 1999, p 13
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interventionism and goals of social conservatism, a convergence that was initially joined 
by both social democratic parties.
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9.1. Factors predetermining party policy approaches
Building on social psychology, cultural sociology and historical institutionalism, it 
is possible to develop fairly specific expectations on how identities shape parties policy­
making. These experiences can be formulated as empirical questions which can be put 
together with our quantitative and qualitative data on the political parties' in question.
Which ideas of the role and capacity of the state and the functioning of the labour 
market dominate a party's discourse? Who or what constitutes 'the alternative' to a given 
policy and ideational identity?
Comparing the answers to the above questions, it is possible to draw conclusions 
from the similarities and parallels that can be discovered between Labour's and the SPD' 
party political characteristics. Both parties encountered disorientation and ideological 
crises after the increasingly experienced failure of Keynesian policy prescriptions (due to 
changing circumstances). They eventually moved and embraced neo-liberal LMP 
approaches - although at different speed and intensity - nevertheless eventually into a 
rather similar direction. Here, the different approaches of the Labour Party and the SPD 
growing from the increasing failure of their national blends of Keynesian-led policy 
approaches can be explained by the historical differences in both institutions (federalism, 
Clause 4 etc.) as well as the differences found in the domestic context of both countries 
political systems (Thatcherism, electoral systems, and party competition).
Furthermore, after the collapse of the political systems in Eastern Europe's, the 
increasing level of Western European economic integration, and the emergence of an 
increasingly internationalised economy, both parties moved along a similar policy 
direction and embraced a delayed shift (compared to most of their party political 
competitors) in their institutionalised economic policy paradigm from Keynesian to neo­
liberal economic policy approaches.
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This is not to say that the parties signed up wholeheartedly to the economic and 
social policies of their conservative pre-political rivals. Instead, a rhetoric of social justice 
under new economic conditions was developed that meant that both parties combined - in 
their 1997/98 general election programmes that brought them back into office - distinctive 
aspects of traditional social democratic policy values and rhetoric, and twinned them with 
a new highly pragmatic neo-liberal approach towards economic policy.
9.1.1. Party policy making and the paradigmatic component
As shown by the evidence collected for this thesis, the fundamental economic 
policy changes of parties cannot be understood in rational exchange terms alone as 
support within parties for a specific policy approach does not develop necessarily on the 
basis of actors materially defined interests or simply in electoral terms.
Instead, the factors predetermining a party's policy approach form part and parcel 
of long term party institutionalised policy paradigms that have often also acquired 
symbolic meaning by marking cornerstones of parties policy principles that impact 
strongly on the actions and decisions taken by actors within them. Hence, the 
exceptionally slow decline in Keynesian-led policy prescriptions by the SPD and Labour 
Party can only be understood against the context of institutionalised identity politics, 
while an interest-based account by itself - although not entirely dismissed - may 
substantially miss the mark.
This also explains why Labour and the SPD experienced remarkable little intra­
party challenges towards the revival of state interventionist policy approaches - 
traditionally linked to the parties - once they had been voted out of government office in 
1979 and 1982 respectively.623
623 Labour’s inner-party splits and the departure o f MP’s on the right to found the SDP were based 
predominantly on Labour’s inner party procedural and policy selection reforms (principle o f mandatory re­
selection, introduction of electoral college to elect party leader) as well as anti-EEC and pro-unilateral 
stances, however, not on the rejection by those Labour ‘dissidents’ of a certain revival o f more Keynesian led 
state interventionist economic policy positions (even if  many of them may have disagreed with the brunt o f  
Labour’s newly adopted and far more reaching ‘Alternative Economic Strategy’. See: Williams, Geoffrey L. 
and Alan L. Williams - ‘The Birth o f the SDP’ (Chapter 8), in Williams, G. L. and A. L. Williams - Labour’s 
Decline and the Social Democrats’ Fall, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1989, p 107-11. In the case o f the 
SPD’s economic policy (as already mentioned earlier), the party adopted immediately - when entering 
opposition - policies for a Keynesian style public investment programme o f 10 billion Deutsch Marks, 
financed by a supplementary tax o f 5% on incomes over 50000 DM. (Braunthal, Gerard - ‘The Social
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The collected comparative evidence of both parties policy making behaviour 
processes underlines the fact that conclusions can be drawn from the similarities and 
differences among Labour's and the SPD's LMP making patterns.
1. Anti-Keynesian-led economic policy approaches adopted by the Labour and SPD 
leaderships - when in office (Labour Party 1974-79/ SPD 1966-82) - were abandoned 
and reversed as soon as both parties lost government office and went into opposition. 
The Labour Party decided upon this officially at its Annual Labour Party conference 
September 1979. In the case of the SPD, the party's executive began already to re-shape 
labour market policies by quickly devising a 'declaration on Economic and Labour 
Market Policy' (13/09/1982) that strongly criticised the FDP for its neo-liberal 
economic deflationary and tax policies four days before the opposition bound party - 
the FDP had already left the common coalition - actually lost government office.624 
Here, the SPD executive expressed a renewed interest in Keynesian-inspired public 
investment programmes that were to be financed primarily by supplementary taxes 
(Erganzungsabgabe) on high wage earners as well as extra state borrowing, 
something, which had been categorically ruled out by the Helmut Schmidt led 
coalition government during the previous years.
2. The end of both parties terms in government did not only mark the beginning of 
continuous electoral failure and a 16 i.e. 18 year long spell in opposition, but it marked 
first and foremost the beginning of programmatic crises and uncertainty about the 
parties future economic policy approaches and visions. Here, the initial differences in 
party policy decisions and outlook between the SPD and the Labour Party can be 
explained by differing domestic considerations and political challenges. While the 
Labour Party moved its economic policies to the far left in the early 1980s,625 the
Democratic Party’, in, Wallbach, H. G. P. and G. K. Romoser (ed) - West German Politics in the mid­
eighties. Praeger Publications, New York, 1985, p 100-01).
624 Vorstand der SPD - Erklarung zur Wirtschafts- und Arbeitsmarktpolitik, Nr 407/82, Bonn, 13/09/1982
625 The realisation that old traditional moderate Keynesian led policy approaches were increasingly 
questionable meant - soon after the parties went into opposition - that Labour began to adopted an 
increasingly orthodox socialist ‘Alternative Economic Strategy’ (AES) that contained pledges such as the 
withdrawal from the EEC, extend public ownership and massive increases in public expenditure. This 
development was only the beginning of an economic policy radicalisation process that peaked with the 
party’s general election manifesto of 1983. (Jones, Tudor - Remaking of the Labour Party. Routledge, 
London, 1996, p 89)
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German SPD - in addition to a moderate revival of Keynesian-led policy approaches - 
began to open the party towards policy issues raised by the new social movements 
and in response to the increasing electoral threat from the Greens.626 However, after 
both parties' painful search for new policy approaches and priorities, they eventually 
ended up moving in parallel and over a substantial amount of time towards more neo­
liberal policy applications. This move eventually enabled both parties to establish a 
new sense of purpose and set off of a policy review processes that finally led to 'New' 
Labour's and the SPD's 'Neue Mitte' policy approach which marked the final 
abandonment of the Keynesian-led party paradigm in favour of increasingly neo­
liberal economic policy visions. This move paid off in electoral terms as the parties 
appeal was widened to include the centrist vote.
3. The Labour Party and the SPD's 1987 policy programmes - although containing an 
increasingly more moderate economic policy outlook - still contained immense 
programmatic contradictions between Keynesian- and Neo-Liberal inspired policy 
approaches.627 These damaged both parties policy credibility, undermined their 
electoral capacity and marked the continuation of their search for a credible non neo­
liberal policy alternative to challenge successfully the neo-liberal policy ideas 
advocated by their political opponents.
4. Attempts to seriously amend the paradigmatic predetermination of the parties 
economic policy choices began in earnest only after both parties had lost their 
respective 1987 general elections. It was then that both parties' leaderships decided to 
engage in serious policy review processes in order to respond more effectively to the
626 The SPD - when entering opposition - was originally divided over the question, if  the party should engage 
in a ‘strategy o f integration’ by adopting policies that would appeal to the post-materialist generation and 
make concessions to their interests. (Padgett, S. and T. Burkett - Political Parties and elections in West 
Germany. C. Hurst, London, 1986, p 75) In the end, the party tried to increasingly compete for votes from the 
new social movements as the party “greened” its programme. (Braunthal, Gerard - ‘Opposition in the Kohl 
Era: The SPD and the Left’, German Politics, Vol 7, No 1, (April 1998), p 148-51). In addition, as Diane L. 
Pamess concluded in her study o f the 1980s SPD, the party appeared increasingly “capable o f drafting the 
brand of comprehensive environmentalist programme that can convince the sceptics among the German 
centre-left that the SPD is the party that best represents the moderate approach to the postmaterialist agenda.” 
(Pamess, Diane L. - The SPD and the Challenge o f Mass Politics, Westview Press, Oxford, 1991, p 182)
627 Labour Party - Britain will win with Labour, General Election Manifesto, London, 1987; SPD - 
Regierungsprogramm der SPD 1987-1990, Bonn, 1987
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new realities posed by the changing political and economic conditions; public opinion; 
and to re-organise and modernise their policy approaches.628
In the case of the Labour Party this was also a conscious attempt to shift the party's 
visible policy agenda towards the centre of the political spectrum where the majority 
of the electorate had been identified.629 However, the final outcome still hinted at 
problems to decide between socialist rhetoric and neo-liberal policy ideas and realities. 
Similarly, the SPD had begun to revise its basic policies for a new Basic Programme (as 
a follow up to the highly successful 1959 Godesberger Programme) and finalised a 
new draft in 1989. The party's timing, however, of the completion of the new 'Basic 
Programme' - at the eve of German unification - in late December 1989 was highly 
unfortunate as it accelerated the programme's failure to provide major policy 
guidance towards the unfolding but unexpected policy challenges posed by the end of 
the cold war, issues of European integration and security, German unification, and last 
but not least the fast changing condition for LMPs. The Labour Party's and the SPD's 
policy review documents developed during the end of the 1980s clearly expressed 
both parties continuous problem of coming to terms with the end of their previous 
paradigm-led policy approaches, whilst not being yet able to sketch out a precise and 
credible programmatic policy alternative.
5. The Labour Party's 1992 and the SPD's 1994 electoral performance became another 
gross disappointment. Even though their political opponents had encountered 
considerable economic problems during their previous term in government, and both 
social democratic parties had continued to abandon long held policy approaches in 
favour of more neo-liberal economic policy solutions - in particular in regards to the 
issue of taxes and state budget discipline - both parties' encountered severe difficulties 
in reassuring a critical public over the credibility of their economic policy 
programmes. Hence, both parties had failed again to sketch out and deliver electoral
628 When considering public opinion and electoral requirements, we clearly recognise the contradictions that 
can often be identified in public attitudes. For instance, on issues such as pensions, taxation and consumer 
freedom the public often prefers neo-liberal rhetoric, while at the same time not accepting that this in turn 
must carry a loss o f generous pensions and welfare state provisions. In fact, this contradiction provides a 
difficult policy-making context for all parties - left and right. It is, however, fair to say that during this period 
‘electoral’ public opinion was moving in favour o f neo-liberal rhetoric.
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programmes that would catch the imagination of the majority of voters, even though 
further major efforts had been made to shift economic and LMPs nearer towards the 
policy positions of their Conservative/Christian Democratic competitors.630
6. Finally, after party actors had engaged in a trial and error search for a new party 
policy approach (as an integral component of party policy "learning7 and evaluation), 
policies that had been adopted during the early period in opposition periods and were 
perceived deficient in implementability indeed offered new impulses for further 
reforms. This policy reform, however, led to a change of overall paradigm before the 
parties were able to engage in a "convincing" and substantial overhaul and review of 
their policy positions. In other words, a shift in the parties overall economic policy 
paradigm seems to have been a vital precondition for successful policy change.631
7. As clearly shown by the content analysis of party policy programmes, both Labour's 
and the SPD's economic policy-shift did not take place as rapidly as one may have 
imagined. In fact, the Labour Party and the SPD developed their LMPs in an 
incremental manner, which means that after the initial adoption of more state 
interventionism/anti-economic growth policies during the early 1980s, both parties 
engaged in a slow but continuous move of abandoning their Keynesian inspired 
economic policies and increasingly replaced them with neo-liberal policy proposals 
that clearly culminated in both parties' "market orthodoxy' by 1997/98. Comparing 
them with the policies implemented by the "neo-liberal" influenced CDU and 
Conservatives parties in government, we are able to conclude that Labour as well as 
the SPD shifted their policies towards a neo-liberal position, although up to 10 years 
later.
629 Seyd, Patrick -  ‘Labour: the great transformation, in King, Anthony -  Britain at the polls. 1992. Chatham 
House, Chatham, 1993
630 See chapter 7.
631 Bulmer, Simon J. - ‘The governance o f the European Union: A New Institutionalist Approach’, Journal o f  
Public Policy. 13: 4, 1994, p 373
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9.2. Historical Institutionalism applied
Guiding principles, such as Keynesian inspired economic policy approaches can 
play an important role in shaping patterns of party policy making, even though they may 
be difficult to quantify and thus represent a challenge to those whose theory-building 
tends towards the algebraic. However, polity structures as well as the inputs of social, 
economic and political forces often have a consequential impact on policy outcomes.632 In 
such an approach, institutions play a key-mediating and directing role, however, as 
pointed out by Simon Bulmer, institutions certainly do not provide the fundamental 
dynamics of politics, but instead structure access of political forces as they form actors' 
behaviour, a process that is of vital importance for policy process outcomes.633
Historical institutionalism does not concentrate on whether party actors are 
winners or losers of decision-making processes, but focuses more neutrally on the way in 
which outcomes of negotiations are shaped in a process of policy reconstruction. 
Furthermore, parties and actors within them can be viewed as products of their specific 
'logic' which prescribes searches for solutions, and prioritises approaches to solve policy 
problems. In the case of social democratic parties, this has traditionally meant the 
prioritisation of a re-distributive orientated management of welfare states and the battle 
against unemployment.
Clearly, historical institutionalism is no grand theory. However, it offers a valuable 
method for deriving analytical insights to policy processes and hence allows us to focus 
on different inter-linking aspects that offer - in this study - insights into determents of 
parties labour market policy formation. Research questions have been approached under 
three different considerations, namely by looking at systemic changes, institutional 
structures and normative dimensions.
How were labour market policy options shaped by changes in national and 
international political and socio-economic conditions? (The increasingly reduced ability of 
policy makers to subscribe to policies that intervene extensively in the economy). 
(Systemic Changes)
632 Bulmer, Simon J. - ‘New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market’, Journal o f  
European Public Policy. 5:3, September 1998, p 369
633 Bulmer, Simon J. - ‘The governance of the European Union: A New Institutionalist Approach’, Journal o f  
Public Policy. 13: 4, 1994, p 370
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How were changes and amendments in labour market policies adopted and expressed? 
(Policy Evolution).
How did changes to the parties' institutional structures contribute to the amendment of 
labour market policy choices? (Institutional Structures).
How did institutional structures shape actors' choices in the labour market policy area 
and their party policy making regimes? (Institutional Structures)
Why did both party institutions not act simply as neutral arenas, but instead structured 
the parties' policy processes? (Institutional Structures)
How did the parties' organisational disposition, intra-party conflict as well as 
institutional norms, values and ideas shape policy outcomes? (Normative Dimensions)
In this thesis, we have aimed to advance historical institutionalism as a method of 
analysing the multifaceted nature of party policy processes. The analytical focus has been 
placed upon the institutional aspects of actors policy making choices, although without 
neglecting the wider national and international factors that condition and predetermine 
public policy choices. Hence, "historical institutionalism offers an explanation based on 
intermediating factors rather than going to the underlying sources of macro-social 
change."634
Regarding the question of whether the historical institutional approach offers any 
predictive qualities, it must be stated that while this approach may not be able to make 
precise predictions of parties' future policy developments, it certainly enables us to make 
more localised predictions such as that institutions which have previously adopted and 
enacted policies develop their own dynamics, norms and values which remain in place 
long after their original adoption. Hence, this approach predicts the importance of 
previously adopted policy paths (and depending on their degree of institutionalisation) 
how far they can be expected to carry potential for policy continuation and incremental 
change over medium-periods of time. Hence, it is fair to say that historical institutionalism 
offers a research methodology with a medium-range validity that links key institutional 
factors together to make overall sense of party policy processes.
634 Bulmer, Simon J. - ‘New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market’, Journal of  
European Public Policy. 5:3 September, 1998, p 382
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Regarding the methodology applied during this study to assess party programmatic 
change, we can assume that the technique of content analysis can be further developed 
and applied to deal, for instance, with greater party/ programme samples and to analyse 
parties in government. The question, if this approach has been able to advance social 
science research and how this study may help and offer other investigators a tool to assess 
certain developments of party policies, can be answered positively. In fact, this research 
has shown that it make sense to look first at the general policy making paradigms of the 
organisations under investigation (in addition to the overall national and international 
political and economic context) before investigating or trying to understand institutional 
developments and actor behaviour. Here, institutional and individual actor behaviour as 
well as problems with a pre-dominant paradigm may pre-determine to a far greater extent 
policy processes, actors decision-making and ranking of alternatives as well as final 
outcomes than many analyst would expect. Hence, the tools for investigation developed 
further in this thesis offer analysts another useful path with which the institutional as well 
as individual actions of actors can be better understood and explained.
9.3. The Labour Party and SPD: Comparing programmatic shifts and organisational 
change
We have been able to establish that the Labour Party and the SPD encountered a 
substantial organisational as well as programmatic shift during the period under 
investigation. In fact, a move towards similar, sometimes converging policies and 
strategies could be clearly identified in the economic policy area.635
9.3.1. The development of party change, economic policies, and party values
The change in domestic and international socio-economic conditions and the 
policy environment encouraged the parties to re-think and up-date their traditional LMP 
positions according to contemporary requirements and challenges. Path dependency,
635 We are aware, that by drawing some more general conclusions about the parties, we must be careful not to 
move too far away from the specific example o f labour market policy and its subtleties, paradoxes, 
contradictions and even innovations that the discussion o f this specific policy area have revealed. Hence, it is 
important to point out that we would expect a study of another specific policy area to reveal interesting 
complexities o f this type as well.
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established policy processes and procedures led to a paradigmatic pre-disposition of party 
actors policy choices.
Both parties' increasing emphasis on policy presentation, an increase in party 
discipline, and a moderation in policy aims led to a much improved party appearance, 
while at the same time an increased role of the media, the loss of power by medium-level 
party functionaries (enabling the party leadership to appeal directly to its members and 
the electorate), and substantial changes in party policy making procedures and roles 
enhanced the parties' leaderships ability to reverse an increasing degree of their parties 
traditional paradigmatic LMP prescriptions and advocate electorally (seemingly) more 
popular policy options.
A substantial degree of convergence in the development and adoption of 'new' 
social democratic values /  policies took place. There was also an increasing degree of 
emphasis on the notion of reform that can be referred to as the 'euphemism of 
modernisation' of organisation and policy outlook. These included an unashamed 
adoption of severe policy 'pragmatism' with both parties having begun to draw intensely 
from a greater variety of policy ideas (communitarianism; liberalism etc.) and policy 
formation sources (political opponents; think tanks; outside expertise; industry etc.) than 
previously. Furthermore, the 'modernisation' process witnessed substantial attempts to 
engage in self-conscious image building exercises, the professionalisation of policy 
communication and election campaigning, a greater use of the media, and finally the use 
of market research, public opinion polling and focus groups to test policy appearance and 
the popularity of policies with the electorate.
Policy-making processes and positions within the parties were changed substantially 
(Chapter 5 and 6) as the Labour Party developed and used the Policy Review Process and 
commissions to amend party policies, while the SPD developed a 'new basic programme' 
to clarify and up-date its policy positions. An increased use of policy specialists to develop 
detailed party policy positions in form of commissions, think tanks as well as public 
relations advisors could also be witnessed.
Major areas in which trends of convergence between the parties could be identified 
by the time they regained government office in 1997 and 1998 include the following 
aspects.
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A. Today, the Labour Party as well as the SPD are recognising the impact of economic 
globalisation. This acceptance of cuts in policy choices includes the realisation that the 
scope of the state to intervene and control in economies has been reduced. Current 
policy approaches have increasingly taken account of the global environment with its 
requirements and operating conditions for economic policies among different 
countries becoming more similar - a circumstance that inevitably effects the number of 
policy choices available. The Labour Party - followed by the SPD - increasingly 
focused programmatically on the need to facilitate the supply side revolution on 
manpower skills and educational reform. This includes the acceptance of the need for 
economic modernisation and greater flexibility to safeguard international 
competitiveness. Furthermore, there seems to have been an apparent supplanting of 
trade unions with business representatives as increasingly favourite partners for 
parties' leaderships when planning economic policies.
B. Labour as well as the SPD have chosen to pursue economic integration as a response 
to globalisation. Therefore, it must be argued that both social democratic parties have 
engaged in a 'if you can't beat them, join them' approach. Growing support for 
European integration developed together with an increase in belief and emphasis on 
pro-growth benefits and the aim to get actively involved in the agenda setting of the 
integration process, thus being able to press more effectively for the social dimension 
of European integration.636
C. The centralisation and concentration of power in the hands of viewer party leaders has 
led to changes in party operations. As described by Peter Hennessey in the case of the 
Labour Party, a declining role of the party's middle level functionaries can be detected 
due to an increasing ability of party leaders to appeal directly for support to party 
members.637 Both social democratic parties also witnessed a "modernisation" of their
636 Here, the French socialist and former president of the European Commission Jacques Delors’ (1985-1995) 
played an instrumental role in persuading many of Western Europe’s social democratic parties to engage in a 
strategic shift towards a more positive centre-left attitude towards European integration by emphasising the 
‘social dimension’ o f the process, something that has left virtually all o f Europe’s social democratic parties 
united in a far more pro-European policy stance than had been previously held by many on this issue.
637 Hennessy, Peter -  ‘The Blair Style o f Government: An Historical Perspective and Interim Audit’, 
Government and Opposition. Vol. 33, No. 1, 1998, pp 3-20
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ideology that was linked to the attempt to redefine the sense of purpose and shift the 
parties7 value systems towards stressing traditional values but also the need to apply 
them differently under changing and evolving overall conditions.
D. There has been increasing emphasis on the notion of libertarian individualism as a 
recent shift of agenda within both parties from "equality' to 'individual liberty' clearly 
shows. Labour's 'Meet the challenge' (1990) document 'newly1 stressed the notion of 
equality as an enhancement for individual self-fulfilment. Furthermore, ever since 
becoming prime minister, Tony Blair has clearly stressed his belief that the Labour 
Party should move further away from a redistributive agenda towards a more 
broadly-based progressive libertarian coalition. In fact, Blair went as far as describing 
"my vision for New Labour is to become, as the Liberal Party was in the 19th century, a 
broad coalition of those who believe in progress and justice, not a narrow class-based 
politics, but a party founded on clear values, whose means of implementation changes 
with the generations."638
Hence, ideas of communitarianism and social responsibility emphasising that 
individuals act via community structures have gained in importance. Furthermore, new 
emphasis has been placed on social authoritarianism (stressed, for instance, by extra 
policy initiatives on crime, emphasis on family, law's against aggressive begging, night 
curfews etc). Not too surprisingly, as this was presumed to work electorally for Labour, 
the SPD was quick to adopt this new emphasis, even directly copying Labour's 1997 
electoral campaign slogan of pledging to be 'tough on crime (and the causes of crime)' for 
the SPD's 1998 general election campaign.
Here, academics such as Herbert Kitschelt predicted already in 1994 that 
'toughness' and Taw and order' issues would play an increasingly more important role for 
social democratic parties which want to attract an electoral majority. In fact, Kitschelt 
devised a two-dimensional model of party competition in which Social Democrats have 
not only to chase voters increasingly more to the right, but also attract more authoritarian 
minded voters in a libertarian-authoritarian field of issue space.
638 ‘Blair’s praise for the Victorian way’, The Guardian, 16 December 1998
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Both parties clearly displayed their increasing interest in communitarian values 
and the stressing of the responsibility of the individual in "non-socialist rhetorical" terms 
in various programmatic publications. In Labour's 1997 election manifesto it was clearly 
stated that ""New Labour believes in a society where we do not simply pursue our own 
individual aims, but where we hold many aims in common and work together to achieve 
them."639 Similarly, in 1997 the SPD emphasised "the need to re-address the balance 
between communal- and self-responsibility as solidarity, self-help and a communal sense 
must be able to develop within families, neighbourhoods and communities as citizens 
must be enabled and encouraged to take responsibility for the common good and to 
accept social duties on a voluntary basis'.640
However, as must be expected when comparing two parties that operate within 
different political systems, a substantial degree of divergence remains among the policies 
advocated by domestically based social democratic party organisations. In fact, while 
constraints on economic and employment policies have been growing increasingly similar 
in most countries, the Labour government has taken the neo-liberal cause - for the time 
being - far further than her German sister party.
In the case of the Labour Party, at least four factors can be identified that explain 
why the process of policy convergence among social democratic parties still depends 
strongly on domestic considerations and factors. In Britain, a variety of domestic reasons 
can be identified that provide the unique context to the Labour Party's policy positioning.
A. It is important to recognise the legacy and impact the Conservative Party agenda 
(1979-1997) has had on the political system of the UK. This agenda has pushed the 
state much further towards economic deregulation and privatisation than has 
happened anywhere else in continental Europe. This is also why the political context 
in the UK in which the Labour Party had to win elections was much more favourable
639 Labour Party - New Labour - because Britain deserves better (Manifesto 19971 London, April 1997, p 3
640 “Wir brauchen...ein neues Verhaltnis von Eigenverantwortung und Solidaritat.... Solidaritat, Selbsthilfe 
und Gemeinsinn miissen sich in der Familie, in der Nachtbarschaft, in der Gemeinde entfalten konnen. Die 
Burger und Burgerinnen miissen befahigt und motiviert werden, Verantwortung fiir sich und das Gemeinwohl 
zu iibemehmen und soziale Aufgaben auf freiwilliger Basis zu erfullen.” (SPD - Manifest - Innovationen fur 
Deutschland. Diisseldorf, 20/21 May 1997, para 3.8)
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towards issues on the right -  something that was inevitably reflected by the party's 
choice of policies.
B. The missing threat of an electoral competitor to the left of the Labour Party has meant, 
that it has been much easier for the party - once the inner-party conflicts had been 
overcome - to aim its appeal at the political centre without risking an alienation of 
traditional voters on the left of the party, as there was a clear lack of credible electoral 
alternatives to the left.
C. Public sector trade unions have remained more powerful in continental Europe than in 
the UK. The emasculation of trade unions in general, and in particular of public sector 
trade unions has meant that the Labour Party did not have to make allowances for 
trade union pressures to the same degree than other European centre/ left parties 
when making policy choices.
D. Although similarities among social democratic parties can be established when it 
comes to their advocation of a supply side reform path (centred on initiatives to 
improve skills and education levels), the Labour Party has gone significantly further 
with its policy initiatives in this area, even if this may partly be due to a greater 
perception of skill shortages and problems within the UK's education system.
In the case of the SPD, we find - apart from similar international economic and 
environmental factors influencing the party's policy choices - that once again unique 
domestic factors have led to the SPD's far more cautious approach towards shifting and 
amending her main policy beliefs and values. Hence, the following factors can be 
identified as having been influential for the party's specific policy choices.
A. The federal party structure of the SPD has enabled a greater variety of party leaders to 
gain influence in the party's policy making process, hence resulting in a greater 
variety of policy ideas being brought forward as well as posing a greater number of 
potential inner-party veto points to the change of policy positions. Hence, inner-party
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negotiations on the adoption of policies required more time and often led to 
compromises that resulted in watered down and hence less radical policy outcomes.
B. The SPD having to compete electorally with two parties on the left (Die Griinen and 
PDS) made the strategic and electoral situation for the party quite difficult, as the SPD 
was required to put forward policies that would have to appeal to the centre as 
strongly as to the left of the electoral spectrum.
C. The SPD has been faced with strong, but traditionally disciplined and moderate public 
sector trade unions as the party continued to hold strong links with the German trade 
union movement.
D. It is fair to say that the political and economic impact of German unification had a 
negative effect on the SPD's electoral strategy and policy positioning. Certainly during 
the 1990 and 1994 general election, unification and the popularity of Chancellor Kohl 
strengthened the CDU's overall electoral position, while the SPD's previously rather 
cautious attitude towards unification as well as its 'red' perception did not aid its 
electoral appeal in the new Eastern Lander.
Even though the above sets of national factors that have influenced Labour's and 
the SPD's policy choices and electoral performances could be easily extended, we still end 
up concluding that parties' programmatic choices and policies adapted point towards a 
process of slow but continuous economic policy convergence among both parties. This 
process must be expected to continue - in particular in the area of economic policy co­
operation - in order to find answers to the challenges ahead, such as the further 
integration in the economic and monetary field inside the European Union. In fact, the 
pressures of the political environment point towards further cohesion, a process that can 
be expected not only to take place among social democratic parties, but also among many 
of the other European party families.
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9.3.2. The parties shift from a Keynesian to the acceptance of a neo-liberal policy 
approach
As discussed previously, paradigms can be understood as frameworks of ideas 
and standards that specify not only the goals and the kind of instruments that can be used 
to attain them, but they also specify the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing. Paradigms - in contrast to single policy ideas - are guiding frameworks which 
'embed' policy positions, the understanding of problems and solutions into a greater 
overall picture of reference. Transposing the notions on paradigms developed by Ronald 
Chilcote to the world of policy-making, a paradigm guides, for instance, the policy­
makers selection of problems, his/her evaluation of data, and the advocacy of theory. A 
paradigm may set the limits of action, the boundaries of acceptable inquiry and maintain 
criteria for the finding of problem solutions. Inevitably, policy-makers may face the 
problem of being unable to perceive and consider possible problems of solutions, which 
lie beyond their own paradigm-defined horizon.641
Clearly, a link between the notion of paradigms and institutionalism can be made. 
In fact, it can be argued that paradigms that have asserted themselves on the political and 
economic system of the state tend to gain an institutionalised status. Consequently, 
paradigms can influence the development and adoption of formal rules and compliance 
procedures as well as standard operating practices, for instance within a political party.642
Hence, the shift identified in Labour's and the SPD's economic paradigm that was 
expressed by substantial changes in the parties' approaches towards labour market 
policies enabled both parties - over time - to re-define their underlying ideology, to re­
state a new sense of purpose, and most importantly to close some of the policy gaps which 
had been appearing in response to the declining implementablity of previous Keynesian 
labour market policy options (as advocated during the early stages of their period in 
opposition).643
641 Chilcote, Ronald H. - Theories o f Comparative Politics. Westview Press (2nd ed), Oxford, 1994, p 58
642 Hall, Peter A. - Governing the Economy: The Politics o f State Intervention in Britain and France. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1986, p 19
643 Here, parties have not only experienced the convergence of their policies, but also a convergence o f ‘social 
democratic’ values, including a new emphasis on ‘pragmatism’, the notion o f ‘modernisation’
(expressed in form o f the substantial reform o f policies and institutional structures), and a conscious attempt 
to engage in self-conscious image building exercises.
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However, the shift experienced in the economic paradigm was not only confined 
to the Labour Party and the SPD. The Conservative Party and (to a lesser extent) the CDU 
also embraced in such a shift and consequently changed their policy approach, albeit 
significantly earlier.644 Hence, the paradigm shift of both social democratic parties as 
expressed by the changes in policies advocated during the period under investigation did 
not take place until the early 1990s.
This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the Keynesian policy paradigm 
had become an ingrained part of post-war social democratic ideology. In other words, 
Keynesian type policies had been strongly institutionalised within the Labour Party and 
the SPD which slowed the scope and pace of social democratic policy-making actors to re­
orientate their parties' policy outlook according to the needs and requirements of an 
increasingly international 'capital' and neo-liberal policy orientated economy.
Interestingly, 'conflicts of change' could also be observed among the Conservatives 
and the CDU with respect to their adoption of neo-liberal paradigm led rhetoric and 
policy programmes. In fact, even though the Conservative and Christian Democratic 
parties increasingly advocated neo-liberal policy approaches within their policy 
programmes in response to a change in paradigm, they were not necessarily able to fully 
act upon their own programmatic rhetoric without encountering substantial constraints. 
In retrospect, neither Margaret Thatcher's nor - to a lesser extent - Helmut Kohl's 
governments' were able 'to roll back the state' or 'reduce the state to the core of its tasks' 
as both parties had repeatedly pledged.645
In fact, in the case of the German Christian Democrats whose substantial shift of 
policies towards a neo-liberal policy rhetoric during the 1980s had been clearly detectable 
was forced by the 'special historic circumstance' of German unification - as Klaus von
644 In this case, the claim o f an earlier adoption o f the neo-liberal paradigm or rather the implementation of  
increasingly neo-liberal policies by the CDU and Conservative Party led governments does not require any 
backing up with quantitative content analysis as the qualitative assessment o f their policies directly adopted 
and implemented as government parties shows most clearly their shift towards a neo-liberal paradigm, which 
preceded those shifts observed at a later stage in the case o f the Labour Party and the SPD.
645 Zohlenhofer, Reimut - ‘Institutions, the CDU and policy change: Explaining German Economic Policy in 
the 1980s’, German Politics. Vol 8, No 3, December 1999, p 141-42; Hood, C. with Dunsire, A. and 
Thompson, L. - ‘Rolling back the state: Thatcherism, Fraserism and bureaucracy’, Governance. Vol 1, No 3,
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Beyme rightly described it - to adopt a " Vereinigungskeynesianismus wider Willen" i.e. to 
engage 'reluctantly in a unification-Keynesian' economic policy approach that relied on 
stimulus based fiscal policies to generate economic recovery in the East.646 In fact, 
throughout the 1990s the Kohl government transferred between DM 142 billion and DM 
195 billion annually to the new Lander in an attempt to finance among other things 
unemployment benefits and pensions; employment and retraining companies; new 
investments in eastern businesses; and the rebuilding of the eastern infrastructure.647 Even 
though the CDU as well as the FDP government coalition parties expressed an increasing 
overall programmatic belief in neo-liberal policy solutions, circumstances forced the 
government to act pragmatically and adopt Keynesian inspired policy approaches when 
in office, which may however be abandoned, once the problems caused by unification 
decrease.
Hence, the difference that may occur between party policy programmes and actual 
policy choices when in government office justifies the assumption, that in the case of the 
Labour Party and the SPD, programmatic, rhetorical and ideological shifts experienced by 
both parties from a Keynesian to the acceptance of a neo-liberal policy approach may not 
have necessarily translated into the same practical policy outcomes, if both parties would 
have been holding government office, as pragmatic requirements could have changed 
actors policy positions.
9.3.3. The emergence of a European level party strategies
Linking the observed convergence of two national parties' policy programmes and 
their common shift towards the neo-liberal paradigm to the assessment of possible 
responses, the increasing development of a more European level economic policy strategy 
can be expected. The fact, that national political actors increasingly feel that they are 
exposed to an international economy 'beyond their control'648 has already fostered the 
belief - among members of the socialist group in the European Parliament (EP) - that an
1988, pp 243-70; ‘Shrinking the welfare state - The new government and public spending’, The Economist 
02 May 1992
646 Beyme, Klaus von - ‘Verfehlte Vereinigung - verpafite Reformen?’, Journal fur Sozialforschung, Jahrgang 
34, Heft 3, p 265
647 Dininio, Phyllis - ‘Germany’s Economic Policy after the 1994 elections’, German Politics and Society, Vol 
13, No 1, Spring 1995, p 127
648 Gray, John - After Social Democracy, Demos, London 1996, p 28
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exclusive national Social Democratic policy agenda is no longer a feasible option. 
Therefore, in can be expected that attempts to construct an appropriate European Social 
Democratic strategy are likely to be of growing importance.649 In fact, Europe's Social 
Democratic parties have already increased the degree of policy co-ordination within the 
Socialist Group of the European Parliament.650
Even though, the process of convergence is still at an early stage and 
programmatic differences will remain due to differing national political interests, 
traditions, histories and cultures, the case of the SPD's and Labour Party's LMP 
development still shows, that the scope of parties to develop nationally differing or even 
fundamentally contrasting policy programmes (in policy areas that have been 
substantially affected by economic 'internationalisation') has been significantly 
diminished.
9.3.4. The slow process of policy convergence and the future outlook
The analysis of the development of labour market policies by two substantially 
differing European political parties (in approach and tradition) clearly shows that 
economic policy choices have converged along similar pathways. In fact, since the late 
1980s and 1990s, the remaining substantial traditional differences between party 
institutions and policy making processes, which could have been expected to have led to a 
consistently larger range of varying LMP approaches, were significantly overwritten by 
the greater picture of social democratic parties having to re-orientate their common policy
649 It is clear that the democratic parliamentary control function of the European Parliament in the European 
Union has been consistently extended by the Single European Act, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties 
and that the EP carries the potential for the further extension o f its current powers and role. Furthermore, the 
Maastricht Treaty emphasised the important role o f European level political parties: “Political parties at a 
European level are an important factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a 
European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.” (Article 138a, Treaty on 
European Union, Maastricht 1991)
650 The June 1999 EP election manifesto of the PES stated among its substantial policy pledges dealing with 
LMPs - the need for greater involvement of Social Partners in EU policy making by ‘reinforcing the 
distinctive social models o f the countries of Europe’ and the development of'a more effective global 
governance...and a better regulated international financial system.’ Furthermore, the Manifesto called for a 
sustainable European economic growth strategy in both demand and investment (Trans-European Networks) 
making job creation within a ‘pact for employment’ a priority of the EU. The PES insisted, that the ECB 
‘must work in close dialogue with the democratic institutions and economic policy making bodies o f the 
Union1, while labour market supply side policies in form of ‘investing in education, modem skills and 
technology....promoting a Europe o f knowledge’ were advocated as well as an increase in the EU budget
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approaches (and paradigms) according to the requirements of the substantial changes 
experienced by political and economic circumstances.
This process carries a - so far - unrecognised significance, which offers the 
potential for much greater European level interaction of party's policy formation strategies 
in addition to the currently already experienced substantial degree of policy convergence 
in areas such as labour market policies.
In fact, patterns of policy convergence are emerging as the growing dominance of 
the external environment takes place at the expense of historical institutional 'centrifugal' 
tendencies. In response, it can be predicted that this development will eventually 
strengthen the ability of national parties to engage more effectively in European level 
policy co-operation - inevitably strengthening the so-called 'Euro-parties' and eventually 
replacing the current system of searching for the smallest common programmatic 
denominator -  by increasing their capability to decide policies and political strategies 
increasingly top-down.
Furthermore, if national policies to regulate or even tame the market economy lose 
their capacity to be effective, then the parties will eventually converge on the idea that 
everything is counterproductive, which reinforces the illusion that national state activities 
remain at their centre of economic policy-making attention. Hence the social democratic 
parties of the future can be expected to be strongly 'European' in orientation.
9.4. The future of Social Democracy
Predictions made during the 1980s by scholars such as Adam Przeworski and John 
Sprague (1986) that Social Democratic parties would decline irreversibly, as their political 
projects would turn inwards to their working class base, inevitably bearing disastrous 
electoral consequences have been greatly exaggerated.651 Instead, the 1990s have 
witnessed a degree of social democratic strategic and electoral revival (e.g. in Britain, 
France and Germany) that must be at least partly accredited to the capacity of social 
democratic parties to rewrite their party programmes and aim at attracting the widest 
possible groups of the electorate.
allocation spend on structural funds helping the regions and ‘targeted towards job creation, promoting 
solidarity and improving social and economic cohesion’. (PES, 1-2 March 1999)
651 Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague - Paper Stones. A History of Electoral Socialism. University o f  
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986, p 183
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In contrast to Przeworski and Sprague, Gosta Esping-Andersen already 
anticipated in 1985 that social democratic parties electoral fortunes would not necessarily 
depend upon structural variables such as Class' (as argued by Przeworski). Instead, 
Esping-Andersen envisaged that - in order to compete successfully in elections - social 
democratic parties would have to offer an attractive electoral policy package that would 
appeal to blue as well as white collar employees in order to win back the policy initiative 
from parties on the right.652 This, it seems, social democratic parties have been doing 
increasingly successful during the latter half of the 1990s.
Furthermore, it seems clear, that the social democratic movement of the late 20th 
century could no longer rely on theoretical instruments such as Marxism or Keynesianism 
as guiding policy principles which predetermined its policy strategy, decision making and 
policy choices. In fact, deprived of a clear pathway to achieve the 'traditional' goals of 
social democracy, the parties seem to have adopted throughout the 1980s a predominantly 
defensive strategy, replacing clear political visions with a strategy to defend as much of 
the previous social democratic policy consensus as possible from the challenges of neo­
liberalism. However, to campaign as a party for the former policy status quo in an ever- 
changing political and economic environment often gave the parties an appearance of 
stagnancy on ideas.
The overriding questions which Europe's Social Democratic parties will have to 
continue to answer are, can social democracy be a distinctive 'centre-left' approach to 
policy making that attempts to manage social and economic change in the global 
economy? Or is it inevitable that social democratic parties have to adapt to the changing 
economic and political conditions by adopting the neo-liberal policy agenda that has been 
enforced upon policy makers by the internationalised market conditions and deregulative 
regimes?
Here, the collapse of the 'real-existing' communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 
1989/1990 may have weakened and influenced the overall perception of notions of social 
democracy and socialism. In fact, various authors - with Francis Fukuyama possibly being
652 Esping-Andersen, Gesta - Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1985
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the best known - have concluded that the collapse of communism has proved and 
reinforced the traditional beliefs in 'liberalism' and in turn disproved the qualities and 
claims of 'socialism'.653 In fact, Fukuyama's 'end of history' rhetoric claims that through 
the collapse of communism, history has taught us, that no progression to the liberal state 
and liberal market-economy - as we know it - will emerge again. Hence, Fukuyama has 
predicted - as a consequence - the inevitable failure of any party ideology that dares to 
challenge liberalism or contains fundamental 'alternatives' to the political status quo that 
has emerged in the early 1990s.
Here, the ongoing search of social democratic parties to find a 'third way' between 
traditional social democracy and neo-liberalism, to re-establish an identity built on the 
parties traditional values, to accept most neo-liberal ideas about economic processes and 
the adoption of some new notions possibly borrowed from communitarianism seems to 
currently lead the way and be the most likely scenario for the path of future social 
democracy.
One thing, however, is for certain. The revival of 'classic' post-WW 2 social 
democracy can be ruled out. Hence, a new kind of pragmatism that has accepted the 
superiority of free markets and included the adoption of tight fiscal policies and the 
substantial shedding of traditional socialist symbolism and rhetoric has undoubtedly 
emerged among Europe's 'social democratic' and 'democratic socialist' left. This - as 
Donald Sassoon called it - third wave of ideological 'modernisation' of social democratic 
thinking - after earlier revisionist attempts at the turn of the century and the impact of 
Crosland and Bad Godesberg revisionism - consisted of a fundamental critique of 
socialism and the acceptance of the superiority of capitalism.
Donald Sassoon argued that 'neo-revisionism' predominantly accepts the doctrine 
that "markets should be regulated by legislation and not through state ownership".654 This 
recognition of changing economic circumstances pays tribute to the general acceptance of 
Europe's social democratic parties throughout the 1980s that economic planning on a 
national scale had become unworkable in the new climate of globalisation and 
deregulation. With the quasi abundance of advocating alternative economic systems to 
capitalism, social democratic policy options have been irrevocably cut, with "Keynesian
653 Fukuyama, Francis - The end of history and the last man. Penguin Books, London, 1992
654 Sassoon, Donald - One Hundred Years of Socialism. I.B. Tauris Publishers, London 1996, p 734
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macroeconomic policies" being rightly described by John Gray as "a pillar of a status quo 
ante which has been destroyed" and cannot be revived.655 Here, Donald Sassoon has 
identified "the establishment of the new ideological consensus of European Social 
Democracy; the neo-revisionism of the later 1980s...marks the second historical 
reconciliation between socialism and capitalism...(after 1945) ...[with] the second 
representing a compromise on the terms set by neo-liberalism."656
Hence, not surprisingly, observers such as Herbert Kitschelt see the future of social 
democracy in rather sober terms by describing social democratic parties as "what still 
distinguishes them from conservative parties is the search for policy formulas that make 
economic liberalisation less painful for the most vulnerable constituencies in society than 
the policies their competitors are likely to choose. Social democrats search for a different 
balance between equity and efficiency and present themselves as better political managers 
of capitalism, because their commitment to comprehensive social policies, job retraining 
and education, advanced infrastructure, and industrial modernisation builds on the 
insight that sometimes a judicious use of non-market arrangements assists a productive 
economy more than an ideological zeal to assert the rules of the marketplace in all matters 
of economic governance." 657
Let us, however, also not forget that social democratic parties in Britain, France 
and Germany have been elected on policy platforms that also promoted certain 
'traditional' social democratic policy concerns by proposing, for instance, an expansion to 
employment creation schemes as well as stressing the need for a more 'humane 
capitalism'.658 In fact, the electoral success of Social Democratic parties could even indicate 
that the electorate places greater trust in the ability of social democratic parties to make 
the - perceived as 'necessary' - adjustments to state welfare provisions less painful and 
socially just than could be expected from Christian Democratic or Conservative parties.
However, it is clear that once the painful 'delayed' switch of paradigm - from 
Keynesian to neo-liberal - among the Labour Party and the SPD had taken place and been 
institutionalised; and with the absence of a major change in 'external' socio-economic
655 Gray, John - After Social Democracy. Demos, London 1996, p 28
656 Sassoon, Donald - One hundred years of socialism, I. B. Tauris, London, 1996, p 692
657 Kitschelt, Herbert - ‘European Social Democracy between political economy and electoral competition’; in 
Kitschelt, Herbert et al - Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999, p 323
658 Financial Times - ‘Jospin exploits a wave o f national disenchantment’, 2 June 1997, p 3
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conditions and 'internal' changes to policy making; the new 'path' adopted by the parties 
during the 1990s can certainly be assumed to be continued in the foreseeable future.
Hence, is it possible to identify the beginning of a new 'historic' compromise 
between a reformed social democracy and capitalism as the question which faces the 
movement at the beginning of the 21st century? After the end of 'traditional' Keynesian 
social democracy the test will be, if social democratic parties are able to generate a new  
model of managed capitalism that accepts the efficiencies of markets, takes account of the 
new economic realities, but at the same time provides individuals with a sufficient degree 
of security, welfare, equality and community. The ability to find a reform path which 
remains in the social democratic tradition of adopting "Halbwegpositionen" (half-way- 
house positions) between two poles - such as the currently attempted between neo­
liberalism and Keynesianism - has often been at the heart of the development of social 
democracy.659
Overall, when reflecting on the recent writings on social democracy, the future of 
social democracy depends on its ability to transform its political message and to construct 
new electoral coalitions. This research has underlined what Herbert Kitschelt rightly 
stated as "no social democratic party can ignore the challenge of market efficiency...and 
continue... with conventional Keynesian welfare state policies. Everywhere the 
transformation of social democracy involves substantial changes in the parties' 
programmatic appeals, organisational structures, and electoral support coalitions."660 
However, this change and the abandunce of traditional policy positions carries the 
substantial risk, as described by the German party specialist Franz Walter for the case of 
the SPD after two years in government, that many members up and down the country 'do
659 Peter Glotz, at the time SPD Party-Manager (Geschaftsfuhrer) and member o f the SPD’s executive 
committee since 1983 argued in his book ‘Die Beweglichkeit des Tankers: Die Sozialdemokratie zwischen 
Staat und neuen sozialen Bewegungen’, (Bertelsmann, Miinchen, 1982), that social democratic parties 
traditionally adopt ‘halbweg’ (half-way) positions, which are never clearly true to doctrines, but instead 
attempts to bridge a position which lies between the poles, such as capitalism and socialism or strongly 
advocating Green principles as well as party inactivity on the issue.
660 Kitschelt, Herbert - The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1994, p 301
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not quite know anymore, if the policies adopted are actually good, and what is supposed 
to be social democratic about them/661
Clearly, Social Democratic parties - after a long ideological crisis that began with 
the questioning and eventual replacement of the Keynesian paradigm during the second 
half of the 1970s - are still an essential part of Western Europe's party political systems. 
Furthermore, their transitional processes and search for realigning its positions on the 
political scale is far from decided, in fact it is still emerging. Herbert Morrison's662 
insistence - dating back to the 1950s - that 'socialism is whatever the Labour Party 
happens to be doing at the time'663 may still carry some truth as parties' programmatic 
appeals, organisational structure and electoral support coalitions change inevitably over 
time. However, while the previous (consensual) dominance of social democratic ideology 
exerted on Western Europe's political and economic system during the post Second World 
War boom is unrepeatable, the future can be expected to lie in a version of social 
democracy that accounts for the insecurities and risks posed to the individual in a modern 
post-industrial societies with an emphasis on the 'traditional' values of equality and 
justice that recognise individualism as well as communal responsibilities.
661 Deupmann, Ulrich and Horand Knaup - ‘SPD -  Gefahr aus der Flache’, Per Spiegel, No 37, 11/09/2000, p 
23
662 Former Labour minister and influential character in the Labour Party during the 1940s and 1950s, also 
Peter Mandelson’s grandfather.
663 Cited in: Roy Hattersley - ‘The Mandelson Problem’; Evening Standard. 30/09/1997, p 8
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Appendix I
Interviewed policy actors from the Labour Party and the Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands.
(The changing of individual policy belief patterns over time and the actors evaluation of 
their party's labour market policy and paradigm changes.)
Labour Party
Braggins, John London, 08 February 2000
Head of Message Delivery at Millbank (has worked for the Labour Party since 1965).
Also taskforce leader in the 1997 General Election for regional operations and joint 
taskforce leader for key campaigners and member of key seats taskforce; co-author of 
'USA Presidential Election 1992 - What lessons can Labour leam ? '6 6 4  made numerous 
presentations on 'How Labour won the 1997 General Election' to sister parties. Positions 
previously held in the Labour Party also include regional liaison officer; senior 
organisation officer, deputy general secretary (London Labour Party); assistant regional 
organiser and organiser for the Labour Party in Hackney, Islington and Camden.
Hill, David London, 26 July 1999
Labour Party Director of Campaigns and Elections (1994-98); Director of Campaigns and 
Communications (1992-94). Member of Campaign Advisory Team in 1992. (1977-92) 
Personal assistant to Roy Hattersley's (deputy leader from 1983-92).
Wright, Dr. Tony London, 01 February 2000
Member of Parliament for Cannock Chase
Called by Roy Hattersley "a super-modemiser" (Guardian, 26/11/96), Tony Wright has 
been a lecturer and reader in politics at the University of Birmingham before becoming an 
influential member of parliament in 1992. He has widely published on the modernisation 
of the Labour Party and its ideology, and his books include 'The New Social Democracy' 
(1999 - together with Andrew Gamble); 'Socialisms' (1996); 'Values, Visions and Voices' 
(1995), 'British Socialism' (1983); and 'Why vote Labour' (1997). Tony Wright has also been 
a parliamentary aide to the Lord Chancellor (1998) and is chairman of the Commons 
public administration select committee.
Lipsey, Lord Dr. (David) London, 08 February 2000
Labour 'Working Peer' in House of Lords since 1999.
(1984-86) Member of executive committee 'Charter for Jobs'; (1981-82) chairman of the 
Fabian Society; (1972-77) member of the Fabian Society executive committee and a former 
(special) adviser to the late Mr Tony Crosland; (1977-79) Prime Minister's Staff (under 
James Callaghan); co-writer of Labour Party's 1979 draft manifesto. David Lipsey 
proposed in June 1992 in a Fabian Pamphlet ('The name of the Rose') that the Labour 
Party should change its name to 'New Democrats'. He is furthermore a visiting Professor
664 Braggins, J., McDonagh, M. and A. Barnard - The American Presidential Election 1992 - What Can 
Labour Learn.. Labour Party, 1992
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in Public Policy at the University of Ulster and has been a member of the recent Jenkins 
commission on electoral reform.
Lord Lipsey is also a distinguished journalist who has been the political editor of the 
Economist (since 1992); an anonymous columnist for Economist/Guardian (author of 
weekly Bagehot column); associate editor of the Times (1990-92); Co-founder and Dep. 
Editor of Sunday Correspondent (1988-90); and editor of New Society (1986-88).
Kinnock, Neil Brussels, 24 July 2000
Since 1999 vice-president of the European Commission (administrative reform, personnel 
and administration, Inspectorate-General)
(1995-99) European Commissioner for transport; (1983-92) leader of the Labour Party and 
opposition; former vice-president of the Socialist International; (1978-94) Member of the 
Labour Party's National Executive Committee; (1974-75) Parliamentary Private Secretary 
to the Secretary of State for Employment.
SPD
Engholm, Bjorn Liibeck, 15 June 1999
(1991-93) SPD party chairman (Parteivorsitzender); (1988-93) Ministerprasident of 
Schleswig-Holstein.
Farthmann, Professor Dr. Friedhelm Diisseldorf, 24 June 1999
Until 1996, influential long-term chairman of the SPD's parliamentary party organisation 
in the Landtag of Nordrhein-Westphalia.
Fuchs, Anke Bonn, 23 June 1999
(1998-) Vice-president of the German Bundestag.
(1993-98) Vice-chair of the federal SPD-parliamentary party organisation (Stellvert. 
Vorsitzende der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion); (1987-91) SPD party manager 
(Bundesgeschaftsfiihrer der SPD); (1982-85) Chair of party commission for social policy; 
member of the SPD party executive since 1979.
Glotz, Professor Dr. Peter Erfurt, 14 June 1999
(1981-87) SPD party secretary (Bundesgeschaftsfiihrer der SPD); member of the party 
executive (Mitglied im Vorstand der SPD), Vorsitzender - Kommission Grundwerte 1983. 
Professor Glotz has published widely on the SPD with books including 'Die Linke nach 
dem Sieg des Westens' (1992); 'Manifest fur eine Neue Europaische Linke' (1985); 'Die 
Beweglichkeit des Tankers: Die Sozialdemokratie zwischen Staat und neuen sozialen 
Beziehungen' (1982); and 'Der Weg der Sozialdemokratie' (1975).
Meyer, Professor Dr. Thomas Bonn, 24 June 1999
Frequently described as 'chief ideologist of the SPD', Prof. Meyer is an academic that 
works for the 'SPD think-tank' Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung and as a Professor in Politics at the 
University Dortmund. He has been an active member in various SPD programme 
development commissions since the early 1980s; and has taken substantial part in the 
development of the 'Berlin Programm' as a leading member of programme commission. 
He has published widely, most recently 'Die Transformation der Sozialdemokratie - Eine
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Partei auf dem Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert (1998)'; 7Politik als Theater7 (1998); 'Parteien in der 
Defensive7 (1994); 7Was bleibt vom Sozialismus7 (1991); 7Demokratischer Sozialismus7 
(1982) and is a member of the 7Forum Scholars for European Social Democracy7.
Ostertag, Adi Bonn, 25 June 1999
Member of the Bundestag (MdB),
Chairman of th e7 sub-working group labour market7 of the SPD-parliamentary party 
(Bundestagsfraktion) since 1990; member of the federal commission for employment- and 
social order (Mitglied im Bundesausschufi fiir Arbeits und Sozialordnung) since 1990.
Rohde, Helmut Bonn, 24 June 1999
Former minister for employment (Minister fiir Arbeit und Sozialordnung); (1973-84)
(First) Chairman of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft fiir Arbeitnehmerfragen (AFA); (1983) 
Chairman of the SPD7s social policy commission.
Schreiner, Ottmar Bonn, 23 June 1999
(1999- ) Chairman of Arbeitsgemeinschaft fiir Arbeitnehmerfragen (AFA); (1998-99) SPD 
party manager (Bundesgeschaftsfiihrer der SPD); (1997-98) vice-chairman of the 
parliamentary party (stellv. Vors. der SPD-Fraktion) and spokesman on social policy; 
(1990-94) parliamentary party spokesman for the commission on employment and social 
order (Fraktionsprecher im Ausschufi fiir Arbeit und Sozialordnung).
Skarpelis-Sperk, Dr. Sigrid Bonn, 25 June 1999
Member of the Bundestag (MdB)
Member of the parliamentary committee on the economy; member of the SPD party 
executive; MdB since 1980; member of 7traditionssozialistischer Stromung7 that argued for 
the inclusion of Tnvestitionslenkung7 in Berlin Programme to give state a greater stake in 
investment decisions.
Vogel, Dr. Hans-Jochen Miinchen, 21 June 1999
(1987-91) Party chairman (Parteivorsitzender); (1987-91) chairman of the SPD7s 
parliamentary Bundestag party organisation; Chair of commission for the development of 
a new basic programme; 1983 SPD 7Kanzler7-candidate in general election.
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Appendix II
Interview questions in English and German
(The changing of actors' individual policy belief patterns over time and their evaluation of 
party's labour market policy and paradigm changes.)
A. Questions to current/past party (policy-making) actors about current and past policy 
changes/programmatic differences and evaluation during their party's time of 
opposition.
1. What do you think - as a former...(position)...about the Blair /  Schroder Paper - 
'Europe: The Third Way /  Die Neue Mitte'?
(Future of Social Democracy - EU policy - no re-regulation or emphasis on supranational 
protection for social institutions or refraining to use the economic policy tool-kit on the EU 
level? Instead - affirm globalisation and free play of internationalised market forces?!)
Is there currently a wide ranging inner-party debate taking place about the meaning of the 
'Third Way'?
2. After Labour's disappointing showing at the European Parliament election; the recent 
resignation and critique of defence secretary Peter Kilfoyle, do you think the Labour Party 
should concentrate more on attracting its traditional ‘core1 electorate (rather than middle 
England) and focus more on social justice and re-distributive issues?
3. Do you think the TUC was instrumental in changing the Labour Party's attitude 
towards Europe? How do you perceive the changing role of /  and relationship with trade 
union movement during the 1980s and 90s?
4. How do you evaluate the role of party election manifesto's and action programmes in 
general. Do they represent sufficiently the actual policy intentions of parties?
Are parties in opposition faced with a structural disadvantage when having to develop 
'realistic' policy proposals?
5. How do you feel about the increased use of out of party institutions for policy 
development processes/tools in form of commissions, think tanks etc.?
B. Questions about programmatic developments and processes of policy change.
6. How important have been the following factors for initiating party reforms in labour 
market policies: The party leadership; electoral defeats; made necessary by the changing 
economic and political environment; recommendations of commissions, academic studies; 
and/or changes in party ideology (and paradigm)?
7. Did institutional changes /  reforms inside the party significantly influence Labour's 
LMP approach?
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(What about the increasing role of media; the need to proof economic competency and 
policy credibility; and to tackle the image of being a high tax and spend party).
8. What do you see as the Labour Party's most significant changes in today's economic 
policy approach, ideology and/or basic principles in comparison to the party's LMP 
choices taken in the early and late 1980s?
9. How strong is (or has been) the ability of the party leadership to influence /  set out the 
programmatic policy direction of the party? (Does the party leader holds some kind of 
veto over major policies adopted?)
10. What were your personal policy beliefs (independent of 'official' party beliefs) during 
the 1980s (Keynesian demand management/supply side focus). How did you feel 
(in/during ....) about... . Did any of your own beliefs change over time? In what specific 
policy area? When and why?
11. How much do you belief were your own beliefs and perceptions depending (at the 
time) on (institutionalised paradigmatic sets of) basic party policy principles; beliefs; 
approaches; values; and ideology?
12. What position did you hold within the Labour Party that enabled you to influence the 
development, formulation and choices of party labour market policies?
C. Other comments /  Suggestions
A. Fragen iiber die Einschatzung von Veranderungen der Parteiprogrammatik wahrend  
der Oppositionsphase an Parteifunktionstrager mit Einflufi auf den  
Parteiprogrammatikbereich.
1. Was denken Sie als ehemaliger... (Position)...der SPD iiber das Blair /  Schroder Papier 
zur 'neuen Mitte' bzw. 'dritten Weg'?
2. Es gibt Widerstand zu 'angebotsorientierter' Politik z. B. vom Frankfurter Kreis und 
dem DGB. Konnte Schroders 'Modernisierungsoffensive' die Sozialdemokraten spalten? 
(Die Welt schreibt: "Schroders Abrechnung mit Lafontaine".)
3. Haben sich Veranderungen in den Beziehungen zwischen der SPD und dem DGB auf 
programmatische Strategien ausgewirkt?
4. Wie beurteilen sie die Rolle von Partei Wahlprogrammen und Sofortprogrammen? Sind 
sie generell ein guter Gradmesser fur die Politikinhalte von Parteien?
(Gibt es einen strukturellen Nachteil fur Oppositionsparteien wenn es darum geht, 
realistische politische alternative Politikideen zu entwickeln?)
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5. Fur wie wichtig bzw. erfolgreich halten Sie die parteiliche Auslagerung von 
Politikinhalts-entwicklung in Kommissionen, think tanks etc. die zum Teil auEerhalb von 
Parteien parteiinitierte Politikansatze entwickeln?
(Wie wichtig/erfolgreich schatzen Sie im nachhinein die Arbeit der 
Programmkommission und des Berliner Programmes ein?)
B. Fragen iiber die programmatische Entwicklung und Prozesse des Politikwechsels /  
Grundsatzliche Fragen zur Veranderung personlicher Politikiiberzeugungen 
(Denkmusterwechsel)
6. In wie weit wurden programmatische Reformen der Arbeitsmarktpolitik von der 
Parteifiihrung forciert; durch Wahlniederlagen motiviert, oder durch Veranderungen von 
wirtschaftlichen oder politischen Umstanden ausgelost, Empfehlungen von 
Kommissionen, akademische Studien und Forschungsresultate, Verandenmgen in Partei- 
Ideologie und Paradigma?
7. Haben institutionelle Veranderungen/Reformen innerhalb der SPD die sich 
verandernden Arbeitsmarkt-Politikansatze entscheidend beeinflusst?
(Wiedervereinigung, verstarkte Medienrolle der Parteifiihrung...)
8. Wo sehen Sie heute die gravierendsten Veranderungen in der ideologischen 
Ausrichtung, im Politikverstandnis, der Ideologic imd bei den Grimdwerten der SPD (im 
Vergleich zu den friihen/spaten 80er Jahren), welche die (konkrete) Wahl der SPD von 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik beeinflusst hat?
9. Wie schatzen Sie die Rolle der Parteifiihrung und des Kanzlerkandidaten in der 
Beeinflussung von Bundestagswahlkampf -  Programminhalten ein? Gibt es eine Art Veto? 
Gab es - Ihrer Meinung nach - spezielle Akteure /  Entwicklungen, die einen besonderen 
Einflufi auf die Entwicklung der SPD Arbeitsmarktpolitik-Programmatik hatten?
10. Was waren Ihre personliche Uberzeugungen im Bereich Arbeitsmarktpolitik 
(unabhanigig von offizieller Parteipolitik) wahrend der 80er Jahre? In welchem  
Politikbereich haben sich Ihre Uberzeugungen verandert?
Worin sehen Sie die Beweggriinde fur Ihren personlichen Meinungswechsel? Waren es 
Anderungen in Ihren Uberzeugungen, Politikansatzen, die veranderte Gesamtsituation, 
personliche Erfahrungen, (akademische) Studien, Kommissionsarbeit, und/oder 
W ahlniederlagen?
11. Wie weit werden eigene individuelle Politikvorstellungen gebimden durch einen von 
der Partei vorgegebenen ideologischen/ institutionellen (paradigmatischen) Rahmen?
12. Welche Aufgabe /  Position haben Sie in der SPD bekleidet, in welcher Sie EinfluR auf 
die Formulierung, Entwicklung und Festsetzung von arbeitsmarktpolitischen 
Grundsatzen und PoHtikansatzen hatten?
C. Literatur- und Interview-Vorschlage
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Key for Interview-Analysis und Interview
1 . New Policies /  Policy change
2. Party institutions /  specific
3. Personal
4. Party specific
5. Factors for policy change
6. Programmes
7. Future party- /  labour market policy outlook /  expectations
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Appendix III
Labour Market Policy Coding scheme for party political programmes/manifestos and
'major' (mid-term) statements
FULL STANDARD CODING FRAME (FCF)
DOMAIN 1 External Relations
1010 European Community /  Union: Positive
Favourable mention of European Union in general; desirability of relevant country joining 
(or remaining as member); desirability of expanding EU and/or of increasing 
competencies and favourable of EU intervention, pro-European Union in general. 
Excluding EU level activity/planning of programmes to tackle unemployment (directly or 
as a co-ordinator; pro-Delors' White Paper on Competitiveness and Employment)
1020 European Community /  Union LMP initiatives: Positive
Increasing competencies and favourable of EU intervention in areas regarding EU level 
activity/planning of programmes to tackle unemployment (directly or as a co-ordinator; 
pro-Social Chapter/Charter, Delors' White Paper on Competitiveness and Employment, 
Employment Chapter)
1030 European Community /  Union and EU LMP initiatives: Negative
As 1030 and 1040, but negative.
1040 Protectionism (Positive)
Favourable mention of extension or maintenance of tariffs, to protect internal markets, or 
other domestic economic protectionism; pro-free trade.
1050 Protectionism (Negative)
As 1040, but negative.
DOMAIN 2 -  General Policy Outlook and Labour Market Regulation 
General Economic Statements/Party Ideology
2010 Full Employment (except commitment to reduce unemployment)
2020 Intention to tackle unemployment /  high employment (except commitment to full 
employment)
2021 Monitoring of employment levels /  job creation targets 
2030 Economic State Planning and Nationalisation: Positive
Advocating of nationalisation (government ownership and control, partial or complete, 
including government ownership of land), state planning of consultative or indicative 
nature, need for government to create national plan, need to plan imports and exports 
except labour markets (Domain 2), employment agreements, greater role for MSC, 
favouring statutory obligations (e.g. on training provision), planning agreement
2040 Economic State Planning: Negative
As 2030, but negative. Positive on privatisation and deregulation except labour markets, 
generally positive on voluntary /  partnership arrangements with private sector.
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2041 Support for public/private partnerships, positive mentioning of joint investment /  
co-operation among public and private sector
2050 Pro-labour market regulation
General need for direct control of economy and the setting of a state framework in which 
the economy has to operate (minimum standards). In other words, state interventionism 
to exercise control over prices, wages, rents, etc. to encourage/force the creation of 
employment. This covers neither nationalisation nor indicative planning. Tendency 
towards advocating anti-deregulation policies.
2051 Policies to encourage work sharing, extension of legal protection for part-timers, job
rotation
2052 Working time /  overtime reductions (e.g. introduction of 35 hour week)
2053 Reducing retirement age, encouragement of early retirement
2054 Measures for the disabled and vocational rehabilitation
2055 Pro-minimum wage
2060 Anti-labour market regulation
Arguing for a reduction/against state interventionism as it may distort market efficiency 
and performance. Interventionism can damage Natural' market balance and leads to less 
efficient markets. The belief that markets and voluntary codes are most sufficient and that 
markets can predominantly regulate themselves best. Pro-partnership with private sector. 
Tendency to advocate pro-deregulation policies, (cutting red tape) and emphasis on 
greater overall labour market flexibility.
2061 Policies focusing on the reduction of labour turnover costs
2062 Policies to enable greater flexibility of working time
2063 New models of part-time employment
2064 Temporary working time reductions at a company level
Supply Side Measures
DOMAIN 3 - Skills and Competitiveness
3010 General statements of intent to improve provisions for training and education
Policies centring on human capital formation as part of a full blown competitiveness 
package and industrial strategy), i.e. improve provisions of education and training 
facilities. Aim to tackle skills shortage with the help of training.
3020 Training subsidies /  skills development
Labour promotion and training companies for unemployed, long-term unemployed, 
contract Labour (Start), government training programmes, (re-)training schemes for 
adults, continuing training at work
3030 Youth: Support of apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training and 
education





The need to expand and/ or improve education provision at all levels -  education of youth 
and adults in schools and universities.
3050 Education Anti-Expansion
As 3040, but negative
3060 Technology, industrial policy and competitiveness
Importance of policies supporting the modernisation of industrial administration and 
industry to improve to enhance competitiveness and open new markets. Importance of 
science and technological developments in industry; need for government sponsored 
R&D, subsidies, need for overhaul of capital equipment, and methods of communications 
and transport; support for industrial restructuring, rebuilding industrial base, 
development of Nuclear Energy. Increase the attractiveness of location for business 
(domestic and foreign investments).
3061 Promoting green environmental sector innovations and businesses, stressing its
future potential
3062 Help and support with technology/innovations specifically for Small and Medium
Enterprises
DOMAIN 4 - Benefit System and Labour Market Agencies
Reforming the unemployment benefit system to make more job friendly /  encourage job 
search.
4010 Social Justice /  Social Stability
Need for fair treatment of all people; for special protection for exploited; fair treatment in 
a tax system; need for equality of opportunity; need for fair distribution of resources and 
removal of class barriers; end of discrimination
4020 Social Services Expansion: Positive
Favourable mention of need to maintain or expand any basic service or welfare scheme; 
support for free basic social services such as public health, or housing as well as in-work 
child/family benefit, improvement of child care facilities, help for lone parents.
4030 Social Services Expansion: Negative
As 4020, but negative. Overall (social) benefit system to provide a cheaper, more efficient 
service - financial support for the unemployment reduced due to greater limitations and 
pre-conditions; crack down on fraud.
4040 Benefit conditioning
Benefit (pressure) conditioning, withdrawal (Carrot and stick) e.g. JSA, changes in 
unemployment compensation, employment zones
4050 Role of Labour Market Agencies (e.g. Arbeitsamt, Jobcentre)
Statement of general intention to make agencies more effective and efficient. Reforming 
the unemployment benefit system to make it more job friendly - (This excludes education, 
but includes experience and on the job training)
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4051 Information dissemination, counselling and assistance with setting out employment
search strategy, employment advice, re-motivation and placement, matching 
provision of skills with capacity, job clubs etc.
4052 Public sector schemes, "welfare to work" programmes, work-start /  new work
schemes, environmental task force, temporary work for voluntary sector, initial 
training /  job guarantee.
4053 Recruitment subsidies, labour cost and employment subsidies, job creation schemes,
benefittransfers, job creation allowances, work-trials (to gain experience), part-time 
worker's assistant/ job finder grants /  temporary support for short-time workers, 
support for unemployed to start enterprises.
4054 Policies to stimulate worker mobility
4055 Positive on private sector employment agencies
4056 Negative on private sector employment agencies, pro-job placement by public
agencies
Demand Side Measures
DOM AIN 5 -  Public Sector activity, Social employment' and em ploym ent taxes
5010 Public Sector and social employment
Overall statements on the need for public involvement and public expansion. Create jobs 
via public investment schemes and public sector employment to meet pressing social 
needs (long term benefits for society) e.g. to reconstruct inner cities, public services and 
utilities. Public sectors as 'a social safety valve' -  re-distributive function to create and 
preserve jobs. Public sector acts as the employer of last resort.
5011 Job creation schemes (public employment)
5012 Labour cost subsidies for work in public interest e.g. social services, culture,
environmental task force and other voluntary organisations
5013 Emphasis on helping regions, sectors and specific occupations; central/local
regeneration partnerships, local development boards
5014 Work Experience Schemes
5015 Mentioning of public expenditure on military (instead of Public sector)
5020 Employment Taxes
Specific reforms of tax system to boost employment i.e. reduction of tax on labour e.g. 
employers NI contribution 'holidays', tax incentives for employers to create jobs, low 
wage subsidies and payroll tax reductions, benefit transfers, (except 6014)
5021 Ecological tax reform - reduction in labour cost/taxes
DOM AIN 6 - Macro-economic policies for Economy /  Labour Market
6010 Economic Orthodoxy, Government Efficiency, pro-free market economy
Need for traditional economic orthodoxy, e.g. aiming at balanced budget, retrenchment in 
crisis, low taxation, thrift and savings; support for traditional economic institutions such 
as the Stock Market and banking system, support for strong currency internationally, pro­
monetarism, pro-competition
6011 Stable macro-economic framework for sustained economic growth enabling
investment in capacity and skills, only borrow to invest
6012 Use of stringent monetary based inflation targets; curb inflation; aiming at price
stability
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6013 Government attempt to control aggregate expenditure using monetary and fiscal
instruments, emphasis on more efficiency - rather than more public spending (excl. 
4030 social service)
6014 General reduction in taxes for employers and employees
6020 Keynesian Demand Management (counter cyclical policies), general statements on 
pro-public sector role, positive on public borrowing and spending, emphasis on pro-social 
market economy (renewal of model), economic expansion, tax increases to fund public 
investment /  general tax decreases to encourage spending.
6021 Government employment policies (e.g. spending on infrastructure)
6022 Government product demand policies (e.g. spending on construction)
6023 Other types of expanding the economy, proposed additional public spending, lower
overall taxation levels to stimulate economy, reflationary programmes, public 
purchasing.
6024 Anti-monetarism - Rejection of policies, which prioritise the fight against inflation
and accept a natural rate of unemployment, pro-exchange controls
Ideology and Institutions
DOMAIN 7 -  Ideology and Institutions of the Economy /Labour Market
Role of labour market institutions and state, use of their resources.
7010 State provisions specifically for small businesses, self-employed, new businesses, 
and other Economic Groups; favourable references to any economically - defined group 
not covered by 7040 or 7050, such as employers, middle-classes and professional groups in 
general.
7020 Equal opportunities, concerns of equal pay/opportunities for women, the disabled 
and ethnic minorities.
7030 Long-term unemployed and the old
7040 Corporatism (Positive)
Advocating the need to involve employers and trade union organisations in overall 
economic planning and direction through /tri-partite/ bodies. Positive on trade union role. 
Establishment (or strengthening) of corporatist frameworks, collective institutions and/ or 
social partnerships; emphasis on important role of (free) collective bargaining, emphasis 
on employers and employees consulting each other and co-operating, 'Bundnis fur Arbeit, 
Innovation & Gerechtigkeit'
7041 Policies to influence the balance of power between corporatist actors.
7042 Reforming of the wage bargaining system.
7043 Pro-stakeholding, employee share and fund holding.
7044 Emphasis on co-operating with industry, employers or business
7050 Corporatism (Negative)
As 7040, but negative
7060 Other general intended measures of institutional change
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Suggested institutional changes to improve functioning of economy and labour market 
situation, calling for general increase in the funding of (state) institutions
7061 Promotion of better finance and banking arrangement (anti-short termism)
7062 Reform in financial arrangements
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Appendix IV
Labour Market Policy Coding scheme for party political programmes/manifestos and
'major' (mid-term) statements
COLLAPSED CODING FRAME (CCF)
DOMAIN 1 External Relations
1010 European Community /  Union: Positive
Favourable mentioning of EC/EU initiatives in general; desirability of relevant country 
joining (or remaining as member); desirability of expanding EU and/or of increasing 
competencies and favourable of EU intervention, pro-European Union in general. 
Excluding EU level activity/planning of programmes to tackle unemployment (directly or 
as a co-ordinator; pro-Delors' White Paper on Competitiveness and Employment)
1020 European Community /  Union LMP initiatives: Positive
Increasing competencies and favourable of EU intervention in areas regarding EU level 
activity/planning of programmes to tackle unemployment (directly or as a co-ordinator; 
pro-Social Chapter/Charter, Delors' White Paper on Competitiveness and Employment, 
Employment Chapter)
1030 European Community /  Union and EU LMP initiatives: Negative
As 1010 and 1020, but negative.
1040 Protectionism (Positive)
Favourable mention of extension or maintenance of tariffs, to protect internal markets, or 
other domestic economic protectionism; pro-free trade.
1050 Protectionism (Negative)
As 1040, but negative.
DOMAIN 2 -  Party Policy Outlook and Labour Market Regulation
General Economic Statements /  Party Ideology
2010/2020/2021 Full Employment and commitment to reduce unemployment
Generally concerned with and making employment an issue, job creation targets
2030 Economic State Planning and Nationalisation: Positive
Advocating of nationalisation (government ownership and control, partial or complete, 
including government ownership of land), state planning of consultative or indicative 
nature, need for government to create national plan, need to plan imports and exports 
except labour markets (Domain 2), employment agreements, greater role for MSC, 
favouring statutory obligations (e.g. on training provision)
2050/2051/2052/2053/2054/2055 Pro-labour market regulation
General need for direct control of economy and the setting of a state framework in which 
the economy has to operate (minimum standards). In other words, state interventionism 
to exercise control over prices, wages, rents, etc. to encourage/force the creation of 
employment. This covers neither nationalisation nor indicative planning. Tendency 
towards advocating anti-deregulation policies. Policies to encourage work sharing,
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extension of legal protection for part-timers, job rotation, working time /  overtime 
reductions (e.g. introduction of 35 hour week), reducing retirement age, encouragement of 
early retirement; measures for the disabled and vocational rehabilitation; and pro­
minimum wage
2040/2041/2060/2061/2062/2063/2064 Anti-economic State Planning and nationalisation; 
pro-public private partnerships; Pro-deregulative labour market measures.
As 2030, but negative. Positive on privatisation and deregulation except labour markets, 
generally positive on voluntary /  partnership arrangements with private sector. Support 
for public/private partnerships, positive mentioning of joint investment /  co-operation 
among public and private sector.
As 2050/2051/2052/2053/2054/2055, but pro-deregulation. Arguing for a 
reduction/ against state interventionism as it may distort market efficiency and 
performance. Interventionism can damage 'natural' market balance and leads to less 
efficient markets. The belief that markets and voluntary codes are most sufficient and that 
markets can predominantly regulate themselves best. Pro-partnership with private sector. 
Tendency to advocate pro-deregulation policies (cutting red tape) and emphasis on 
greater overall labour market flexibility; policies focusing on the reduction of labour 
turnover costs; policies to enable greater flexibility of working time; new models of part- 
time employment, temporary working time reductions at a company level.
Supply Side Measures
DOMAIN 3 - Skills and Competitiveness
3010/3020/3030/3040 General statements of intent to improve provisions for training 
and education Training subsidies - skills development/Youth: Support of 
apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training and education/ Education 
Pro-expansion
Policies centring on human capital formation as part of a full blown competitiveness 
package and industrial strategy), i.e. improve provisions of education and training 
facilities. Aim to tackle skills shortage with the help of training.
Labour promotion and training companies for unemployed, long-term unemployed, 
contract Labour (Start), government training programmes, (re-)training schemes for 
adults, continuing training at work; including all training related measures specifically 
aimed at unemployed and disadvantaged youth (until 25).
3050 Education Anti-Expansion
As 3040, but negative
3060/3061/3062 Technology, industrial policy and competitiveness
Importance of policies supporting the modernisation of industrial administration and 
industry to improve to enhance competitiveness and open new markets. Importance of 
science and technological developments in industry; need for government sponsored 
R&D, need for overhaul of capital equipment, and methods of communications and 
transport; support for industrial restructuring, rebuilding industrial base, development of 
Nuclear Energy. Increase the attractiveness of location for business (domestic and foreign 
investments).
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Promoting green environmental sector innovations and businesses, stressing its future 
potential
Help and support with technology/innovations specifically for Small and Medium 
Enterprises
DOMAIN 4 - Benefit System and Labour Market Agencies
Reforming the unemployment benefit system to make more job friendly /  encourage job 
search.
4010 Social Justice /  Social Stability
Need for fair treatment of all people; for special protection for exploited; fair treatment in 
a tax system; need for equality of opportunity; need for fair distribution of resources and 
removal of class barriers; end of discrimination
4020 Social Services Expansion: Positive
Favourable mention of need to maintain or expand any basic service or welfare scheme; 
support for free basic social services such as public health, or housing as well as in-work 
child/family benefit, improvement of child care facilities, help for lone parents.
4030 Social Services Expansion: Negative
As 4020, but negative. Overall (social) benefit system to provide a cheaper, more efficient 
service - financial support for the unemployment reduced due to greater limitations and 
pre-conditions; crack down on fraud.
4040 Benefit conditioning
Benefit (pressure) conditioning, withdrawal (Carrot and stick) e.g. JSA, changes in 
unemployment compensation, employment zones.
4050/4051/405^/4053/4054/4056 Role of Labour Market Agencies (Arbeitsamt, Jobcentre) 
Statement of general intention to make agencies more effective and efficient.
Reforming the unemployment benefit system to make it more job friendly - (This excludes 
education, but includes experience and on the job training).
Information dissemination, counselling and assistance with setting out employment 
search strategy, employment advice, re-motivation and placement, matching provision of 
skills with capacity, job clubs etc.; public sector schemes, "welfare to work" programmes, 
work-start /  new work schemes, environmental task force, temporary work for voluntary 
sector, initial training /  job guarantee.
Recruitment subsidies, labour cost and employment subsidies, job creation schemes, 
benefit transfers, job creation allowances, work-trials (to gain experience), part-time 
worker's assistant/job finder grants /  temporary support for short-time workers, support 
for unemployed to start enterprises.
Policies to stimulate worker mobility; negative on private sector employment agencies, 
pro-job placement by public agencies.
4055 Positive on private sector employment agencies.
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Dem and Side Measures
DOM AIN 5 -  Public Sector activity, Social employment' and employment taxes 
5010/5011/501^5013/501^5015 Public Sector and social employment
Overall statements on the need for public involvement and public expansion. Create jobs 
via public investment schemes and public sector employment to meet pressing social 
needs (long term benefits for society) e.g. to reconstruct inner cities, public services and 
utilities. Public sectors as 'a social safety valve' -  re-distributive function to create and 
preserve jobs. Public sector acts as the employer of last resort. Job creation schemes (public 
employment); labour cost subsidies for work in public interest e.g. social services, culture, 
environmental task force and other voluntary organisations.
Emphasis on helping regions, sectors and specific occupations; central/ local regeneration 
partnerships, local development boards; Work Experience Schemes; mentioning of public 
expenditure on military.
5020/5021 Employment Taxes
Specific reforms of tax system to boost employment i.e. reduction of tax on labour e.g. 
employers NI contribution 'holidays', tax incentives for employers to create jobs, low 
wage subsidies and payroll tax reductions, benefit transfers, (except 6014)
DOM AIN 6 - Macro-economic policies for Economy /  Labour Market 
6020/6021/602^/6023/6024 Keynesian Demand Management
(Counter cyclical policies), general statements on pro-public sector role, positive on public 
borrowing and spending, emphasis on pro-social market economy (renewal of model), 
economic expansion, tax increases.
Pro-government employment policies (e.g. spending on infrastructure) and pro-public 
demand policies (e.g. spending on construction); Other types of expanding the economy, 
proposed additional public spending, lower overall taxation levels to stimulate economy, 
reflationary programmes, public purchasing. Anti-monetarism - Rejection of policies, 
which prioritise the fight against inflation and accept a natural rate of unemployment.
6010/6011/601^/6013/6014 Economic Orthodoxy, Government Efficiency, pro-free market 
economy
Need for traditional economic orthodoxy, e.g. aiming at balanced budget, retrenchment in 
crisis, low taxation, thrift and savings; support for traditional economic institutions such 
as the Stock Market and banking system, support for strong currency internationally, pro­
monetarism, pro-competition.
Stable macro-economic framework for sustained economic growth enabling investment in 
capacity and skills, only borrow to invest. Use of stringent monetary based inflation 
targets; curb inflation; aiming at price stability. Government attempt to control aggregate 
expenditure using monetary and fiscal instruments, emphasis on more efficiency - rather 




DOMAIN 7 -  Institutions of the Economy /  Labour Market
Role of labour market institutions and state, use of their resources. 
7040/7041/704^7043/7044 Corporatism (Positive)
Advocating the need to involve employers and trade union organisations in overall 
economic planning and direction through' tri-parti te' bodies. Positive on trade union role. 
Establishment (or strengthening) of corporatist frameworks, collective institutions and/or 
social partnerships; emphasis on important role of (free) collective bargaining, emphasis 
on employers and employees consulting each other and co-operating, 'Biindnis fur Arbeit, 
Innovation & Gerechtigkeit' Policies to influence the balance of power between corporatist 
actors. Reforming of the wage bargaining system. Pro-stakeholding, employee share and 
fund holding.
7050 Corporatism (Negative)
As 7040, but negative 
7010/7020/7030 Other Economic Groups
Favourable references to any economically - defined group not covered by 7040 or 7050 
such as employers, middle-classes and professional groups in general.
State provisions specifically for small businesses, self-employed, new businesses. 
Concerns of equal pay/opportunities for women, the disabled and ethnic minorities. 
Long-term unemployed and the old.
7060/7061/7062 Other general intended measures of institutional change
Suggested institutional changes to improve functioning of economy and labour market 
situation, calling for general increase in the funding of (state) institutions. Promotion of 




Party Election Programmes /  Manifestos and 'major' mid-term statements chosen for 
the analysis with Labour Market Policy Coding scheme
LABOUR PARTY - Election programmes and manifestos_________________________
New Labour: Because Britain deserves better (1997)
It's time to get Britain working again (1992)
Britain w ill w in (1987)
The New Hope for Britain - Think positive, think Labour (1983)
The Labour way is the better way (1979)
'Major' mid-term statements on LMPs and employment__________________________
A new economic future for Britain - Economic and employment opportunities for all 
(1995) (Conference 95, Labour Party - follow up to Rebuilding the Economy 1993 interim 
document)
Labour's economic approach (Statement 1993)
Looking to the future - A dynamic economy, a decent society, strong in Europe (1990)
(Labour Party Policy Document)
'Meet the challenge - Make the change' - A new agenda for Britain (1989)
(Final report of Labour's Policy Review for the 1990s)
New Jobs for Britain - Programme for national renewal (1987)
A New Partnership, A New Britain (1985)
(TUC - Labour Party Liaison Committee - Part of Labour's Jobs and Industry Campaign) 
The Socialist Alternative (1981)
(Statement by the National Executive Committee to the Conference)
SOZIALDEMOKRATISCHE PARTEIPEUTSCHLANDS - General election 
programmes and manifestos
Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit - SPD-Programm fur die Bundestagswahl (1998)
Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD - Reformen fur Deutschland (1994)
Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD 1990 -1994 - Der Neue Weg - okologisch, sozial, 
wirtschaftlich stark (1990)
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Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD 1987-1990 (1987)
Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD 1983-1987 (1983) 
Sicherheit fur Deutschland - Wahlprogramm 1980 (1980)
'Major' mid-term statements on ALMP and employment
Arbeitsplatze fur Deutschland - Den Aufbau in Ost-Deutschland fortsetzen, den 
deutschen Einigungsprozess weiter fuhren (1995)
(Vorstand der SPD, 14-17 November 1995, Parteitag)
Parteivorstand - SPD Sofortprogramm (1992)
(Protokoll vom Aufierordentlichen Parteitag Bonn, 16-17 November 1992)
Unser Konzept: Humaner Fortschritt, okologische Emeuerung und Vollbeschaftigung 
(1988)
(Wirtschafts- und Beschaftigungspolitik, Antrag W1 - Parteivorstand)
Niirnberger Aktionsprogramm: Massenarbeitslosigkeit uberwinden - Die Wirtschaft 
okologisch und sozial em euem  (1986)
(Protokoll vom Parteitag der SPD in Niimberg 1986 /  Politik, Informationsdienst der SPD, 
Sept. 1986)
Arbeit fur alle - Gemeinsam die Zukunft gestalten (1984)
(Antrag 1 (Parteivorstand), Parteitag Essen, Protokoll, 17 Mai 1984)
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Appendix VI
Labour Market policy frame count -  data sheets
Labour Market Policy Coding Frame - Party I code I (year) programme pledge count
1979 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998
L abour-1010 3 1 9 4 16
S P D -1 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 2 7 3 8 7 11
L abour-1020 0 2 2 2 4 5 5 4
S P D -1 0 2 0 1 0 1 3 2 3 3 5 10
L abour-1030 11 1 9 1 5 1 3
S P D -1 0 3 0 0 1
L abour-1040 5 2 4 1
S P D -1 0 4 0 0
L abour-1050 0
S P D -1 0 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
L abour-2010 5 3 1 9 2
S P D -2 0 1 0 3 0 1 1 1 1
L abour-2020 0 3 9 2 5 3 3 5 3
S P D -2 0 2 0 1 1 2 3 6 2 4 3 3 14
L abour-2021 1
S P D -2021 0
L abour-2030 9 13 31 7 1 12 1 1 2 1
S P D -2 0 3 0 2 2 6 2 2 2 3 2
L abour-2040 0 2 2 1 3 4
S P D -2 0 4 0 0 1 2 1
L abour-2041 0 1 1 3
S P D -2041 0
L abour-2050 1 2 1 4 3 10 4 4
S P D -2 0 5 0 5 2 2 6 3 6 5 1 2 1 8
Labour-2051 0 1 3 1 8 1 2 1 1
S P D -2051 0 3 1 1 2 2
L abour-2052 2 2 4
S P D -2 0 5 2 3 0 4 8 3 5 5 2 1
L abour-2053 1 1 1 1 1 1
S P D -2 0 5 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
L abour-2054 0
S P D -2 0 5 4 0
L abour-2055 0 1 1 5 1 1 2 6
S P D -2 0 5 5 0
L abour-2060 0 5
S P D -2 0 6 0 3 0 1 2 2 5
Labour-2061 0
S P D -2061 0 1
L abour-2062 0 1
S P D -2 0 6 2 2 0 1 1 1 3 6
L abour-2063 0
S P D -2 0 6 3 0 2
L abour-2064 0
S P D -2 0 6 4 0
L abour-3010 4 5 6 2 6 14 12 2 5 7
S P D -3 0 1 0 3 1 2 8 8 5 4 18
L abour-3020 0 6 1 1 2 14 5 5 5 3
S P D -3 0 2 0 1 1 2 3 1 4 2 1
L abour-3030 3 6 1 1 3 2 1 5 8
S P D -3 0 3 0 2 3 1 1 2 4 2 4 5
Labour-3040 1 8 1 4 3 9
S P D -3 0 4 0 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
Labour-3050 0
S P D -3 0 5 0 0
Labour-3060 5 6 8 8 9 21 12 5 7 12
S P D -3 0 6 0 4 4 7 4 6 9 6 8 9 14 20
L abour-3061 0 1 5
S P D -3061 2 0 2 7 5 2 3 5 1 6 5
Labour-3062 0 1 1
S P D -3 0 6 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 3
365
L abour-4010  9  4  2  3 1 1 2  3  5
S P D -4 0 1 0  4  3 4  6 8 2  5 5  5 3  14
L abour-4020  1 5 8 1 5 1 3  1 4
S P D -4 0 2 0  2 1 1 4 5 1 5  5  3 3
L abour-4030  0 1 5
S P D -4 0 3 0  0
L abour-4040  0 2
S P D -4 0 4 0  0 3
L abour-4050  0 1 1 14 1 2 8 4
S P D -4 0 5 0  1 2  4 1 1 3 2  3  2 3 1
Labour-4051 0 1 2  1
S P D -4051  0 1 2
L abour-4052  1 1 2  1 2  3 1 4  10
S P D -4 0 5 2  1 3 1 1 5
L abour-4053  3 1 5 1 2  2
S P D -4 0 5 3  1 2 2 4 1 2  5
L abour-4054  0
S P D -4 0 5 4  0
L abour-4055  0
S P D -4 0 5 5  0 2
L abour-4056  0 2
S P D -4 0 5 6  0
L abour-5010  1 1 1 2 4 3  3  1 1
S P D -5 0 1 0  1 1 1 3 2 4 4  2  4 1 1
Labour-5011 0
S P D -5011 0  1 1  1 1 1
L abour-5012  0 1 1
S P D -5 0 1 2  0 1 2 2
L abour-5013  3 1 5  4 11 2  3  2  2
S P D -5 0 1 3  1 1 1 6  2 1 1 1 1 1 2
Labour-5014  0
S P D -5014  0
L abour-5015  0
S P D -5 0 1 5  0
Labour-5020  1 1 1 1 1 1 5
S P D -5 0 2 0  1 1 1 1 2  4  9
L abour-5021 0
S PD -5021 0 1 1 4  4  1
Labour-6010  2  6  1 2  7  7
S P D -6 0 1 0  5  0 4 10 5  10 11 14 14
L abour-6011 0 1 1 1 5
S P D -6 0 1 1 0 1
L abour-6012  6 1 1 1 1 1 2  4
S P D -6 0 1 2 2  0
L abour-6013  0 1 1 2
S P D -6 0 1 3  0 2
L abour-6014 0
S P D -6 0 1 4  0 2 2  1 1 13
Labour-6020  2 12 2 2  6  1 1 3  2 1
S P D -6 0 2 0  2  3 6  10 6 6  6 4  1 4  8
L abour-6021 0  1 5 2 1 1 1 3
S PD -6021 0 2 1 3 9  4  1 1
Labour-6022  2 4 8 1 3 2  1 1 1
S P D -6 0 2 2  1 0 2 8 4  2  1
Labour-6023  0  1
S P D -6 0 2 3  0 1 2
L abour-6024 2 5 2  1 2  1
S P D -6024  0
L abour-7010 0 1 2  3  2  1 2
S P D -7 0 1 0  2  3 2  2 1 1 2  1 2  4
Labour-7020  0 5  21 2 5 11 7 3  4
S P D -7 0 2 0  4  3 3 7 3  4 4  8 4  2
Labour-7030  1 1 1 1 1
S P D - 7030  0 1 2
L abour-7040 16 7 14 12 5 31 5 1 1 3
S P D -7 0 4 0  2  4 8  12 8 7  6 2  4 3  5
Labour-7041 1 2  2 5 1
S PD -7041 1 0 1 2  2 2  1 1
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L abour-7042 1
S P D -7 0 4 2 0 1
L abour-7043 0 2 2 2
S P D -7 0 4 3 1 2  2 I 1 1
L abour-7044 0 4
S P D -7 0 4 4 0
L abour- 7 0 5 0 0 1
S P D -7 0 5 0 0
L abour-7060 1 2 1 2 1
S P D -7 0 6 0 0 1
L abour-7061 1 1 1 1 5 2 4 6 2
S P D -7061 0
L abour-7062 0 3  1 2 2
S P D -7 0 6 2 0 1 1
Full labour market policy frame. Party manifesto pledge counts in percentage points.
1979 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998
L abour-1010 2 ,8 6 0,00 0,00 0,00 1.37 4.11 4 ,1 7 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 9 ,7 0
S P D -1 0 1 0 0,00 0,00 3,23 3,54 6,86 2,20 6,25 3 ,4 9 8 ,79 5 ,9 3 4 ,8 7
L abour-1020 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,08 2,74 0,91 4 ,1 7 8 ,9 3 4 .7 2 2 ,4 2
S P D -1 0 2 0 1,79 0,00 1.61 2,65 1,96 3,30 0,00 0 ,0 0 3,30 4 ,2 4 4 ,4 2
L abour-1030 10 ,48 1,00 4 ,4 8 0,00 1,37 2,28 1,04 0,00 0 ,0 0 1,82
S P D -1 0 3 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,10 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0
L abour-1040 4 ,7 6 2,00 1,99 1,54 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0
S P D -1 0 4 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
L ab o u r-1050 0,00 0 ,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
S P D -1 0 5 0 0,00 2,27 1,61 0,88 0,98 1,10 0,00 1,16 1.10 0 ,0 0 0 ,4 4
L abour-2010 4 ,7 6 3,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 4,11 0,00 0 ,00 1,89 0 ,0 0
S P D -2 0 1 0 5 ,3 6 0,00 0,00 0,88 0,98 1,10 0,00 1.16 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
L abour-2020 0 ,0 0 3,00 4 ,4 8 3,08 6,85 0,00 3,13 5,36 4 ,7 2 1,82
S P D -2 0 2 0 1,79 2,27 3,23 2,65 5,88 2,20 3,57 0 ,0 0 3,30 2 ,5 4 6 ,1 9
Labour-2021 0 ,9 5 0,00 0,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
S P D -2021 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
L abour-2030 8,57 13,00 15,42 10,77 1,37 5,48 1,04 1,79 1,89 0,61
S P D -2 0 3 0 0 ,0 0 4 ,5 5 3,23 5,31 1,96 2,20 1.79 3 ,4 9 0 ,0 0 1,69 0 ,0 0
Labour-2040 0 ,0 0 2,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,91 0 ,0 0 1,79 2 ,8 3 2 ,4 2
S P D -2 0 4 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1.16 2,20 0 ,8 5 0 ,0 0
Labour-2041 0,00 0 ,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1.79 0 ,9 4 1,82
S P D -2041 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
Labour-2050 0 ,9 5 2,00 0,50 6,15 4,11 4,57 0 ,0 0 0,00 3,77 2,42
S P D -2 0 5 0 8,93 4 ,5 5 3,23 5,31 2,94 6,59 4,4 6 1,16 2,20 0 ,8 5 3 ,5 4
Labour-2051 0 ,0 0 1,00 1,49 0,00 1,37 3,65 1,04 3,57 0 ,9 4 0,61
S P D -2051 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,30 0,89 0 ,0 0 1,10 1,69 0 ,8 8
L abour-2052 1,90 2,00 1,99 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00
S P D -2 0 5 2 5 ,3 6 0,00 6,45 5,31 2,94 5,49 4,46 0,00 0,00 1,69 0 ,4 4
L abour-2053 0 ,9 5 1,00 0,50 0,00 1.37 0,46 1,04 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00
S P D -2 0 5 3 1,79 4 ,5 5 1,61 1,77 0,00 1,10 0,89 0 ,0 0 1,10 0 ,8 5 0 ,4 4
Labour-2054 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00
S P D -2 0 5 4 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0
L abour-2055 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,5 0 0,00 1.37 2,28 1,04 1.79 1,89 3,64
S P D -2 0 5 5 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
L abour-2060 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 3,03
S P D -2 0 6 0 5 ,3 6 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,98 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 2,20 1,69 2,21
L abour-2061 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00
S P D -2061 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,4 4
L abour-2062 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,5 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
S P D -2 0 6 2 3 ,5 7 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,98 1.10 0,00 0 ,0 0 1,10 2,54 2 ,6 5
L abour-2063 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,0 0
S P D -2 0 6 3 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,8 8
Labour-2064 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
S P D -2 0 6 4 0,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
L abour-3010 3,81 5,00 2,99 3,08 8,22 6,39 12,50 3,57 4 ,7 2 4,2 4
S P D -3 0 1 0 0 ,0 0 6,82 1,61 1.77 0,00 8,79 7.14 5,81 0 ,0 0 3,39 7 ,9 6
Labour-3020 0,00 6,00 0,50 1,54 2.74 6,39 5,21 8,93 4 ,7 2 1,82
S P D -3 0 2 0 1,79 2,27 3,23 2,65 0,98 0,00 3,57 0 ,0 0 2 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,4 4
L abour-3030 2 ,8 6 0 ,0 0 2,99 1,54 1,37 1,37 2 ,0 8 1.79 4 ,7 2 4 ,8 5
S P D -3 0 3 0 3,57 6 ,8 2 1,61 0,88 1,96 0,00 0,00 4 ,6 5 2,20 3 ,3 9 2,21
L abour-3040 0 ,9 5 0,00 3,98 0,00 0,00 0,46 4 ,1 7 0,00 2 ,8 3 5,45
S P D -3 0 4 0 1.79 2,27 1.61 0,00 1,96 0,00 0,89 2 ,3 3 1.10 1,69 1,33
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L abour-3050 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
S P D -3 0 5 0 0 ,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
L abour-3060 4 ,7 6 6,00 3,98 12,31 12,33 9,59 12,50 8,93 6 ,6 0 7 ,2 7
S P D -3 0 6 0 7 ,14 9,09 11,29 3,54 5,88 9,89 5 ,3 6 9 ,3 0 9,89 11,86 8 ,8 5
Labour-3061 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,94 3 ,0 3
S P D -3061 3 ,57 0,00 3,23 6,19 4,90 2,20 2,68 5,81 1,10 5 ,08 2,21
L abour-3062 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 1,79 0 ,94 0 ,0 0
S P D -3 0 6 2 1,79 0,00 0,00 0,88 0,98 0,00 0,89 0 ,0 0 1,10 1,69 1,33
L abour-4010 8,57 4,00 1,00 4 ,62 1,37 0,46 2 ,0 8 0,00 2 ,8 3 3 ,0 3
S P D -4 0 1 0 7,14 6 ,8 2 6,45 5,31 7,84 2,20 4 ,4 6 5,81 5,49 2,54 6,19
L abour-4020 0 ,9 5 5,00 3 ,9 8 1,54 6,85 0,46 3 ,1 3 1,79 0,00 2 ,4 2
S P D -4 0 2 0 3,57 2,27 1,61 3,54 4,90 1.10 4 ,4 6 5,81 0 ,0 0 2 ,54 1,33
L abour-4030 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,37 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 3 ,0 3
S P D -4 0 3 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00
L abour-4040 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,00 1.21
S P D -4 0 4 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 1,33
L abour-4050 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,54 0,00 6,39 1,04 3,57 7 ,5 5 2 ,4 2
S P D -4 0 5 0 1.79 4 ,5 5 6,45 0,88 0,98 3,30 1.79 3 ,4 9 2,20 2,54 0,44
L abour-4051 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,46 0 ,0 0 0,00 1,89 0,61
S P D -4051 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1.16 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,8 8
L abour-4052 0 ,9 5 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,37 0,91 3 ,1 3 1,79 3,77 6 ,0 6
S P D -4 0 5 2 0,00 2,27 0,00 2,65 0,00 1,10 0,89 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 2,21
L abour-4053 2 ,8 6 1,00 2,49 0,00 0,00 0,46 0 ,0 0 0,00 1,89 1.21
S P D -4 0 5 3 0 ,0 0 2,27 3,23 1.77 0,00 4,40 0,00 0 ,0 0 1.10 1,69 2,21
Labour-4054 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0.00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,00 0,00
S P D -4 0 5 4 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00
L abour-4055 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
S P D -4 0 5 5 0 ,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,8 8
L abour-4056 0,00 0 ,0 0 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
S P D -4 0 5 6 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00
Labour- 5 010 0 ,9 5 1,00 0,50 3,08 5,48 1,37 3 ,1 3 0,00 0,94 0,61
S P D -5 0 1 0 1,79 2,27 1,61 2,65 1,96 4,40 3,57 2 ,3 3 4 ,4 0 0 ,8 5 0,44
L a b o u r-5 0 1 1 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,00 0 ,0 0
S P D -5 0 1 1 0 ,0 0 0,00 1,61 0,88 0,00 0,00 0,00 1.16 0,00 0 ,8 5 0,44
L abour-5012 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,5 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,94 0 ,0 0
S P D -5 0 1 2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 1,10 1,69 0,88
Labour-5013 2 ,8 6 1,00 2,49 6 ,1 5 0,00 5,02 2 ,0 8 5,36 1,89 1,21
S P D -5 0 1 3 1,79 2,27 1,61 5,31 1,96 1,10 0 ,8 9 1,16 1,10 0 ,8 5 0,88
L abour-5014 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
S P D -5 0 1 4 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00
Labour-5015 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,00 0,00
S P D -5 0 1 5 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0
L abour-5020 0 ,9 5 0,00 0,50 0,00 1,37 0,00 1,04 1,79 0,94 3 ,0 3
S P D -5 0 2 0 0,0 0 2,27 0,00 0,00 0,98 0,00 0,89 1,16 2,20 3,39 3,98
Labour-5021 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
S P D -5021 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,10 0,89 0 ,0 0 4 ,4 0 3,39 0 ,4 4
Labour-6010 1,90 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,74 1,04 3,57 6,60 4 ,2 4
S P D -6 0 1 0 8,93 0,00 0,00 3,54 9,80 0,00 4 ,4 6 11,63 12,09 11,86 6 ,1 9
Labour-6011 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,37 0,00 1,04 0,00 0,94 3 ,0 3
S P D -6 0 1 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,44
L abour-6012 5,71 1,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,46 1,04 1,79 1,89 2 ,4 2
S P D -6 0 1 2 3,57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,0 0 0,00 0,0 0 0,00
Labour-6013 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 1,37 0,00 1,04 0 ,0 0 0,0 0 1,21
S P D -6 0 1 3 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 1,77 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,0 0 0,00
L abour-6014 0 ,0 0 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,0 0 0,00
S P D -6014 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,20 0,00 2,3 3 1,10 0 ,8 5 5 ,7 5
L abour-6020 1,90 12,00 10,95 9,23 1,37 0,46 3,1 3 3,57 0,94 0,00
S P D -6 0 2 0 3,57 6 ,8 2 9,68 8,85 5,88 6,59 5,36 4 ,6 5 1,10 3,39 3,54
Labour-6021 0 ,0 0 1,00 2,49 0,00 2,74 0,46 1,04 1,79 2 ,8 3 0 ,0 0
SPD -6021 0,0 0 0,00 3,2 3 0,88 0,00 3,30 8,04 4 ,6 5 1,10 0 ,8 5 0 ,0 0
L abour-6022 1,90 4 ,0 0 3,9 8 1,54 4.11 0,00 2 ,0 8 1,79 0,94 0,61
S P D -6 0 2 2 1,79 0,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,20 7,14 4 ,6 5 2,20 0 ,8 5 0 ,0 0
Labour-6023 0,00 0 ,0 0 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0
S P D -6 0 2 3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,98 0,00 1.79 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00
L abour-6024 1,90 5,00 1,00 1,54 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 3,57 0,94 0 ,0 0
S P D -6024 0 ,0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0,0 0 0,00 0,00
Labour-7010 0,0 0 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,91 3 ,1 3 3,57 0,94 1,21
SP D -7 0 1 0 0 ,0 0 4 ,5 5 4,84 1,77 1,96 1,10 0 ,8 9 2 ,3 3 1,10 1,69 1,77
L abour-7020 0 ,0 0 5,00 10,45 3,08 6,85 5,02 7 ,2 9 5,3 6 3.77 0,00
SP D -7 0 2 0 7 ,1 4 6,82 0,00 2,65 6,86 3,30 3,57 4 ,6 5 8,79 3,39 0 ,8 8
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Labour-7030 0,95 0,00 0,50 0,00 1.37 0,00 1,04 0,00 0,00 0,61
S PD -7030 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,85 0,88
Labour-7040 15,24 7,00 6,97 18,46 6,85 14,16 5,21 1,79 0,94 1,82
SPD -7040 3,57 9,09 12,90 10,62 7,84 7,69 5,36 2,33 4,40 2,54 2,21
Labour-7041 0,95 2,00 1,00 0,00 6,85 0,46 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
SPD -7041 1,79 0,00 0,00 0,88 1,96 2,20 1,79 0,00 1,10 0,00 0,44
Labour-7042 0,95 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
SPD -7042 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,85 0,44
Labour-7043 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,91 2,08 0,00 0,00 1,21
SPD -7043 0,00 2,27 0,00 1,77 1,96 1,10 0,89 1.16 0,00 0,00 2,21
Labour-7044 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,83 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
SPD -7044 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Labour-7050 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,61
SPD -7050 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,44
Labour-7060 0,95 0,00 1,00 1,54 0,00 0,91 0,00 1,79 0,00 0,00
SPD -7060 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,98 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,44
Labour-7061 0,95 1,00 0,50 0,00 1.37 2,28 2,08 7,14 5,66 1.21
SPD -7061 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Labour-7060 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,62 1.37 0,91 0,00 0,00 1,89 0,00
SPD -7060 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,10 0,85 0,00
Collapsed labour market policy codinq frame. Pledqe count in percentaae terms.
1979 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998
Labour-1010 2,86 0,00 0,00 0,00 1.37 4,11 4.17 0,00 0,00 9,70
SPD -1010 0,00 0,00 3,23 3,54 6,86 2,20 6,25 3,49 8,79 5,93 4,87
Labour-1020 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,08 2,74 0,91 4.17 8,93 4.72 2,42
SPD -1020 1.79 0,00 1,61 2,65 1,96 3,30 0,00 0,00 3,30 4,24 4,42
Labour-1030 10,48 1,00 4,48 0,00 1,37 2,28 1,04 0,00 0,00 1,82
SPD -1030 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Labour-1040 4,76 2,00 1,99 1,54 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
S PD -1040 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Labour-1050 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
S PD -1050 0,00 2,27 1,61 0,88 0,98 1,10 0,00 1,16 1,10 0,00 0,44
Labour-2010/ 5,71 6,00 4,98 3,08 6,85 4,11 3,13 5,36 6,60 1,82
S P D -2010/20/21 7,14 2,27 3,23 3,53 6,86 3,30 3,57 1,16 3,30 2,54 6,19
Labour-2050/ 3,81 6,00 4,98 6,15 8,22 10,96 3,13 5,36 6,60 6,67
S PD -2050/51/52/53/5 16,07 9,09 11,29 12,39 5,88 16,48 10,71 1,16 4,40 5,08 5,31
Labour-2040/ 0,00 2,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,91 0,00 3,57 3,77 7,27
S PD -2040/41/60/61/6 8,93 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,96 1,10 0,00 1,16 5,49 5,08 6,19
Labour-3010/ 7,62 11,00 10,45 6,15 12,33 14,61 23,96 14,29 14,15 10,91
SPD -3010/20/30/40 7,14 18,18 8,06 5,31 4,90 8,79 11,61 12,79 5,49 8,47 11,95
Labour-3050 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
SPD -3050 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Labour-3060/ 4,76 6,00 3,98 12,31 12,33 9,59 12,50 10,71 8,49 10,30
S PD -3060/61/62 12,50 9,09 14,52 10,62 11,76 12,09 8,93 15,12 12,09 18,64 12,39
Labour-4010 8,57 4,00 1,00 4,62 1,37 0,46 2,08 0,00 2,83 3,03
SPD -4010 7,14 6,82 6,45 5,31 7,84 2,20 4,46 5,81 5,49 2.54 6,19
Labour-4020 0,95 5,00 3,98 1,54 6,85 0,46 3,13 1,79 0,00 2,42
SPD -4020 3,57 2,27 1,61 3,54 4,90 1,10 4,46 5,81 0,00 2,54 1,33
Labour-4030 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,37 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,03
SPD -4030 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Labour-4040 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,21
SPD -4040 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,33
Labour-4050/ 3,81 3,00 4,48 1,54 1,37 8,22 4,17 5,36 15,09 10,30
SPD -4050/51/52/53/5 1,79 9,09 9,68 5,31 0,98 8,79 2,68 4,65 3,30 4,24 5,75
Labour-4055 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
SPD -4055 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,88
Labour-5010/ 3,81 2,00 3,48 9,23 5,48 6,39 5,21 5,36 3,77 1,82
S P D -5010/11/12/13/1 3,57 4,55 4,84 8,85 3,92 5,49 4,46 4,65 6,59 4,24 2,65
Labour-5020/ 0,95 0,00 0,50 0,00 1,37 0,00 1,04 1,79 0,94 3,03
SPD -5020/21 0,00 2,27 0,00 0,00 0,98 1,10 1,79 1,16 6,59 6,78 4,42
Labour-6020/ 5,71 22,00 18,91 12,31 8,22 0,91 6,25 10,71 5,66 0,61
S  P D-6020/21Z22/23/2 5,36 6,82 12,90 9,73 6,86 12,09 22,32 13,95 4,40 5,08 3,54
Labour-6010/ 7,62 1,00 0,50 0,00 2.74 3,20 4.17 5,36 9,43 10,91
S PD -6010/11/12/13/1 12,50 0,00 0,00 5,31 9,80 2,20 4,46 13,95 13,19 12,71 12,39
Labour-7040/ 17,14 9,00 7,96 18,46 13,70 17,35 7,29 1.79 0,94 3,03
SPD -7040/41/42/43/4 5,36 11,36 12,90 13,27 11,76 10,99 8,04 3,49 5,49 3,39 5,31
Labour-7050 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,61
SPD -7050 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,44
Labour-7010/ 0,95 6,00 10,95 3,08 8,22 5,94 11,46 8,93 4,72 1,82
S PD -7010/20/30 7,14 11,36 4,84 4,42 8,82 4,40 4,46 6,98 9,89 5,93 3,54
Labour-7060/ 1,90 1,00 1,49 6,15 2,74 4,11 2,08 8,93 7,55 1.21
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